Suchergebnisse

This Country Partnership Framework (CPF) covers the five-year period FY16-20. Anchored in the government's medium-term development plan as outlined in a January 2015 Cabinet of Ministers Program of Action, it also reflects the analysis and recommendations of the World Bank Group's (WBG) 2015 Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) for Uzbekistan and the lessons learned from the Completion Report of the previous CPS. The CPF's objectives and program, which focus on developing the conditions for faster job creation, are consistent with the WBG's twin goals of eliminating extreme poverty and boosting shared prosperity. The Uzbekistan Systemic Country Diagnostic (SCD) identified ten priority areas that would need to be addressed to eliminate poverty, boost shared prosperity, and enable Uzbekistan to reach upper middle-income status. The government's strategic objectives are for Uzbekistan to achieve upper middleincome status by 2030, implying income growth averaging 6 percent annually, and in particular to create 500,000 jobs annually. Building country systems for statistical, fiduciary, safeguard, and statistical capacity underlie the foundation of this CPF. The CPF program will remain flexible as circumstances change and new opportunities may arise.

The Education for All (EFA) initiative depends on students being taught by suitably and sufficiently trained teachers. But time-on-task studies conducted in low-income countries show that relatively little time is being spent on instruction, including the critical teaching of reading. Teachers may be absent often and may avoid teaching when in school (Abadzi 2007). They may engage with the few students who can do the work, neglecting the rest (Llambiri 2006, Abadzi and Llambiri 2011). They may fail to use textbooks even when they exist and spend class time copying on the blackboard. The same issues affect supervisors and principals (Abadzi 2006). As a result, students may graduate or drop out illiterate. The investments in teacher training are potentially valuable, but need to be linked to results. Thus far evidence is limited. Preservice training often lasts 6-9 months compared to 3-4 years in higher-income countries and may be insufficient to remedy students' academic deficits or teach them how to teach. The poor results have disappointed governments and donors. The persistent teacher training problems worldwide make it imperative to seek new means for changing behaviors, particularly for poorly paid teachers with limited education. This must be done relatively quickly and efficiently so that teachers can impart basic skills to their students. Since feasible educational methods seem to have been exhausted, it is useful to look for solutions in the field that studies behavior. Even for better educated teachers in lower-income countries, the capacity for formulating and solving complex problems such as those presented in teaching real classrooms may be limited compared to some 'ideal' model (Feldon 2007).

Importantes falencias en los procedimientos de licenciamiento ambiental en Colombia se relacionan directamente con la degradación generalizada de sus franjas costeras y zonas litorales. Estas áreas se encuentran afectadas severamente por intervenciones humanas que interfieren con los procesos naturales y modifican sustancialmente sus balances sedimentarios, contextos geomorfológicos y condiciones físico-bióticas. Entre muchos otros ejemplos, se destacan: a) La erosión generalizada y la destrucción de playas y dunas en el delta del Río Magdalena, asociadas a la construcción de los tajamares de Bocas de Ceniza; b) La modificación drástica de la hidrodinámica de los litorales de los departamentos del Atlántico y Magdalena por proyectos de infraestructura lineal; c) la híper-salinización y pérdida de más de 30,000 hectáreas de manglar en el complejo lagunar de la Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta (CGSM) debido a la expansión de la frontera agrícola e infraestructura lineal d) el retroceso acelerado de playas y acantilados en el Caribe sur, debido a actividades como la deforestación, extracción de materiales de playa y construcción desordenada y caótica de cerca de 500 obras de defensa costera; y e) La salinización de más de 10,000 hectáreas de pantanos de agua dulce en la Bahía de Cispatá, como consecuencia de la formación inducida del nuevo delta de Tinajones. En este sentido, la ubicación de infraestructura en terrenos geológica y geomorfológicamente inestables, afectados por fenómenos como la subsidencia costera y el diapirismo de lodos, plantea amenazas y riesgos naturales de primer orden. Este es un panorama palpable en el presente y futuro de zonas urbanas y rurales de ciudades como Barranquilla, Cartagena, Arboletes y Necoclí, todas ellas con desarrollos futuros (industria, puertos, urbanísticos) de la mayor importancia. Los costos ambientales asociados a intervenciones como las mencionadas son incalculables, sin contar la existencia de otros numerosos ejemplos, que evidencian entre otros factores un insuficiente reconocimiento a la geomofología en la evaluación, seguimiento y control de las intervenciones humanas en el entorno marino-costero. Estas funciones de manejo ambiental en Colombia se surten por medio del procedimiento de licenciamiento ambiental, que están a cargo de autoridades de orden nacional y regional según la Ley 99 de 1993. En el contexto anterior, se plantean las siguientes preguntas de investigación:  ¿Qué elementos del licenciamiento ambiental de intervenciones en ambientes costeros pueden mejorarse, dando prioridad a los contextos geomorfológicos particulares de las zonas de intervención?  ¿Cómo ha evolucionado el sistema regulatorio en Colombia con respecto a las intervenciones humanas sobre los ambientes costeros? 20  ¿Qué mejoras técnicas se pueden hacer al marco regulatorio colombiano para guiar la evaluación, seguimiento y control de intervenciones humanas desde el enfoque geomorfológico de susceptibilidad? Este trabajo examina el marco regulatorio ambiental que actualmente rige en las zonas costeras colombianas, a través de dos niveles geográficos. En un primer nivel macro se caracterizan y analizan las intervenciones humanas en el litoral Caribe continental, región que representa una muestra significativa del contexto colombiano por sus mayores niveles de ocupación humana y consecuentes perturbaciones antropogénicas. En un segundo nivel, de mayor detalle, se define e ilustra el enfoque conceptual y metodológico que resulta de esta investigación, con la demostración en una de las unidades ambientales costeras definidas por el decreto 1120 de 2013 para el manejo costero integrado. Para responder a los interrogantes planteados, el Capítulo I introduce brevemente la evolución geomorfológica histórica de los litorales colombianos desde finales del siglo XVIII. En este "abrebocas" se evidencia la compleja geología y geomorfología de las costas Caribe y Pacífico de Colombia, en las cuales islas-barrera deltaicas de bajo relieve y manglares contrastan con relieves rocosos escarpados, acantilados y amplias plataformas costeras emergidas y sumergidas. La evolución histórica de los litorales colombianos involucra cambios en la línea de costa estimados en cientos de metros, a tasas máximas de 40 metros al año (Punta Rey, Arboletes, Bahía de Tumaco), y pérdidas y ganancias de terrenos del orden de decenas de kilómetros cuadrados (Ciénaga de Mallorquín, Isla Cascajo, Delta de Tinajones-Bahía de Cispatá, Golfo de Urabá, Delta de los ríos San Juan y Patía). Estos casos reflejan variaciones drásticas en los balances de sedimentos del litoral, muchos de ellos provocados o influenciados por acciones humanas, como infraestructura para la navegación, modificación de cauces y obras de protección costera. El Capítulo II identifica la perspectiva geomorfológica en el licenciamiento ambiental de intervenciones costeras en Colombia, a partir de su comparación con los marcos regulatorios de Italia, España y Cuba. Las entrevistas y revisiones documentales destacaron 59 intervenciones asociadas con usos y actividades humanas en las zonas costeras, cuya obligatoriedad para el licenciamiento varía entre países. Los procesos geomorfológicos naturales también fueron analizados dentro de los criterios técnicos incluidos en las directrices oficiales para estudios ambientales. Se concluye que, a pesar de la aceptación mundial de las evaluaciones de impacto ambiental como procedimiento de licenciamiento, su aplicación es aún muy diversa y limitada en cuanto a la pertinencia de los procesos geomorfológicos costeros. Por consiguiente, se identifican siete buenas prácticas para la evaluación y el control de los impactos antropogénicos en la zona costera y se introduce un nuevo enfoque, orientado en procesos, para los procedimientos de licenciamiento ambiental. 21 En el Capítulo III se hace un inventario y se caracterizan las intervenciones humanas sobre la costa continental del Caribe colombiano, para establecer una línea base regional. A partir de imágenes de Google Earth, se ubicaron un total de 2,742 obras y actividades, que representan 29 tipos diferentes de intervenciones humanas. Este inventario se complementó con una evaluación del impacto general de cada intervención, en función de cuatro atributos de sus efectos geomorfológicos, a saber, extensión, intensidad, reversibilidad y persistencia. Los tres tipos de intervenciones humana más comunes (asentamientos de baja densidad, espolones y asentamientos de lujo con muelle) fueron también los más impactantes. Sin embargo, algunas intervenciones (por ejemplo, asentamientos de alta densidad o infraestructura vial) tuvieron valores de impacto ambiental más altos que otras más frecuentes. A partir de este análisis exhaustivo del Caribe colombiano, en el Capítulo IV se evalúa el marco regulatorio ambiental nacional aplicable a las áreas costeras. Se evidencia que el procedimiento de licenciamiento en Colombia actualmente solo regula cuatro de los diez tipos de intervenciones con mayor efecto en las zonas costeras colombianas. También se resalta que el número de obras y actividades cubiertas en cada nueva reforma legislativa disminuyó constantemente con el tiempo. Adicionalmente, se extrajeron tres implicaciones políticas para la planificación costera y oceánica, relacionadas con: a) la diversidad geográfica de las zonas costeras tropicales; b) la necesidad de instrumentos de capacidad de carga territorial; y c) la falta de articulación de los instrumentos de planificación territorial. Las conclusiones identifican una brecha importante entre la toma de decisiones técnicas y políticas en el marco regulatorio ambiental de Colombia, lo que subraya la necesidad de diseñar nuevos métodos para evaluar la amplitud y la dimensión de la dinámica geomorfológica en un contexto de manejo ambiental. Por consiguiente, los capítulos anteriores resaltan tres deficiencias importantes en Colombia, con respecto al manejo ambiental de intervenciones humanas en zonas costeras: 1) la ausencia de una estrategia para determinar intervenciones que requieren un procedimiento de licencia ambiental (screening); 2) una deficiente definición del alcance de los estudios ambientales a través de requisitos de información pertinentes (scoping); y 3) la desarticulación de los instrumentos de gestión ambiental, como la planificación territorial y las licencias ambientales. Todos estos elementos ratifican que el marco regulatorio ambiental en Colombia ha sido insuficiente hasta la fecha para manejar el impacto antropogénico en los ambientes costeros, debido a que no se tiene en cuenta la susceptibilidad natural al efecto de las intervenciones humanas. En este trabajo se define susceptibilidad como la predisposición de una unidad ambiental (sistema socio-natural) para experimentar cambios o afectaciones debido a la introducción de una intervención humana. Con el fin de proponer mejoras al sistema ambiental colombiano, el Capítulo V plantea un nuevo modelo conceptual y metodológico para guiar la evaluación, el seguimiento y el control de los 22 impactos humanos desde una perspectiva geomorfológica. Este producto novedoso se ha denominado Susceptibilidad a las Intervenciones Humanas con fines de Licenciamiento Ambiental (SHIELP en inglés). La arquitectura de este modelo tiene tres componentes, que son particulares para un tipo de entorno, a saber, procesos geomorfológicos, configuraciones geomorfológicas e intervenciones humanas potencialmente impactantes. Cada uno de estos componentes se traduce en una variable por medio de calificaciones de expertos y el cálculo de lógica difusa. Por lo tanto, el sistema experto-difuso SHIELP cuantifica la susceptibilidad de una geoforma distintiva a los efectos de un tipo característico de intervención humana, a través de la perturbación estimada en cada proceso geomorfológico que configura el tipo de ambiente en estudio. Como demostración, este capítulo también documenta el diseño del sistema experto-difuso para ambientes costeros, esbozado en talleres de investigación con miembros del Instituto de Investigaciones Marinas y Costeras "José Benito Vives de Andréis"- INVEMAR. El rol que cumple este instituto como asesor oficial de las autoridades ambientales en cuestiones de evaluación de impacto, demuestran su pertinencia para soportar la base de conocimiento experto del modelo. Como resultado, el modelo SHIELP se aplicó con los parámetros establecidos para los entornos costeros, derivando en una base de datos de valores de susceptibilidad para 4,524 interacciones (configuración litoral frente a intervención). La aplicabilidad real de este ejercicio corresponde a la traducción de esta base de datos en un criterio técnico para mejorar el marco regulatorio colombiano. Por un lado, cinco rangos de susceptibilidad se vincularon a cinco instrumentos diferenciados, dos de los cuales articulan el licenciamiento ambiental con planes territoriales, mientras que los otros diferencian el tipo licenciamiento pertinente según las propiedades de ubicación de la intervención (screening). Por otro lado, los instrumentos diferenciados también se combinaron con cuatro grados de requisitos de información para la definición del alcance en los estudios ambientales respectivos (scoping). De esta manera, el valor de susceptibilidad de una intervención dada en una configuración determinada (interacción) se ajusta a un rango percentilico que establece la competencia territorial (regional o nacional) para su control ambiental, así como un instrumento de licencia específico con requisitos de información diferenciados para la definición de la línea base ambiental. Finalmente, la operación del modelo SHIELP se demostró con un estudio de caso: la unidad ambiental costera Rio Magdalena - complejo Canal del Dique - sistema lagunar Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta. La información geográfica de esta unidad costera regional se interpretó de acuerdo con los parámetros definidos en el modelo SHIELP para ambientes costeros. Se delimitaron 154 polígonos en el área de estudio, de acuerdo con las 40 configuraciones litorales identificadas. Como resultado, 13 mapas cartográficos representan esta área, con los niveles de susceptibilidad atribuidos a cada configuración para las 52 intervenciones potencialmente impactantes. A fin de ilustrar la aplicabilidad del modelo, se presentan cuatro escenarios para discriminar las 23 intervenciones por instrumento de manejo ambiental (screening) y para definir los requerimientos de información sobre procesos geomorfológicos (scoping). De esta manera el modelo SHIELP especifica el instrumento de licenciamiento ambiental para las intervenciones humanas y el alcance correspondiente del estudio técnico requerido, dadas las características de su interacción con la configuración gemorfológica. Las Conclusiones Generales documentan reflexiones y recomendaciones al Sistema Nacional Ambiental colombiano (SINA) para implementar los resultados de esta investigación. Además, este trabajo abre una perspectiva amplia para futuras investigaciones en el enfoque de la susceptibilidad al efecto de las intervenciones humanas. El modelo SHIELP para entornos costeros se puede replicar en diversas geografías para articular progresivamente una base de datos nacional de susceptibilidad costera. Asimismo, el esquema metodológico presentado puede aplicarse en diferentes tipos de entornos, distintos de la zona costera. La ampliación de este enfoque de susceptibilidad geomorfológica sobre la variedad de ecosistemas tropicales, establecería el camino para una transición exitosa desde la actual concepción antropocéntrica y orientada a la fragmentación, hacia una aproximación del manejo basado en los ecosistemas. ; Important flaws in the environmental licensing procedures in Colombia are directly related to the generalized degradation of its coastal fringes and littoral zones. These areas are severely affected by human interventions that interfere with natural processes and severely modify their sedimentary balances, geomorphological contexts, and physical-biotic conditions. Among many other examples, the following stand out: a) the widespread erosion and destruction of beaches and dunes in the Magdalena River delta, associated with the construction of the Bocas de Ceniza jetties; b) the drastic modification of the hydrodynamics of the littorals at the Atlantic and Magdalena departments due to linear infrastructure projects; c) the hyper-salinization and loss of more than 30,000 hectares of mangrove in the lagoon complex of the Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta (CGSM) due to the expansion of the agricultural frontier and linear infrastructure projects; d) the accelerated retreat of beaches and cliffs in the southern Caribbean, due to activities such as deforestation, beach material extraction, and disordered and chaotic construction of nearly 500 rigid shore protection works; and e) the salinization of more than 10,000 hectares of freshwater marshes in the Bay of Cispatá as a consequence of the induced formation of the new delta of Tinajones. In this sense, the location of infrastructure in geological and geomorphologically unstable lands, affected by phenomena such as coastal subsidence and mud diapirism, poses first order natural threats and risks. This is a palpable panorama in the present and future of urban and rural areas of cities such as Barranquilla, Cartagena, Arboletes and Necoclí, all of them with future developments (industry, ports, urban development) of the greatest importance. The environmental costs associated with such interventions are incalculable, not counting the existence of numerous other examples, which demonstrate among other factors an insufficient acknowledgment to geomorphology in the evaluation, monitoring, and control of human interventions in the marine-coastal environment. These environmental management functions in Colombia are provided through the environmental licensing procedure, which rests upon national and regional authorities according to Law 99 of 1993. In the above context, the following research questions arise:  What elements of the environmental licensing of interventions in coastal environments can be improved, giving priority to the particular geomorphological contexts of the intervention zones?  How has the regulatory system evolved in Colombia with respect to human interventions on coastal environments?  What technical improvements can be made to the Colombian regulatory framework to guide the evaluation, monitoring, and control of human interventions from the geomorphological approach of susceptibility? This research work examines the environmental regulatory framework that currently governs Colombian coastal zones, through two geographic levels. At the first macro level, human interventions 16 are characterized and analyzed on the continental Caribbean coast, a region that represents a significant sample of the Colombian context due to its higher levels of human occupation and consequent anthropogenic disturbances. At a second level, in greater detail, the conceptual and methodological approach resulting from this research is defined and illustrated, with the demonstration in one of the coastal environmental units defined by decree 1120 of 2013 for integrated coastal management. To answer the questions raised, Chapter I briefly introduces the historical geomorphological evolution of the Colombian coastlines since the end of the XVIII century. The complex geology and geomorphology of the Caribbean and Pacific coasts of Colombia are evident in this "appetizer", in which low-relief deltaic islands and mangroves contrast with steep rocky reliefs, cliffs and wide emerged and submerged coastal platforms. The historical evolution of the Colombian littorals involves changes in the coastline estimated in hundreds of meters, at maximum rates of 40 meters a year (Punta Rey, Arboletes, Tumaco Bay), and land losses and gains of the order of tens of square kilometers (Ciénaga de Mallorquín, Isla Cascajo, Tinajorenas Delta - Cispatá, Bay, Urabá Gulf, San Juan and Patía river deltas). These cases reflect drastic variations in the sediment balances of the coast, many of them caused or heavily influenced by human actions, such as navigation infrastructure, modification of river courses and coastal protection works. Chapter II identifies the geomorphological perspective in the environmental licensing of coastal interventions in Colombia, based on its comparison with the regulatory frameworks of Italy, Spain, and Cuba. The interviews and documentary reviews highlighted 59 interventions associated with human uses and activities in the coastal zones, whose compulsory nature for the licensing varies among countries. The natural geomorphological processes were also analyzed within the technical criteria included in the official guidelines for environmental studies. It is concluded that, despite the worldwide acceptance of environmental impact assessments through a licensing procedure, their application in coastal environments is still very diverse and limited in terms of the pertinence of the geomorphological processes that configures the coast. Therefore, seven good practices for the evaluation and control of anthropogenic impacts in the coastal zone are underlined, and a new process-oriented approach is introduced for environmental licensing procedures. In Chapter III, an inventory and characterization of human interventions on the continental coast of the Colombian Caribbean are documented, to establish a regional baseline. Based on images from Google Earth, a total of 2,742 works and activities were located, representing 29 different types of human interventions. This inventory was complemented with an evaluation of the general impact of each intervention, based on four attributes of its geomorphological effects, namely, extension, intensity, reversibility, and persistence. The three most common types of human interventions (low-density settlements, groins and luxury settlements with dock) were also the ones with the higher environmental impact. However, some interventions (e.g., high-density settlements or road infrastructure) had higher environmental impact values than more frequent ones. 17 Based on this exhaustive analysis of the Colombian Caribbean, Chapter IV evaluates the national environmental regulatory framework applicable to coastal areas. It evidences that the licensing procedure in Colombia currently regulates only four of the ten types of interventions with greater effect in the Colombian coastal zones. Also, the number of works and activities covered in each new legislative reform consistently decreased over time. In addition, three policy implications were extracted for coastal and ocean planning, related to a) the geographic diversity of tropical coastal zones; b) the need for territorial carrying capacity instruments and; c) the lack of articulation of territorial planning instruments. The conclusions identify an important gap between technical and political decision making in the environmental regulatory framework of Colombia, which stresses the need for the design of novel methods to assess the breadth and length of geomorphological dynamics in an environmental management context. Therefore, the previous chapters highlight three important deficiencies in Colombia, with respect to the environmental management of human interventions in coastal areas: 1) the absence of a strategy to determine interventions that require an environmental licensing procedure (screening); 2) a poor definition of the scope of environmental studies through relevant information requirements (scoping) and; 3) the disarticulation of environmental management instruments, such as territorial planning and environmental licenses. All these elements ratify that the environmental regulatory framework in Colombia has been insufficient to date to manage the anthropogenic impact in coastal environments due to the unawareness of the natural susceptibility to the effect of human interventions. In this work, the susceptibility is defined as the predisposition of an environmental unit (socio-natural system) to experience changes or affectation due to the introduction of human interventions. In order to propose improvements to the Colombian environmental system, Chapter V establishes a new conceptual and methodological approach to guide the evaluation, monitoring, and control of human impacts from a geomorphological perspective. This novel product has been called Susceptibility to Human Interventions for Environmental Licensing Purposes (SHIELP). The architecture of this model has three components, which are particular to a kind of environment, namely, geomorphological processes, geomorphological configurations and potentially impacting human interventions. Each of these components is translated into a variable by means of expert qualifications along with a fuzzy logic computation strategy. Therefore, the expert-diffuse system SHIELP qualifies the susceptibility of a distinctive landform to the effects of a characteristic type of human intervention, through the estimated perturbation in each geomorphological process that configures the kind of environment under study. As a demonstration, this chapter also documents the design of the expert-diffuse system for coastal environments, drafted from research workshops with members of the marine and coastal research institute INVEMAR (In Spanish: Instituto de Investigaciones Marinas y Costeras "José Benito Vives de Andréis"). The role of this institute as an official adviser to the environmental authorities in matters of impact assessment demonstrates its relevance to support the expert-knowledge base of the model. 18 As a consequence, the SHIELP model was applied with the parameters established for coastal environments, resulting in a database of susceptibility values for 4,524 interactions (littoral configuration vs intervention). The real applicability of this exercise corresponds to the translation of this database into a technical criterion to improve the Colombian regulatory framework. On the one hand, five susceptibility ranges were linked to five differentiated instruments, two of which articulate environmental licensing with territorial plans, while the others differentiate the pertinent degree of licensing for human interventions according to location properties (screening). On the other hand, the differentiated instruments were also combined with four degrees of information requirements for the definition of the scope in the respective environmental studies (scoping). In this way, the susceptibility value of a given intervention in a given configuration (interaction) would fit a percentile range that places its environmental control in a territorial competence (regional or national), and through a specific licensing instrument, with differentiated information requirements for the baseline definition. Finally, the operation of the SHIELP model was also demonstrated with a case study: the environmental coastal unit Magdalena River - Canal del Dique complex - Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta lagoon system. The geographic information of this regional coastal unit was interpreted according to the parameters defined in the SHIELP model for coastal environments. 154 polygons were delimited in the study area, according to the 40 coastal configurations identified. As a result, 13 cartographic maps represent this area, with the levels of susceptibility attributed to each configuration for the 52 potentially impacting interventions. In order to illustrate the applicability of the model, four scenarios are presented to discriminate interventions by environmental management instrument (screening) and to define information requirements on geomorphological processes (scoping). In this way, the SHIELP model specifies the environmental licensing instrument for human interventions and the corresponding scope of the technical study, given the characteristics of its interaction with the geomorphological configuration. The Overall Conclusions document reflections and recommendations to the Colombian national environmental system – SINA (in Spanish: Sistema Nacional Ambiental) to implement the results of this research. In addition, this work opens a broad perspective for future research in the approach of susceptibility to the effect of human interventions. The SHIELP model for coastal environments can be replicated in different geographies to progressively articulate a national database of coastal susceptibility. Also, the presented methodological scheme can be applied in different kinds of environments, other than the coastal zone. The extension of this approach of geomorphological susceptibility to the variety of tropical ecosystems would set the path for a successful transition from the current anthropocentric and fragmentation-oriented conception towards an ecosystem-based management approach.

