Suchergebnisse

A reading of David Hume with the intent to highlight components of a reformistic approach to social change. The well-known formulation about "reason as the slave of passions" poses the first problem. In spite of this, it is maintained that reason plays a decisive role in Hume's theory of knowledge as in his practice as a political philosopher. Connected with this problem is Hume's skepticism, which is based on the discovery of the logical impossibility of inductive inference. However, this theoretical skepticism does not lead to defeatism regarding the possibility of improving knowledge & society; it just leads to modesty &, paradoxically, to an even more important role for reason. A parallel to Hume's criticism of induction is his demonstration of the impossibility of deducing values from facts. Again, it is necessary to notice the difference between his theoretical position & his recommendations for politics. The task of the historian is to give a causal explanation of social institutions &, on the basis of this, point out values inherent in the institutions. This gives the instrument for a rational discussion of maintaining or reforming the institutions. Obviously, Hume is a relativist, but not in the usual & careless meaning of individual or collective subjectivism. Values are produced by men in a historical process, but as they stand before the historian & the politician, they are as objective as facts. Finally, it is worth mentioning that Hume with his view of the importance of an informed & critical discussion of social problems comes close to critical-rationalism. 28 References. Adapted from the source document.