Suchergebnisse

In this article I make a critical analysis of educational policy in Poland during the 25 years of the political transformation. I try to refer to the Polish thoughts and practices of teaching experience in the period of 1918--1948. What is more, I present experiences of anti-socialist opposition during the socialist period. They influenced on impression in the works and commitments of many scientists and a new generation of academics. Furthermore, I indicate how my generation after 1989 went into the road of scientific autonomy and/or independence in the field of government and private education. Benchmark for these analyzes build up the hopes which we tied up with the Polish revolution of non- violence. Moreover, there was a strong disappointment, which revealed over the years due to the departure of distinctive political formation of the Third Republic of the ideals and the phenomenon of Polish "Solidarity" movement, and civil society, which included the move away from the base of participatory democracy. Finally, I look at how education as a science and practice of education fit into democratization of the Polish state and society. The key meaning for me has the perception of education as a common good, as environments and entities, institutions or management practices which participate in the democratic society. To sum up, this society is constantly in the period of recovery from years of experience not only fascist, but Bolshevik totalitarianism, too.

This article analyses the Brexit debate within the UK. It examines the historical roots of the debate from 1973 when the UK joined the European Economic Community, but focuses primarily on the debates that occurred between 2013 when David Cameron pledged to hold a referendum up and the 2019 UK General Election. Section one briefly introduces the topic. Section two examines the rise of social hatred during the referendum campaign. It focuses on the history of British euro-scepticism, the immediate context of the Brexit campaign, concerns over UK sovereignty and immigration, and the increasing use of threats and political violence. Section three examines the decline of trust in politics due to the increasing failure to challenge lies in the Brexit debate. It explores the idea of "Project Fear", the anti-expert narrative, and the anti-elitism narrative. Section four asks what this period tells us about UK democracy. It focuses on weak and disorderly government, the democratic status of the referendum, the erosion of trust in parliamentary institutions and mechanisms, and some reasons for (limited) optimism. The article concludes by considering possible ways forward for the UK government and polity following the decisive Conservative victory in the 2019 UK General Election. ; This article analyses the Brexit debate within the UK. It examines the historical roots of the debate from 1973 when the UK joined the European Economic Community, but focuses primarily on the debates that occurred between 2013 when David Cameron pledged to hold a referendum up and the 2019 UK General Election. Section one briefly introduces the topic. Section two examines the rise of social hatred during the referendum campaign. It focuses on the history of British euro-scepticism, the immediate context of the Brexit campaign, concerns over UK sovereignty and immigration, and the increasing use of threats and political violence. Section three examines the decline of trust in politics due to the increasing failure to challenge lies in the Brexit debate. It explores the idea of "Project Fear", the anti-expert narrative, and the anti-elitism narrative. Section four asks what this period tells us about UK democracy. It focuses on weak and disorderly government, the democratic status of the referendum, the erosion of trust in parliamentary institutions and mechanisms, and some reasons for (limited) optimism. The article concludes by considering possible ways forward for the UK government and polity following the decisive Conservative victory in the 2019 UK General Election.

This article analyses the Brexit debate within the UK. It examines the historical roots of the debate from 1973 when the UK joined the European Economic Community, but focuses primarily on the debates that occurred between 2013 when David Cameron pledged to hold a referendum up and the 2019 UK General Election. Section one briefly introduces the topic. Section two examines the rise of social hatred during the referendum campaign. It focuses on the history of British euro-scepticism, the immediate context of the Brexit campaign, concerns over UK sovereignty and immigration, and the increasing use of threats and political violence. Section three examines the decline of trust in politics due to the increasing failure to challenge lies in the Brexit debate. It explores the idea of "Project Fear", the anti-expert narrative, and the anti-elitism narrative. Section four asks what this period tells us about UK democracy. It focuses on weak and disorderly government, the democratic status of the referendum, the erosion of trust in parliamentary institutions and mechanisms, and some reasons for (limited) optimism. The article concludes by considering possible ways forward for the UK government and polity following the decisive Conservative victory in the 2019 UK General Election. ; This article analyses the Brexit debate within the UK. It examines the historical roots of the debate from 1973 when the UK joined the European Economic Community, but focuses primarily on the debates that occurred between 2013 when David Cameron pledged to hold a referendum up and the 2019 UK General Election. Section one briefly introduces the topic. Section two examines the rise of social hatred during the referendum campaign. It focuses on the history of British euro-scepticism, the immediate context of the Brexit campaign, concerns over UK sovereignty and immigration, and the increasing use of threats and political violence. Section three examines the decline of trust in politics due to the increasing failure to challenge lies in the Brexit debate. It explores the idea of "Project Fear", the anti-expert narrative, and the anti-elitism narrative. Section four asks what this period tells us about UK democracy. It focuses on weak and disorderly government, the democratic status of the referendum, the erosion of trust in parliamentary institutions and mechanisms, and some reasons for (limited) optimism. The article concludes by considering possible ways forward for the UK government and polity following the decisive Conservative victory in the 2019 UK General Election.