This guide accompanies the following article: Matthew W. Hughey, 'The Janus Face of Whiteness: Toward a Cultural Sociology of White Nationalism and White Antiracism', Sociology Compass 3/6 (2009): 920–936, 10.1111/j.1751‐9020.2009.00244.xAuthor's introductionOver the past 20 years, the study of white racial identity has received in‐depth, interdisciplinary attention. Under sociological scrutiny, the study of whiteness has traversed quite a few stages: from understandings of whiteness as a category replete with social privileges, as a mere reflection of non‐racial (often class‐based) dynamics, to its most recent turn that emphasizes the contextual and intersectional heterogeneity of whiteness. Because of the increased attention to context and political disputes, the study of whiteness has never been more amenable to cultural analysis than it is today. Hence, an emphasis on different white racial formations that span a political spectrum – from conservative to liberal and racist to antiracist – is now dominant. In this vein, white nationalists and white antiracists represent the distinct polarities of contemporary inquisitions into white racial identity. Motivated by this academic milieu, this guide offers an overview of the major scholarship that address white nationalism & white antiracism, appropriate online materials, and examples from a sample syllabus. Together, these resources aim to assist in understanding the general processes and contexts that produce 'whiteness' and imbue it with meaning, the social relationships and practices in which white racial identity identities become embedded, and how whiteness simultaneously possesses material and symbolic privileges alongside diverse and seemingly antagonistic experiences.Author recommendsThe complexity of whitenessMcDermott, Monica and Frank L. Samson 2005. 'White Racial and Ethnic Identity in the United States.'Annual Review of Sociology 31: 245–61.Any contemporary apprentice of the sociological study of white racial identity should read this essay. Monica McDermott and her student Frank Samson combine to provide a robust overview of the literature. They walk the tightrope of balancing both a broad coverage of the literature with the depth that key studies necessitate. In so doing, they put a finger on the key dilemma of studying white racial identity today: 'Navigating between the long‐term staying power of white privilege and the multifarious manifestations of the experience of whiteness remains the task of the next era of research on white racial and ethnic identity' (2005: 256).Duster, Troy 2001. 'The 'Morphing' Properties of Whiteness.' Pp. 113–33 in The Making and Unmaking of Whiteness, edited by E. B. Rasmussen, E. Klinenberg, I. J. Nexica and M. Wray. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.In this essay – part of a larger volume on whiteness that I also recommend – Duster synthesizes disparate approaches to the study of whiteness. Demonstrating how some scholars understand white racial identity as a contextual and cognitive category ('fluid'), while some frame whiteness as a structural and fixed category of material privileges ('frozen'), Duster asks 'who is right?' He answers via the metaphor of whiteness‐as‐water. In one moment, whiteness can morph into vapor as a contextual and unstable identity, while the next moment it can instantly transform into a harsh and unyielding form of ice‐like privilege. Duster's essay is an excellent retort for those who argue that we should move 'beyond' race to the utopian realm of color‐blind individualism. Duster demonstrates, although the example of the supposedly egalitarian New Deal, that while race is socially constructed, the legacy of racism remains a historically reproduced and real social fact – denying the existence of race perpetuates racial inequality. Duster closes the chapter with a personal anecdote that grounds the historical example in modern, interactional, and everyday life.Perry, Pamela 2002. Shades of White: White Kids and Racial Identities in High School. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.Perry gives us two ethnographic studies in one – that of two northern California high schools: one located in a predominantly white, if economically diverse, suburb, the other situated in a multiracial urban community. Perry persistently and systematically probes the complexities of white racial identity in the practices and discourses of the youth attending these high schools. She finds that whites in the predominantly white, suburban high school do not see themselves as a unique race and take their racial identity for granted – they understand distinctly white practices as normative rather than as constitutive of a subjective worldview. In contrast, the whites at the multiracial, urban high school possess a more critical and comparative view of race and their own place in the racial order. In sum, Perry argues that whiteness is a set of complex, contradictory, and multiple subject positions.Wray, Matt. 2006. Not Quite White: White Trash and the Boundaries of Whiteness. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.Matt Wray brings the tools of cultural sociology viz‐á‐viz'symbolic boundaries' to the interrogation of the moniker White Trash. Wray problematizes this relatively normalized term to question its origins and how it persists. Drawing upon literary texts, folklore, diaries, medical articles, and social scientific analyses from the early 1700s to the turn of the 20th century, Wray documents the multiple meanings that were projected onto poor rural whites in the United States. Of particular import, Wray demonstrates how white supremacist ideas about class and region became dominant through public health campaigns and eugenic reformations. Impoverished whites found themselves the targets of officials and activists who framed them as 'filthy' or "feebleminded," and thus a threat to the purity and supremacy of the white race. This text is particularly informative for its demonstration of how white supremacist logic was not only focused on racial 'otherness' but used the axes of class and location to directly demarcate and attack those seen as 'white' yet somehow racially deficient and unworthy.Winant, Howard 2004. 'Behind Blue Eyes: Whiteness and Contemporary U.S. Racial Politics.' Pp. 3–16 in Off White: Readings on Race, Power, and Society, edited by Michelle Fine, Lois Weis, Linda C. Powell and April Burns. New York, NY: Routledge.In applying his now classic approach formulated in concert with Michael Omi (Racial Formations, 1986), Howard Winant applies the 'racial projects' thesis to whites: 'I think it would be beneficial to attempt to sort out alternative conceptions of whiteness, along with the politics that both flow from and inform these conceptions. … focusing on five key racial projects, which I term, far right, new right, neoconservative, neoliberal, and new abolitionist' (2004: 6). Hence, Winant maps a theory of white identity formation onto a bifurcated 'culture war.' Labeling this phenomenon 'racial dualism as politics,' Winant advances a paradigm in which whiteness is undergoing 'a profound political crisis.' Winant's essay is especially important for those that wish to emphasize the heterogeneity of white racial identity, as he provides Weberian‐like 'ideal types' for the comprehension of the racial‐political landscape.Hughey, Matthew W. (forthcoming 2010). 'Navigating the (Dis)similarities of White Racial Identities: The Conceptual Framework of "Hegemonic Whiteness."'Ethnic & Racial Studies.In this work, I build upon many of the aforementioned studies. Like Pamela Perry (2002) I dive into two ethnographic sites, but of much different breed. To interrogate how whiteness might be akin to 'vapor and ice' (Duster 2001) and to provide a robust answer to the dilemma of the 'long‐term staying power of white privilege' (McDermott and Samson 2005) alongside the 'political crisis' of whiteness (Winant 2004), I studied a white nationalist and white antiracist organization. Combining over fourteen months of field observations, in‐depth interviews, and content analysis of documents, I found that the varied political and overt ideological orientations of both groups masked striking similarities in how both groups made meaning of whiteness. In particular, these similarities were guided by a collective reliance on reactionary, racist, and essentialist scripts, latent worldviews – and like Wray (2006) – symbolic boundaries. The realization that there remains a shared 'groupness' to outwardly different white identities has the potential to destabilize the recent trend that over‐emphasizes white heterogeneity at the expense of discussion of power, racism, and discrimination. As a resolution to this analytic dilemma, this article advances a conceptual framework entitled 'hegemonic whiteness.' In this model, white racial identity formation is understood as an ongoing process in which (1) racist, reactionary, and essentialist ideologies are used to demarcate inter‐racial boundaries and (2) performances of white racial identity that fail to meet those ideals are marginalized and stigmatized, thereby creating intra‐racial distinctions within the category 'white.'White supremacy & nationalismDobratz, Betty A. and Stephanie L. Shanks‐Meile 1997. The White Separatist Movement in the United States: 'White Power, White Pride!' Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.This is a good place to begin with the study of the white separatist, nationalist, and supremacist movements in the United States. The book is primarily descriptive and quickly debunks the stereotype that the movement is tied to an uneducated and Southern cadre of disenfranchised men. The authors interviewed more than 125 white separatists, attended white power rallies and other white separatist meetings, and examined much of the movement‐generated literature. A major strength of the text is the demonstration of key divisions within the white supremacist movement, most notably religious ideology and views toward gender. However, this high note is often bookended by their overdependence on journalistic‐like description rather than sociological explanation.Zeskind, Leonard. 2009. Blood and Politics: The History of the White Nationalist Movement from the Margins to the Mainstream. New York, NY: Farrar Straus Giroux.This book is a critical companion to Dobratz and Shanks‐Meile (1997). Beginning in the 1950s and taking the reader into the contemporary moment, the text affords a sprawling account of the shifting currents in white nationalism. In both meticulous detail and incredible breadth, the 645‐page tome was composed from Zeskind's 15‐year‐long research of the white nationalist movement – describing in detail how the movement has somewhat successfully moved from the shadows of a stigmatized racist identity to wear the mask of a more 'button‐down' and gentile white nationalism.Ferber, Abby L. 1998. White Man Falling: Race, Gender, and White Supremacy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.Abby Ferber does an excellent job of illuminating white nationalist publications like White Patriot and White Power to clarify not only the racial, but the intersectional weltanschauung of white male nationalists. In so doing, Ferber demonstrates how the concept of 'race' has evolved alongside the development of the white supremacist and nationalist movements. Ferber's empirically based critique unpacks the still‐growing ideological assertion that white men are now the quintessential victims of the social order, and she convincingly demonstrates the repercussions of their attempts to re‐assert white male power. I would be remiss if I did not also point the reader to her follow‐up study: Home‐Grown Hate: Gender and Organized Racism (New York, NY: Routledge, 2004). Other notable mentions in this vein include Kathleen Blee's Inside Organized Racism: Women in the Hate Movement (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002) and Jessie Daniels'White Lies: Race, Class, Gender, and Sexuality in White Supremacist Discourse (New York, NY: Routledge, 1997).Berbrier, Mitch 2000. 'The Victim Ideology of White Supremacists and White Separatists in the United States.'Sociological Focus 33: 174–91.In much the same vein as Ferber, Mitch Berbrier demonstrates how white victimization ideologies are a growing, but not yet central, facet of white supremacist and separatist organizing. Rather, discourses of racial victimization are put to the service of larger concerns in white supremacist activism: for example, either to activate a sense of urgency in the perceived loss of white racial pride and self‐esteem, or to convince outsiders (and potential members) that they are living in time of white 'genocide.' I also recommend Berbrier's 1998 Social Problems article entitled '"Half the Battle": Cultural Resonance, Framing Processes, and Ethnic Affectations in Contemporary White Separatist Rhetoric.'White antiracismBonnett, Alastair 2000. Anti‐Racism. London and New York, NY: Routledge.This is a valuable text for those wishing to understand both the historical trajectory of, and current variation within, the antiracist movement. Bonnett first traces anti‐racism's philosophical historicity through thinkers such as Comte, Montaigne, and Du Bois. After delineating the theoretical underpinnings of the movement, Bonnett then outlines the spatial variation of antiracism to uncover the networked relationships between Brazil, China, France, the US, and the UK, to name just a few examples. In this vein, while the text does not explicitly focus on white anti‐racism, a large portion of the book directly challenges the dominance of the Eurocentric variations of anti‐racism, as it even briefly surveys the outgrowths of anti‐racism in the form of multiculturalism, anti‐Nazi/anti‐fascist movements, and the 'local' activist organizations that purport to represent marginalized communities. While the book takes on a large subject matter, its relatively small size often falls short of giving each subject the attention it deserves. Still, the book serves as an excellent overview.Apthecker, Herbert 1993. Anti‐Racism in U.S. History: The First Two Hundred Years. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.Like Bonnett's text (2000), this book does not explicitly center on white antiracism, but much of the examples used by the late Marxist historian are drawn from white abolitionists and activists. In fact, recovering the lost history of whites whom rejected racist rationales for the 'peculiar institution' of slavery and in turn, evidenced a remarkable degree of racial egalitarianism, appears the impetus for Aptheker's decision to compose the book. Overall, the text remains a tour de force of the pervasiveness of both white racism and its white resistance, as it covers the intersection of racism, sexuality, labor, the political ideologies of Grégoire, Banneker, & Jefferson, religion, the effects of the civil war, and emancipation.Srivastava, Sarita 2005. '"You're Calling me a Racist?" The Moral and Emotional Regulation of Antiracism and Feminism.'Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 31(1): 29–62.This article demonstrates how the dominant practices and discourses of emotional expression shape antiracist debates over what constitutes a proper antiracist approach. By showing how the predominant mode of discussion in many antiracist organizations is hinged to the disclosure of personal experiences and emotion, Srivastrava demonstrates that this mode constricts the ability to produce organizational or structural change. Accordingly, white antiracist discussion groups often devolve into a setting in which the focus shifts from fighting racism to that of quelling the emotional turbulence of white participants – a pattern that unintentionally reestablishes a focus on white well‐being and privilege.Niemonen, Jack June 2007. 'Antiracist Education in Theory and Practice: A Critical Assessment.'The American Sociologist 38(2): 159–77.With critical aplomb, Jack Niemonen interrogates the pedagogical, curricular, and organizational claims of 'antiracist education'– an endeavor largely tied to liberal, white, and 'multicultural advocates.' Operationalized through a study of approximately 160 papers recently published in peer‐reviewed journals, Niemonen finds that the dominant forms of 'antiracist education' are far from sociologically grounded, empirically based accounts of the significance of race, but 'embodies the confessional and redemptive modes common in evangelical Protestantism' (164). Picking up on a key contradiction endemic to a large percentage of white antiracist literature, whites are often framed as 'inherently racist' yet are prodded to constantly seek paths to redemption and salvation. Informing my own work, Niemonen demonstrates how antiracist educators often employ a myopic and reductionist 'culture war' view of the world in which battle lines are drawn between the 'good and bad' whites. Aside from the fact that Niemonen's scathing critique sometimes borders on a kind of evangelicalism in its own right, his overview of the literature does afford the prescient observation that a great deal of antiracist activism is built on abstract moralism rather than sociological empiricism.O'Brien, Eileen 2001. Whites Confront Racism: Antiracists and Their Paths to Action. New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.O'Brien's work is a survey of white antiracist activists from across North America. The book is a nice counterpoint to Niemonen's (2007) findings, as O'Brien finds that many white antiracists are quite savvy in their ability to avoid the typical options of 'being a nonracist' or devolving into emotional turmoil associated with 'white guilt'; many of the whites demonstrate large variation in how they combat modern racism. Of import, O'Brien shows that these whites' affiliations with antiracist organizations – and even their lack thereof – can play a crucial role in their approach to their antiracist activism. As such, O'Brien shows that a more critical white antiracist approach is evolving; one that frames race as a 'social construction' and which unpacks the individual, institutional, and cultural forms of racism.Online materialsPublic Broadcasting Service, 'Race – The Power of an Illusion' http://www.pbs.org/race/000_General/000_00‐Home.htm Starting from the supposition that 'Race is one topic where we all think we're experts', the series, readings, video, and ability to directly ask questions of experts in the field (e.g.: historian George M. Fredrickson and biological anthropologist Alan Goodman) together help to debunk many of the core beliefs that undergird the modern white supremacist and nationalist movement. In so doing, the program helps to show how social, economic, and political conditions, rather than biological make‐up, disproportionately channel advantages and opportunities to whites.Public Broadcasting Service, 'From Swastika to Jim Crow' http://www.pbs.org/itvs/fromswastikatojimcrow/index.html The website includes a video, discussion guide, and multi‐chaptered narrative on the little‐known story of German refugee scholars, who were expelled from Nazi Germany, migrated to the United States south and faced oppression from US white supremacists, and found employment at historically black colleges and universities. The resources therein illuminate the intricate web of politics, migration, nationalism, the contextual construction of racial and ethnic identity, and racism & antiracism.'Racism Review' http://www.racismreview.com/blog/ Launched in 2007, 'Racism Review' is produced and maintained by Joe R. Feagin (Texas A&M University) and Jessie Daniels (CUNY‐Hunter College). Contributors to the blog are scholars and researchers from sociology and a number of other social science disciplines across North America. Many of the articles center on the topics of white racial identity, racism, and antiracism, and aim to serve as credible and reliable sources of information for journalists, students, and members of the general public who seek evidence‐based research and analysis.Southern Poverty Law Center http://www.splcenter.org/index.jsp The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) was founded in 1971 as a small civil rights law firm, and today the website for the SPLC is internationally known as a clearing‐house for critical information, and perspectives on, white supremacist and white nationalist groups.Sample syllabus'Sociological Perspectives on Whiteness'Overview of the courseThis course investigates the social construction of race through an exploration of white identity, both theoretically and empirically. It includes an investigation of the historical genesis of white identity, its intersection with political movements and organizations, the relation of whiteness to race, ethnicity, class, gender, nation, and how whiteness is understood in popular culture, and the sociological mechanisms by which it is reproduced, negotiated, and contested.Lecture 1 – Introduction to Race as a Social ConstructionHaney López, Ian F. 1998. 'Chance, Context, and Choice in the Social Construction of Race.' Pp. 9–16 in The Latino/a Condition: A Critical Reader, edited by Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic. New York, NY: New York University Press.Urciuoli, Bonnie 1996. 'Racialization and Language.' Pp. 15–40 in Exposing Prejudice: Puerto Rican Experiences of Language, Race, and Class. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Duster, Troy 2001. 'The 'Morphing' Properties of Whiteness.' Pp. 113–133 in The Making and Unmaking of Whiteness, edited by E. B. Rasmussen, E. Klinenberg, I. J. Nexica and M. Wray. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.Lipsitz, George 1998. 'The Possessive Investment in Whiteness.' Pp. 1–23 in The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: How White People Profit from Identity Politics. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.Lecture 4 – The Creation of 'White Ethnics'Jacobson, Matthew Frye 2001. 'Becoming Caucasian: Vicissitudes of Whiteness in American Politics and Culture.'Identities 8(1): 83–104.Roediger, David R. 1994. 'Whiteness and Ethnicity in the History of "White Ethnics" in the United States.' Pp 181–198 in Towards the Abolition of Whiteness. New York, NY: Verso.Sacks, Karen Brodkin 1994. 'How did Jews Become White Folks?' Pp 78–102 in Race, edited by Steven Gregory and Roger Sanjek. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.Roediger, David R. 1999. 'Irish‐American Workers and White Racial Formation in the Antebellum United States.' Pp 133–163 in The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class. New York, NY: Verso.Lecture 6 – Colorlessness and Color‐blindness as a Defense of WhitenessAnsell, Amy E. and James M. Statman 1999. '"I Never Owned Slaves:" The Euro‐American Construction of the Racialized Other.'Research in Politics and Society 6: 151–73.Gallagher, Charles A. 2003. 'Playing the White Ethnic Card: Using Ethnic Identity to Deny Contemporary Racism.' Pp. 145–158 in White Out: The Continuing Significance of Racism, edited by Ashley Doane and Eduardo Bonilla‐Silva. New York, NY: Routledge Press.Bonilla‐Silva, Eduardo. 2003. 'The Central Frames of Color‐Blind Racism.' Pp. 25–52 in Racism Without Racists. New York, NY: Rowman and Littlefield.Lecture 7 – Learning WhitenessConley, Dalton. 2001. 'Universal Freckle, or How I Learned to Be White.' Pp. 25–42 in The Making and Unmaking of Whiteness, edited by Birgit Brander Rasmussen, Eric Klinenberg, Irene J. Nexica, and Matt Wray. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.Giroux, Henry A. 1998. 'Youth, Memory Work, and the Racial Politics of Whiteness.' Pp 123–36 in White Reign: Deploying Whiteness in America, edited by Joe L. Kincheloe, Shirley R. Steinberg, and Nelson M. Rodriguez, and Ronald E. Chennault. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.Hall, Kim Q. 1999. 'My Father's Flag.' Pp. 29–35 in Whiteness: Feminist Philosophical Reflections, edited by Chris J. Cuomo and Kim Q. Hall. New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.Williams, Patricia J. 1997. 'The Ethnic Scarring of American Whiteness.' Pp. 253–63 in The House that Race Built: Black Americans, U.S. Terrain, edited by Wahneema Lubiano. New York, NY: Pantheon Books.Lecture 12 – Whiteness in Popular Culture and Everyday LifeDeloria, Philip 1999. Playing Indian. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Hughey, Matthew W. 2009. 'Cinethetic Racism: White Redemption and Black Stereotypes in "Magical Negro" Films.'Social Problems 56(3): 543–77.Lott, Eric 1995. Love and Theft: Blackface Minstrelsy and the American Working Class. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Lecture 13 – White Privilege and the Future of White PeopleHaney López, Ian F. 1998. 'Choosing the Future.' Pp. 404–7 in The Latino/a Condition: A Critical Reader, edited by Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic. New York, NY: New York University Press.Winant, Howard 2001. 'White Racial Projects.' Pp 97–112 in The Making and Unmaking of Whiteness, edited by Birgit Brander Rasmussen, Eric Klinenberg, Irene J. Nexica, and Matt Wray. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.West, Cornel 1997. 'I'm Ofay, You're Ofay: A Conversation with Noel Ignatiev and William "Upski" Wimsatt.'Transition 73(7): 176–98.Yúdice, George 1995. 'Neither Impugning nor Disavowing Whiteness Does a Viable Politics Make: The Limits of Identity Politics.' Pp. 255–85 in After Political Correctness: The Humanities and Society in the 1990s, edited by Christopher Newfield and Ronald Strickland. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.[The construction of this syllabus is indebted to Bethany Bryson (James Madison University), Wende E. Marshall (University of Virginia), and Jennifer Roth‐Gordon (Brown University)]

