Suchergebnisse

T eorija društvenog izbora postavlja značajan izazov pred teoriju demokratije. Erouova teorema mogućnosti pokazuje da nije moguće istovremeno da budu zadovoljeni neki normativni uslovi u pogledu procedure glasanja koji garantuju da je ona fer i da ishod glasanja bude koherentan. Ovaj rezultat dovodi u pitanje normativnu opravdanost demokratije u onoj meri u kojoj se ona zasniva na proceduri glasanja. Kao jedan od mogućih puteva za rešenje Erouovog problema predložen je uslov jednovršnosti u pogledu poredaka preferencija. U ovom radu bavićemo se pitanjem u kojoj meri koncepcija deliberativne demokratije može da doprinese postizanju jednovršnosti koja potom garantuje koherentan društveni izbor. U tom kontekstu posebno ćemo istražiti tezu da javna deliberacija dovodi do metasaglasnosti koja potom može da implicira jednovršnost. Ovoj tezi pristupićemo ispitujući njenu empirijsku i normativnu adekvatnost. ; T he social choice theory presents a significant challenge to democratic theory. Arrow's impossibility theorem shows that it is not possible for some normative conditions – regarding the voting procedure guaranteeing its fairness and that the outcome of voting be coherent – to be satisfied at the same time. This brings into question normative justification of democracy to the degree to which it is based on the voting procedure. The single-peakedness condition was proposed as one of the possible ways to solve the Arrow's problem. In this paper we will explore to what extent the conception of deliberative democracy may contribute to achievement of single-peakedness which subsequently guarantees coherent social choice. In this context we will particularly explore the thesis that public deliberation leads to meta-agreement which might subsequently imply single-peakedness. We approach this thesis by probing its empirical and normative adequacy.

Cilj ove doktorske disertacije jeste da pruži argumente u prilog epistemičkog opravdanja demokratije. Tvrdićemo da zbog toga što čisto proceduralno opravdanje definiše autoritet i legitimnost demokratije samo u odnosu na pravičnost same procedure, ono ne može biti adekvatno objašnjenje za sve ono do čega nam je u demokratiji istinski stalo. Ljudima je u demokratiji veoma važan i sam ishod demokratskog procesa. Legitimost demokratske procedure, dakle, zavisi i od kvaliteta odluka koje ta procedura proizvodi. Uspon epistemičkih teorija o demokratiji je u skladu sa porastom popularnosti ideje o "mudrosti gomile" koju pronalazimo u različitim oblastima istraživanja. Zbog toga ćemo se osvrnuti na razvoj i rezultate organizacione teorije i predstaviti psihološke nalaze o kapacitetima ljudskog rasuđivanja. Instrumentalne ili epistemičke teorije tvrde da je demokratija legitimna ako i samo ako ima tendenciju da nas dovede do "dobrih" ili "istinitih" političkih odluka. Tvrdićemo da ono što omogućava da demokratsko odlučivanje, pod određenim uslovima, ima veću epistemičku vrednost od alternativnih formi odlučivanja jeste postojanje kognitivne raznovrsnosti unutar grupe koja donosi političke odluke. Pružićemo teorijske i empirijske argumente u prilog epistemičke vrednosti kolektivnog, demokratkog donošenja odluka. Ukazaćemo na značaj političkih institucija koje mogu da omoguće prisustvo kognitivne raznovrsnosti i povećaju nivo pojedinačne kompetencije opšte javnosti. Takođe ćemo tvrditi da je neophodno kombinovati deliberativnu i agregativnu metodu, i to upravo tim redosledom, s obzirom da i jedna i druga imaju važne epistemičke karakteristike. ; The aim of this doctoral dissertation is to provide arguments in support of the epistemic justification of democracy. We will argue that because a purely procedural justification defines the authority and legitimacy of democracy only in relation to the fairness of the procedure itself, it can not be an adequate explanation for all the things we really care about in democracy. The outcome of the democratic process itself is very important to people in democracy. The legitimacy of a democratic procedure, therefore, depends on the quality of the decisions that this procedure produces. The rise of epistemic theories about democracy is in line with the increasing popularity of the idea of the "wisdom of the crowds" that we find in various fields of research. Therefore, we will look at the development and results of organizational theory and present psychological findings about human reasoning capacities. Instrumental or epistemic theories claim that democracy is legitimate if and only if it has a tendency to lead us to "good" or "true" political decisions. We will argue that what allows democratic decision-making, under certain conditions, to have a higher epistemic value than alternative forms of decision-making is the existence of the cognitive diversity of a group that makes political decisions. We will provide theoretical and empirical arguments in favor of the epistemic value of collective, democratic decision-making. We will point out the importance of political institutions that can enable the presence of cognitive diversity and increase the level of individual competence of the general public. We will also argue that it is necessary to combine a deliberative and aggregative method, precisely in this order, given that both of them have important epistemic characteristics.

