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Democracy in Indonesia is often carried out with the word "election". But democracy is not just the word "election", democracy has wide and many phenomena and reviews these phenomena are important. One of them is deliberative democracy. Many scientists have reviewed this idea. Both from the forum, both from the process, both from the of participants, both from the ideas themselves in Indonesia. Even though deliberative democracy has other elements. One of them is learning. It's very rare to hear the idea of learning in deliberative democracy itself. Rarely describe what learning is and why it is important. And it turns out learning has an important role in supporting the deliberate process in the public sphere / public space

This paper traces the evolution of deliberative institutions in India to understand the role of deliberation in democratic life, as well as the ways in which deliberative bodies influence, and are influenced by, entrenched social inequality. The paper first unpacks the historical roots of Indian deliberation in the pre-colonial and colonial periods, emphasizing the ways in which religious traditions fostered a culture of debate and dialogue. The paper then explores the interplay between Western liberal philosophers, most notably Henry Maine, and Indian political thinkers, including Gandhi and Ambedkar, on participatory democracy in India. The discussion then highlights the continued dialogue between Indian and Western ideas in the push for greater participatory development. Finally, the paper probes the current incarnation of state-sponsored deliberation in India -- namely, village assemblies known as gram sabhas under the constitutionally mandated system of Indian village democracy or Panchayati Raj -- and reviews the growing empirical scholarship about these village assemblies.

From small-scale experiments, deliberative mini-publics have recently taken a constitutional turn in Europe. Iceland and Ireland have turned to deliberative democracy to reform their constitutions. Estonia, Luxembourg and Romania have also experienced constitutional process in a deliberative mode. In Belgium the G1000, a citizen-led initiative of deliberative democracy, has fostered a wider societal debate about the role and place of citizens in the country's democracy. At the same time, European institutions have introduced different forms of deliberative democracy as a way to connect citizens back in. These empirical cases are emblematic of a possibly constitutional turn in deliberative democracy in Europe. The purpose of this book is to critically assess these developments, bringing together academics involved in the designing of these new forms of constitutional deliberative democracy with the theorists who propagated the ideas and evaluated democratic standards.

Paperet er en diskussion af de to demokratimodeller, deliberativt og agonistisk. Det argumenteres at agonistisk demokrati overkommer en række grundlæggende vanskeligheder ved deliberativt demokrati. Men den måde som Chantal Mouffe har formuleret agonistisk demokrati på har en række problemer, særligt når det relateres til globalisering.

Deliberative democracy is usually presented as a polity in which legitimacy is achieved by deliberative participation on the part of those subject to a collective decision. But cast in these terms, the theory runs headlong into the long-recognized impossibility of directly involving more than a few members of any large-scale democracy in decision making. After canvassing the available solutions to this problem, an argument is made for conceptualizing deliberative democracy in terms of the contestation of discourses in the public sphere, and public opinion as the provisional outcome of this contestation as transmitted to the state. Legitimacy is then achieved to the degree collective outcomes respond to the balance of discourses in the polity, to the extent this balance is itself subject to dispersed and competent political control.

Deliberative democracy is usually presented as a polity in which legitimacy is achieved by deliberative participation on the part of those subject to a collective decision. But cast in these terms, the theory runs headlong into the long-recognized impossibility of directly involving more than a few members of any large-scale democracy in decision making. After canvassing the available solutions to this problem, an argument is made for conceptualizing deliberative democracy in terms of the contestation of discourses in the public sphere, and public opinion as the provisional outcome of this contestation as transmitted to the state. Legitimacy is then achieved to the degree collective outcomes respond to the balance of discourses in the polity, to the extent this balance is itself subject to dispersed and competent political control.

Setting priorities in healthcare has become a highly politicised activity. Traditionally it has been undertaken by government and the health professions but there is an increasing imperative to involve the public. The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) has established a Citizens' Council as an attempt to capture the informed views of the public in shaping the Institute's social value judgements. Although, in the future, better ways of involving the public may emerge, NICE's approach represents one way in which ordinary citizens can engage in the process of prioritising healthcare.

The globalization process is not reducible to its international dimension, i.e., to international, or even, to transnational relationships. In many states, it also consists of domestic phenomena, such as an increasing cultural pluralism, that does not result solely from a domestic and gradual evolution, but, to a significant extent, either from migrations or from radical changes of mind made possible by cultural globalization. This kind of cultural pluralism is what one can call multiculturalism, in the descriptive sense of the characteristics of a multicultural society (as distinguished from the normative meaning, i.e., from the policies that aim at either maintaining or promoting multiculturalism in the descriptive meaning). This paper aims to discuss the articulation between deliberative democracy and cultural pluralism.

Around the world, deliberative democracy is on the rise and is being implemented in real politics. In Belgium, the G1000, a citizen-led experiment, set deliberative democracy on the political agenda. In this wake, all parliaments of the country have initiated deliberative mini-publics. More recently the Ostbelgien modell was fostered; that is the Parliament of the German-speaking community has enacted a permanent system of deliberative democracy that will start in September 2019: a randomly selected body of 24 citizens will work next to the existing elected parliament made of 25 MPs. These democratic innovations set the pace for a renewal of democratic dynamics in practice.