In mid-December, the Israeli army discovered the bodies of three of the hostages kidnapped from southern Israel to the Gaza Strip on October 7: the soldiers Ron Sherman and Nik Beizer, and the civilian Elia Toledano. Their families were initially informed that the three men had been killed in Hamas captivity, but Maayan, the mother of Sherman, soon declared otherwise."Ron was indeed murdered," she wrote on her Facebook page on Jan. 16, but "not by Hamas." Instead, she asserted, her son was killed by "bombings with poisonous gasses."Maayan made her claim after reading the inconclusive findings of a pathology report, presented to her by a delegation from the Israeli army's casualties department and the 551st brigade, whose soldiers recovered Sherman's body from Gaza. "The delegation told us that they don't rule out gas poisoning as a result of IDF bombings, but they're not certain," she told +972 Magazine and Local Call.According to two Israeli security sources who spoke to +972 and Local Call on the condition of anonymity, this wouldn't be the first time that Israeli airstrikes targeting Hamas' network of underground tunnels in Gaza have killed people in this way. The army, they say, is well aware that bombs exploding in tunnels can disperse toxic gasses such as carbon monoxide.In May 2021, for example, amid its broader assault named "Operation Guardian of the Walls," the Israeli army launched a specific attack on Hamas' tunnel network which it called "Operation Lightning Strike." Gadi Eizenkot, who was the IDF Chief of Staff when the operation was planned and is now a member of Israel's war cabinet, said later that the operation was intended to "turn the tunnels into a death trap" and kill hundreds of Hamas members. During those attacks, which ultimately killed only a few dozen Hamas members, those hiding in tunnels were killed "not only from a bomb that hit them, but also from the fact that the bombings release gasses inside the tunnels," a source told +972 and Local Call.The source explained that the army did not use a chemical or biological warhead, but rather discovered that certain bombs penetrating the tunnels could, as a byproduct, spread toxic gas "over a long distance" in a closed compound. A second source confirmed this, adding that tests have been conducted in the military on the subject which have shown that inhaling these gasses in confined spaces is lethal.+972 and Local Call could not confirm whether suffocation by toxic gas was a deliberate tactic used by the Israeli army in the current war to kill Hamas members hiding in tunnels.In response to these allegations, the IDF Spokesperson told +972 and Local Call that the army "uses legal means of warfare only, in accordance with international law. The IDF did not in the past, and does not currently, use byproducts of bombings to harm its targets."'Israelis and Palestinians were equal — both lives were disregarded'The Israeli army announced earlier this month that the bodies of Ron Sherman and the other two hostages were found near the site of an underground tunnel in which the commander of Hamas' northern Gaza brigade, Ahmed Ghandour, was assassinated in an Israeli airstrike in mid-November. Maayan accuses the Israeli military of knowingly killing her son in the strike to assassinate Ghandour.An Israeli security source privy to information about the attack told +972 and Local Call that they did not know if the army suspected that there were Israeli hostages being held near Ghandour. But in order to kill the Hamas commander, the source said, the army bombed a building full of Palestinian civilians, knowingly killing dozens of them. "Ghandour was under a very large building," the source said. "We bombed knowing that the entire building would collapse. Many civilians were killed. But Ghandour wasn't there. They missed. It took a second strike to kill him, also with a lot of collateral damage."IDF Spokesperson Daniel Hagari asserted that "the IDF did not know about the presence of hostages in the area." He made similar remarks again after Hamas released a video in which the hostage Noa Argamani states that two of the hostages with whom she was being held were killed in an airstrike: "We [the army] do not attack places where we know there may be hostages," Hagari said.However, Hagari's statements are inconsistent with the testimony of a senior security source, which is revealed here for the first time. The source told +972 and Local Call that during the first weeks of the war, the Israeli army systematically targeted Palestinians defined as "kidnappers" — those who abducted Israelis during the Hamas-led October 7 attack — with its bombings, despite a concern that there were hostages being held next to them. According to the source, Israeli abductees were "certainly hit" in these bombings; only later did this policy change."We bombed Palestinians suspected of being kidnappers," the source said. "We found such suspects and we bombed them. And it was surreal, because you see in the identification of the person you are bombing that he is a 'suspected kidnapper' of Israelis, meaning that there is a chance there are hostages next to him. In retrospect, we know that many Israelis were held underground. But for sure, mistakes happened and we bombed hostages."The decision to bomb kidnappers, the source suspected, was not made at the military level. "This is the political echelon, in my opinion," they explained. "We bombed a lot of kidnappers. More than a few dozen, and less than a hundred. Absurdly, Israeli and Palestinian civilians were equal there — both of their lives were disregarded."Only later in the war did the army's prisoner of war and missing persons department inform them of the areas that they should not strike, due to fear that hostages would be harmed. "At the start of the war, this didn't happen," the source said. "There was no protocol about the hostages. They weren't taken into account."I remember leaving the army base for the first time two or three weeks [into the war], and realizing that there were demonstrations about the hostages and that everyone here was talking about this issue," the source continued. "And it was surreal for me, because it wasn't until I went home that I really found out their names and how many people were kidnapped."The source explained that the Palestinians who were targeted because they were suspected kidnappers were not necessarily holding Israelis in their homes, but that this was likely; no checks were conducted before striking them. "We weren't dealing with that at all at the start of the war," they said. "The atmosphere was very painful and vengeful. We would bomb any Palestinian kidnapper."The source's testimony is relevant only to the initial stages of Israel's Gaza onslaught. In an investigation last month by +972 and Local Call, three intelligence sources confirmed that bombings were not carried out by the army if they would knowingly kill hostages, but in many cases the intelligence picture was incomplete.'The state sacrificed them twice'After the Israeli army initially claimed that the three hostages were killed by Hamas, pathology reports on Ron Sherman and Nik Beizer's bodies found no external signs of injury, such as bullet marks or bone fractures. Hagari himself stated that "at this stage it is not possible to rule out or confirm that they were killed as a result of suffocation, strangulation, poisoning, or the consequences of an IDF attack, or a Hamas operation."Maayan, Sherman's mother, received a detailed report from the army after the examination of her son's body, which also included a CT scan. "There are no fractures, no gunshot wounds, no dry blows," she explained. According to Maayan, the head of the IDF Personnel Directorate told the family on Jan. 19 that "the matter is closed" and the army would not be conducting any further investigations. Daniel Solomon, a doctor who has treated trauma patients who suffocated from gas or smoke, said that due to the fact that so much time had elapsed between the time of death and the recovery of the bodies, it could prove difficult to identify post-mortem signs of suffocation from carbon monoxide — such as edema in the vocal cords, burns in the airways, or tissue damage. Katia, Beizer's mother, told +972 and Local Call that the army informed them that the three men were being held in the same tunnel that Ghandour was hiding in when the army carried out its attack. "The [military] intelligence told us that [their deaths] could have been the result of the bomb that killed Ghandour, from the gasses and the blast, but that they don't know."I demand that they continue the investigation," Katia went on. "I told them I wouldn't let them stop. After all, we were constantly told, in meetings with military and government officials, that they suspected there were hostages [being held] near senior Hamas figures. So if you know and suspect that there are hostages around, even if you don't know who exactly, how can it be that you bombed?"Maayan said that three weeks after her son was abducted, intelligence officials informed the family that "there are indications that he is alive and that they know where he is." During the shiva (the seven-day Jewish mourning ritual) held after Sherman's body was recovered in December, Maj. Gen. Ghassan Alian — the head of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) — told her that he and Nitzan Alon, who is in charge of prisoners of war and missing persons, "knew at any given moment where Ron and Nik were," and so was surprised to hear about their deaths.That's why Maayan accuses the military of killing her son for the sake of killing Ghandour. "Somebody is lying here," she said. "It is clear to me that my son was sacrificed. I ask myself how they would act if it was Bibi [Netanyahu]'s son there, and not Ron. We underwent months of torture.""My only question is my son's cause of death," Katia said. "I want to know how it happened and when it happened. We don't even know the dates. The state sacrificed them not once, but twice: first when they were abducted from their military base, which is supposed to be safe, and I called everyone possible and nobody saved them. And second when they were in captivity, and the army didn't bring them back alive."In response to the allegations raised in this article, the IDF Spokesman stated: "The IDF shares the families' grief for the difficult loss, and will continue to support them. IDF representatives have given the families all the verified information that the IDF has, and will continue to do so."The lives of the abductees are a leading value in considerations of the decision-makers and therefore the IDF does not attack areas where there are indications or estimates that hostages are present. It should be emphasized that the IDF did not have information about the presence of hostages in the tunnel of Hamas' northern brigade commander at the time of the attack."The attack in which the commander of the northern brigade was eliminated was approved in accordance with the relevant operational procedures. It should be emphasized that the scope of the estimated harm to civilians as part of the attack mentioned in your request is completely unfounded. The claims regarding the attacks on kidnappers' houses are also false."This article has been republished with permission from +972 Magazine in conjunction with Local Call.

Actual importance of study. At the beginning of the 2020s developed world countries and countries which are the leaders of world economic development faced up the challenges of radical structural reformation of social production (from industry to service system) which is based on digitalization. Digital technologies in world science and business practice are considered essential part of a complex technological phenomenon like 'Industry 4.0'. Digitalization should cover development of all business processes and management processes at micro-, meso- and microlevels, processes of social production management at national and world economy levels. In general, in the 21st century world is shifting rapidly to the strategies of digital technologies application. The countries which introduce these strategies will gain guaranteed competitive advantages: from reducing production costs and improved quality of goods and services to developing new sales market and making guaranteed super-profits. The countries which stand aside from digitalization processes are at risk of being among the outsiders of socio-economic development. Such problem statement highlights the actual importance of determining the directions, trends and strategic priorities of social production digitalization. This issue is really crucial for all world countries, including Ukraine which is in midst of profound structural reformation of all national production system. Problem statement. Digital economy shapes the ground for 'Industry 4.0', information, It technologies and large databases become the key technologies. The main asset of 'Industry 4.0' is information, the major tool of production is cyberphysical systems that lead to formation the single unified highly productive environmental system of collecting, analyzing and applying data to production and other processes. Cyberphysical systems provides 'smart machines' (productive machines, tools and equipment which are programmed) integration via their connection to the Internet, or creation special network, 'Industrial Internet' (IIoT) which is regarded as a productive analogue of 'Internet of Things' (IoT) that is focused on the consumers. 'Internet of Things' can be connected with 'smart factories' which use 'Industrial Internet' to adjust production processes quickly turning into account the changes in costs and availability of resources as well as demand for production made. One of the most essential tasks for current economics and researchers of systems and processes of organization future maintenance of world production is to determine the main strategic priorities of social production digitalization. Analysis of latest studies and publications. Valuable contribution to the study of the core and directions of strategic priorities concerning social production digitalization was made by such foreign scientists as the Canadian researcher Tapscott D [1], foreigners Sun, L., Zhao, L [2], Mcdowell, M. [3] and others. Yet, the study of issues concerning social production digitalization are mainly done by the team of authors as such issues are complicated and multihierarchical. Furthermore, the problem of social production digitalization is closely linked to the transition to sustainable development, which is reflected in the works by Ukrainian scholars like Khrapkin V., Ustimenko V., Kudrin O., Sagirov A. and others in the monograph "Determinants of sustainable economy development" [4]. The edition of the first in Ukraine inter-disciplinary textbook on Internet economy by a group of scientists like Tatomyr I., Kvasniy L., Poyda S. and others [5] should also be mentioned. But the challenges of social production digitalization are constantly focused on by theoretical scientists, analytics and practitioners of these processes. Determining unexplored parts of general problem. Defining strategic priorities of social production digitalization requires clear understanding of prospective spheres of their application, economic advantages and risks which mass transition of social production from traditional (industrial and post-industrial)to digital technologies bear. A new system of technological equipment (production digitalization, Internet-economy, technology 'Industry 4.0', NBIC- technologies and circular economy) has a number of economic advantages for commodity producers and countries, as well as leads to dramatical changes in the whole social security system, changes at labour market and reformation the integral system of social relations in the society. Tasks and objectives of the study. The objective of the study is to highlight the core and define the main strategic priorities of social production digitalization, as they cause the process of radical structural reformation of industrial production, services and social spheres of national economy of world countries and world economy in general. To achieve the objective set in the article the following tasks are determined and solved: - to define the main priorities of digital technologies development, which is radically modify all social production business processes; - to study the essence and the role of circular economy for transition to sustainable development taken EU countries as an example; - to identify the strategic priorities of robotization of production processes and priority spheres of industrial and service robots application; - to define the role of NBIC-technologies in the process of social production structural reformation and its transition to new digital technologies in the 21st century. Method and methodology of the study. While studying strategic priorities of social production digitalization theoretical and empirical methods of study are used, such as historical and logical, analysis and synthesis, abstract and specific, casual (cause-and-effect) ones. All of them helped to keep the track of digital technologies evolution and its impact on structural reformation of social production. Synergetic approach, method of expert estimates and casual methods are applied to ground system influence of digital technologies, 'Industry 4.0' and their materialization as 'circular economy' on the whole complicated and multihierarchical system of social production in general. Basic material (the results of the study). Digital economy, i.e. economy where it is virtual but not material or physical assets and transactions are of the greatest value, institutional environment in which business processes as well as all managerial processes are developed on the basis of digital computer technologies and information and communication technologies (ICT), lies as the ground for social production digitalization. ICT sphere involves production of electronic equipment, computing, hardware,.software and services. It also provides various information sevices. Information Technology serves as a material basis for digital economy and digital technologies development. Among the basic digital technologies the following ones play the profound role: technology 'Blockchain', 3D priniting, unmanned aerial vehicles and flying drones, virtual reality (VR). Augmented reality (AR), Internet of Things (IoT), Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), Internet of Value (IoV) which is founded on IT and blockchain technology, Internet of Everything (IoE), Artificial Intelligence (AI), neuron networks and robots. These basic digital technologies in business processes and management practices are applied in synergy, complexity and system but not in a single way. System combination of digital technologies gives maximal economic effect from their practical application in all spheres of social production-from industry to all kinds of services. For instance, in education digital technologies promote illustrating and virtual supplement of study materials; in tourism trade they promote engagement of virtual guides, transport and logistics security of tourist routes, virtual adverts and trips arrangements, virtual guidebooks, virtual demonstration of services and IT brochures and leaflets. Digital technologies radically change gambling and show businesses, in particular, they provide virtual games with 'being there' effect. Digital technologies drastically modify the retail trade sphere, advertisement and publishing, management and marketing, as well as provide a lot of opportunities for collecting unbiased data concerning changes in market conditions in real time. Digital technologies lie as the basis for 'circular economy', whose essence rests with non-linear, secondary, circular use of all existing natural and material resources to provide the production and consumption without loss of quality and availability of goods and services developed on the grounds of innovations, IT-technology application and 'Industry 4.0'. Among priorities of circular economy potential applications the following ones should be mentioned: municipal services, solid household wastes management and their recycling, mass transition to smart houses and smart towns, circular agriculture development, circular and renewable energy, The potential of circular economy fully and equally corresponds to the demands for energy efficiency and rational consumption of limited natural resources, so it is widely applied in EU countries while transiting to sustainable development. In the 21st century processes of social production robotization draw the maximal attention of the society. There is a division between industrial and service robots which combine artificial intelligence and other various digital technologies in synergy. Industrial robots are widely used in production, including automotive industry, processing industry, energetic, construction sectors and agriculture Services are applied in all other spheres and sectors of national and world economies –from military-industrial complex (for instance, for mining and demining the areas, military drones) to robots-cleaners (robots-vacuum cleaners), robots-taxis, robots engaged in health care service and served as nurses (provide the ill person with water, tidy up, bring meals). Social production robotization is proceeding apace. According to "World Robotic Report 2020", within 2014 – 2019 the total quantity of industrial robots increased by 85 %. By 2020 in the world the share of robots in the sphere of automated industrial production had comprised 34 %, in electronics – 25%, in metallurgy – 10 %. These indicators are constantly growing which results in structural reformation of the whole system of economic and industrial processes, radical changes in world labour market and the social sphere of world economy in general. Alongside with generally recognized types of digital technologies and robotization processes, an innovation segment of digital economy – NBIC – technologies (Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information technology, Cognitive Science) are rapidly spread. Among the priorities of NBIC-technologies development the special place belongs to interaction between information and cognitive technologies. As a material basis for its synergy in NBIC-technologies creation of neuron networks, artificial intelligence, artificial cyber brain for robots are applied. It is estimated as one of the most prospective and important achievements of digital economy which determines basic, innovational vector of social production structural reformations in the 21st century. The sphere of results application. International economic relations and world economy, development of competitive strategies of national and social production digitalization of world economy in general. Conclusions. Digital technologies radically change all spheres of social production and social life, including business and managerial processes at all levels. Digital technologies are constantly developing and modifying, that promotes emergence of new spheres and new business activities and management. 21st century witnessed establishing digital economy, smart economy, circular economy, green economy and other various arrangements of social production which are based on digital technologies. Social production digitalization and innovative digital technologies promotes business with flexible systems of arrangement and management, production and sales grounded on processing large Big Data permanently, on the basis of online monitoring in real time. Grounded on digital technologies business in real time mode processes a massive Big Data and on their results makes smart decisions in all business spheres and business processes management. Radical shifts in social production digitalization provides businesses of the states which in practice introduce digital technologies with significant competitive advantages - from decrease in goods and services production cost to targeted meeting of specific needs of consumers. Whereas, rapid introduction of digital technologies in the countries-leaders of world economic development results in a set of system socio-economic and socio-political challenges, including the following: crucial reformatting the world labour market and rise in mass unemployment, shift from traditional export developing countries' specialization, breakups of traditional production networks being in force since the end of the 20th century, so called 'chains of additional value shaping', breakups of traditional cooperation links among world countries and shaping the new ones based on 'Industry 4.0' and 'Industrial Internet'. Socio-economic and political consequences of radical structural reformation of all spheres in national and world economy in the 21st century, undoubtedly, will be stipulated with the processes of social production digitalization. It will require further systemic and fundamental scientific studies on this complicated and multi hierarchical process.