Cilj ove doktorske disertacije jeste da pruži argumente u prilog epistemičkog opravdanja demokratije. Tvrdićemo da zbog toga što čisto proceduralno opravdanje definiše autoritet i legitimnost demokratije samo u odnosu na pravičnost same procedure, ono ne može biti adekvatno objašnjenje za sve ono do čega nam je u demokratiji istinski stalo. Ljudima je u demokratiji veoma važan i sam ishod demokratskog procesa. Legitimost demokratske procedure, dakle, zavisi i od kvaliteta odluka koje ta procedura proizvodi. Uspon epistemičkih teorija o demokratiji je u skladu sa porastom popularnosti ideje o "mudrosti gomile" koju pronalazimo u različitim oblastima istraživanja. Zbog toga ćemo se osvrnuti na razvoj i rezultate organizacione teorije i predstaviti psihološke nalaze o kapacitetima ljudskog rasuđivanja. Instrumentalne ili epistemičke teorije tvrde da je demokratija legitimna ako i samo ako ima tendenciju da nas dovede do "dobrih" ili "istinitih" političkih odluka. Tvrdićemo da ono što omogućava da demokratsko odlučivanje, pod određenim uslovima, ima veću epistemičku vrednost od alternativnih formi odlučivanja jeste postojanje kognitivne raznovrsnosti unutar grupe koja donosi političke odluke. Pružićemo teorijske i empirijske argumente u prilog epistemičke vrednosti kolektivnog, demokratkog donošenja odluka. Ukazaćemo na značaj političkih institucija koje mogu da omoguće prisustvo kognitivne raznovrsnosti i povećaju nivo pojedinačne kompetencije opšte javnosti. Takođe ćemo tvrditi da je neophodno kombinovati deliberativnu i agregativnu metodu, i to upravo tim redosledom, s obzirom da i jedna i druga imaju važne epistemičke karakteristike. ; The aim of this doctoral dissertation is to provide arguments in support of the epistemic justification of democracy. We will argue that because a purely procedural justification defines the authority and legitimacy of democracy only in relation to the fairness of the procedure itself, it can not be an adequate explanation for all the things we really care about in democracy. The outcome of the democratic process itself is very important to people in democracy. The legitimacy of a democratic procedure, therefore, depends on the quality of the decisions that this procedure produces. The rise of epistemic theories about democracy is in line with the increasing popularity of the idea of the "wisdom of the crowds" that we find in various fields of research. Therefore, we will look at the development and results of organizational theory and present psychological findings about human reasoning capacities. Instrumental or epistemic theories claim that democracy is legitimate if and only if it has a tendency to lead us to "good" or "true" political decisions. We will argue that what allows democratic decision-making, under certain conditions, to have a higher epistemic value than alternative forms of decision-making is the existence of the cognitive diversity of a group that makes political decisions. We will provide theoretical and empirical arguments in favor of the epistemic value of collective, democratic decision-making. We will point out the importance of political institutions that can enable the presence of cognitive diversity and increase the level of individual competence of the general public. We will also argue that it is necessary to combine a deliberative and aggregative method, precisely in this order, given that both of them have important epistemic characteristics.