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The analysis has shown that both approaches are legitimate and useful in understanding and maintaining democracy. Of course, the interactional approaches are more complex, as well as more important and more vital for understanding democracy. The analysis has shown how political culture (democratic legitimation or political trust, support for civil freedoms, satisfaction with the functioning of democracy, etc.) often depend on the elements of the very political structure (party systems and coalition models, election patterns, patterns of democracy, positions in power structure, etc.). Political culture is autonomous in relation to political structure, but frequently its role greatly depends on the relations among political actors and the variables of the political culture itself. The analysis has also demonstrated how these investigations into the interaction (combined effects) between political culture and structure are extremely sophisticated and that in the future they are going to become the most fruitful part of political science, making possible not only a deeper understanding of the "dynamic regularities" in the functioning of democracy but also the attempts at its "innovative sustainment" and gradual development. (SOI : PM: S. 131) + The purpose of this essay is to prove the connection among political culture, political structure and democracy. All the arguments pointing to such a connection have been analysed within the framework of two fundamental approaches to the relationship between culture and structure i.e. within the framework of the classical approach to their correspondence (which claims - primarily in line with the functional theory of culture - that there is a functional concordance between culture and structure, that democracy is mirrored by the civic political culture, i.e. that "culture is a structure's way of life", that culture determines the structure) and the contemporary interactional approach (in which - primarily in line with the theory of culture "as meaning" or "social functioning" - complex relations among various cultural variables and structural variables are analysed as well as their combined effect on democracy as the consequence of these relations). The latter approach considers democracy not as a "fixed condition" but rather as a dynamic phenomenon or the end result of the combined interactional relationships between culture and structure

A number of contemporary states have undergone a transformation of their constitutions. One of the reasons is the process of increasing tensions between the majority democracy and constitutionalism. In a special way, this tension is the lot of the new democracies having problems both with a lack of democratic experience and a lack of genuine constitutionalism. Although the Republic of Croatia's 1990 Constitution apparently uses the paradigm of constitutional democracy, it is becoming even more obvious that its ontology is to a large extent determined both by the general and the particular aspect of the tension between democracy and constitutionalism. (SOI : PM: S. 136)

A few years after the collapse of communist regimes, it is evident that the confidence about the ultimate triumph of liberal democracy was premature. This waking up to the reality is not only the consequence of the hardships in the transformation of post-communist societies, but of the intellectual scepticism regarding the normative potential of liberal democracy in the developed western societies. The problem might in most general terms be formulated as the incapacity of liberal democracy to generate and reproduce the normative requirements for its own survival. The author thinks that the solution to this paradox can nevertheless be found within the institutional framework of liberal democracy: if the traditional moral concepts on which liberal democracy was founded in the past are worn out indeed, and no civil- religious substitute for that tradition has emerged as yet, then its only possibility is to create its own, modern or post-modern, morality by means of the public discourse mechanism and the political participation of citizens. The normative dimension of liberalism must not be reduced to the theory of private ownership, market and competition, but be envisaged as a constitutional theory of human rights and restricted government and the egalitarian distribution of goods and opportunities. (SOI : PM: S. 30)

The author analyses the relationship among legal nationhood, social nationhood, and democracy in democratic constitutional states. After identifing the definitions of democratic constitutional state, he concludes that it is an efficient structures within which one can mvestigate the relationship among democracy, legal and social nationhood. He suggests that these three principles have their normative roots in human freedom i.e. in the freedom of participating in p0litical negotiation, in the freedom from coercion and unjust rule, in the freedom from exigency, and in the free participation in the "we" of the modern industrial, technological and information society. And finally, the author analyses the tension between the legal and social nationhood which may be fruitful only if democracy contributes to the accomplishment of major social changes that maximise human freedom. (SOI : PM: S. 91)

The poll on political tolerance was conducted on a 772 -subject sample. Because of the long-lasting totalitarian system and the short period of democracy, a rather low level of political tolerance was expected. However, the results of the poll have not confirmed these expectations but showed a high Ievel of political tolerance instead. Similar findings have been obtained by an American survey conducted in several European countries, including Croatia. This means that the political tolerance in Croatia has not been shaped by the totalitarian system but by the pluralist traits of the Croatian culture, ensuing from numerous contacts with a plethora of different cultures. In order for the pluralist democracy in Croatia to function democratically, appropriate legal prerequisites and institutions do not suffice; the people who is in line with the principles of pluralist democracy are central to this as well. Pluralist democracy legalizes various political options and enables the citizens to organize themselves and act in accordance with the embraced option. All this, however, is a dead letter if people are not willing to accept the existence and the activism of different political options. That is why the concept of political tolerance always goes hand in hand with the concept of pluralist democracy. The Latin word "tolerantia" means 'indulgence', 'patience'. That is why political tolerance is usually understood as a readiness to bear or put up with political options and their operationalizations which are obnoxious and even repugnant to us ... . The essence of political life is not tolerance and patience but non-restriction of political freedoms and political pluralism. Those who accept political pluralism find it easier to bear the existence of various political options, even those they do not approve of. There are more a less intensive feelings of intolerance and bigotry. So, tolerance means accepting and not only forbearing different political options. (SOI : PM: S. 148)

Democratic consolidation of post-authoritarian and post-totalitarian societies is looked into at the levels of (1) basic political institutions; (2) chief proponents of representative democracy (political parties and interest associations); (3) behaviour of powerful informal political actors (army, church, entrepreneurs, etc); and (4) civic culture. Democracy is stable only after it has been consolidated on all four levels. This "maximalist concept" of democratic consolidation excludes the explanation of a breakdown of democratic systems by voluntaristic and non-conceptualized descriptions of "deconsolidation". (SOI : PM: S. 150)

The article deals with Mill's theory of liberal democracy as a synthesis of the elements of two different political traditions and doctrines: liberalism and democracy, integration of liberal concepts of freedom, limitations of power, political representation and elite leadership and democratic ideas of equality, social homogeneity, national sovereignty and citizens" participation. The author concludes that the contradictions found in Mill's theory do not stem from the inconsistency of the logic of his argumentation, but from the contradictory demands he tried to reconcile. (SOI : PM: S. 162)

Democracy and constitutional state should understandably be reviewed in the context of a society's progression in curbing the state. In any community the central issue is the relationship between the people as individuals and as members of a collective, since it is desirable for a collective to be a synerg sum of individuals. Thus it is prudent to search for a corellation between democracy and constitutional state. Democracy is an emanation of freedom, constitutions always a limitation. A state hems in a civil society; within it there is a network of the processes of structuring government from "above", which is of particular interest in transitional countries that gave up on the ideologised inaugural effect in designing government and adopted "constitutional engineering": power-sharing, popular sovereignty, representative parliamentarism, promotion of freedoms and basic rights of individuals and citizens. In this, it is imperative to make note of the necessity of structuring societies from "below" by means of the principle of local self-rule. (SOI : PM: S. 147)

The author analyses Schmitt's and Luhmann's theory of democracy and the constitutional state. By comparing them, he concludes that Schmitt's critique of the democratic pluralistic state has ended in the theory of direct or plebiscitary democracy in which the constitution is subject to an unpredictable will of political majority which can change it wilfully in line with the power relations. Luhmann, on the other hand, starts from the assumption of the separation between law and politics and builds his concept of the constitutional state on the bipolar differentiation and the mutual checks between law and politics. The author concludes that Luhmann does not give up on Hobbes' pessimistic conviction that human nature is bestial; he only offers a different strategy for the coexistence of cultured savages. (SOI : PM: S. 67)