Si observamos la cronología del conflicto sirio, desde las protestas pacíficas en 2011 hasta la guerra abierta que vivió el país hasta finales de 2018, llama la atención la gran cantidad de información producida en este período, que contrasta con las décadas anteriores de silencio informativo. Durante décadas de dictadura de los Asad en Siria, poco se supo de este país ubicado en el epicentro de una región estratégica y sacudida por guerras, ocupaciones y golpes de estado. La represión ejercida por la familia que ostentaba el poder había resultado en un país hermético que aislaba a su ciudadanía y que apenas recibía cobertura, con la excepción de cuestiones puntuales vinculadas a la geoestrategia internacional. A partir de marzo de 2011, en el contexto de las movilizaciones bautizadas como "Primavera Árabe" que se extendieron por Oriente Próximo y el norte de África y que encontraron en Siria una de sus máximas expresiones, tanto la propia población siria como el resto del mundo pudieron asomarse a la realidad de lo que hasta entonces había sido un país en el que todas las instituciones sufrían un fuerte control y que reprimía con brutalidad cualquier forma de disidencia. La dificultad de comprender las claves del conflicto sirio que se desarrolló en los años posteriores remite en a medida a esas largas décadas de silencio casi absoluto en torno a Siria. En 2011, el país pasó en pocos meses de ser un agujero negro informativo a ser "el conflicto más mediado de la historia" (O'Callaghan et al., 2014), con un flujo incesante de contenidos producido en su mayoría por la propia ciudadanía, ansiosa de canalizar unas necesidades expresivas reprimidas durante décadas. Sin embargo, estos contenidos no siempre contaban con un contexto que permitiera su comprensión al resto del mundo. Frente a una cantidad ingente de mensajes, vídeos e imágenes, muchos de ellos muy gráficos y violentos, difíciles de procesar y contextualizar, se impusieron discursos centrados en aspectos militares y geoestratégicos. A medida que las manifestaciones pacíficas devenían en un levantamiento armado tras la brutal represión del régimen, avanzaba una batalla por la hegemonía del país condicionada por la influencia de las distintas potencias –estadounidense, rusa, iraní, saudí, turca–, una influencia que se impuso también en el ámbito mediático eclipsando las cuestiones internas y las motivaciones, avances e iniciativas de la propia ciudadanía siria. A la ausencia de contexto para comprender un país aislado durante décadas se sumó la propaganda desplegada tanto por el régimen como por distintos grupos de la oposición, en una batalla por la legitimidad recrudecida en paralelo a los enfrentamientos sobre el terreno. Ante el ruido y la propaganda mediática, y sin corresponsales internacionales que pudieran retransmitir la realidad sobre el terreno, las voces de la población siria continuaron narrando su propia realidad, pero con un eco mediático e internacional que se mitigaba a medida que el conflicto se enquistaba. A pesar de los discursos oficiales y de la tendencia a la militarización que copaba la cobertura mediática, proliferaron los proyectos de construcción y reconstrucción sobre el terreno. Se sucedieron las campañas que denunciaban tanto los abusos del régimen como de los distintos grupos extremistas que buscaban imponer sus propias agendas sobre la población local. Surgieron un gran número de iniciativas ciudadanas impregnadas de creatividad y florecimiento artístico que rompieron con las largas décadas de represión y censura. Entre estos esfuerzos destaca la comunicación, sostenida desde el inicio del levantamiento, de un pequeño pueblo del norte de Siria, en la provincia de Idlib: Kafranbel. Un pueblo cuya actividad lo colocó en el centro de la diana de los ataques, primero del régimen y, una vez liberado de este, de distintos grupos extremistas que buscaron ocupar su lugar. Este trabajo de investigación se centra en un aspecto no explorado que creemos de gran importancia en el contexto mediático actual: partiendo de la relevancia de Kafranbel, realizamos una cronología a través de la recopilación y organización de los carteles existentes, o de los que hemos podido identificar en el largo proceso de búsqueda por distintos canales y plataformas de internet, y analizamos las claves y rasgos característicos del "storytelling digital" de este pueblo, paradigmático del contexto sirio. O, dicho de otro modo, de la comunicación sostenida en el tiempo a través de la voz colectiva, y "desde abajo", del pueblo de Kafranbel. Partimos en esta investigación de la importancia del acercamiento a la guerra "desde abajo", tal como lo plantea Joshka Wessels en Syrian masquerades of war (Wessels, 2015), donde analiza cómo los habitantes de Kafranbel proporcionan un análisis desde la base de cuestiones que a menudo se analizan sin contar con la relevancia de las dinámicas internas y sus consecuencias en quienes las sufren. También del trabajo desarrollado por Christine Sylvester, cuyo libro War as experience (La guerra como experiencia) ha sido un gran hallazgo a la hora de encauzar esta investigación. Sylvester enfatiza la necesidad empírica de promover acercamientos a la guerra que partan de las personas que la sufren ("study up"), en lugar de los acercamientos dominados por las élites, los estados y las estructuras de poder ("study down") (Sylvester, 2013, p. 109). Esta visión "desde abajo" ha sido, según la autora, tradicionalmente descuidada en su ámbito de especialización, las Relaciones Internacionales, y consideramos de gran importancia, para una mejor comprensión del mundo y en particular de los conflictos, ponerla en valor también el ámbito que ocupa esta investigación. El asesinato a finales de 2018 de Raed Fares y Hammod Junaid, dos de los artífices de los carteles elaborados desde Kafranbel, a la vez que el anuncio de las autoridades locales y geopolíticas del "fin de la guerra", marcaron el fin de un ciclo y dieron paso a otro en el que destaca la recuperación del territorio por parte del régimen sirio y sus aliados geoestratégicos. Desde este contexto de re-normalización del régimen, y de creciente incomprensión o indiferencia hacia la realidad de la población siria, ofrecemos un análisis del comienzo del proceso revolucionario y de su evolución a través de la voz colectiva y "desde abajo", del pueblo de Kafranbel. ; If we look at the chronology of the Syrian conflict, from the peaceful protests in 2011 until the open war the country suffered until late 2018, we notice the huge amount of information produced during this period, which contrasts with the fifty previous years of information vacuum. For decades under the Assad regime, little was known about this country located in the epicenter of a strategic region, shaken by wars, occupations and coups. The repression exercised by the ruling family resulted in the country being shut off from the rest of the world and rarely got any media coverage, with the exception of issues related to international geopolitics. After March 2011, in the context of the mobilisations named by media as the "Arab Spring" which spread throughout the Middle East and North Africa region and reached Syria, both the Syrian people and the rest of the world could get a glimpse at the reality of a country that suffered severecontrol and where any form of dissident was brutally repressed. The fact that Syria was, and continues to be, a difficult conflict to understand is linked to those long decades of nearly absolute silence. In 2011, the country went from being an information black hole to "the most mediatized conflict in history" in just a few months (O'Callaghan et al., 2014), providing a constant flow of content produced mostly by citizens, eager to channel expressive needs that had been long repressed. However, this content didn't always include context that allowed the rest of the world to understanding it. As a huge number of messages, videos, images, many of them extremely graphic and difficult to process and contextualize, continued to be produced, discourses focused on military and geopolitical aspects started gaining ground. As the peaceful demonstrations became an armed uprising after the brutal repression unleashed against protesters, a battle for the control of the country continued to develop under the influence of major powers –US, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey…, an influence that was captured by media, eclipsing internal dynamics and motivations, advances and initiatives by Syrian civil society. In addition to the absence of context to understand a country isolated for fifty years, the propaganda displayed by the regime and by different opposition groups escalated, feeding a media battle in parallel to the confrontations on the ground. With so much noise and propaganda, and with few foreign correspondents to share the reality from the ground, a diversity of voices from the Syrian people continued to share their own reality, but with less and less international and media amplification. Despite official discourses and the tendency to militarization that captured media attention, projects of building and rebuilding continued to happen on the ground. Campaigns were launched xi by activists denouncing both abuses by the regime and by different extremist groups that tried to impose their agendas on the local population. A great number of citizen initiatives were born, full of creativity and artistic flourishing that broke with the long decades of censorship. Among these efforts there is the communication, sustained from the beginning of the uprising, of a small town in northern Syria, in the Idlib province: Kafranbel, a town that became the target of attacks, first by the Syrian regime and, after the town liberated itself from the regime, by extremist groups trying to fill its place. This research focuses on an unexplored aspect that we consider of key relevance in the current media context: the "digital storytelling" of the town of Kafranbel. We offer a chronology of the existing banners through different internet channels and platforms and analyze the characteristics of the town's "digital storytelling". In other words, we focus on the sustained communication of the war "from below" through the collective voice of a small Syrian town. A key idea that our research revolves around stems from the approach to war studies "from below", as Joshka Wessels poses on Syrian masquerades of war (Wessels, 2015), where she analyses how the people of Kafranbel offer insights on internal dynamics and the consequences of the war on those who suffer it. Equally relevant is the work of Christine Sylvester, whose book War as experience has been key in channeling this research in a fruitful direction. Sylvester emphasizes the empirical need to promote approaches to war that stem from those who suffer it ("study up") as opposed to those dominated by the elites, states and power structures ("study down") (Sylvester, 2013, p. 109). This view "from below" has been traditionally dismissed in the author's area of work, International Relations. We consider it key to a better understanding of the world, and of conflicts in particularly, and have chosen to apply it in our research area: Communications. The assassination of Raed Fares and Hammod Junaid, two of the most relevant actors in Kafranbel's storytelling process, at the end of 2018, coincided with the announcement by the Syrian regime and its allies of the "end of the war". This marked the end of a cycle and gave way to another period, marked by the regime recovering most of the territory it had lost, including the town of Kafranbel. From this context of re-normalization of the regime, and increasing misunderstanding or indifference to the reality suffered by the Syrian population, we offer an analysis of the beginning of the revolutionary process and its evolution through a powerful collective voice from "below". ; Programa de Doctorado en Investigación en Medios de Comunicación por la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid ; Presidente: Ignacio Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño.- Secretario: Eduardo Francisco Rodríguez Gómez.- Vocal: María Ángeles Blanco Ruiz

Luri, Xavier, et al. (Gaia Collaboration) ; [Context] This work is part of the Gaia Data Processing and Analysis Consortium papers published with the Gaia Early Data Release 3 (EDR3). It is one of the demonstration papers aiming to highlight the improvements and quality of the newly published data by applying them to a scientific case. [Aims] We use the Gaia EDR3 data to study the structure and kinematics of the Magellanic Clouds. The large distance to the Clouds is a challenge for the Gaia astrometry. The Clouds lie at the very limits of the usability of the Gaia data, which makes the Clouds an excellent case study for evaluating the quality and properties of the Gaia data. [Methods] The basis of our work are two samples selected to provide a representation as clean as possible of the stars of the Large Magellanic Cloud (LMC) and the Small Magellanic Cloud (SMC). The selection used criteria based on position, parallax, and proper motions to remove foreground contamination from the Milky Way, and allowed the separation of the stars of both Clouds. From these two samples we defined a series of subsamples based on cuts in the colour-magnitude diagram; these subsamples were used to select stars in a common evolutionary phase and can also be used as approximate proxies of a selection by age. [Results] We compared the Gaia Data Release 2 and Gaia EDR3 performances in the study of the Magellanic Clouds and show the clear improvements in precision and accuracy in the new release. We also show that the systematics still present in the data make the determination of the 3D geometry of the LMC a difficult endeavour; this is at the very limit of the usefulness of the Gaia EDR3 astrometry, but it may become feasible with the use of additional external data. We derive radial and tangential velocity maps and global profiles for the LMC for the several subsamples we defined. To our knowledge, this is the first time that the two planar components of the ordered and random motions are derived for multiple stellar evolutionary phases in a galactic disc outside the Milky Way, showing the differences between younger and older phases. We also analyse the spatial structure and motions in the central region, the bar, and the disc, providing new insightsinto features and kinematics. Finally, we show that the Gaia EDR3 data allows clearly resolving the Magellanic Bridge, and we trace the density and velocity flow of the stars from the SMC towards the LMC not only globally, but also separately for young and evolved populations. This allows us to confirm an evolved population in the Bridge that is slightly shift from the younger population. Additionally, we were able to study the outskirts of both Magellanic Clouds, in which we detected some well-known features and indications of new ones. ; The Gaia mission and data processing have financially been supported by, in alphabetical order by country: the Algerian Centre de Recherche en Astronomie, Astrophysique et Géophysique of Bouzareah Observatory; the Austrian Fonds zur Förderung der wissenschaftlichen Forschung (FWF) Hertha Firnberg Programme through grants T359, P20046, and P23737; the BELgian federal Science Policy Office (BELSPO) through various PROgramme de Développement d'Expériences scientifiques (PRODEX) grants and the Polish Academy of Sciences - Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek through grant VS.091.16N, and the Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique (FNRS); the Brazil-France exchange programmes Fundaçãode Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) and Coordenação de Aperfeicoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) - Comité Français d'Evaluation de la Coopération Universitaire et Scientifique avec le Brésil (COFECUB); the National Science Foundation of China (NSFC) through grants 11573054 and 11703065 and the China Scholarship Council through grant 201806040200; the Tenure Track Pilot Programme of the Croatian Science Foundation and the École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne and the project TTP-2018-07-1171 "Mining the Variable Sky", with the funds of the Croatian-Swiss Research Programme; the Czech-Republic Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sports through grant LG 15010 and INTER-EXCELLENCE grant LTAUSA18093, and the Czech Space Office through ESA PECS contract 98058; the Danish Ministry of Science; the Estonian Ministry of Education and Research through grant IUT40-1; the European Commission's Sixth Framework Programme through the European Leadership in Space Astrometry (ELSA) Marie Curie Research Training Network (MRTN-CT-2006-033481), through Marie Curie project PIOF-GA-2009-255267 (Space AsteroSeismology & RR Lyrae stars, SAS-RRL), and through a Marie Curie Transfer-of-Knowledge (ToK) fellowship (MTKD-CT-2004-014188); the European Commission's Seventh Framework Programme through grant FP7-606740 (FP7-SPACE-2013-1) for the Gaia European Network for Improved data User Services (GENIUS) and through grant 264895 for the Gaia Research for European Astronomy Training (GREAT-ITN) network; the European Research Council (ERC) through grants 320360 and 647208 and through the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation and excellent science programmes through Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant 745617 as well as grants 670519 (Mixing and Angular Momentum tranSport of massIvE stars – MAMSIE), 687378 (Small Bodies: Near and Far), 682115 (Using the Magellanic Clouds to Understand the Interaction of Galaxies), and 695099 (A sub-percent distance scale from binaries and Cepheids – CepBin); the European Science Foundation (ESF), in the framework of the Gaia Research for European Astronomy Training Research Network Programme (GREAT-ESF); the European Space Agency (ESA) in the framework of the Gaia project, through the Plan for European Cooperating States (PECS) programme through grants for Slovenia, through contracts C98090 and 4000106398/12/NL/KML for Hungary, and through contract 4000115263/15/NL/IB for Germany; the Academy of Finland and the Magnus Ehrnrooth Foundation; the French Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales (CNES), the Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR) through grant ANR-10-IDEX-0001-02 for the "Investissements d'avenir" programme, through grant ANR-15-CE31-0007 for project "Modelling the Milky Way in the Gaia era" (MOD4Gaia), through grant ANR-14-CE33-0014-01 for project "The Milky Way disc formation in the Gaia era" (ARCHEOGAL), and through grant ANR-15-CE31-0012-01 for project "Unlocking the potential of Cepheids as primary distance calibrators" (UnlockCepheids), the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) and its SNO Gaia of the Institut des Sciences de l'Univers (INSU), the "Action Fédératrice Gaia"' of the Observatoire de Paris, the Région de Franche-Comté, and the Programme National de Gravitation, Références, Astronomie, et Métrologie (GRAM) of CNRS/INSU with the Institut National Polytechnique (INP) and the Institut National de Physique nucléaire et de Physique des Particules (IN2P3) co-funded by CNES; the German Aerospace Agency (Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V., DLR) through grants 50QG0501, 50QG0601, 50QG0602, 50QG0701, 50QG0901, 50QG1001, 50QG1101, 50QG1401, 50QG1402, 50QG1403, 50QG1404, and 50QG1904 and the Centre for Information Services and High Performance Computing (ZIH) at the Technische Universität (TU) Dresden for generous allocations of computer time; the Hungarian Academy of Sciences through the Lendület Programme grants LP2014-17 and LP2018-7 and through the Premium Postdoctoral Research Programme (L. Molnár), and the Hungarian National Research, Development, and Innovation Office (NKFIH) through grant KH_18-130405; the Science Foundation Ireland (SFI) through a Royal Society - SFI University Research Fellowship (M. Fraser); the Israel Science Foundation (ISF) through grant 848/16; the Agenzia Spaziale Italiana (ASI) through contracts I/037/08/0, I/058/10/0, 2014-025-R.0, 2014-025-R.1.2015, and 2018-24-HH.0 to the Italian Istituto Nazionale di Astrofisica (INAF), contract 2014-049-R.0/1/2 to INAF for the Space Science Data Centre (SSDC, formerly known as the ASI Science Data Center, ASDC), contracts I/008/10/0, 2013/030/I.0, 2013-030-I.0.1-2015, and 2016-17-I.0 to the Aerospace Logistics Technology Engineering Company (ALTEC S.p.A.), INAF, and the Italian Ministry of Education, University, and Research (Ministero dell'Istruzione, dell'Università e della Ricerca) through the Premiale project "MIning The Cosmos Big Data and Innovative Italian Technology for Frontier Astrophysics and Cosmology" (MITiC); the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) through grant NWO-M-614.061.414, through a VICI grant (A. Helmi), and through a Spinoza prize (A. Helmi), and the Netherlands Research School for Astronomy (NOVA); the Polish National Science Centre through HARMONIA grant 2018/06/M/ST9/00311, DAINA grant 2017/27/L/ST9/03221, and PRELUDIUM grant 2017/25/N/ST9/01253, and the Ministry of Science and Higher Education (MNiSW) through grant DIR/WK/2018/12; the Portugese Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT) through grants SFRH/BPD/74697/2010 and SFRH/BD/128840/2017 and the Strategic Programme UID/FIS/00099/2019 for CENTRA; the Slovenian Research Agency through grant P1-0188; the Spanish Ministry of Economy (MINECO/FEDER, UE) through grants ESP2016-80079-C2-1-R, ESP2016-80079-C2-2-R, RTI2018-095076-B-C21, RTI2018-095076-B-C22, BES-2016-078499, and BES-2017-083126 and the Juan de la Cierva formación 2015 grant FJCI-2015-2671, the Spanish Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports through grant FPU16/03827, the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (MICINN) through grant AYA2017-89841P for project "Estudio de las propiedades de los fósiles estelares en el entorno del Grupo Local" and through grant TIN2015-65316-P for project "Computación de Altas Prestaciones VII", the Severo Ochoa Centre of Excellence Programme of the Spanish Government through grant SEV2015-0493, the Institute of Cosmos Sciences University of Barcelona (ICCUB, Unidad de Excelencia "María de Maeztu") through grants MDM-2014-0369 and CEX2019-000918-M, the University of Barcelona's official doctoral programme for the development of an R+D+i project through an Ajuts de Personal Investigador en Formació (APIF) grant, the Spanish Virtual Observatory through project AyA2017-84089, the Galician Regional Government, Xunta de Galicia, through grants ED431B-2018/42 and ED481A-2019/155, support received from the Centro de Investigación en Tecnologías de la Información y las Comunicaciones (CITIC) funded by the Xunta de Galicia, the Xunta de Galicia and the Centros Singulares de Investigación de Galicia for the period 2016-2019 through CITIC, the European Union through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) / Fondo Europeo de Desenvolvemento Rexional (FEDER) for the Galicia 2014-2020 Programme through grant ED431G-2019/01, the Red Española de Supercomputación (RES) computer resources at MareNostrum, the Barcelona Supercomputing Centre - Centro Nacional de Supercomputación (BSC-CNS) through activities AECT-2016-1-0006, AECT-2016-2-0013, AECT-2016-3-0011, and AECT-2017-1-0020, the Departament d'Innovació, Universitats i Empresa de la Generalitat de Catalunya through grant 2014-SGR-1051 for project 'Models de Programació i Entorns d'Execució Parallels' (MPEXPAR), and Ramon y Cajal Fellowship RYC2018-025968-I; the Swedish National Space Agency (SNSA/Rymdstyrelsen); the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research, and Innovation through the ESA PRODEX programme, the Mesures d'Accompagnement, the Swiss Activités Nationales Complémentaires, and the Swiss National Science Foundation; the United Kingdom Particle Physics and Astronomy Research Council (PPARC), the United Kingdom Science and Technology Facilities Council (STFC), and the United Kingdom Space Agency (UKSA) through the following grants to the University of Bristol, the University of Cambridge, the University of Edinburgh, the University of Leicester, the Mullard Space Sciences Laboratory of University College London, and the United Kingdom Rutherford Appleton Laboratory (RAL): PP/D006511/1, PP/D006546/1, PP/D006570/1, ST/I000852/1, ST/J005045/1, ST/K00056X/1, ST/K000209/1, ST/K000756/1, ST/L006561/1, ST/N000595/1, ST/N000641/1, ST/N000978/1, ST/N001117/1, ST/S000089/1, ST/S000976/1, ST/S001123/1, ST/S001948/1, ST/S002103/1, and ST/V000969/1.

In her recent book published after the election of Donald Trump as the US President in 2016, Cynthia Enloe argues that the patriarchy, similar to our smart phones, has updated itself as a reaction against the achievements of the second and third wave feminisms. The updated patriarchy has this time renewed itself through the beliefs and values about the ways the world works (2017). The competing foreign policies representing the hypermasculine hegemonic masculinity of the current world politics and its authoritarian leaders are the outputs of this new updated version of patriarchy. Enloe doubts that having gained sustainability with its updates, the patriarchy could be fought against simply with street demonstrations, as it was before. The patriarchy could be forced to retreat only by incessantly asking "curious" feminist questions that would expose all masculine patterns of life (2017). Continuously asking questions without giving up or giving in would make the patriarchy transparent and vulnerable. In the face of curious, non-stop questions from a gender perspective and the conscious use of the terms supporting gender equality, the patriarchy, albeit updated and sustained, does not stand a chance.
Enloe explains the reason why incorporating gender in International Relations has been considered irrelevant by the power- and security dominated character of the discipline. Also, because the heavy majority of the academics associated with International Relations are male, it is them who choose what is important and worthy of 'serious' investigation (Enloe, 2004, 96). This masculine attitude, however, has been clearly excluding multiple human experiences and hindering their capacity to create new possibilities for peaceful co-existence in international relations (Youngs, 2004).
As a matter of fact, when we look at the emergence of International Relations as a separate discipline, and the political theories that it takes as its first point of reference, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen) – the human rights document at the time of the French Revolution – Machiavelli's The Prince; and Man, the State and War, written in 1959 by Kenneth Waltz, the founder of neo-realism, were the mainstream writings that brought liberal (libertarian) and realist perspectives to the discipline of International Relations, respectively. The fundamental aim of these texts was, in fact, to make an analysis based on history and 'his' problems. Although these texts put forward a desire for rights and freedoms, as well as the achievement of peace, these values are mostly targeted towards men. Thus, over time, the prominent concepts of International Relations, such as security and hegemony, were defined from a masculine and patriarchal perspective. For instance, from the theoretical view of realists, hegemony is attributed to the order established and led by the most powerful state of the international system– both militarily and economically– while sovereignty evokes the Hobbesian Leviathan (the Devil), with its masculine nature and might. Raewyn Connell responds to these masculine conceptualizations by pointing out that hegemony includes organized social domination in all spheres of life, from religious doctrines to mundane practice, from mass media to taxation (1998: 246). As Connell reminds us, "hegemonic masculinity" expresses the domination of men over women intellectually, culturally, socially, or even politically, thus establishing an unequivocal linkage between gender and power (Connell, 1998).
Just as the Western approach to reading and identifying the East and its fiction found an answer in Edward Said's critique of Orientalism, the theory of political realism put forth by Hans Morgenthau was criticized by Ann Tickner for conceptualizing international politics through the lens of an assumed masculine subject (Tür & Koyuncu, 2010: 9). Critical theory and postmodernism, as alternative approaches in International Relations, drew attention to the otherization of different geographies, civilizations and identities. Yet, on the issue of gender equality, the otherization of women has not been sufficiently recognized; the superiority of man and patriarchy is made possible through the othering of women. From this point of view, it would be beneficial to make a holistic reading of the International Relations literature, and to dismantle these masculine concepts by asking "curious" questions of the discipline.
In Terrell Carver's words, "Gendering IR" is...a project; "gendered" IR is an outcome" (Carver, 2003: 289). In order to achieve such outcome, it bears utmost importance for the gender-equality advocates to insist on, institutionally and practically, gender-based approaches and to not agree with the priority list of the masculine agenda. Security, order, control and retaliation increasingly dominate the discourse shaping the world politics. The gender perspective in International Relations develops to create alternative paradigms that would break this vicious circle of (in)security.
Feminist theory in International Relations has demonstrated significant progress since the 1990s and opened pathways in an uncharted territory. Cynthia Enloe, Ann Tickner, Spike V. Peterson and Christine Sylvester, among others, are the most prominent forerunners of this field. Through their works, feminist theory has adopted a perspective critical of the masculinity and the masculine values of international politics by taking not only 'women' but a wider category of gender into its centre. These feminist scholars have deconstructed International Relations theories by posing gender-related questions and displayed the masculine prejudice embedded in the definitions of security, power and sovereignty. The feminist theories of International Relations have thus distinguished themselves from the other theories of the discipline by paying a 'curious' attention to the power hierarchies and relation structures through inclusiveness and self-reflexivity (True, 2017: 3).
As Cynthia Enloe puts it, the gender perspective in International Relations must first be guided by a feminist consciousness (2004: 97). The feminist International Relations, however, although more than a quarter of century has passed since its emergence, are still struggling with the masculine theories to be considered as an equally legitimate way of understanding how the world works. Various epistemological, ontological and ethical debates may have enriched the field (True, 2017: 1), but at the same time, too many as they are, such debates may paradoxically be accusing the spreading-thin of the gender coalition. The capacity of the feminist International Relations' ethical principles to participate in the global politics has been limited to the United Nations Security Council's decision number 1325 and the Swedish feminist foreign policy.
The feminist attempt to facilitate substantial change and interaction by creating a normative agenda has been called 'normative feminism' by Jacqui True (2013: 242). Normative feminism is a project of institutionalising gender in foreign policy by focusing on socio-economic and political changes. The special issue here is our attempt to partake in this project of change in international relations. We have aimed to enhance the visibility of the gender norms of behavior and decision-making with the presupposition that they would pose an alternative to the masculine norms in International Relations by better supporting the human priorities of peace and co-existence.
