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Frontmatter -- PREFACE -- CONTENTS -- INTRODUCTION -- I. THE EARLY SOCIALIST MOVEMENT -- II. THE EARLY LABOR MOVEMENT -- III. THE INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT AND THE WARS -- IV. THE RADOMIR REBELLION -- V. STAMBOLISKI AND THE COMMUNISTS -- VI. THE JUNE COUP -- VII. THE SEPTEMBER INSURRECTION -- VIII. DEFECTORS AND ALLIES -- IX. ALLIES AND DECOYS -- X. SOCIALISM AND BALKAN FEDERATION -- XI. COMMUNISM AND BALKAN FEDERATION -- XII. UNDERGROUND DECADE -- XIII. PURGE -- CONCLUSION -- APPENDIX: LABOR LEGISLATION AND LABOR ORGANIZATION IN BULGARIA BEFORE THE FIRST WORLD WAR -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX

IN recent years a good deal of attention has been focused on the Vlasov movement as an outstanding example of "Soviet opposition to Stalin" and as a wartime opportunity (largely missed by Germany) to utilize defectors and prisoners for military as well as political propaganda purposes. One important facet of the Vlasov problem has eluded systematic investigation: the reaction of the Soviet authorities to the movement. The themes employed in their campaign to reduce the political force of the Vlasov challenge provide some insight into their political behavior under the stress of indigenous opposition.

Despite the dramatic shift away from the Democratic (Dem) Party by large segments of the Ur Wc in the presidential election of 1952, a study of election behavior in Philadelphia yields substantial evidence to indicate that the interest group basis of pol'al behavior was not destroyed. A comparison of motivation within a group of Republican (Rep) voters disclosed 6 decisive factors, the influence of which was differently related to occup'al strata. Pro-party factors were cited frequently by voters in the big business stratum, less frequently in the middle (professional, small business & white-collar) stratum, & infrequently in the labor stratum. Non-party factors, such as the qualities of Mr. Eisenhower & aissatisfaction with the Korean War, were repeatedly mentioned by semi-skilled & skilled workers, less often by middle occup'al people, & only seldom by big-business men. Moreover, the `defectors' in the lower & middle occup'al groups (those who voted Dem in 1948) as compared with the 'regular' Rep voters laid even more stress on the non-party factors influencing their voting behavior, claimed less allegiance to business in answering a direct question on the subject, & were less business-oriented in replying to 6 partisan statements on domestic politico-econ issues. These facts suggest that the interest group basis of pol'al behavior was not destroyed by the defections to the Rep's, & that in deciding how to vote in national elections, business-labor loyalties congruent with one's objective occup are suppressed when the stimulus of any non-party, non-econ factor is high. IPSA.

Evidence based on results of intensive interviews with 300 refugees demonstrate that under certain circumstances, refugee interviews are projectable. Purpose of study was to obtain data on effects in Soviet satellites of international communication issuing from the West, and opinions of resident refugees and pop on world political problems. It is frequently stated that, because refugees are self-selected they will be biased. Differences between refugees and non-refugees must be 'opinion linked' in some way. Contention of non-projectability holds if considerable % of the pop of satellite nations were pro-communist or neutral. However, interview data demonstrate that vast majority of current defectors are not political refugees, but defected because of poor living conditions. Pop remaining is equally dissatisfied and that which differentiates refugees from non-refugees is specific personal circumstances which precipitate flight. Listed are 9 bases for defection. Refugees who escaped for political reasons did so in earlier phase of communist rule (1945-48). 4 factors differentiate refugees from people left behind: (1) residence in border areas facilitating escape; (2) age-flight is dangerous and arduous, favoring young; (3) absence of family and property obligations; and (4) exceptional opportunities for escape. Since samples of current refugees are unrepresentative of home-pop in terms of SES, occupation, education, residence, we can't discover from them % of pop who listen to Western news. But for broader opinions and attitudes about their regimes and images of the West, results are projectable to larger pop segments. This is because the refugees and the people they come from are so alike with respect to the situations which create such images. R. S. Halpern.

The report on a res project into the ways in which interaction synthesizes individuals into soc units. The method used was the 2-person, 2-choice Prisoner's Dilemma game, in which the players can chose a cooperative or a defection response. Cooperative responses by both players are rewarding to both; defective responses deterimental to them. But if one player defects & another cooperates, the defector is more highly rewarded, to the detriment of the cooperator. Pairs of defectors & cooperators are gradually established; a new form of the game permits a subtler grading on a 21 by 21 matrix into Hawks, Doves & Mugwumps. In this experiment 64 pairs of M Coll S's participated, after an exp'al session & completion of J's. The 2 members of the pair were isolated from each other & manipulated 2-faced poker chips on a playing board divided into The game was played in 2 exp'al settings-abstract & simulated (as arms race)-with each half of the players playing in one setting only. There were short & long games-all S's played 40 short & 15 long ones. The experiment produced 26 pairs of Doves, 17 of Hawks & 21 of Mugwumps. 5 personality variables were used to determine formative factors of groups-self-acceptance, monetary risk preference, tolerance for ambiguity, internat'lism & soc risk preference. Individual personality was proved to be a poor predictor of game behavior. Nor was the diff in exp'al settings of much help. But early behavior in play, as measured by cooperativeness, cooperative gesture & discrepant outcome, indicates that terminal pairing is a 2-party affair & a fair indicator of terminal behavior. The Hawks hardly ever tried to cooperate, the Doves experimented with cooperation from the start, the Mugwamps showed no definite pattern. 9 Tables & a Bibliog. I. Langnas.