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Montesquieu may have been inaccurate in his description of the English system of government of his time and a poor prophet of the developments that were to take place in it, but he certainly proved an excellent forecaster of one of the major trends in American political development. Montesquieu believed that in order to safeguard liberty it was necessary to separate the powers of government and to vest them in legislative, executive, and judicial departments. When the framers of the Constitution of the United States vested the legislative, the judicial, and the executive powers of government in the three departments, they were doubtless following the ideas of Montesquieu as well as generalizing from the hard experiences of early state and Confederation years.The doctrine that a department to which certain powers of government have been assigned may not grant them to another department and thus frustrate the principle of the separation of powers is often called the doctrine of the delegation of powers. This doctrine is a corollary of the doctrine of the separation of powers. It might also be thought of as a sanction of that doctrine.To think of the doctrines of separation and delegation of powers without reference to their qualifications may give one a misleading idea of both Montesquieu and the American system of government, and it is important to remember that Montesquieu himself introduced the idea of checks and balances in his formulation of the doctrine of the separation of powers. He also seems to have anticipated the charge that a rigid separation would be unworkable. Practical observer and reformer that he was, he saw the necessity for making it possible to have the legislative and executive branches of government work together, and he believed that in his proposed system of government he not only had protected liberty, but had made it easy for the government to function effectively. In his discussion of the constitution of England, he stated that: "These three powers should naturally form a state of repose or inaction. But as there is a necessity for movement in the course of human affairs, they are forced to move, but still in concert."

"The majority of rules adopted at the EU level are not issued by democratically elected institutions, but rather by administrative bodies which are empowered to exercise rule-making powers by legislative acts. This book analyses the legal mechanism through which these powers are conferred on the most relevant bodies in the EU institutional landscape, namely the European Commission, the Council, the ECB and EU agencies, and the democratic controls in place to limit and oversee the exercise of these powers. Providing an overarching perspective of the delegation of powers, this book reflects on the notion of delegation and on the commonalities between the different forms of delegation identified. It focuses on the legal requirements and limits for the delegating act, the procedures for the exercise of such powers, the position of the acts in the hierarchy of norms, and their judicial review. Overcoming the fragmentation which characterized the development of the different forms of delegation in the EU, this analysis provides a clear, structured and coherent picture of the legal framework for the delegation of powers in the light of the constitutional principles of this legal system. Academics and practitioners will equally appreciate this highly accessible addition to the current debate in legal scholarship of the delegation of powers in the EU, as well as its explanations on comitology and the empowerment of EU agencies"--

Defining delegation powers : from state-based models to an EU notion -- Delegations of power in the EU : development, powers and features -- Limiting the delegation of powers : the Delegating Act -- Limiting the delegation of powers : the procedures -- The acts of the delegate and their judicial review -- Conclusion.

Introduction -- A formal model of delegation in the European Union -- Data and longitudinal analysis -- Decision rules, preferences and policy complexity -- Delegation in the European Union : quantitative analysis -- Delegation in the European Union : case studies -- The delegation preferences of the European Parliament -- Conclusion.

The article is devoted to substantiation of existing shortcomings in the mechanisms of delegation of powers between public authorities and local governments in Ukraine and the development of proposals for tools to improve them based on the analysis of foreign experience. Delegation mechanisms in Ukraine are imperfect, which is accompanied by problems such as legal conflicts, duplication of functions of local governments and local executive authorities at various levels, reduced financial self- sufficiency of local governments, imbalance of powers, which ultimately leads to increased corruption risks and reduced quality of provision. public services to the population. To confirm the imbalance of delegated powers of local governments, the calculation of the "vertical imbalance" of local budgets is used as a share of transfers from the state budget in the total local budget revenues. The article suggests ways to solve the problems of delegation of powers between public authorities and local governments in Ukraine is possible, in particular through the introduction of tools tested by positive foreign experience. Among such tools is the development of a single law on delegated powers, which will regulate the procedure and conditions for delegating powers to public authorities, local governments and their officials, in particular, the proposed structure of such a law by sections. It is also proposed to apply the practice of municipal contracts and outsourcing to increase the efficiency of management processes during the delegation of powers, and to follow the Carlton principle when delegating powers between government officials. The basic principles of delegation of powers, and also elements of the municipal contract are defined. Peculiarities of indirect delegation of powers (subdelegation) as one of the complex but successful trends in foreign practice of public administration are given.

SummaryDoes delegation of the budget preparation process to top civil servants improve or worsen fiscal performance? We address this question by analyzing high‐quality data on budgetary procedures and fiscal performance over a 25‐year period in Norwegian local governments. This long time period allows exploiting substantial variation in budgetary procedures across time and space. The results show that administrative delegation decreases fiscal deficits as a share of current revenues. Compared to procedures relying on political coordination or the traditional 'bottom‐up' procedure, deficits are approximately 0.3 percentage points lower on average under administrative delegation. Still, this effect is conditional upon the presence of minority governments and fails to materialize when the mayor enjoys majority support in the local council. Our results thus indicate that administrative delegation in budgetary processes may constitute an important tool to alleviate poor fiscal performance arising due to political coordination failures and weak political decision‐making.