Adopting Judith Butler's notion of performativity, the feminist existence in international politics has an undeniable connection to engaging in continuous activities. As Rihannan Bury suggests, "what gives a community its substance is the consistent repetition of these 'various acts' by a majority of members." "Being a member of community," therefore, "is not something one is but something one does" (2005: 14). In Turkey, too, in order to challenge the recognition of the 'hyper' version of the hegemonic masculinity as the only viable world view, gender-charged normative discourses, interactions and agendas must be continuously created and multiplied. We hope that the Turkish literature-review and the articles published here will serve this purpose.
As is the situation in all disciplines, the feminist International Relations has nurtured many onto-epistemologies, some in competition with one another. Such multitude, though definitely a richness, has been challenging the feminist stance's capacity to stand united against the hypermasculine hegemonic masculinity. In her latest book, Enloe calls for a continuous struggle of a new and wider feminist coalition against the updated authoritarianism of the patriarchy –inspiring our title "Don't Give Up! Don't Give In!." Such expanded coalition could rise on the common purpose of fighting male dominance and ignore the differences of discourse created by the debate on identity. The gender-guided change and transformation desired in international politics could be achieved more easily in this way (Hemmings, 2012: 148, 155). On this account, in parallel with Enloe's proposal of establishing a wider consensus simply on peace and co-existence (2017), a new era, in which questions of identity will, for some time, not be asked, may be dawning. A grand coalition of consensus has better chance of resisting the authoritarian leaders of hyper hegemonic masculinity.
Our special issue of Gender and International Relations opens with a Turkish literature review with the aim of introducing the topic to Turkish readers. Çiçek Coşkun, against a historical background, presents some of the prominent feminist scholars who have left their footprints in this very masculine area with their fresh gender perspectives. In doing that she offers us a comparative framework in which works by the Turkish and international scholars could be assessed simultaneously. Nezahat Doğan's article seeks to establish the relation between global peace and gender by using the data obtained from the Global Peace Index, Gender Inequality Index and Social Institutions and Gender Index. In this way, adopting a currently trendy approach, Doğan investigates the interaction between gender and International Relations through a quantitative method. Zehra Yılmaz's article discusses the temporary position of Syrian women asylum seekers in Turkey from the perspective of the post-colonial feminist concept of subaltern. The article aims to combine feminist migration studies and post-colonial feminist literature within the context of International Relations. Sinem Bal's article questions whether the EU has designed its gender policies as an aspect of the human-right norms of the European integration or as a way to regulate market economy. Bal pursues such questioning through the reading of the official documents of the EU that prescribes what Europeanization is for Turkey. Thus, all articles constitute a well-rounded understanding of what gendered approaches can achieve in the current practice of international studies.
The co-authored article written by Bezen Balamir-Coşkun and Selin Akyüz examined how the images of women leaders in international politics were presented in the international media. The selected images the three most powerful women political leaders list of Forbes in 2017 –Angela Merkel, Theresa May and Federica Mogherini were analysed in the light of the political masculinities literature from a social visual semiotics perspective. It is believed that such an analysis will contribute to the debates about gendered aspect of international relations as well as the current debates on political masculinities. Gizem Bilgin-Aytaç points out that the global policy that emerged after the Cold War and the emergence of the new way of approaching the IR from a feminist perspective have improved the scope of conceptual analysis in peace theories as well. Bilgin-Aytaç discusses global peace conditions with a gender perspective - in particular, referring to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, with a focus on exemplary contemporary issues. Fulden İbrahimhakkıoğlu, in her article, discusses the debate between Ukraine-based feminist group FEMEN staged several protests in support of Amina Tyler, a Tunisian FEMEN activist receiving death threats for posting nude photographs of herself online with social messages written on her body and the Muslim Women Against FEMEN who released an open letter criticizing the discourse FEMEN used in these protests, which they found to be white colonialist and Islamophobic. Thus, İbrahimhakkıoğlu aimes to examines the discursive strategies put forth by the two sides of the very debate, and unveiling the shortcomings of liberalism as drawn on by both positions, the author attempts to rethink what "freedom" might mean for international feminist alliances across differences.

Background: Schizophrenia is a chronic serious mental disorder with prevalence close to 0.7%. Early symptoms of schizophrenia generally appear in late adolescence or the early twenties. The prognosis is usually worse in cases of early onset. The symptomatology of schizophrenia is complex and can vary a lot between individuals. The two main symptom dimensions are referred to as positive symptoms and negative symptoms. The most common positive symptoms are: hallucinations, particularly auditory hallucinations, delusions, disturbances of thought and persecutory ideation. The most common negative symptoms are: lack of social interest, loss of personal hygiene, reduced motivation, loss of insight and blunting of affect. Over 100 variants are now known in the genome that increase the risk of schizophrenia and the genetic pathogenesis is therefore very complex. Environmental risk factors are believed to play a role in the pathogenesis of schizophrenia, especially cannabis use in adolescence. The socioeconomic cost of schizophrenia is very high because the disease often causes disability among young sufferers. Patients with schizophrenia have a reduced life expectancy of 22.5-25 years. The main reasons are unhealthy lifestyle (most patients smoke, take little exercise, use alcohol or illicit substances and are on a poor diet), cardiovascular disease and suicide. About 20-30% of patients do not respond to conventional antipsychotic treatment and are said to have treatment-resistant schizophrenia (TRS). The only approved treatment that has proven to be efficacious in TRS and been shown to improve overall mortality as well as reduce suicide attempts and probably the odds of suicide is the antipsychotic clozapine. Despite this clozapine is often used rather late in the disease course, most probably due to many side effects and some rare adverse drug reactions (ADR) which can be life-threatening for a very small proportion of TRS patients. A much greater number of patients with TRS lose years of life because they commit suicide or die prematurely due to an unhealthy lifestyle than those who pass away as a result of these rare ADRs. Despite this the proportion of TRS patients with schizophrenia that have ever had clozapine prescribed is much less than the expected 20-30% in most countries. Fewer still remain on the treatment long term for various reasons. Clozapine is not available in a depot injectable preparation and that limits its effectiveness in the treatment of patients with lack of insight or who have difficulty in taking tablets daily. Objective: To study the use of clozapine in the treatment of schizophrenia in Iceland and to assess serious side effects of antipsychotics, focusing on clozapine. Assess neutropenia and the progression to agranulocytosis and compare the prevalence for patients on clozapine versus those that have never been on clozapine. Examine the proportion of patients who had developed diabetes or dyslipidemia and compare it to a standard Icelandic population. Finally, to contribute to Evidence-Based as well as Value-Based Practice and shared decision-making in the often challenging treatment and long term care of patients with TRS. Method: The study population consisted of patients who had participated in an ongoing joint research project of Landspitali University Hospital and deCODE genetics on psychotic disorders. Patients were recruited to the study between 1986-2014. A total of 611 patients with schizophrenia took part in the study. Patients' health records were searched electronically to identify patients who had used clozapine. The health records were then reviewed to confirm use of clozapine. Patients´ health records were searched electronically to seek information on side effects and ADRs as well as the blood test database at Landspitali. Statistical analyses were performed using STATA. Results: The use of clozapine in Iceland is described in paper I. Two hundred and one patients took clozapine at some point during the study. The mean age at the start of clozapine use was 37.8 years. Some 71.2% of patients who began treatment with clozapine remained on clozapine treatment 20 years later. It was estimated that 11.4% of patients with schizophrenia in Iceland were using clozapine and that 16% had ever tried clozapine treatment. Antipsychotic polypharmacy was common since two out of every three patients, 65.6%, also used other antipsychotics alongside treatment with clozapine. Paper II focuses on neutropenia and agranulocytosis in the course of treatment of TRS with clozapine versus other antipsychotics. After the first 18 weeks of clozapine treatment the median number of days between neutrophil measurements was 124 days. Neutropenia was observed in 34 patients out of 188 on clozapine and of those 24 developed mild neutropenia (granulocytes between 1500-1900/mm3). One year after the neutropenia 28 patients out of 34 were still on clozapine. No difference was observed in the proportion of patients who developed moderate to severe neutropenia (granulocytes in the range 0-1400/mm3) between patients on clozapine versus TRS patients who had never been on clozapine. In paper III it was presented that women on clozapine were 4.4 times more likely to have been diagnosed with type 2 diabetes (T2D) than women in the general population. Males on clozapine were 2.3 times more likely to have been diagnosed with T2D than males in the general population. Triglycerides were higher both among those with schizophrenia who had been on clozapine as well as among patients with schizophrenia who had never received clozapine compared to the general population. One case of ketoacidosis was identified in a patient with type 1 diabetes. Conclusions: More patients with TRS in Iceland and other countries should get the opportunity to be offered treatment with clozapine. A large proportion of neutropenia developing during clozapine treatment is probably not caused by clozapine. If clozapine treatment proves to be effective a decision to stop clozapine should only be taken following careful consideration of all possible options in cases of moderate neutropenia, because there are usually no other alternative treatment options available that offer comparable effectiveness available. Doctors must be well aware of the risk of metabolic syndrome during clozapine treatment, especially the high risk of T2D developing in women. ; Bakgrunnur: Geðklofi er langvinnur alvarlegur geðsjúkdómur með algengi nálægt 0,7%. Fyrstu einkenni geðklofa koma oftast fram seint á unglingsárum eða á þrítugsaldri, en þeim mun fyrr sem sjúkdómurinn kemur fram eru horfurnar að jafnaði verri. Einkennaróf geðklofa er margþætt og birtingarform veikindanna getur því verið talsvert mismunandi milli einstaklinga. Tvær helstu víddir sjúkdómsins eru svokölluð jákvæð einkenni og neikvæð einkenni (brottfallseinkenni). Algengustu jákvæðu einkennin eru: ofskynjanir og þá einkum ofheyrnir, ranghugmyndir, truflun á hugsun og aðsóknarkennd. Algengustu neikvæðu einkennin eru: félagsleg einangrun, skert persónuhirða, minni áhugahvöt, innsæisleysi og skert tilfinningaleg viðbrögð. Nú eru þekktir yfir 100 breytileikar í erfðamenginu sem auka líkur á geðklofa og samband erfða og svipgerðar því afar flókið. Talið er að umhverfisþættir komi auk þess við sögu í tilurð geðklofa, ekki síst regluleg notkun unglinga á kannabisefnum. Samfélagslegur kostnaður vegna geðklofa er hár þar sem sjúkdómurinn veldur mjög oft örorku ungs fólks. Sjúklingar með geðklofa lifa að meðaltali 22,5-25 árum skemur en aðrir. Helstu ástæður þess eru óheilbrigður lífstíll (flestir reykja, lítil hreyfing, óheilbrigt mataræði og notkun vímugjafa), hjarta og æðasjúkdómar og loks sjálfsvíg. Um 20-30% sjúklinga svara ekki hefðbundinni meðferð með geðrofslyfjum og eru þeir sagðir vera með meðferðarþráan geðklofa. Eina meðferðin sem hefur sannað sig sem gagnreynd meðferð hjá þeim hópi er geðrofslyfið clozapín, en oft er það notað frekar seint í sjúkdómsferlinu vegna margvíslega aukaverkana, sem sumar hverjar geta verið lífshættulegar. Mun fleiri sjúklingar með meðferðarþráan geðklofa falla þó fyrir eigin hendi en látast vegna þessara sjaldgæfu aukaverkana, en clozapín er það lyf sem helst minnkar líkur á sjálfsvígum og dregur úr dánartíðni í þessum hópi. Þrátt fyrir það eru margir læknar ragir við að bjóða sjúklingum meðferðina og hlutfall sjúklinga sem fær að reyna clozapín meðferð vegna meðferðarþrás geðklofa er hvarvetna mun lægra en 20-30%. Clozapín er ekki til sem forðalyf í sprautuformi. Það takmarkar notagildi þess í tilfellum þar sem sjúklingar hafa mjög skert innsæi eða ráða illa við að taka töflur daglega. Markmið: Að rannsaka notkun clozapíns hér á landi í meðferð geðklofa og alvarlegar aukaverkanir geðrofslyfja með áherslu á clozapín. Skoða kyrningafæð (neutropenia) og tengingu hennar við algjöra kyrningafæð (agranulocytosis) og bera saman tíðnina hjá sjúklingum á clozapín og þeim sem hafa aldrei farið á clozapín. Einnig á að kanna tíðni sykursýki og blóðfituröskunar og bera saman við almennt íslenskt þýði. Síðast en ekki síst að þróa frekar gagnreynda og gildismiðaða meðferð og sameiginlega ákvarðanatöku í langtíma meðferð meðferðarþrás geðklofa. Aðferð: Þýðið í rannsókninni samanstóð af sjúklingum sem hafa tekið þátt í geðrofsrannsókn LSH og Íslenskrar erfðagreiningar. Sjúklingum var safnað í rannsóknina á árunum 1986-2014. Samtals voru upplýsingar um 611 sjúklinga notaðar í rannsókninni. Til að finna sjúklinga sem höfðu notað geðrofslyfið clozapín var leitað að rafrænum skjölum í sjúkraskrá Landspítala sem bentu til clozapín notkunar. Þau skjöl voru lesin til að meta hvort hægt væri að staðfesta clozapín notkun. Til að finna upplýsingar um aukaverkanir var framkvæmd rafræn leit í sjúkraskrám auk þess sem aðgangur fékkst að blóðprufugagnagrunni Landspítala. Tölfræðiúrvinnsla var gerð í STATA. Niðurstöður: Í grein I er fjallað um notkun clozapíns á Íslandi. Tvöhundruð og einn sjúklingur hafði fengið meðferð með clozapíni. Meðalaldur við upphaf clozapíns notkunar reyndist 37,8 ár á tímabilinu. Um 71,2% sjúklinga sem hófu meðferð með clozapíni voru enn á clozapín meðferð 20 árum síðar. Við áætluðum að 11,4% sjúklinga með geðklofa á Íslandi væru að taka clozapín og 16% þeirra hefðu einhvern tíma reynt meðferð með lyfinu. Fjöllyfjanotkun geðrofslyfja var algeng samhliða clozapín meðferð þar sem tveir af hverjum þremur sjúklingum eða 65,6% notuðu önnur geðrofslyf samhliða meðferð með clozapíni. Grein II fjallar um kyrningafæð og algjöra kyrningafæð. Eftir fyrstu 18 vikurnar á clozapín meðferð þá var miðgildi milli mælinga á kyrningum 124 dagar. Kyrningafæð greindist hjá 34 sjúklingum af 188 á clozapín meðferð en oftast var um að ræða væga kyrningafæð (kyrningar milli 1500-1900/mm3 ) eða hjá 24 sjúklingum. Einu ári eftir kyrningarfæð voru 28 af 34 sjúklingum ennþá á clozapíni. Enginn munur kom fram á tíðni alvarlegrar kyrningafæðar (kyrningar á bilinu 0-1400/mm3 ) hjá sjúklingum á clozapíni og sjúklingum með geðklofa sem höfðu aldrei farið á clozapín meðferð. Í grein III kemur fram að konur sem hafa tekið clozapín voru 4,4 sinnum líklegri en konur í almennu þýði til að hafa greinst með sykursýki týpu 2. Karlar á clozapín meðferð voru 2,3 sinnum líklegri til að hafa greinst með sykursýki týpu 2 en karlar í almennu þýði. Þríglýseríð voru einnig hærri bæði hjá þeim sem höfðu tekið clozapín og hjá sjúklingum með geðklofa sem höfðu aldrei tekið clozapín samanborið við almennt þýði. Eitt tilfelli af ketónblóðsýringu greindist hjá sjúklingi með sykursýki af týpu 1. Ályktanir: Hærra hlutfall sjúklinga með meðferðarþráan geðklofa á Íslandi og í öðrum löndum ætti að eiga þess kost að reyna meðferð með clozapíni. Stór hluti af kyrningafæð sem kemur fram hjá sjúklingum á clozapín meðferð stafar líklega ekki af lyfinu. Því þarf að ígrunda vel ákvarðanir um að hætta clozapín meðferð einstaklinga með meðferðarþráan geðklofa á grundvelli miðlungs alvarlegrar kyrningafæðar hafi meðferð skilað góðum árangri og þar sem þá er almennt ekki önnur meðferð með sambærilega virkni í boði. Læknar þurfa að vera vel vakandi fyrir efnaskiptavillu af völdum clozapíns og þá sérstaklega sykursýki týpu 2 hjá konum. ; Landspitali, The National University Hospital European Union's Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no. 279227 (CRESTAR).