Adapted from the source document.

After the restoration of independence of Lithuania the legal basis and administrative structures of heritage preservation were changed many times, though the maintenance, use and state of heritage were not improved, and its decay did not decrease. Undemocratic and inhumane legal basis and management of heritage preservation based on restrictions, prohibitions and penalties without any compensatory incentives for imposed restrictions and economic disadvantages increasingly raises discontent not only from society but also from heritage owners and users.The owners and users of land where heritage objects are situated realize that their property can be used more efficiently and profitably and that social and economic restrictions imposed by heritage protection regulations contravene their rights. Instead of investing into preservation of heritage objects, owners usually attempt to get rid of them.Conflicts between heritage preservation institutions, owners of heritage objects and society are especially inherent in historic city centers where commercial interests are expanding and master plans and development projects propose intensive modernization and development of high rise buildings.Countries with long-lasting democracy traditions are looking for solutions how, without contradicting heritage preservation ethics and social justice, to encourage owners and users of heritage objects to protect and use rationally the legacy inherited from the past simultaneously retaining and stimulating vitality of historic centers and improving quality of life of their inhabitants.The problem is multipartite and ambivalent. Only changes and improvements in heritage preservation systems enacted in latter years in the countries of stable democracy, emphasizing the problem of development and protection ethics, the questions of respect of heritage values and implementation of social justice in juridical and practical heritage preservation activities are discussed in the paper.

After the restoration of independence of Lithuania the legal basis and administrative structures of heritage preservation were changed many times, though the maintenance, use and state of heritage were not improved, and its decay did not decrease. Undemocratic and inhumane legal basis and management of heritage preservation based on restrictions, prohibitions and penalties without any compensatory incentives for imposed restrictions and economic disadvantages increasingly raises discontent not only from society but also from heritage owners and users.The owners and users of land where heritage objects are situated realize that their property can be used more efficiently and profitably and that social and economic restrictions imposed by heritage protection regulations contravene their rights. Instead of investing into preservation of heritage objects, owners usually attempt to get rid of them.Conflicts between heritage preservation institutions, owners of heritage objects and society are especially inherent in historic city centers where commercial interests are expanding and master plans and development projects propose intensive modernization and development of high rise buildings.Countries with long-lasting democracy traditions are looking for solutions how, without contradicting heritage preservation ethics and social justice, to encourage owners and users of heritage objects to protect and use rationally the legacy inherited from the past simultaneously retaining and stimulating vitality of historic centers and improving quality of life of their inhabitants.The problem is multipartite and ambivalent. Only changes and improvements in heritage preservation systems enacted in latter years in the countries of stable democracy, emphasizing the problem of development and protection ethics, the questions of respect of heritage values and implementation of social justice in juridical and practical heritage preservation activities are discussed in the paper.

After the restoration of independence of Lithuania the legal basis and administrative structures of heritage preservation were changed many times, though the maintenance, use and state of heritage were not improved, and its decay did not decrease. Undemocratic and inhumane legal basis and management of heritage preservation based on restrictions, prohibitions and penalties without any compensatory incentives for imposed restrictions and economic disadvantages increasingly raises discontent not only from society but also from heritage owners and users.The owners and users of land where heritage objects are situated realize that their property can be used more efficiently and profitably and that social and economic restrictions imposed by heritage protection regulations contravene their rights. Instead of investing into preservation of heritage objects, owners usually attempt to get rid of them.Conflicts between heritage preservation institutions, owners of heritage objects and society are especially inherent in historic city centers where commercial interests are expanding and master plans and development projects propose intensive modernization and development of high rise buildings.Countries with long-lasting democracy traditions are looking for solutions how, without contradicting heritage preservation ethics and social justice, to encourage owners and users of heritage objects to protect and use rationally the legacy inherited from the past simultaneously retaining and stimulating vitality of historic centers and improving quality of life of their inhabitants.The problem is multipartite and ambivalent. Only changes and improvements in heritage preservation systems enacted in latter years in the countries of stable democracy, emphasizing the problem of development and protection ethics, the questions of respect of heritage values and implementation of social justice in juridical and practical heritage preservation activities are discussed in the paper.