Around the world, deliberative democracy is on the rise and is being implemented in real politics. In Belgium, the G1000, a citizen-led experiment, set deliberative democracy on the political agenda. In this wake, all parliaments of the country have initiated deliberative mini-publics. More recently the Ostbelgien modell was fostered; that is the Parliament of the German-speaking community has enacted a permanent system of deliberative democracy that will start in September 2019: a randomly selected body of 24 citizens will work next to the existing elected parliament made of 25 MPs. These democratic innovations set the pace for a renewal of democratic dynamics in practice.

This thesis contains a critical analysis of deliberative democracy. I present the normative arguments for the theory in the context of a discussion of how to explicate democracy more generally, and I assess these arguments throughout the thesis. I defend a Habermasian interpretation of the deliberative ideal, and I argue that we should conceive of deliberative democracy in participatory, dialogical, and adversarial terms. I discuss the implications of acute moral disagreement and the necessarily mediated nature of much deliberative exchange. ; TARA (Trinity?s Access to Research Archive) has a robust takedown policy. Please contact us if you have any concerns: rssadmin@tcd.ie

I analyze the prerequisites for the existence of public opinion in society, reflecting on whether the absence of prejudices should be one of these. At the same time, I delve, among other questions, into the process of forming public opinion, to what degree public opinion acts as a control or brake on political power, and on the role of intellectuals in the context of a deliberative democracy. KEYWORDS: public opinion – democracy – deliberation – freedom of expression – equality – political pluralism – power – control - social change – prejudices – education – comunication media – intellectuals

I analyze the prerequisites for the existence of public opinion in society, reflecting on whether the absence of prejudices should be one of these. At the same time, I delve, among other questions, into the process of forming public opinion, to what degree public opinion acts as a control or brake on political power, and on the role of intellectuals in the context of a deliberative democracy. KEYWORDS: public opinion – democracy – deliberation – freedom of expression – equality – political pluralism – power – control - social change – prejudices – education – comunication media – intellectuals

Taken as a model for how groups should make collective judgments and decisions, the ideal of deliberative democracy is inherently ambiguous. Consider the idealised case where it is agreed on all sides that a certain conclusion should be endorsed if and only if certain premises are admitted. Does deliberative democracy recommend that members of the group debate the premises and then individually vote, in the light of that debate, on whether or not to support the conclusion? Or does it recommend that members individually vote on the premises, and then let their commitment to the conclusion be settled by whether or not the group endorses the required premises? Is deliberative democracy to enforce the discipline of reason at the individual level, as in the first possibility, or at the collective level, as in the second? Deliberative-democratic theory has not addressed this issue, perhaps because of an implicit assumption that it does not matter whether the discipline of reason is imposed at the individual or at the collective level. But that assumption is no and there is no excuse for neglecting the issue raised. The discursive dilemma of my title — a generalisation of the doctrinal paradox that has recently received attention in analytical jurisprudence — shows that the procedures distnguished can come apart. Thus deliberative democrats must make up their minds on where they stand in relation to the issue; they cannot sit on the fence. This paper is an attempt to address the issue and look at the grounds on which it may be resolved. In the first section, I give a brief account of the ideal of deliberative democracy, as I understand it. In the second, I introduce the discursive dilemma with the help of some stylised examples and then in the third section I show why the issue that it raises is of relevance, theoretically and practically, to the deliberative-democratic ideal. How should deliberative democrats resolve that issue? I argue in the fourth section that the role in which republican theory casts deliberative democracy argues for preferring the imposition of reason, where possible, at the collective level. And then in the final section I argue for the consistency of that position with the main sorts of argument put forward by others in defence of the ideal.

Two overarching questions motivate this dissertation: How might the participants to a nominally democratic process themselves craft decision-making processes that are "inclusive," or, that best approximate the ideal of treating them and those, if any, they represent as "free and equal"? And what role, if any, might a normative theory of the democratic process play in their diverse efforts to do so? To address these questions, the dissertation juxtaposes selected aspects of the literature on "deliberative democracy" with ideas drawn from pragmatist approaches to ethics and social inquiry. Broadly speaking, pragmatists theorize by explicitly drawing on the resources provided to us by our actual practices, and by making reference to the consequences they have for actual lives. The dissertation deploys pragmatist ideas to develop a normative theory of the democratic process, intended as a contribution to a public philosophy for contemporary democratic governance. In developing the theory, the dissertation illustrates how engaged, situated agents might invoke that theory in their diverse efforts to craft processes for collective decision-making that actually treat the citizens of the respective demos, or the members of the respective association, as "free and equal."In brief, the theory developed in this dissertation is a "deliberative" conception because, like other such conceptions, it stresses that democracy's participants ought to try to justify their expressed policy preferences to one another. Yet, for a number of reasons, it is also distinct from other deliberative conceptions. For instance, it is distinctive in the stress it places on inquiry of various kinds. Indeed, the theory developed here suggests that, ideally speaking, democracy itself ought to be conducted as a form of collective social inquiry, one in which participants inquire into the procedures, virtues, and cultural practices that, in some particular context, are most apt to treat citizens or members in a way that is consistent with the values that arguably justify the adoption of a democratic process in the first place.