Suchergebnisse

The question is examined of what personal income distribution will be brought about by the institutions of a political democracy, assuming these institutions have the power to determine this. It has been assumed that an egalitarian income distribution would result. The ideas of Hans van den Doel (Democracy and Welfare Economics, Cambridge, 1979) offer an alternative model. The majority of individuals would not seek radical leveling down of incomes for several reasons: concern for economic growth & employment, & the hope of the poor to become rich. Also, if a majority sought radical leveling down, & the measures were not rigorously enforced, a Prisoner's Dilemma would result for each individual; but if they were rigorously enforced, a situation of collective intransitivity would emerge, making the decision subject to cycling. Resolution of this problem would likely leave median income voters in a strong position that they could use to benefit themselves at the expense of the poor. These findings are consistent with the finding of R. W. Jackman (Politics and Social Equality: A Comparative Analysis, New York, 1975) that political equality does not play an important role in increasing equality of material rewards. 4 Tables, 5 Figures. Modified HA.

The politicization of Belgian political parties since WWII has resulted in what is termed a "particracy," ie, a parliamentary democracy wherein party structures dominate the political decision-making process. The gradual institutionalization of party patronage within the parliament, ministerial cabinets, public administration, the judiciary, & mass media is discussed, examining mechanisms of recruitment & policy articulation. The process of within-party candidate selection is also considered, focusing on the shift away from rank-&-file participation toward central decisions by local & national party leaders, with a concomitant restructuring of "party discipline." Historical bases of the current patronage system are briefly considered, noting the prewar politicization of magisterial posts & the shift from reliance on party newspapers to party control of broadcast media administrators. Modified HA.

To investigate the attitudes of Flemish secondary school students toward politics, interview data were collected (N = 242 Ms & 130 Fs, aged 12-14) in 1981, using the method employed in a French study by Annick Percheron (L'Univers politique des enfants [The Political Environment of Children], Paris, 1974). Analysis of the data reveals that most of the children bear considerable hostility toward the political system. When asked to explain their attitudes toward 18 political concepts (eg, "democracy," "communism") most of the Rs gave equally negative opinions for theories on both ends of the political spectrum. Reactions toward specific politicians were even more negative. Little difference was noted between the attitudes or knowledge of boys & girls. UMc Rs had the highest level of knowledge, while Wc Rs had the lowest. Surprisingly, Wc Rs showed hostility toward unions & tended to have conservative political opinions. 9 Tables, 4 Figures. Modified HA.

The aim here is to understand better the governing organizations of Us & high schools in a democratic environment. The Law for U Government Reform is studied & its model of government characterized in terms of ideal models. A small empirical research project was set up to investigate how the rules relative to departmental councils function to reach the objectives they are assigned. One must distinguish between the allotment of responsibility for making decisions on subjects that relate to the U's "output" (teaching, research, degrees) & matters that are related to the U "input." Three conceptions of authority & three models of U government must be noted: (1) the "professional" model (decisions rest with the best qualified scientific personnel), (2) the "corporate" model (every section of the U contributes to the government), & (3) the "council" model (all responsibilities are vested in the whole U). The Law for U Government Reform aims at working out the corporative model. Research must concentrate on the relationship between goals & implementation, & not on evaluating the goals set up by the Law. By & large, nonscientific personnel are represented in the councils. The student position on these councils is strong due to the absenteeism of other members. Propositions initiated by students or nonscientific personnel are a small minority of the adopted propositions. Propositions opposed by a majority of the scientific personnel present are always adopted. The main student input is found in the area of teaching goals. It is doubtful that the intended democratization of decision-making can be effectively accomplished in the framework of the departmental councils. 6 Tables, Appendix. HA Tr & Modified by A. Orianne.