After the restoration of independence of Lithuania the legal basis and administrative structures of heritage preservation were changed many times, though the maintenance, use and state of heritage were not improved, and its decay did not decrease. Undemocratic and inhumane legal basis and management of heritage preservation based on restrictions, prohibitions and penalties without any compensatory incentives for imposed restrictions and economic disadvantages increasingly raises discontent not only from society but also from heritage owners and users.The owners and users of land where heritage objects are situated realize that their property can be used more efficiently and profitably and that social and economic restrictions imposed by heritage protection regulations contravene their rights. Instead of investing into preservation of heritage objects, owners usually attempt to get rid of them.Conflicts between heritage preservation institutions, owners of heritage objects and society are especially inherent in historic city centers where commercial interests are expanding and master plans and development projects propose intensive modernization and development of high rise buildings.Countries with long-lasting democracy traditions are looking for solutions how, without contradicting heritage preservation ethics and social justice, to encourage owners and users of heritage objects to protect and use rationally the legacy inherited from the past simultaneously retaining and stimulating vitality of historic centers and improving quality of life of their inhabitants.The problem is multipartite and ambivalent. Only changes and improvements in heritage preservation systems enacted in latter years in the countries of stable democracy, emphasizing the problem of development and protection ethics, the questions of respect of heritage values and implementation of social justice in juridical and practical heritage preservation activities are discussed in the paper.

Adapted from the source document.

We can name three Christian democratic ideology parties on Lithuania political scene: Christian Democratic Party of Lithuania, Christian Democrats Union and Modern Christian Democrats. Modern Christian Democrats seceded from the matrix (parent) party of Lithuanian Christian Democrats in 2000. Analyzing the Christian democracy process in post- communistic Lithuania it is important to state that it is one of the trends under a tradition which is difficult to assign to right or left economic frames. The Christian Democrats parties were named leftist because they contradicted the liberals and they aspired to limit the economic capital influence on politics in the XXth century. After few decades the main opponents of the right parties were socialists and the policy contemptuous human rights. The experience of politic democracy accumulated in the period of Lithuania between the two wars was a relevant factor in for mation of the contemporary system of political parties. In 1989 restored the Party of Lithuanian Christian Democrats became unambiguous reforms orientated and was classified as a right party. Experience of democracy of the party in inwar Lithuania was also a meaningful factor which formed the modernist party system. The Christian Democrats Party of Lithuania (Lietuvos krikscionių demokratų partija, LKDP) - 16 seats – was founded in 1905 and re-established in 1989 likewise the Homeland Union the Christian democrats are right of centre. Prior to the 1996 elections the party had agreed to form a coalition with the conservatives (even though it stands closer to the social democrats of the LSDP regarding economic issues). Some time in 1994 the Christian democrats were very popular - exactly when the Homeland Union became more radical. Lithuanian Christian democracy can be proud of its past experience and its successful activity after reestablishing the independence.[.].

We can name three Christian democratic ideology parties on Lithuania political scene: Christian Democratic Party of Lithuania, Christian Democrats Union and Modern Christian Democrats. Modern Christian Democrats seceded from the matrix (parent) party of Lithuanian Christian Democrats in 2000. Analyzing the Christian democracy process in post- communistic Lithuania it is important to state that it is one of the trends under a tradition which is difficult to assign to right or left economic frames. The Christian Democrats parties were named leftist because they contradicted the liberals and they aspired to limit the economic capital influence on politics in the XXth century. After few decades the main opponents of the right parties were socialists and the policy contemptuous human rights. The experience of politic democracy accumulated in the period of Lithuania between the two wars was a relevant factor in for mation of the contemporary system of political parties. In 1989 restored the Party of Lithuanian Christian Democrats became unambiguous reforms orientated and was classified as a right party. Experience of democracy of the party in inwar Lithuania was also a meaningful factor which formed the modernist party system. The Christian Democrats Party of Lithuania (Lietuvos krikscionių demokratų partija, LKDP) - 16 seats – was founded in 1905 and re-established in 1989 likewise the Homeland Union the Christian democrats are right of centre. Prior to the 1996 elections the party had agreed to form a coalition with the conservatives (even though it stands closer to the social democrats of the LSDP regarding economic issues). Some time in 1994 the Christian democrats were very popular - exactly when the Homeland Union became more radical. Lithuanian Christian democracy can be proud of its past experience and its successful activity after reestablishing the independence.[.].