Tutkimus pureutuu poliittisen edustuksen käsitteeseen, keskittyen erityisesti edustuksen ja demokratian yhteyteen. Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan teoreettisessa ajattelussa tapahtunutta siirtymää siitä, että edustus ymmärretään edustuksellisen demokratian kontekstissa siihen, että edustus ymmärretään ideaksi ja prosessiksi, joka on demokratialle välttämätön. Tätä siirtymää analysoidaan ja kehitetään eteenpäin tarkastelemalla Talvivaaran kaivoksen ympärille kehkeytynyttä poliittista toimintaa ja edustuspuhetta. Vaaleja, edustajien responsiivisuutta edustettaville, universaalia äänioikeutta ja tasa-arvoa pidetään tavallisesti edustuksellisen demokratian tunnusmerkkeinä. Tässä katsannossa edustuksen demokraattisuuden katsotaan toteutuvan, kun vaaleilla valitut edustajat pidetään mahdollisimman lähellä heidät auktorisoineita kansalaisia. Tämä läheisyys on tarkoittanut muun muassa sitä, että lainsäätäjien päätöksiltä vaaditaan vastaavuutta kansalaisten mielipiteiden kanssa, että päättäjien pitäisi olla vastaanottavaisia (responsiivisia) kansalaisilta tuleville ärsykkeille, ja että kansanedustuslaitos olisi kansan pienoiskuva suhteessa erinäisiin sosio-demografisiin piirteisiin. Edustusta sinänsä ei pidetä demokraattisena, ellei se seuraa vaaleista ja ellei yllä kuvailtu läheisyys edustajien ja edustettavien välillä toteudu. Demokratiateoriassa on kuitenkin viimeisen 20 vuoden aikana tapahtunut niin sanottu edustuskäänne, tai konstruktivistinen käänne. Sen keskeinen huomio on, että edustus ei ole demokratian välttämätön lisäke vaan demokratia itse asiassa edellyttää edustusta. Tällä ei kuitenkaan viitata elitistiseen, schumpeterilaiseen, näkemykseen edustuksellisesta demokratiasta eikä siihen, että suuret yhteiskunnat voisivat olla demokraattisia vain edustuksen kautta. Sen sijaan edustuksen katsotaan mahdollistavan kommunikaation ja symbolit, joiden seurauksena edustettava kokonaisuus muodostuu. Edustus ymmärretään siis ennen kaikkea ajatukseksi eikä institutionaaliseksi muodoksi. Edustamisväitteillä (representative claims; Saward 2006; 2010) sekä edustaja että edustettava rakennetaan symbolisesti. Nämä väitteet ovat vääjäämättä valikoivia, esteettisiä ja performatiivisia. Tämä edustuksen esteettinen ominaisuus tekee vallankäytöstä näkyvää ja kutsuu kontrolloimaan sitä. Edustamisväitteiden tekemistä ei kuitenkaan tule ymmärtää vaaleilla valittujen edustajien yksinoikeudeksi, vaan niiden tekeminen on auki kaikille subjekteille. Edustamisväitteet mahdollistavat erilaiset käsitykset 'meistä' ja 'meidän' eduistamme ja näiden käsitysten keskinäisen kamppailun, mikä on välttämätöntä demokraattisen politiikan jatkuvuudelle. Monet empiiriset tutkimukset ovat ottaneet edustuskäänteen lähtökohdakseen. Koska siirtymä uuteen teoreettiseen ymmärrykseen on tapahtunut verrattain hiljattain, empiiriset tutkimukset eivät kuitenkaan muodosta vielä yhtenäistä tutkimusperinnettä. Edistääkseen edustuskäännettä seuraavaa edustustutkimusta, esitetään kaksiosainen tutkimusongelma: (1) Mitä oikeastaan tutkimme, kun tutkimme edustusta? ja (2) Mikä tekee edustuksesta demokraattista? Näitä kahta kysymystä tarkastellaan sekä teoreettisesti että tutkimalla edustuspuhetta (representational speech) käyttäen Talvivaaraa tapaustutkimuksena. Edustuspuhe on laajempi käsite kuin Sawardin edustamisväite, ja sillä viitataan mihin tahansa lausumiin ja (esimerkiksi visuaalisiin) symboleihin, joilla rakennetaan edustajaa ja edustettavaa tietynlaisiksi. Edustuspuheen käsitteeseen sisältyy myös eksplisiittinen puhe edustuksesta ja sen merkityksistä. Aiempien teoreettisten keskusteluiden pohjalta tutkimuksessa esitetään, että edustus toimii demokratian ehtona erityisesti siksi, että (1) se on epäsuoraa ja mahdollistaa siten kommunikaation; (2) se mahdollistaa symboliset esitykset edustajasta, edustettavasta ja todellisuudesta, eikä siten ole vain kahdenvälinen suhde; ja (3) se näin ollen mahdollistaa politiikan. Demokratia ei ole mahdollista ilman politiikkaa. Tätä teoreettista näkemystä tarkastellaan edelleen Talvivaaran tapauksen valossa. Tapaustutkimuksen aineisto koostuu 41 haastattelusta ministerin, kansanedustajien, kunnanvaltuutettujen, viranhaltijoiden, kansalaistoimijoiden ja Talvivaara-yhtiön edustajien kanssa. Aineistoon sisältyy myös osallistuvaa havainnointia mielenosoituksista, kansalaiskokoontumisista ja paneelikeskustelusta, hallinnollisia lausuntoja ja virallisia tiedotteita, eduskuntalähteitä (kirjallisia kysymyksiä, talousarvio- ja lisätalousarvioaloitteita sekä täysistunnon pöytäkirjoja) sekä Stop Talvivaara -liikkeen tiedotteita ja YouTube-videoita aikaväliltä 2005–2015. Tapaustutkimus havainnollistaa teoriaa käytännössä. Tutkimus osoittaa, että edustuksen (edustuspuheen) tutkiminen johtaa huomaamaan poliittisen toiminnan reunaehdot ja ymmärtämään, mitkä tekijät ovat tärkeitä toimijoiden legitimiteetille tietyssä kontekstissa. Talvivaaran kaivoksen kontekstissa oli paradoksaalista, että kansalaistoimijoilta edellytettiin paikallisuutta, vaikka sekä vaaleilla valitut että muut toimijat laajasti arvioivat, että Talvivaara oli kansallinen kysymys. Kansalaistoimijoiden edustamisväitteet näyttäytyivät marginaalisilta korostaessaan ympäristönäkökulmaa. Sen sijaan kansanedustajien edustamisväitteet olivat monin paikoin ympäripyöreitä ja reaktiivisia, pyrkien löytämään kultaisen keskitien. Edustamisväitteet mahdollistivat 'meidän' tulkinnan niin, että tästä tulkinnasta saattoi vetää johtopäätöksiä siitä, mitä tulisi poliittisesti päättää. Samalla edustamisväitteet paljastivat syvempiä jaettuja merkityksiä, joissa talouteen viittaavat argumentit olivat hegemonisempia kuin ympäristöön viittaavat. Tutkimuksen tulokset haastavat perinteisen edustustutkimuksen siinä, että perinteinen tutkimus jakaa edustusfokukset vaalipiiriin, koko valtioon ja puolueeseen. Tapaustutkimus osoittaa, että paikallisten ja kansallisten intressien määritelmät ovat poliittisia ja ne esitetään tietyllä tavalla riippuen puhujan poliittisista kannoista. Edustuspuheeseen liittyy merkityksiä, jotka johdattavat poliittisten (puolue)kantojen äärelle, mutta nämä kannat perustellaan puoluetta useammin viittauksilla paikallisiin tai kansallisiin etuihin. Samalla edustuspuhe tarjoaa näennäisesti neutraalin tavan puhua poliittisesti. 'Kaikkia' väitetään edustettavan, mutta mitä etuja 'kaikkiin' liitetään, riippuu puhujan poliittisista kannoista ja siitä, miten hän esittää käsillä olevan poliittisen kysymyksen. Viittaamalla 'kaikkiin' mahdollistuu poliittisten päämäärien ja ideologioiden kommunikointi tavalla, jonka kuulija voi hyväksyä mahdollisesti helpostikin. Edustamisväitteillä pystyy 'myymään' poliittisia näkökantoja yleisölle. Edustuspuhe onkin kaksiteräinen miekka: se toisaalta mahdollistaa demokratialle tarpeellisen väittelyn 'meistä' ja 'meidän' eduistamme, mutta samalla mahdollistaa poliittisuuden hämärtämisen edellä kuvatulla tavalla. Tämä edellyttää yleisöltä taitoa lukea edustamisväitteitä. Valpas yleisö tunnistaa edustamisväitteet ja pystyy arvioimaan niitä kriittisesti. Epävalpas yleisö sen sijaan ei ymmärrä edustamisväitteiden vääjäämätöntä osittaisuutta ja sitä, että mikään edustamisväite ei ole lopullinen totuus 'meistä'. Epävalppaan yleisön ollessa kyseessä edustamisväitteet avaavat tilaa populismille. Talvivaara-tapaustutkimus vahvistaa Dischin (2011) esittämän käsityksen, että demokraattisesta näkökulmasta normatiivista empiiristä tutkimusta tehdessä on kiinnitettävä huomiota edustamisväitteiden tekijöiden institutionaalisiin positioihin. Tutkimus ehdottaakin, että edustuksen demokraattisuuden tutkijoiden tulee huomioida positiot, joista edustamisväitteitä esitetään, eikä tarkastella vain yleisesti edustamisväitteiden moninaisuutta. Näin ollen tutkijoiden tulisi olla kiinnostuneita myös ei-vaaleilla valittujen toimijoiden tekemistä edustamisväitteistä ja näiden väitteiden suhteesta vaaleilla valittujen toimijoiden edustamisväitteisiin. Edustuspuheen tutkiminen paljastaa valtasuhteita, joiden analyysi on välttämätöntä poliittisen edustuksen tutkijoille. ; The dissertation studies the concept of political representation. Specifically, it examines the connection between representation and democracy. It discusses the shift in theoretical thinking from understanding representation in the context of representative democracies to understanding representation as an idea and process necessary for democracy. This shift is analyzed and developed further by an examination of politics and representational speech during the Talvivaara mine controversy in Finland. In the standard (traditional) account, elections, responsiveness of elected representatives to citizens, universal suffrage, and equality are understood as characteristic to representative democracies. In this account, normative requirements for democratic representation arise from keeping elected representatives and the represented as close to each other as possible. This requires congruence between the decisions of legislators and the opinions of citizens, responsiveness of the representatives to the represented, and descriptive similarity between the two in terms of socio-demographic characteristics. Representation as such is not held to be democratic unless representation emerges from elections and the closeness between representatives and the represented is realized. The representative, or constructivist, turn in democratic theory argues otherwise. This turn in theoretical thinking on representation has taken place over the last 20 years or so. Its central observation is that representation is not second-best to direct democracy, but democracy in fact presupposes representation. However, this argument refers neither to the elitist Schumpeterian view of representative democracy nor to the notion that representation would be the only imaginable way of organizing government in large-scale societies. Instead, it views democracy as an idea rather than an institutional form, in which representation allows for communication and symbols through which the represented constituency emerges. In making representative claims (Saward 2006; 2010), both the representative and the represented are constructed. These claims are necessarily selective, aesthetic, and performative. This aesthetic quality of representation makes power visible and invites control over it. According to this view, claims-making should not be understood as a privilege of the elected, but as open to anyone. Claims make it possible to create and contest portrayals of 'us', and thus sustain democratic politics. While there have been numerous empirical studies departing from this account, these studies point to different directions in terms of how to bring the theoretical turn into (normative) empirical research. This thesis aims to contribute to this state of affairs by addressing two research questions: (1) What do we study when we study representation after the representative turn? and (2) What makes representation democratic? These questions are addressed by studying representational speech. Representational speech is a broader concept than the representative claim. It refers to anything that can be interpreted as constructing a represented category or presenting someone as a representative. Speech about political representation is also included under the umbrella term of representational speech. The dissertation takes the representative turn further by clarifying, confirming, and defining its assertions. Based on analysis of previous theoretical accounts, it is argued that representation functions as a precondition for democracy through its indirectness. It invites communication and symbolic action, and makes politics possible. This theoretical account is further examined in the Talvivaara case study. The case study data consists of 41 interviews with a minister, MPs, local councilors, public officials, civic actors, and Talvivaara representatives. The data also includes participatory observation of demonstrations, citizen assemblies, and a panel discussion, ministerial and administrative statements, parliamentary sources (written questions, budgetary and supplementary budgetary motions, and parliamentary minutes), as well as press releases and YouTube videos by the Stop Talvivaara movement between 2005 and 2015. The case study provides an example of an application of a theory, and is illustrative, or exemplifying, in nature. The case study shows that studying representation (through representational speech) leads to unraveling institutional terms for political action and to understanding what factors are relevant for gaining legitimacy in a specific context. In the context of the Talvivaara mine, it was paradoxical that locality was required from civic actors as a proof of their legitimacy, whilst actors across the political landscape, both elected and non-elected, viewed the Talvivaara case a national issue. At the same time, representative claims made by civic actors were marginal in their emphasis on the environment, as opposed to the rather vague, reactive, and middle-of-the-road representative claims made by MPs. While representative claims allow an interpretation of 'us' that sets the stage for immediate decisions, studying representational speech reveals deeper shared meanings. In the context of Talvivaara, economic arguments were privileged over environmental concerns. The findings of the dissertation challenge traditional representation research that separates electoral district, the party and the nation as representational foci. The case study shows that local and national interests are political matters. How they are represented and defined depends on political standpoints. Representational speech carries meanings that can be traced back to political (party) standpoints. However, these standpoints are often backed with references to local and national interests rather than party affiliations. At the same time, representational speech offers a neutral way to speak politically. 'Everybody' is claimed to be represented, but 'everybody's' interests and how these interests are best served depends on the speaker's political standpoints and representations of the issue. The reference to 'everybody' allows communication of political aims and ideologies in ways that can potentially be accepted quite easily. Claiming to represent 'the people' works as a way to 'sell' policy standpoints to the public. Indeed, representational speech is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, speaking 'representationally' opens space for debates about who 'we' are and what is important to 'us'. On the other, representative claims offer ways to communicate political standpoints in a seemingly neutral way. This requires that audiences be attentive. A politically attentive audience recognizes representative claims and is able to assess whether the portrayal of 'us' is desirable or not. But a politically inattentive audience fails to see that representative claims are necessarily selective and not the final truth about 'us'. If the audience is inattentive, individual representative claims can open space for populism. The case study confirms Disch's (2011) argument that the institutional positions of would-be representatives need to be included when the representative turn is applied to normative empirical research from a democratic perspective. The study of democratic representation should take into account not simply the plurality of representative claims, but the plurality of the positions from which the representative claims are made. This is why representative claims made by non-elected actors and the relationship of these claims vis-à-vis representative claims made by elected actors are worth studying. Addressing representational speech reveals power relations whose analysis is imperative for scholars of political representation.

Introduction: Never before in history has global demand for energy been stronger than today. While exhaustible resources such as oil, gas, and coal are expected to remain the world's primary basis of energy generation in the near future, alternative resources like biomass, solar, or wind energy are predicted to grow significantly in importance (e.g. International Energy Agency, 2009). The strong global energy demand, together with rising costs of finding and exploiting fossil fuels, has contributed to a considerable increase in public awareness for the energy supply issue in recent years, and thus also to an acceleration of the investments and developments in the field of alternative resources. Yet, in order to achieve a fundamental shift away from exhaustible resources on a long-term basis, creative innovations and new technology solutions for renewable energy production are vital. The basis for the successful development and commercialisation of such new technologies is effective research and development (RD) work by companies, universities, and other organisations. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) take on a special role in this respect. The majority of European companies are SMEs if measured by the EU criteria (EC DG Research Communication Unit, 2010a, p. 6), that is, they have less than 250 employees, and an annual turnover and/or balance sheet total lower than EUR 50 million and/or EUR 43 million, respectively. The large number of SMEs in Europe implies that there is a high diversity, and thus also a vast potential for innovation, in these organisations. Nevertheless, in most countries, including Switzerland, the bulk of research in the private sector is undertaken by larger businesses. In Switzerland, RD by SMEs (SFSO definition, i.e. firms with less than 100 employees) accounted for only 16% of total in-house RD spending in 2008, although some 99% of Swiss companies are categorised as SMEs (SFSO, 2010, p. 9). In addition, many smaller companies do not engage in RD at all, as they simply do not possess the necessary resources. These facts lead to a situation where much potential for innovation in smaller firms remains unused. Providing SMEs with the opportunity to engage in publicly funded RD projects offers one way to tap into this potential for innovation that would otherwise continue to lie idle, and is therefore highly reasonable from a policy point of view. At the same time, participation in such projects potentially also has a number of positive impacts on the SMEs involved. The latter is the focus of this thesis, which concentrates on the participation of Swiss SMEs in the field of renewable energy in publicly funded RD projects. As such, this thesis is concerned with the company point of view rather than the policy perspective. In general, a large number of RD funding programmes exist nationally in Switzerland and at the European level with opportunities for SMEs to participate (examples in the field of renewable energy will be introduced in this thesis). Yet, reviews of funding programmes reveal that SME participation is frequently lower than desired. This gives rise to three central questions: (i) How important is participation in a funded project for the involved SMEs in terms of the benefits they can gain from participating, (ii) What do companies which took part say about their participation, and (iii) What are the main barriers to participation? Based on these broad questions, the main goal of this thesis is to shed light on three major points: (i) the influence of SMEs' participation in a publicly funded research project on their competitiveness, (ii) the companies' evaluation of various aspects of their participation, and (iii) the reasons for non-participation of SMEs. To this end, the report starts with a brief review of major theories on firm competitiveness in chapter 2, with a special focus on resource-based perspectives of the firm. The empirical findings of this research project are later discussed in the light of these concepts. The thesis then continues with a presentation of selected national and EU funding programmes suitable for Swiss SMEs in the field of renewable energy in chapters 3 and 4. Here the aim is to identify the programmes' central goals and funded activities in order to derive a list of benefits that companies can potentially gain from participation. The most important benefits are then summarised in chapter 5, together with a list of barriers to participation. These findings form the basis of the primary research undertaken within the scope of this thesis, which in turn investigates the research questions through an online company survey on the one hand, and expert interviews with representatives of funding bodies on the other. Finally, in chapters 8 and 9 the findings from the literature review and the empirical section are contrasted and analysed, conclusions are drawn, and recommendations for SMEs are provided.Inhaltsverzeichnis:Table of Contents: AbstractII AcknowledgementsIIV List of tables and figuresVII List of abbreviationsVIII 1.Introduction1 2.Review of selected theories on firm competitiveness4 2.1General aspects4 2.2Industrial organisation view5 2.3Resource-based view of the firm6 2.4Dynamic capabilities8 2.5Knowledge-based view of the firm9 3.RD funding in Switzerland10 3.1General aspects10 3.1.1Switzerland as a research location10 3.1.2Relevant Swiss research promoting institutions11 3.1.3SME specific issues13 3.2Funding programmes of the SFOE14 3.2.1Hydropower research15 3.2.2Biomass and Wood energy research16 3.2.3Photovoltaics research17 3.2.4Solar heat and heat storage research18 3.2.5Wind energy research19 3.2.6Heat pumping technologies, cogeneration, refrigeration research20 3.2.7Indirect support of geothermal energy21 3.3Funding by the CTI22 3.3.1RD projects22 3.3.2The CTI 'Innovationsscheck'23 3.3.3Feasibility studies23 4.RD funding at the European level24 4.1General aspects24 4.1.1Europe as a research location24 4.1.2Relevant EU research promoting instruments24 4.1.3SME specific issues26 4.27th Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development27 4.2.1FP7-Cooperation-ENERGY30 4.2.2FP7-Cooperation-ENVIRONMENT31 4.2.3FP7-Capacities-Research for the benefit of SMEs32 4.3EUREKA33 4.4EUREKA Eurostars33 5.Potential benefits of and barriers to participation for SMEs36 5.1Benefits36 5.1.1Reduced time-to-market for a product36 5.1.2Outsourcing of RD37 5.1.3Financing a demonstration or prototype project37 5.1.4Acquiring intellectual property rights38 5.1.5Accessing new technological know-how38 5.1.6Expanding the company network39 5.1.7Enhanced company reputation and visibility39 5.1.8Economic impacts40 5.2Barriers40 6.Research methodology42 6.1Research questions and hypotheses42 6.2Quantitative research (company survey)44 6.2.1Sampling approach44 6.2.2Collaboration with external organisations46 6.2.3Questionnaire and survey implementation48 6.3Qualitative research (expert interviews with funding bodies)50 6.4Data analysis51 7.Research findings52 7.1Response rate52 7.2Previous participation vs. non-participation53 7.3Companies with previous participation53 7.3.1Funding bodies used53 7.3.2Benefits gained from participation55 7.3.3Companies' evaluation of their participation57 7.4Companies without previous participation65 8.Discussion of research findings67 8.1Companies with previous participation67 8.1.1Funding bodies used67 8.1.2Benefits gained from participation68 8.1.3Companies' evaluation of their participation73 8.2Companies without previous participation75 9.Conclusion and recommendations77 List of references82 Glossary of terms91 Appendices93 Appendix 1: German names of Swiss government bodies93 Appendix 2: Questionnaire of the survey (original)94 Appendix 3: Questionnaire of the survey (translation)100 Appendix 4: Covering letter of the survey102 Appendix 5: First reminder of the survey103 Appendix 6: Second reminder of the survey104 Appendix 7: Selected answers to question 7 (original and translation)105 Appendix 8: Additional answers to question 8 (original and translation)108 Appendix 9: Selected answers to question 9 (original and translation)110Textprobe:Text Sample: Chapter 3.3, Funding by the CTI: 3.3.1, RD projects: The CTI, the Swiss Confederation's Innovation Promotion Agency, has been providing funds for RD and innovation projects to promote the exchange of knowledge between companies and academia for about 60 years. With a budget of CHF 532 million between 2008 and 2011, the CTI mainly co-finances market-oriented projects with a clear goal to develop products or services, and is therefore one of the most important funding institutions for Swiss SMEs. Besides facilitating projects within Switzerland, the CTI also supports companies' efforts to join international research projects. As mentioned in chapter 3.1.2, contrary to the SFOE programmes where companies can also receive direct financial support, CTI funds are entirely used for the financing of the RTD provider's research services. In this way, the involved companies – primarily SMEs with limited RD budgets – have the possibility of outsourcing research activities without additional costs. This, in turn, enables them to benefit from academic know-how while focusing their resources on their own core capabilities, which usually results in a significant reduction in the time-to-market (TTM) for innovations. CTI funding follows a bottom-up approach and is open to all research areas that create scientific innovations and economic impact. As such, innovative potential and economic impact are also the central funding criteria. The CTI support generally covers 50% of the project costs. Besides RD project financing, two other support measures are of particular relevance for the topic of this thesis: the CTI 'Innovationsscheck' and feasibility studies. 3.3.2, The CTI 'Innovationsscheck': The first edition of the CTI 'Innovationsscheck' ('innovation cheque') initiative was launched in 2009 as a CHF 1 million pilot project that offers SMEs, in all areas of technology, a 'cheque' of up to CHF 7,500 for RD services of research institutions such as universities. The initiative specifically addresses SMEs without prior experience in science-based innovation projects and aims at encouraging them to start working with universities or research centres. Demand during the first round of the initiative exceeded supply, and as a result the initiative is currently being repeated. Participation in the second edition is exclusively reserved for SMEs active in the area of Cleantech (i.e. industries and services that preserve and maintain natural resources and systems), which can be described as unusual for the CTI, since funding by this government agency is usually not limited to a specific topic area. 3.3.3, Feasibility studies: With a maximum contribution of CHF 100,000 per project, the CTI also offers support for feasibility studies that take less than one year to complete. The goal is to assist companies in assessing whether their idea for an innovation has a realistic chance of success and in which time frame. Feasibility studies may therefore substantially decrease the involved risk for the company and help to avoid misdirected investments that fail to deliver the expected results. CTI funding rates for this support measure are more flexible than for standard projects and can be adapted to the specific situation of the company. The business partner is obliged to actively participate in the study and must be involved in the actual project after feasibility has been confirmed. 4, RD funding at the European level: 4.1, General aspects: 4.1.1, Europe as a research location: Although Europe as a whole is a well-established research location and host to a large number of top-level universities, research institutions, and innovative companies, the EU also faces major challenges in this respect, such as insufficient coordination of research policies and increasing global competition for talent. Over the last few years, progress has been made towards improving the situation, most notably through the common objective to formally establish a European Research Area (ERA) that aims at the creation of a '[...] European 'internal market' for research, where researchers, technology and knowledge freely circulate [...]'. The EU's total RD spending (i.e. including the private sector) was at 1.84% of GDP in 2006. As such, the Union was still far off the self-imposed 3% target defined by the Lisbon Strategy and to be reached by 2010, and lags behind other areas of the world, such as the U.S. or Asia. In 2006, Japan invested 3.39%, South Korea 3.23% and the U.S. 2.61% of their GDP in research activities. With regard to the distribution of RD spending between the public and private sectors, the EU's objective is to reach a total of two thirds of RD expenditure being raised by the business sector. By 2005, this figure was at 54.6%.

Grenada has faced various socioeconomic challenges within the last decade, including the destruction wrought by Hurricane Ivan in 2004 and the global financial crisis. As a result, economic indicators for Grenada illustrate unfavorable. Increases in the poverty and unemployment rates, especially among the youth and young adults. This report presents an assessment of the regulatory, legislative, and institutional landscape governing workforce development (WfD) in Grenada. The results of this analysis are based on a newly designed analytical tool developed by the World Bank under the Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) initiative. The aim of this initiative is to garner data so as to provide systematic documentation and assessment of the policy and institution factors that influence the performance of education and training systems of SABER-participating countries. The SABER-WfD tool encompasses initial, continuing, and targeted vocational education and training that are offered through multiple channels, and focus largely on programs at the secondary and post-secondary levels. The results of the assessment presented in this report are expected to assist in clarifying priorities. They classify the WfD system according to four stages of maturity in policy and institutional development, as follows: (1) Latent, (2) Emerging, (3) Established, and (4) Advanced.

