Choice of Partners in Multiple Two-Person Prisoner's Dilemma Games: An Experimental Study
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 45, Heft 6, S. 770-793
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
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In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 45, Heft 6, S. 770-793
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
In: Intelligence and national security, Band 13, Heft 2, S. 159-170
ISSN: 0268-4527
In: Peace and conflict: journal of peace psychology ; the journal of the Society for the Study of Peace, Conflict, and Violence, Peace Psychology Division of the American Psychological Association, Band 9, Heft 2, S. 159-170
ISSN: 1078-1919
Examines changes in conscious and nonconscious prejudicial attitudes towards North Korea resulting from June 13, 2000 summit between the leaders of North and South Korea, seen as an initial step in possible unification; data from surveys of college students in 1998, 2000, and 2002. Follow-up to the article "Psychosocial aspects of Korean reunification: explicit and implicit national attitudes and identity of South Koreans and North Korean defectors," by the author and Hye-Jung Oh, printed in vol. 7, no. 3, 2001 of Peace and Conflict, and indexed in PAIS International, 2001.
In: An East Gate Book
Introduction: toward the elusive goal of reconciliation and reunification. Snyder, Scott: The end of history, the rise of ideology, and the pursuit of inter-Korean reconciliation. Lee Doowon: The economic outlook for reconciliation and reunification. Hassig, Ralph C. ; Oh Kongdan: The new North Korea. Kim, Samuel S.: China, Japan, and Russia in inter-Korean relations. Olsen, Edward A.: U.S. policy toward the inter-Korean dialogue. Dettke, Dieter: The mellowing of North Korean power. Lessons of reconciliation and unification for Korea from Germany. koh, Kelly ; Baek, Glenn: North Korean defectors. A window into a reunified Korea
World Affairs Online
The author examines the role of pseudo operations in several foreign counterinsurgency campaigns. Pseudo operations are those in which government forces disguised as guerrillas, normally along with guerrilla defectors, operate as teams to infiltrate insurgent areas. This technique has been used by the security forces of several other countries in their operations, and typically it has been very successful. A number of factors must be taken into account before attempting pseudo operations, especially their role in the intelligence and operational systems. Although it is likely that most insurgent movements have become more sophisticated, many of the lessons learned from previous pseudo operations suggest their continued usefulness in counterinsurgency campaigns. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1747/thumbnail.jpg
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In: Comparative politics, Band 34, Heft 1, S. 85-104
ISSN: 0010-4159
The paper aims at understanding the structural features of the bargaining coalitions in the Doha Round of the WTO. We provide an empirical assessment of the preferences of each negotiating actor looking at general economics indicators, development levels, structure of the agricultural sectors, and trade policies for agricultural products. Bargaining coalitions are analyzed by grouping countries through a cluster analysis procedure. The clusters are compared with existing coalitions, in order to assess their degree of internal homogeneity as well as their common interests. Such a comparison allows the detection of possible "defectors", i.e. countries that according to their economic conditions and policies seem to be relatively less committed to the positions of the coalition they join.
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In: Cornell international law journal, Band 29, Heft 3, S. 727-765
ISSN: 0010-8812
In: Legislative studies quarterly, Band 29, Heft 4, S. 545-568
ISSN: 1939-9162
In this paper, we analyze the roll‐call voting behavior of House and Senate members who changed party affiliation during the course of their political careers. We analyze members who switched during the stable periods of the three major two‐party systems in American history: the Federalist‐Jeffersonian Republican system (3d to 12th Congresses), the Democratic‐Whig System (20th to 30th Congresses), and the Democratic‐Republican System (46th to 106th Congresses). Our primary findings are that the biggest changes in the roll‐call voting behavior of party defectors can be observed during periods of high ideological polarization and that party defections during the past 30 years are distinct from switches in other eras because of high polarization and the disappearance of a second dimension of ideological conflict.
In: Japanese journal of political science, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 23-51
ISSN: 1474-0060
This article employs a simple model of sophisticated voting under incomplete information and explores the strategic contexts of the vote on political reform bills in Japan. The government-sponsored political reform bills were voted down by the defection of government coalition members in the House of Councillors before a final compromise was reached in the joint committee of both houses and passed subsequently. In contrast to the accepted view that the defectors were short-sighted sincere voters, I show that Japan's institutional arrangements created an uncertainty about the agenda in the legislative process and led to the sophisticated voting behavior of pivotal voters whose preferences were different from the party leadership. The analysis underscores the importance of sophisticated voting for the empirical study of Japanese legislative politics.
In: Politics, philosophy & economics: ppe, Band 6, Heft 3, S. 285-306
ISSN: 1741-3060
In one-shot public goods dilemmas, defection is the strictly dominant strategy. However, agents with cooperative strategies can do well if (1) agents are `translucent' (that is, if agents can fallibly recognize the strategy other agents play ex ante) and (2) an institutional structure allows `assortation' such that cooperative agents can increase the likelihood of playing with their own kind. The model developed in this article shows that even weak levels of translucency suffice if cooperators are able to pool their information to exclude defectors. Computer simulations confirm this claim. The results imply that conditional cooperation can be a successful strategy given translucency and `assortation', even if the game has a one-shot character. The article discusses implications for moral theory against the backdrop of `virtual self-regard' and the concept of moral integrity.
In: Politics & policy: a publication of the Policy Studies Organization, Band 33, Heft 4, S. 672-705
ISSN: 1555-5623
In: Legislative studies quarterly, Band 29, Heft 4, S. 545-568
ISSN: 0362-9805
Darwinian evolution can explain human cooperative behaviour among non-kin by either direct or indirect reciprocity. In the latter case one does not expect a return for an altruistic act from the recipient as with direct reciprocity, but from another member of the social group. However, the widespread human behaviour of donating to poor people outside the social group, for example, to charity organizations, that are unlikely to reciprocate indirectly and thus are equivalent to defectors in the game is still an evolutionary puzzle. Here we show experimentally that donations made in public to a well-known relief organization resulted both in increased income (that the donors received from the members of their group) and in enhanced political reputation (they were elected to represent the interests of their group). Donations may thus function as an honest signal for one's social reliability.
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