We can name three Christian democratic ideology parties on Lithuania political scene: Christian Democratic Party of Lithuania, Christian Democrats Union and Modern Christian Democrats. Modern Christian Democrats seceded from the matrix (parent) party of Lithuanian Christian Democrats in 2000. Analyzing the Christian democracy process in post- communistic Lithuania it is important to state that it is one of the trends under a tradition which is difficult to assign to right or left economic frames. The Christian Democrats parties were named leftist because they contradicted the liberals and they aspired to limit the economic capital influence on politics in the XXth century. After few decades the main opponents of the right parties were socialists and the policy contemptuous human rights. The experience of politic democracy accumulated in the period of Lithuania between the two wars was a relevant factor in for mation of the contemporary system of political parties. In 1989 restored the Party of Lithuanian Christian Democrats became unambiguous reforms orientated and was classified as a right party. Experience of democracy of the party in inwar Lithuania was also a meaningful factor which formed the modernist party system. The Christian Democrats Party of Lithuania (Lietuvos krikscionių demokratų partija, LKDP) - 16 seats – was founded in 1905 and re-established in 1989 likewise the Homeland Union the Christian democrats are right of centre. Prior to the 1996 elections the party had agreed to form a coalition with the conservatives (even though it stands closer to the social democrats of the LSDP regarding economic issues). Some time in 1994 the Christian democrats were very popular - exactly when the Homeland Union became more radical. Lithuanian Christian democracy can be proud of its past experience and its successful activity after reestablishing the independence.[.].

Turkey has adopted the presidential system over parliamentarism in 2018 with the promise that the new system would bring more stability, democracy, and economic growth. As being the most recent country which changed its government system through a referendum to presidentialism, Turkey constitutes a very important example to be analyzed in order to see the effects of it after a long-adopted parliamentary period in the 21st century. This paper compares the basic features of democracy as well as the democratic presidential systems with the example of Turkey and aims at finding out if the presidentialism has performed well and if not, why, in the light of examples and chosen indicators. Findings of this study suggest that presidential system led to a "consolidation of power" which in its nature is anti-democratic. Analysis of certain indicators show that presidentialism did not perform well in Turkey on democratic, political as well as economic fronts.

In actual legal and political conditions in Poland it has been assumed that in decision-making processes in an enterprise in the first place participate, as representatives of the employees' interests: a self-government of a crew, a Party organization, a trade union. In economic praxis, it created complicated problems, since it is very difficult to draw distinct lines separating the areas of activity of those organizations. The research indicates that despite quite large competences of a self-government, its participation in management activities is not big (a very big influence on decision-making: a general assembly of a crew and the employees' council — 8.9% of answers). The most important decisive body is a chief executive director — 35.3°/o of answers. In effect, formal institutions which might have created conditions to develop industrial democracy do not function according to the expectations and consequently, an increase in the position and authority of an enterprise director has been noted in 1988 in comparison with previous years. As a result of those changes, cooperation between a director, a Party organization and a trade union does not develop adequately. The cooperation is the best between a director and a Party organization — 16.6% of positive indications. Among workers a view prevails that the organizations which are to be the workers' representations in decision-making processes do not meet such expectations. It was only o 9% of respondents who indicated that a party organization represents the workers' interests. 12.9% of respondents were of the same opinion with respect to a self-government of a crew and the employees' council. At the same time workers declare little interest in taking posts in self-government organs; in effect, not always the best people are candidates for seats in the employees' council. The workers, however, want to have a much greater influence than they have now on decisions concerning their workplaces (26.9%) as well as on their participating in taking decisions concerning the collective work (30.6%). It seems apparent that the increase in employees' democracy depends on organizational and legal conditions and, in the first place, requires the change of attitudes among workers and the managing staff. It is also necessary to increase the self-dependence of enterprises in financial matters and to reduce the degree of their subordination to the economic center. Moreover, there arises the need to establish self-government structures on a supra-enterprise level, eg. the Self-Government Chamber in the Sejm (Parliament). ; Digitalizacja i deponowanie archiwalnych zeszytów RPEiS sfinansowane przez MNiSW w ramach realizacji umowy nr 541/P-DUN/2016