Sommer, Sonne, Strand - Zypern ist eine Ferieninsel geworden, auf der viele Touristen Urlaub machen. In Nikosia können Tourist*innen in hippen Läden shoppen gehen, die schöne Altstadt genießen und lecker Essen gehen. Aber aufgepasst! Mitten in der Hauptstadt stehen Friedenstruppen der Vereinten Nationen und überwachen die grüne Linie. Der schöne Schein trügt und erinnert an die vergangenen blutigen Ereignisse zwischen den beiden Volkstruppen. Eine Reise nach Nikosia ist nicht nur mit Urlaub verbunden, sondern auch eine lebendige Geschichtsstunde, denn die Insel ist bis heute geteilt. Dennoch ist die Lage entspannter geworden, die Grenzen sind geöffnet und EU-Bürger*innen können mit ihrem Personalausweis problemlos den Südteil hin zum Nordteil überqueren. Der folgende Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit der Friedenssicherung durch die Vereinten Nationen. Die Friedenssicherung hat sich zu einem zentralen Auftrag der Vereinten Nationen entwickelt und soll am Fallbeispiel Zypern erläutert werden. Dabei gliedert sich die Arbeit in fünf Teile. Zu Beginn wird auf den Kontext der UN-Friedenssicherung im allgemeinen eingegangen. Anschließend wird Bezug auf die Charta der Vereinten Nationen genommen und der Prozess und die Verantwortlichkeit der Friedensmissionen geklärt. Im Folgenden werden die ersten Friedensmissionen beleuchtet und reflektiert. Dabei wird der Zypernkonflikt historisch eingeordnet. Ob die Vereinten Nationen im Fall Zypern richtig gehandelt oder den Konflikt nur auf Eis gelegt haben, ist eine Kontroverse. Um diese zu verstehen, müssen die Hintergründe des Konfliktes beleuchtet werden, welches im nächsten Kapitel geschieht. Weiter wird auf die Mitwirkung der UNO an einer Lösung des Konfliktes eingegangen. Hier sollen die Schwierigkeiten und Erfolge beleuchtet werden. Zum Schluss wird anhand von ausgewählten Praxisbeispielen der UNFICYP gezeigt, wie die Friedensmission vor Ort ablief. Die Probleme und Erfolge der Friedenstruppen werden betrachtet, ebenso werden die Konzepte der Vereinten Nationen, die in die Praxis umgesetzt wurden, auf ihre Standhaftigkeit überprüft.  Friedenssicherung durch die Vereinten NationenIm folgenden Abschnitt wird das Konzept der Friedenssicherung vorgestellt und in seinen einzelnen Stufen dargestellt. Die Friedenssicherung ist, zusammen mit der Durchsetzung der Menschenrechte, ein zentraler Auftrag der Vereinten Nationen. Diese Ziele hängen direkt miteinander zusammen (vgl. Mathis, 2013). Es gibt festgeschriebene Grundsätze, die von den Mitgliedern beachten werden sollten; die folgenden stehen in unmittelbarem Zusammenhang der Friedenssicherung der Vereinten Nationen: Die Pflicht zur friedlichen Streitbeilegung, das allgemeine Verbot der Androhung und Anwendung von Gewalt und das Interventionsverbot. Ausnahme beim Gewaltverbot ist die Selbstverteidigung und die vom Sicherheitsrat erlassenen militärischen Zwangsmaßnahmen. Der UN-Sicherheitsrat nimmt hier das Gewaltmonopol ein. Durch das Interventionsverbot dürfen souveräne Staaten sich nicht in innere Angelegenheiten einmischen. Der UN-Sicherheitsrat kann deshalb nicht in innerstaatliche Konflikte und Menschenrechtsverletzungen eingreifen (Ebbing 2012, vgl. S. 3f). Dabei trägt der UN-Sicherheitsrat die Verantwortung für die internationale Sicherheit und den Weltfrieden; dieser kann bindende Entscheidungen für Mitgliedsstaaten treffen (vgl. Deutsche Gesellschaft für die Vereinten Nationen e.V.). Alle UNO-Missionen zur Friedenssicherung und die Entsendung von UN-Soldaten gingen auf die Entscheidung des Sicherheitsrates zurück. Zu betrachten ist, dass durch Menschenrechtsverletzungen Konflikte gestärkt werden und diese in bewaffneten Konflikten und Kriegen enden können. Außerdem kommt es in Kriegen zu Menschenrechtsverletzungen wie z.B. durch Folter, Ermordung von Zivilisten oder sogar Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit, wie Völkermord (vgl. Mathis, 2013). Ein zentrales Gremium für das UN- Konfliktmanagement, welches anhand der UN-Charta entscheidet, ob es sich um einen Friedensbruch oder um einen Bruch der internationalen Sicherheit handelt, ist etabliert. Hier werden Maßnahmen beschlossen, um die internationale Sicherheit und den Weltfrieden wieder herzustellen (vgl. Deutsche Gesellschaft für die Vereinten Nationen e.V.). Mathis zeigt auf, dass die Friedenssicherung eine signifikante Anzahl an Aspekten aufweist und durch das Grundprinzip nicht direkt in bewaffnete Konflikte eingegriffen wird. Zu aller erst gibt es die Prävention, wirtschaftliche Hilfe, Sicherung von Menschenrechten, Verhandlung in Konflikten, Sanktionen gegen Staaten, die völkerrechtswidrig handeln oder völkerrechtliche Vereinbarungen nicht einhalten, wie die Ablehnung von ABC-Waffen. Der Sicherheitsrat kann hierbei Empfehlungen zur friedlichen Streitbeilegung nach Kapitel VI der Charta aussprechen. Darüber hinaus kann es zu Zwangsmaßnahmen nach Kapitel VII kommen. Dabei kann es sich um nicht-militärische, aber auch um militärische Maßnahmen handeln (Deutsche Gesellschaft für die Vereinten Nationen e.V.). Hinzu kommt, dass der UN-Sicherheitsrat einen Krieg völkerrechtlich legitimieren kann (vgl. Mathis, 2013). Während eines Krieges werden Verhandlungen für einen Waffenstillstand geführt, es wird humanitäre Hilfe geleistet, und die Zivilbevölkerung wird durch UN-Soldaten zu schützen versucht. Selbst nach einem Krieg sorgen die UN-Soldaten für die Sicherung des Waffenstillstandes und die Einhaltung von Friedensvereinbarungen. Dabei steht der Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung permanent im Vordergrund. Ein Wiederaufbau, eine Entwaffnung und Abrüstung wird gefördert und schwere Kriegsverbrechen werden geahndet (vgl. ebd.). In einer Resolution wird vom Sicherheitsrat über die Größe und das Mandat einer Friedensmission entschieden, und anhand regelmäßiger Berichte durch den Generalsekretär kann das Mandat verlängert oder geändert werden (vgl. ebd.). Nun soll geklärt werden, wie genau eine Friedensmission abläuft und wer die Verantwortung trägt. Für die Friedensmissionen ist das Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) zuständig; dieses plant die Mission und führt diese durch. Dabei werden sie vom Department of Political Affairs (DPA) unterstützt, dieses beteiligt sich vor allem bei diplomatischen Bemühungen. Eine Einsatzleitung (Force Commander) vor Ort wird vom Generalsekretär bestimmt. Dieser verfügt ebenso auch über die ausführende Leitung der Friedensmission (vgl. Deutsche Gesellschaft für die Vereinten Nationen e.V). Aus Kapitel VII der Charta geht eine starke Anteilnahme der Mitgliedstaaten hervor. Diese Staaten sollen auf Grundlage von Sonderabkommen Streitkräfte zu Verfügung stellen. Dabei sollte erwähnt werden, dass noch kein Sonderabkommen zustande gekommen ist. Festzustellen ist, dass die Anforderungen von den Vereinten Nationen zu hoch und den praktischen Möglichkeiten voraus sind (Gareis/Varwick 2014, vgl. S.117). Gareis analysiert, dass das kollektive Interesse der VN-Mitgliedstaaten oft zu gering ist, um ihre Streitkräfte aus der Hand zu geben und das Leben der Soldaten zu riskieren (vgl. ebd.). Daraus folgt, dass die Vereinten Nationen kein schnelles und effektives Sicherheitssystem besitzt. Die Vereinten Nationen sind "eine unvollkommene, reformbedürftige, aber doch in vielen Bereichen eminent wichtige internationale Organisation" (ebd. S. 356). Voraussetzung für den Erfolg der Vereinten Nationen ist, dass die Staaten multilaterale Strategien zur Problemlösung bevorzugen. Nur dann können die Vereinten Nationen eine Rolle in der internationalen Politik spielen. Die Mitgliedstaaten sind in der Praxis selten bereit, ihre Außenpolitik in die Hände der Vereinten Nationen zu legen. Die großen und mächtigen Staaten neigen dazu, unilateral vorzugehen. Staaten wollen alleine und, wenn notwendig, gegen andere Staaten handeln, um ihre eigenen Interessen zu verfolgen und zu maximieren. Auch wenn nur im Einzelfall unilateral gehandelt wird, entsteht dadurch trotzdem ein Bruch und gegenseitiges Vertrauen wird schwierig (vgl. ebd.). Aufgrund dessen haben sich alternative Formen der Friedenssicherung entwickelt. Diese müssen einerseits dem veränderten Kriegs- und Konfliktgeschehen standhalten und den Souveränitätsansprüchen der Mitgliedsstaaten. Eine eigene UN-Friedenssicherung sind beispielsweise die Blauhelme, welche durch Auslegung von Kapitel VII der Charta vom Sicherheitsrat seit den 1950er Jahren entsendet werden. Dabei bestehen die Blauhelme in der Regel aus unbewaffneten bis leicht bewaffneten Truppen und Beobachtern. Zu ihren Aufgaben gehört unter anderem die Überwachung der Einhaltung von Waffenstillständen oder dem Friedensvertrag. Die Neutralität steht dabei an oberster Stelle (vgl. Gareis 2015). Die ersten Friedensmissionen der Vereinten Nationen Im Mittelpunkt dieses Abschnittes stehen die Anfänge der Friedenssicherung. Dabei wird die Entwicklung beleuchtet und reflektiert. Weiterhin findet eine Einordnung der Friedenssicherung auf Zypern statt. Die Überwachung des Waffenstillstandes nach dem ersten arabisch-israelischen Krieg 1948 war der erste große Einsatz in der Entstehungsphase der Friedenssicherungen. Die nächste größere Mission bestand aus der Überprüfung des Waffenstillstandes zwischen Indien und Pakistan. Gareis stellt fest, dass es sich ebenfalls um eine zwischenstaatliche Auseinandersetzung handelte. Diese Mission wurde vom VN-Haushalt bezahlt und dauert bis heute an.  Daraus entwickelte sich eine zweite Phase der Friedenssicherung, die Behauptungsphase von 1956-1967 mit neun Einsätzen (Gareis/Varwick 2014, vgl. S.127f). In die Behauptungsphase zählte der Einsatz der Friedenstruppen in Zypern, auf den im späteren Abschnitt des Blogbeitrages eingegangen wird. "Erstmals übernahmen die UN zeitweilige Autorität über ein Territorium auf dem Weg zur Unabhängigkeit, ergänzte zivile Polizei zu einer Friedensoperation, wurde in einen Bürgerkrieg verwickelt, führte einen Einsatz im größeren Ausmaß durch und erlaubte den Blauhelmen das Tragen von Waffen." (Jett 2000, S.23f), neue Aufgaben wurden erkannt. Die Vereinten Nationen bekamen zudem immer mehr Macht, aber hatten damals schon mit ersten Problemen zu kämpfen. Das klassische peacekeeping entstand durch die erste Notstandsgruppe der Vereinten Nationen, der United Nations Emergency Force (UNEFI) beim Einsatz in Ägypten. Hier kam es zu Schwierigkeiten, es konnte im Sicherheitsrat keine einstimme Verurteilung der israelischen Aggression und der ägyptischen Verstaatlichung erreicht werden. Durch das Veto von Großbritannien und Frankreich wurde der Sicherheitsrat lahmgelegt. Die Uniting for Peace-Resolution schaltete die Generalversammlung ein, welche auf den Einsatz von Friedenstruppen drängte. Eigentlich wäre laut Kapitel VII Artikel 24 Abs. 1 der UN-Charta der Sicherheitsrat zuständig gewesen, jedoch waren die Konfliktpartien freiwillig mit einem Einsatz einverstanden. Neben Frankreich und der UdSSR verweigerten einige Staaten die finanzielle Unterstützung. Dieses Problem vertiefte sich nochmal beim Einsatz im Kongo; hier wurde die Verantwortung für die Friedenserhaltung beim Sicherheitsrat gesehen. Folglich wurde der Internationale Gerichtshof eingeschaltet, welcher sowohl dem Sicherheitsrat als auch der Generalversammlung eine Zuständigkeit zusprach (vgl. Sucharipa-Behrmann 1999). Die Autoren stellten fest, dass sich aus der Kongo-Krise ein "akzeptiertes Miteinander dieser beiden Organe" (Gareis/Varwick 2014, S.129) entwickelte, wobei "der Sicherheitsrat die Initiative und Entscheidungsbefugnis stärker an sich gezogen hatte"(Gareis/Varwick 2014, S.129). Zu erkennen war außerdem eine zunehmende Bedeutung des Generalsekretärs, welcher über mehr Spielraum verfügte. Die UNEF-Mission ging durch wichtige Grundprinzipen der Notstandsgruppe durch den Generalsekretär in die Geschichte der internationalen Friedenssicherung ein. Hinzu kam der Konsens der Konfliktparteien, welcher beschlossen wurde und besagt, dass klassische Blauhelm-Soldaten nicht gegen den Willen eines Staates eingesetzt werden dürfen. Dadurch wurde eine Toleranz der Truppen gefördert und eine Bereitschaft für eine Zurverfügungstellung der Truppen, durch die Mitgliedstaaten, geschaffen. Dies waren die Grundlagen für das Modell des klassischen peacekeeping vom Generalsekretär Hammarskjöld (vgl. ebd.). Zu diesem Zeitpunkt wurde zudem die Verantwortlichkeit durch die Leitung des Generalsekretärs beschlossen. Aufgrund dessen entstand die DPKO im VN-Sekretariat. Außerdem wurde ein Budget für jede Friedensmission festgelegt, welches durch die Mitgliedstaaten gefüllt wird. Besonders wichtig ist die Unparteilichkeit der eingesetzten Truppen, welche mit dem Konsensprinzip einhergeht. Aus diesem Grund sollten die Truppen eine ausgewogene regionale Zusammenstellung haben (vgl. Auswärtiges Amt). Darüberhinaus wurde der Einsatz von Waffen zur Selbstverteidigung und zur Durchsetzung der Mission erlaubt. Hier besteht eine Problematik, die am folgenden Beispiel gezeigt werden soll: Bei der Kongo-Operation (1960-1964) sollte für den Rückzug belgischer Truppen aus der Republik Kongo gesorgt werden. Es kam zu einer Ausweitung des Mandats, wodurch ein Bürgerkrieg verhindert und die Regierung beim Aufbau ihres Amtes unterstützt werden sollte. Dafür gab es zum ersten Mal die Legitimation der Waffengewalt im Bezug auf das auszuführende Mandat (Gareis/Varwick 2014, vgl. S.131). Das führte dazu, dass die UNEF dadurch selbst zu Konfliktpartei wurde und sich in die innerstaatlichen Konflikte verwickelte. Der Einsatz wurde im Sommer 1964 beendet, aufgrund dessen, dass die Regierung Kongos einer Mandatsverlängerung nicht zustimmte. Dabei sollte man nicht außer Acht lassen, dass die Vereinten Nationen aus diesem Einsatz ihre Konsequenzen zogen. Zum einen wurden keine großen und komplexen Missionen die nächsten drei Jahrzehnte durchgeführt (vgl. ebd.). Zum anderen waren die Ziele der Friedenssicherung fortan bescheidener. Zudem kehrte man zu den Prinzipien von Hammarskjöld zurück und sicherte sich die Zustimmung der Konfliktparteien vor einem Einsatz. Zusätzlich wurden die Friedensmissionen vom Sicherheitsrat nun beobachtet (vgl. ebd.). An dieser Stelle wird nur kurz auf den Zypern-Einsatz eingegangen, um ihn in die Geschichte der Friedenssicherung der Vereinten Nationen einzuordnen. Der Zypern Einsatz gilt als klassisches peacekeeping und hält bis heute an. Nach Bellamy und Williams versteht sich unter klassischem peacekeeping die Phase zwischen einem Waffenstillstand und dem Abschluss einer politischen Konfliktlösung. Hier gibt es eine Unterstützung der zwischenstaatlichen Friedenssicherung (vgl. ebd. S. 127). Durch eine Resolution des Sicherheitsrats wurde im März 1964 die UNFICYP-Mission eingerichtet. Eine Kampfhandlung zwischen der griechisch-zypriotischen und der türkisch-zypriotischen Volksgruppe sollte verhindert werden. Trotz der Friedensmission kam es zur Teilung der Insel, es gab einen Waffenstillstand und zahlreiche Bemühungen zur Vermittlung durch den Generalsekretär. Seit 1974 wird die Pufferzone von der UNFICYP überwacht und das Mandat ab 1964 jedes halbe Jahr verlängert. Kritik an dem Einsatz gibt es durch die permanente Anwesenheit der Soldaten, wodurch der Eindruck erweckt wird, dass es keine Notwendigkeit einer Friedenslösung gibt.Durch den Einsatz der Bewachung des Waffenstillstandes zwischen dem Irak und Iran (UNIIMOG) und dem Abzug der UdSSR Truppen aus Afghanistan (UNGOMAP), wurde "eine Renaissance des peacekeeping eingeleitet" (vgl. ebd. S.132). Gareis verweist darauf, dass diese "Gute-Dienst-Missionen" vom Sicherheitsrat nur gebilligt und nicht mandatiert wurden. Alles in allem zeigt sich ein durchwachsenes Bild der Friedensmissionen in den ersten vier Jahrzehnten. Festzuhalten ist, dass jede Mission ein Einzelfall ist und separat betrachtet werden sollte. Hinzu kommen die Vorstellungen der UN-Charta, welche in der Realität nahezu utopisch umzusetzen sind. Die Blauhelme wurden zum innovativen Instrument. Ihre Aufgabe ist die Konfliktberuhigung und nicht die Konfliktlösung. Diese Aufgabe konnte in vielen Missionen erreicht werden. Bedenklich ist, dass diese häufig nur mit einer dauerpräsenten Lösung, wie in Zypern erreicht wurden (vgl. Mathis). Durch den Brahimi- Bericht von 2000 gab es neue Perspektiven in der Friedenssicherung der Vereinten Nationen. Diese beinhalten die folgenden drei Kategorien: die Konfliktvermeidung, Konfliktmanagement und die Konfliktnachsorge. Dabei gibt es erstens eine Neuorientierung für die politischen und strategischen Rahmenbedingungen. Zweitens muss das DPKO für eine personelle und strukturelle Voraussetzung der Friedensmission sorgen. Zudem gibt es für die Mitgliedstaaten konkrete geforderte Leistungen (vgl. Gareis/Varwick 2014, vgl. S.146).  Hintergründe des ZypernkonfliktsUm den Zypernkonflikt verständlicher zu gestalten, werden zunächst die politischen Hintergründe beleuchtet. Der Zypernkonflikt ist die Folge der britischen Kolonialpolitik, denn bis 1960 war Zypern eine britische Kolonie (vgl. Gürbey 2014). Der Wunsch nach "Enosis", die Vereinigung mit Griechenland, wuchs unter den griechischen Zyprioten seit dem 19. Jahrhundert. Auf Grundlage der Tatsache, dass Großbritannien die Ionischen Inseln an Griechenland zurückgab, hofften die griechischen Zyprioten auf einen ähnlichen Ausgang. Dieser Wunsch wurde jedoch nicht erfüllt und deshalb gab es schon seit 1931 größere Unruhen, welche die diktatorische Führung unterdrückte (vgl. ebd.). Großbritannien nutzte Zypern geostrategisch. Zypern wurde zum Royal-Air-Force-Stützpunkt für Atombomber und Ansatzpunkt für Spionageflüge im Kalten Krieg (vgl. ebd.). Auf Grund dieser Entwicklung war Zypern für Großbritannien unverzichtbar. Deshalb begann der Unabhängigkeitskampf, bei dem die orthodoxe Kirche eine bedeutende Rolle einnahm. Der Erzbischof Makarios III. nötigte die griechische Regierung, den Zypern-Fall vor die UNO zu bringen (Gorgé 1986, vgl. S. 130). Der britische Premierminister Eden versuchte "die griechische Ambition [...] durch türkische zu neutralisieren" (Richter 2010), also die Türkei miteinzubeziehen und damit beide Länder gegeneinander auszuspielen (vgl. Gürbey 2014). Die türkische Position war glasklar; falls sich beim Status Zypern etwas ändern würde, wäre der Friedensvertrag von Lausanne ungültig und Zypern würde wieder der Türkei gehören. 