Explanation is given to the dismal predictions of the Club of Rome studies concerning long-run consequences of economic growth & population increases, & why they are not translated into policy changes affecting those variables. The domestic function of economic growth, providing bargaining space for the solution of political conflicts, & the propensity of policy makers to give priority to short-run problems affecting their own position inhibit these policy changes. Focus is on the theory of W. Harich, (KOMMUNISMUS OHNE WACHSTUM? BABEUF UND DER CLUB OF ROME [Communism without Growth? Babeuf and the Club of Rome], Rheinbeck: Rowohlt, 1975) a philosopher from the German Democratic Republic who argued for rigid centralization of political & economic power at the global level. Although Harich did not include concepts such as `liberty', `democracy', & `constitution' in his theory, this can be compared to some of the political reactions to the challenge in Western Europe. Proposals made by Tinbergen & the Mansholt plan however are found to be more promising. 3 Figures. Modified HA.

Switzerland's attitude toward the EEC is typical of the new foreign policy adopted by that country in 1947 under the heading "Neutrality & Solidarity." A number of centrifugal factors (the EEC is regarded as the center or the pole of attraction) have kept Switzerland out of the EEC although many other factors--economic & commerical, in particular, but also ideological, cultural, political, & geographic--tend toward closer ties with the EEC & have acted as "centripetal" forces. The main "centrifugal" factors were: Swiss neutrality, the federal system, & direct democracy, such economic elements as the fiscal & agricultural systems & especially psychological factors including attitudes & ideas concerning the EEC & the consequences of membership. Fear of bureaucratization & fear of infringement on individual liberties are greater stumbling-blocks than economic & political factors. Timely corrections & adaptations in the international commercial field (EFTA membership, advantages gained from the Kennedy Round, the 1972 Free Trade agreement with the enlarged EEC) have reduced the necessity to seek a closer relationship with the Community, Only drastic economic, social, & political changes in the evolution of the EEC or of Switzerland itself could bring about fundamental changes in the relationship between Switzerland & the EEC. Modified HA.

After having stressed the importance of the org'al structure of the pol'al parties in a democracy, the structure is examined of the 10 pol'al parties which had, in the period 1963-1967, representatives in the 2nd Chamber of Parliament, paying particular attention to the extent to which the members have a say in the party. On the basis of the diff kinds of elections (local, provincial, 1st Chamber, 2nd Chamber) the organs of the party are divided into 6 levels. For each level the powers of the organs in question are discussed, in particular the power to elect, to nominate or to delegate individuals in the organs placed higher. The party members, the lowest level, have only the power to elect, to nominate or to delegate for the next level. For all the other levels their power in this respect is indirect. In general it can be said that the higher the level of the organ, the more indirect the power of the party member is concerning the composition of that organ. In the composition of these higher placed organs, other organs--on the composition of which the party members have little or no diff--have an important say. This kind of org'al structure may easily give rise to feelings of frustration on the part of the party members & hampers their activation & participation. 2 Figures, 9 Tables. HA.

The problem of abortion as a political issue is discussed by focusing on two reports of the Belgian National Commission for Ethical Problems (fall 1976). Both the `translation' of the political problem into a question to be handled by an `apolitical' commission on the level of scientific expertise, & the delivery of two dissenting reports are studied as a typical stage of the development of the political decision-making process in this matter, & compared with similar evolution in neighboring countries (West Germany, France, & the Netherlands). From political theory perspectives, the main problem centers on the question: How does a parliamentary democracy solve such a deep-seated conflict concerning the `basic values' of a social ethical order? Answer elements can be gathered from a comparative analysis of the different positions & arguments in the two reports of the Ethical Commission. In opposition to the majority report (13 members in favor) the minority report (12 members opposed) claims that the legalization of abortion would bring about a drop of 10-15% in the birth rate. The minority argues that a truly ethical choice for abortion is difficult to make, since: (1) the choice must be made as soon as possible,.ie, with little time for reflection, & (2) its importance is belittled in order to avoid guilt feelings in the mother. Some of the most important differences between the two groups concern the relationship of ethics to law. The majority argues that a social concensus must be built on the least possible number of ethical presuppositions, while the minority argues that social cohesion is impossible under those conditions. A difference in tone between the two reports is also noted: the minority argument is much more emotional. This shows that the dispute is political, not scientific, & that it has important consequences for the evolution of the social pattern of values. Modified HA.