Deliberative democracy is usually presented as a polity in which legitimacy is achieved by deliberative participation on the part of those subject to a collective decision. But cast in these terms, the theory runs headlong into the long-recognized impossibility of directly involving more than a few members of any large-scale democracy in decision making. After canvassing the available solutions to this problem, an argument is made for conceptualizing deliberative democracy in terms of the contestation of discourses in the public sphere, and public opinion as the provisional outcome of this contestation as transmitted to the state. Legitimacy is then achieved to the degree collective outcomes respond to the balance of discourses in the polity, to the extent this balance is itself subject to dispersed and competent political control.
Deliberative democracy is usually presented as a polity in which legitimacy is achieved by deliberative participation on the part of those subject to a collective decision. But cast in these terms, the theory runs headlong into the long-recognized impossibility of directly involving more than a few members of any large-scale democracy in decision making. After canvassing the available solutions to this problem, an argument is made for conceptualizing deliberative democracy in terms of the contestation of discourses in the public sphere, and public opinion as the provisional outcome of this contestation as transmitted to the state. Legitimacy is then achieved to the degree collective outcomes respond to the balance of discourses in the polity, to the extent this balance is itself subject to dispersed and competent political control.
Taken as a model for how groups should make collective judgments and decisions, the ideal of deliberative democracy is inherently ambiguous. Consider the idealised case where it is agreed on all sides that a certain conclusion should be endorsed if and only if certain premises are admitted. Does deliberative democracy recommend that members of the group debate the premises and then individually vote, in the light of that debate, on whether or not to support the conclusion? Or does it recommend that members individually vote on the premises, and then let their commitment to the conclusion be settled by whether or not the group endorses the required premises? Is deliberative democracy to enforce the discipline of reason at the individual level, as in the first possibility, or at the collective level, as in the second? Deliberative-democratic theory has not addressed this issue, perhaps because of an implicit assumption that it does not matter whether the discipline of reason is imposed at the individual or at the collective level. But that assumption is no and there is no excuse for neglecting the issue raised. The discursive dilemma of my title — a generalisation of the doctrinal paradox that has recently received attention in analytical jurisprudence — shows that the procedures distnguished can come apart. Thus deliberative democrats must make up their minds on where they stand in relation to the issue; they cannot sit on the fence. This paper is an attempt to address the issue and look at the grounds on which it may be resolved. In the first section, I give a brief account of the ideal of deliberative democracy, as I understand it. In the second, I introduce the discursive dilemma with the help of some stylised examples and then in the third section I show why the issue that it raises is of relevance, theoretically and practically, to the deliberative-democratic ideal. How should deliberative democrats resolve that issue? I argue in the fourth section that the role in which republican theory casts deliberative democracy argues for preferring the imposition of reason, where possible, at the collective level. And then in the final section I argue for the consistency of that position with the main sorts of argument put forward by others in defence of the ideal.
The two most influential traditions of contemporary theorizing about democracy, social choice theory and deliberative democracy, are generally thought to be at loggerheads, in that the former demonstrates the impossibility, instability or meaninglessness of the rational collective outcomes sought by the latter. We argue that the two traditions can be reconciled. After expounding the central Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility results, we reassess their implications, identifying the conditions under which meaningful democratic decision making is possible. We argue that deliberation can promote these conditions, and hence that social choice theory suggests not that democratic decision making is impossible, but rather that democracy must have a deliberative aspect.
The two most influential traditions of contemporary theorizing about democracy, social choice theory and deliberative democracy, are generally thought to be at loggerheads, in that the former demonstrates the impossibility, instability or meaninglessness of the rational collective outcomes sought by the latter. We argue that the two traditions can be reconciled. After expounding the central Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility results, we reassess their implications, identifying the conditions under which meaningful democratic decision making is possible. We argue that deliberation can promote these conditions, and hence that social choice theory suggests not that democratic decision making is impossible, but rather that democracy must have a deliberative aspect.
For contemporary democratic theorists, democracy is largely a matter of deliberation. But the rise of deliberative democracy coincided with ever more prominent identity politics, sometimes in murderous form in deeply divided societies. This paper considers the degree to which deliberative democracy can process the toughest issues concerning mutually contradictory assertions of identity. After considering the alternative answers provided by agonists and consociational democrats, the case is made for a power-sharing state with attenuated sovereignty and a more contestatory deliberative politics in a public sphere that is semi-detached from the state.
For contemporary democratic theorists, democracy is largely a matter of deliberation. But the rise of deliberative democracy coincided with ever more prominent identity politics, sometimes in murderous form in deeply divided societies. This paper considers the degree to which deliberative democracy can process the toughest issues concerning mutually contradictory assertions of identity. After considering the alternative answers provided by agonists and consociational democrats, the case is made for a power-sharing state with attenuated sovereignty and a more contestatory deliberative politics in a public sphere that is semi-detached from the state.
On October 15, 1994, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was returned to power as Haiti's leader. In a blend of political, historical and moral concerns, the author of this study provides an account of Aristide's reinstatement and explores the uncertain fate of democracy in Haiti.
This paper presents analysis of citizen encounters with specialists in a deliberative process, called Deliberative Mapping, which explored options for addressing the shortage of organs for transplantation in the UK. There is a rich theoretical literature about the extent to which citizens are competent to question the knowledge claims of specialists in complex decision-making processes, suggesting the trustworthiness of scientific expertise will depend on the qualities of social interaction in face-to-face dialogue, but little empirical analysis of specific encounters. This paper presents evidence of how citizens located specialist expertise in making judgements about the legitimacy and credibility of specialist knowledge claims, in ways that reflect differences in epistemic procedures valued by the panels of men and women in this process. (C) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
This paper describes a Swedish example of when the Internet was used as a citizen-local government link. More specifically, the Internet has been used to provide on-line discussion forums in three local government districts in the City of Goteborg. Some user representatives participated in the process of design of the forums. Consequently, this is an example of Participatory Design outside the workplace. The potential of the forums to improve democracy is valued against the ideal of deliberative democracy. In this ideal the presence of a genuine discussion between citizens and politicians is seen as a goal. Unfortunately, there was a lively discussion only in the forum of one district. This means that the goal of deliberative democracy was not reached yet in the districts. To reach this goal, a strategy of continuous involvement of potential user groups in the design and implementation of the forums is recommended. Such groups are e.g. parents of schoolchildren, as well as relatives of elderly that get service from local government.
In this Article, Professor Schwartz depicts the widespread, silent collection of personal information in cyberspace. At present, it is impossible to know the fate of the personal data that one generates online. Professor Schwartz argues that this state of affairs degrades the health of a deliberative democracy; it cloaks in dark uncertainty the transmutation of Internet activity into personal information that will follow one into other areas and discourage civic participation. This situation also will have a negative impact on individual self- determination by deterring individuals from engaging in the necessary thinking out loud and deliberation with others upon which choice- making depends. In place of the existing privacy horror show on the Internet, Professor Schwartz seeks to develop multidimensional rules that set out fair information practices for personal data in cyberspace. The necessary rules must establish four requirements: (1) defined obliga- tions that limit the use of personal data; (2) transparent processing systems; (3) limited procedural and substantive rights; and (4) external oversight. Neither the market nor industry self-regulation are likely, however, to put these four practices in place. Under current conditions, a failure exists in the 'privacy market." Moreover, despite the Clinton Administration's endorsement of industry self-regulation, this method is an unlikely candidate for success. Industry self-regulation of privacy is a negotiation about "the rules of play" for the use of personal data. In deciding on these rules, industry is likely to be most interested in protecting its stream of revenues. Therefore, it will benefit if it develops norms that preserve the current status quo of maximum information disclosure. This Article advocates a legislative enactment of the four fair information practices. This legal expression of privacy norms is the best first step in promoting democratic deliberation and individual self-determination in cyberspace. It will further the attainment of ...
12 págs.-- Introducción al libro de Jürgen Habermas "La inclusión del otro", Barcelona: Paidós, 1999. ; El propósito de este escrito es enmarcar La inclusión del otro, obra de Jürgen Habermas, dentro del conjunto de su pensamiento y, en particular, de su producción con contenido político. Siguiendo este objetivo, se ponen de manifiesto los principales motivos y presupuestos que subyacen a la preocupación política de Habermas, en especial, su concepción de la política deliberativa, desde la que encara aquellos temas clave del momento presente que constituyen el objeto de este nuevo libro. ; Peer reviewed
The combination of the evident failure of traditional methods of citizen participation, according to almost any criterion, and the emergence of new collaborative methods involving interests and citizens has led the authors to try to develop a new paradigm for citizen participation -- one that both will work better and better correspond to the realities of contemporary times and to the emerging practices. The authors have sought in this report to outline the obstacles to change, to delineate the characteristics and practices of collaborative planning, and to develop theory to help understand and advance this mode of citizen participation. They are ultimately making the case that such participatory methods can help to build deliberative democracy and civil society and, in doing so, help us to achieve all the objectives that have been laid out for citizen participation.
Introduction:.In this paper, I offer an explanation for the interest in particularly deliberative processes in the NHS both by comparing deliberative principles with imperatives in public management discourse, and by examining the motivations behind three cases: two citizens' juries; and the development of The NHS Plan, a white paper released in July 2000. My research is partly based on the qualitative analysis of secondary documents, partly on the analysis of 26 interviews conducted between May and July 2001 with health policy actors involved either directly in the cases or in patient and public involvement initiatives more generally.
Today Habermas and Apel represent two opposite position in the debate of the fate of democracy in the European Union: the deliberative democracy, based in a utopia of dominion free community and the theory institutional of complementary participation in public decision, based in a discursive ethics of common responsibility, that also is defended in the conclusion.