1922 wurde Frieden mit den Briten geschlossen und sie erhielten die formelle Anerkennung ihrer Herrschaft über Zypern (vgl. Gründer). Richter beschrieb, dass das taktische Manöver Londons aufging und ein neuer griechisch-türkischer Konflikt ausgelöst wurde. Es kam dazu, dass die "divide et impera" Politik Großbritanniens auf die Volksgruppe ausgeweitet wurde. Daraus folge 1956 der griechisch-türkische Minoritäten Konflikt, wobei die Opfer die Istanbuler Griechen waren. Gleichzeitig misslang das Suez-Abenteuer der Briten und Zypern verlor für sie an strategischem Wert. Des Weiteren kam Druck aus den USA, welche die NATO durch die griechisch-türkischen Streitereien gefährdet sahen. Folglich einigten sich Griechenland und die Türkei 1959 zu einer "Scheinlösung" in Zürich. Gleichzeitig wurde der Konflikt nur zwischen den NATO-Verbündeten beigelegt. Wie schon erwähnt, gelang Zypern 1960 die Unabhängigkeit; der innerzypriotische Konflikt blieb jedoch bestehen und verschärfte sich in den nächsten Jahren noch mehr (vgl. Richter 2009). Im Folgenden wird die Position der Bevölkerung verdeutlicht. Die griechischen Zyprioten fordern "Enosis" und die türkischen Zyprioten "Taksim", die Teilung der Insel. Mit der Unabhängigkeit der Insel begann der griechische und türkische Nationalismus auf Zypern (vgl. ebd.). Problematisch waren die Mütterländer, welche den Zypern-Konflikt als nationale Frage ansahen und deshalb enormen Einfluss hatten. Dieser Einfluss wurde durch den Schutz der eigenen Volksgruppe legitimiert (Gorgé 1986, vgl. S. 130f). Zum einen gab es die Strategie von Griechenland; diese war eine Internationalisierung des Konfliktes, um den Druck gegen die Türkei aufzubauen. Dem gegenüber wollte die Türkei den Teilungsprozess forcieren und in seinem Bestand sichern. Ab 1963 gab es blutige Unruhen, weil die griechisch-zypriotische Führung die Verfassungsrechte der türkischen Zyprioten einschränken ließ. An diesem Punkt griffen die USA und die Vereinten Nationen ein und verhinderten eine Eskalation (vgl. Gürbey 2014). Mitwirkung der Vereinten Nationen an einer Lösung des KonfliktesAb 1964 gab es ein Friedensmandat der Vereinten Nationen, durch das eine Sicherung des Burgfriedens gewährleistet werden sollte. Das Wiederaufflammen von Kämpfen sollte verhindert werden, um die Kommunikation der beiden Volksgruppen zu ermöglichen. Die Friedenstruppe UNFICYP wurde vom Sicherheitsrat gesendet und sollte "nach besten Kräften eine Wiederaufnahme von Kämpfen zu verhindern und, soweit notwendig, zur Erhaltung und Wiederherstellung von Recht und Ordnung und zur Rückkehr normaler Lebensbedingungen [in Zypern] beizutragen" (Menning 1974, S.172). Dabei wurde für die Friedenstruppen die zypriotische Nationalgarde und die reguläre türkische Armee zum Konfliktpartner, nicht die bewaffneten Volksgruppen. Außerdem musste die UNFICYP aufpassen, dass lokale Befreiungsversuche nicht als Einmischungsversuche oder Provokation aufgefasst wurden.Festzuhalten ist, dass von 1964 bis Juni 1974 die UNFICYP ein erfolgreicher Vermittler der beiden Volksgruppen war, sodass 1973 eine Kürzung des Mandats stattfand. Auch weil Griechenland und die Türkei einwilligten, dass sie schlichtend auf ihre Volksgruppe einwirken (Menning 1974, vgl. S.172). Der Konflikt spitze sich jedoch wieder zu, im Halbjahresbericht von 1974 erklärte der Generalsekretär, dass weiterhin Misstrauen und Kampfbereitschaft herrscht. Ein Klima von trügerischer Sicherheit war entstanden, die Friedenstruppen wurden als Friedensersatz wahrgenommen, obwohl das Problem ungelöst blieb (Menning 1974, vgl. S.173). Dabei hatte Waldheim in seinem Jahresbericht 1973/74 darauf hingewiesen, dass Friedenseinsätze nicht als Selbstzweck der Vereinten Nationen dienen sollten und "daß eine Friedenssicherungsaktion nicht zu einem Nachlassen der Bemühungen, eine Lösung zu finden, führen dürfe, denn wenn die Konfliktursachen nicht beseitigt werden, könnten sie schließlich das Fundament, auf dem sich die Friedenssicherung aufbaue, zerstören." (Menning 1974, S.173). So kam es 1974 zu einem Putschversuch der Griechen, um die Insel an Griechenland anzubinden. Dieser wurde von dem griechischen Militär ausgelöst und richtete sich gegen die Regierung unter Präsident Makarios. Es gab Differenzen zwischen ihm und der Militärjunta, weil Makarios linksgerichtet war und einen individuellen Kurs mit Zypern vorhatte. Dabei reagierte die Türkei mit einer Invasion. Die Situation eskalierte und die Türkei eroberte fast 40 Prozent der Insel. Die UNFICYP konnte die Angriffe der türkischen Truppen nicht abwehren. Dennoch konnten einige lokale Angriffe auf die Bevölkerung verhindert werden. Außerdem blieb die "Green Line" bestehen und die Kontrolle der Hauptstadt aufrechterhalten. Zudem wurde auf die Forderung von Waldheim eingegangen, welcher in seinem halbjährlichen Bericht Verstärkung angefordert hatte. Im Jahr 1974 stockte die UNFICYP die Zahl der Soldaten von 2.188 auf 4.400 auf. Die Minimierung seit 1971 bis Mitte 1974 war im Nachhinein ein sicherheitspolitischer Fehler der Vereinten Nationen. Nach dem Krieg legte die UNFICYP zwei separate Waffenstillstandslinien fest. Eine UN-Pufferzone wurde von Morphou bis nach Famagusta eingerichtet (vgl. Lugert 2018). Aufgrund dieser Tatsachen war eine Konsolidierung einer Teilung der Inseln der einzige Ausweg. Von nun an gab es einen griechisch-zypriotischen Süden und einen türkisch-zypriotischen Norden. Die Türkei rief 1983 die Unabhängigkeit Nordzyperns aus, dieser Teil wird immer noch nur von der Türkei als Staat anerkannt und wirtschaftlich und politisch gefördert. Der UN-Sicherheitsrat erklärte die Unabhängigkeitserklärung für ungültig und rief andere Staaten dazu auf, dasselbe zu tun (vgl. Gürbey 2014). Faustmann brachte zum Ausdruck, dass Zypern der Ruf als "Friedhof der Diplomatie" (vgl. Faustmann 2009) zusteht. Wie er zu dieser Aussage kam, wird im Weiteren erklärt. Schon im November 1974 forderte die Vereinten Nationen eine Resolution, welche zunächst einen Rückzug der auswärtigen Truppen und die Rückkehr von Flüchtlingen beinhaltete. Darüber hinaus forderten beide Volksgruppen eine Verhandlung unter dem Schutz der Vereinten Nationen. Faustmann wies darauf hin, dass eine Rückkehr zur Verfassungsordnung von 1960 unmöglich für beide Parteien war (vgl. ebd.). Beide Parteien hatten klare Vorstellungen, so forderten die türkischen Zyprioten eine politische Gleichheit als Grundprinzip, allerdings wollte die griechische Seite auch eine Berücksichtigung ihrer prozentualen Bevölkerungsmehrheit von 82% Prozent (vgl. ebd.). In drei Verhandlungsrunden trafen sich die Konfliktparteien unter der Schutzherrschaft der Vereinten Nationen in New York. Nach zähen Verhandlungen kam es 1977 zu einem Abkommen und 1979 zur Erweiterung des Dokuments (vgl. Gürbey 2014). Das Abkommen umfasst die Grundprinzipien einer Wiedervereinigung, die High Level Agreements. Darin wird postuliert, das Zypern als bizonale, bikommunale Föderation wiedervereinigt und entmilitarisiert werden sollte. Außerdem wurden Grundfreiheiten, wie Bewegungs- und Niederlassungsfreiheit und ein Recht auf Eigentum bestimmt. Das Abkommen gestand den türkischen Zyprioten dabei ein einheitliches Territorium zu, wobei die Größe strittig blieb (vgl. Faustmann 2009). Die Ergebnisse der Abkommen zusammengefasst, wird deutlich, dass eine Vereinigung mit Griechenland und eine Teilung ausgeschlossen wurde. Trotz der Unterzeichnung des High Level Agreements kam es zum Stillstand der Verhandlungen. Erst durch die Bemühungen der Vereinten Nationen fanden erneute Verhandlungen statt.Der griechisch-zypriotische Präsident Kyprianoú setzte auf die eigene Internationalisierungskampagne und die Vereinten Nationen. Denktaş forderte die Unabhängigkeit Nordzyperns, sein Streben wurde bestärkt, als eine Resolution der Vereinten Nationen zugunsten der griechischen Seite entschied (vgl. ebd.). Erkennbar wird, wie schwer es für die Vereinten Nationen ist, neutral zu bleiben und beiden Seiten gerecht zu werden. Denktaş führte die türkische Lira als Währung ein und errichtete eine Zentralbank, weiterhin blieb er bei seiner Forderung von einer Unabhängigkeit Nordzyperns. Es kam dazu, dass er am 15. November 1983 die Türkische Republik Nordzypern ausrief. Erst als sich die Beziehung zwischen Griechenland und der Türkei verbesserte, konnten 1988 neue Verhandlungen auf Basis der High Level Agreements beginnen (vgl. ebd.). Man erkannte die wichtige Rolle der beiden Mutterländer, die enormen Einfluss auf die Verhandlungen und die Situation nahmen. Außerdem ließ man eine zu große Einmischung der Vereinten Nationen auch nicht zu, mit den "Set of Ideas" von Generalsekretär Boutros Boutros-Ghali war Denktaş nicht einverstanden. Er forderte Verhandlungen ohne die Vereinten Nationen, weil diese kein Recht für solch umfassende Lösungsvorschläge hätten. Jedoch kam es nie zu Verhandlungen ohne die Vereinten Nationen. Erneute Gespräche endeten 1990, weil die Republik Zypern der EU betreten wollte. Denktaş und die Türkei glaubten, dass die EU keine Konfrontation mit Ankara wollte und der Beitrittsantrag kein Erfolg haben würde, dennoch drohten sie mit einer Annexion des Nordens. Als klar war, die EU würde Zypern auch ohne Lösung des Konflikts aufnehmen, fanden 2002 erneute Verhandlungen unter der Schirmherrschaft der Vereinten Nationen statt. Zugunsten kam diesen die neue AKP-Regierung unter dem linken Oppositionspolitiker Mehmet Ali Talat, welche von der status-quo-Politik abwich und auch Denktaş und seine Nachfolger verschwanden mehr und mehr. Auf türkischer-zypriotischer Seite entstand erstmalig eine moderate Politik. Die griechische Seite wählte mit Tassos Papadopoulos einen Hardliner zum Präsidenten (vgl. ebd.). Dennoch wurden erstmals umfassende Kernpunkte eines politischen Lösungsplans erarbeitet, welcher Anfang 2004 freigestellt wurden, der sogenannte Annan-Plan. Dieser beinhaltete folgendes: "Vom Parlament gewählte Regierung, bestehend aus vier griechischen und zwei türkischen Zyprioten; kollektive Führung mit Vetorechten für beide Volksgruppen; Zwei-Kammern-Parlament nach 1978er Modell; 27 Prozent des Territorium für den Norden; Ambivalenz: Gründung eines neuen Staates durch zwei gleichberechtigte Staaten (wie von der türkischen Seite gefordert, von der griechischen Seite aber als möglichen Ausgangspunkt für eine spätere Abspaltung abgelehnt) oder Umwandlung der bestehenden Republik Zypern in einen neuen Staat (wie von der griechischen Seite gefordert); Ambivalenz: Föderation oder Konföderation; Rückkehr von mehr als der Hälfte der Flüchtlinge unter griechisch-zypriotischer Verwaltung und Umsiedelung von mehreren zehntausend türkischen Zyprioten; Staatsangehörigkeit für mehr als 45 000 türkische Einwanderer, erhebliche und dauerhafte Beschränkungen bei der Rückkehr der griechischen Flüchtlinge und der Niederlassungsfreiheit im Norden; Dauerhafte griechische und türkische Militärpräsenz; Griechenland und die Türkei bleiben zusammen mit Großbritannien Garantiemächte mit Interventionsrecht." (ebd.). Im April 2004 stimmten beide Volksgruppen über den Wiedervereinigungsplan ab. Diese Gelegenheit wurde verpasst, denn 76 Prozent der griechischen Zyprioten stimmten dagegen, weil einige von ihnen hofften, durch den Beitritt in die EU ein besseres Abkommen zu erhalten (vgl. Gürbey 2014). Demgegenüber stand allerdings das türkisch zypriotische Ergebnis des Referendums, welches mit 65 Prozent für eine Wiedervereinigung stimmte. Die Vereinigung Zyperns scheiterte und damit auch der Annan-Plan. Trotzdem trat am 1.Mai 2004 der griechisch Zypriotische Teil der EU bei. Allerdings stellt völkerrechtlich gesehen ganz Zypern EU-Territorium dar, wobei der nördliche Teil ausgegrenzt ist (vgl. ebd.). Seitdem werden immer noch Verhandlungsprozesse unter Aufsicht der Vereinten Nationen geführt. Espen Barth Eide ist seit 2014 der Sonderbeauftragten für den Zypernkonflikt,. Durch ihn gab es eine Einigung, dass eine dritte entscheidende Verhandlungsphase geführt werden soll. Dennoch ging die letzte Verhandlungsrunde für eine Lösung des Zypernkonflikts am 07.07.2017 ohne Ergebnis zu Ende. Hier waren auch die Repräsentanten der sogenannten Garantiemächte Griechenland, Großbritanniens und der Türkei mit dabei. Nun sollen auf Empfehlung von VN-Generalskretär Guterres erstmals eigene Vorstellungen betreffend einer Fortführung des Verhandlungsprozesses gebildet werden (vgl. Auswärtiges Amt 2018).  UNFICYP- Praxisbeispiel für die Leistungen und Probleme der Friedenssicherung Zypern wird durch eine 180 Kilometer lange grüne Line geteilt, welche auch durch die Hauptstadt Nikosia verläuft. Diese Pufferzone wird von den Friedenstruppen der UNFICYP überwacht. Die Waffenstillstandslinie wurde hart umkämpft, sodass sie vor allem in Nikosia nicht gerade verläuft, sondern vor- und zurückspringt. Dadurch ist die Überwachung des Status quo für die UN-Soldaten noch mehr erschwert (Ehrenberg 1991, vgl. S. 1). Seit dem Bürgerkrieg von 1963/64 gab es auf Zypern lange keinen dauerhaften Frieden. Wie schon beschrieben, haben die Sonderbeauftragten des UN-Generalsekretärs schon seit 1964 viele Verhandlungen gestartet, aber immer noch keinen dauerhaften Frieden erreicht. Dabei kam immer wieder der Vorwurf auf, die Vereinten Nationen würden den Kern des Problems nur auf Eis legen und damit könne kein Frieden entstehen (vgl. Gürbey 2014). Unter diesen Umständen versuchen die Friedenstruppen, der Bevölkerung so viel Normalität wie möglich zu gewährleisten. Die Hoffnung, dass durch einen Generationenwechsel sich das Problem von selbst lösen würde, trat nicht ein. Das zeigte sich gerade auf der griechisch-zypriotischen Seite; hier waren die Jugendlichen ernüchtert, weil sich der politische Stillstand nicht überwinden ließ (Ehrenberg 1991, vgl. S.1f). Ein Beispiel hierfür war die Versammlung von 3000 Schülern im November 1988 an der Pufferzone. Sie wollten gegen die türkischen Truppen demonstrieren. Dabei durchbrachen einige von ihnen die grüne Linie, konnten dann aber von UN-Truppen gestoppt werden, bevor sie die türkisch-zypriotischen Truppen erreichten (vgl. ebd. S. 2). Die Jugendlichen bewarfen die UN-Soldaten dabei mit Steinen, Flaschen, Holzstücken und Dachziegeln. Die griechisch-zypriotische Polizei griff erst nach Kommando der UNFICYP-Oberkommandanten ein und räumte mit den UN-Truppen den Platz. Hier ist kritisch anzumerken, dass in der Presse nicht die UN-Soldaten die Helden waren, sondern die Schüler, welche ihr Land zurückerobern wollten. Dabei sollte nicht außer Acht gelassen werden, dass auch die türkisch-zypriotische Seite der UNFICYP die Schuld gab; diese hätten nicht rechtzeitig reagiert (vgl. ebd. S. 2). Demonstrationen wie diese waren kein Einzelfall zu dieser Zeit, ein halbes Jahr später kam es zu einer Frauendemonstration, bei der die UNFICYP noch machtloser war. Auch hier verhielt sich die griechisch-zypriotische Polizei sehr passiv. Die UN-Soldaten wurden von Männern, die am Rand standen, angegriffen. Zudem hatten sich griechisch-orthodoxe Kirchenmänner unter die Frauen gemischt (vgl. ebd. S. 2). Insgesamt zeigt sich, wie schwierig es die Friedenstruppen hatten. Sie mussten sowohl Blutvergießen verhindern und die Konfliktparteien auseinander halten als auch ihre eigene Akzeptanz aufrechterhalten. An diesem Beispiel wird auch deutlich, dass die Friedenstruppen ungerechtfertigte Kritik einstecken mussten. Im folgenden Beispiel wird auf den Waffengebrauch eingegangen. Wie kritisch dieser ist, zeigte sich anhand der Todesschüsse in Athienou Ende Mai 1988. Die Waffen dürfen nur zur Selbstverteidigung gebraucht werden, zum Schutz für das Leben anderer UN-Angehöriger oder Personen, die zu verteidigen sind. Dafür ist immer die Zustimmung des ranghöchsten Soldaten vor Ort nötig (Gareis/Varwick 2014, vgl. S. 117). Athienou gehörte zur griechisch-zypriotischen Seite, war zur damaligen Zeit aber ein umstrittenes Gebiet. Ein türkischer Soldat nahm eine Familie in ihrem Haus als Geiseln. Bevor die UN-Soldaten überhaupt eintrafen, bewegten sich zwei Nationalgardisten auf das Haus zu. Der Geiselnehmer schoss auf die beiden, sodass einer schwer verletzt liegen blieb. Die Nationalgardisten forderten Verstärkung an, ohne Rücksprache mit der UNFICYP. Währenddessen bargen die UN-Soldaten den Verletzten. Die türkischen Streitkräfte wurden nicht über die Geiselnahme informiert. Die UN-Soldaten räumten das Feld, als die griechisch-zypriotische Anti-Terror-Einheit eintraf. Diese stürmte das Haus und tötete den türkischen Soldaten gezielt, obwohl die Geiseln zu diesem Zeitpunkt schon geflohen und in Sicherheit waren (Ehrenberg 1991, vgl. S.3). Ehrenberg erklärte, die UNFICYP hätte eingreifen können. Ob es so klug gewesen wäre, die griechischen Zyprioten mit Androhung von Waffengewalt an der Verletzung der Pufferzone zu hindern, stellt er in Frage. Hieraus ergab sich die Konsequenz, dass die Erwartungen an die UNFICYP viel zu hoch waren, nur aufgrund der Tatsache, dass sie bewaffnet waren. Hier stellt sich die Frage, ob der Waffengebrauch die Sicherheit erhöht und dadurch die Funktion der UN-Soldaten entlastet. Außerdem konnte man beobachten, dass die UN-Friedenstruppen oftmals mindestens einer Konfliktpartei unterlegen waren. Dabei sollte kritisch hinterfragt werden, inwiefern militärische Überlegenheit die politischen und diplomatischen Absichten von Friedenstruppen fördern würde. Dies scheint fraglich, denn würde militärische Übermacht diese nicht eher zerstören (vgl. ebd. S.3ff)?  FazitFestzuhalten bleibt, dass die Friedenssicherung als zentraler Auftrag der Vereinten Nationen gesehen werden kann. In direktem Zusammenhang mit der Durchsetzung der Menschenrechte, weil diese Ziele untrennbar sind und einander beeinflussen. Durch das Interventionsverbot wird eine Einmischung in innere Konflikte durch die Charta ausgeschlossen. Der Sicherheitsrat kann deshalb nicht in innerstaatliche Konflikte und Menschenrechtsverletzungen eingreifen. Daraus folgt, dass es zu aller erst zu Präventionsmaßnahmen kommt; daneben kann der Sicherheitsrat Empfehlungen zur friedlichen Streitbeilegung nach Kapitel VI der Charta geben. Es kann aber auch zu Zwangsmaßnahmen nach Kapitel VII kommen. Dementsprechend steht der Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung permanent im Vordergrund. Allgemein und in Bezug auf die Friedenssicherung gilt für die Vereinte Nationen, dass das Verhalten der Mitgliedstaaten entscheidend ist. Die Vereinten Nationen bieten zwar einen Rahmen, bei dem sich Staaten und ihre Interessen annähern können, aber die Staaten müssen diesen nutzen, um durch Lernprozesse Fortschritte zu machen. Darüber hinaus dürfen die Vereinten Nationen nicht zu viel versprechen; dies gilt gerade im Punkt der Friedenssicherung. Ihre Ankündigung ist oftmals höher als die Möglichkeiten und Aspiration der Mitgliedsstaaten. Andersherum dürfen die Erwartungen an die Vereinten Nationen nicht abwegig sein, sie sind keine Weltregierung. Dennoch bilden sie einen Rahmen für gemeinsame Lösungsansätze. Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit war es ebenfalls zu erklären, wer für die Friedenssicherung zuständig ist. Dabei wurde festgestellt, dies geschieht durch das Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), welches die Missionen plant und durchführt. Unterstützt werden sie vom Department of Political Affairs (DPA), welches sich vor allem um diplomatische Bemühungen kümmert. Durch eine Einsatzleitung (Force Commander) vor Ort gibt es noch eine ausführende Leitung der Friedensmission. Deutlich wird die Problematik, dass die Vereinten Nationen keine eigenen Streitkräfte haben. Es kam noch nie zu einem Sonderabkommen in Bezug auf die Streitkräfte. Hier wird deutlich, dass die Anforderungen der Vereinten Nationen an ihre Mitgliedsstaaten zu hoch und den praktischen Möglichkeiten voraus sind. Dafür entwickelten die Vereinten Nationen alternative Formen, wie z.B. die Blauhelme. Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, dass es eine Entwicklung bei der Friedenssicherung der Vereinten Nationen gab. Eine Zuständigkeit für die Friedenserhaltung wurde durch den Internationalen Gerichtshof dem Sicherheitsrat und der Generalversammlung zugesprochen. Durch die vergangenen Einsätze wurde außerdem beschlossen, dass die Friedensmissionen vom Sicherheitsrat beobachtet werden. Und die Bedeutung und Verantwortung des Generalsekretärs nahm immer mehr zu. Durch Generalsekretär Hammarskjöld sind wichtige Grundprinzipen der Notstandsgruppe in die Friedenssicherung eingegangen. Daraus folgt der Konsens der Konfliktparteien, wodurch klassische Blauhelm-Soldaten nicht gegen den Willen eines Staates eingesetzt werden dürfen. Dieser Konsens führt dazu, dass die Mitgliedstaaten ihre Truppen eher bereitstellen und die Toleranz der Blauhelme gestärkt wird. Festgestellt wurde außerdem die Wichtigkeit von einer ausgewogenen regionalen Zusammenstellung der Truppen, damit die Unparteilichkeit gewahrt werden kann. Zielsetzung der vorliegenden Arbeit war es, die Friedenssicherung anhand vom Zypern-Konflikt zu schildern, dafür wurden die die politischen Hintergründe beleuchtet. Hier kann man festhalten, es gab unheimlich viele beteiligte Parteien. Zum einen Großbritannien, weil Zypern bis 1960 eine britische Kolonie war und geostrategisch genutzt wurde. Dann Griechenland, die Türkei und die griechischen und türkischen Zyprioten. Es ist zu erkennen, dass Großbritannien die beiden Mütterländer gegeneinander ausspielte. Sie sahen den Zypern-Konflikt als nationale Frage und übten deshalb enormen Einfluss aus, dieser wurde durch den Schutz der eigenen Volksgruppe legitimiert. Durch die Unabhängigkeit Zyperns ab 1960 wurde der innerzypriotische Konflikt nicht gelöst, sondern noch mehr verschärft; dieser endete in blutigen Unruhen. Seit 1964 gibt es ein Friedensmandat der Vereinten Nationen, wodurch das Wiederaufflammen von Kämpfen verhindert werden soll. Wie dieser Blogbeitrag gezeigt hat, musste die UNFICYP darauf achten, dass lokale Befreiungsversuche nicht als Einmischungsversuche oder Provokation aufgefasst wurden. Von 1964 bis Juni 1974 war die UNFICYP ein erfolgreicher Vermittler der beiden Volksgruppen, sodass es 1973 eine Kürzung des Mandats gab. Diese Kürzung erzeugte aber ein Klima von trügerischer Sicherheit, wobei die Friedenstruppen als Friedensersatz wahrgenommen wurden, obwohl das Problem ungelöst blieb. Hier wirft man den Vereinten Nationen vor, dass es zu einem Nachlass der Friedensbemühungen kam und die Friedenseinsätze als Selbstzweck genutzt wurden. Deshalb kam es für viele überraschend, als die Griechen 1974 durch einen Putschversuch die Insel an Griechenland anbinden wollten. Man stellte fest, dass die Minimierung der Blauhelme seit 1971 bis Mitte 1974 als sicherheitspolitischer Fehler der Vereinten Nationen gesehen werden kann. Offen bleibt die Frage, ob die Vereinten Nationen den Krieg 1974 hätten verhindern können. Nach dem Krieg war eine Konsolidierung, eine Teilung der Insel der einzige Ausweg.Von Faustmann bekommt Zypern den Titel "Friedhof der Diplomatie". Festhalten lässt sich, dass es etliche Verhandlungen durch die Vereinten Nationen gab und der Konflikt bis heute nicht gelöst wurde. Auch ein Grund dafür sind die klaren Vorstellungen der beiden Parteien, so forderten die türkischen Zyprioten eine politische Gleichheit als Grundprinzip und die griechische Seite eine Berücksichtigung ihrer prozentualen Bevölkerungsmehrheit. Ein Abkommen konnte im Jahre 1977 erreicht werden und eine Erweiterung 1979, hier wurden die Grundprinzipien einer Wiedervereinigung, die High Level Agreements festgehalten. Es kam immer wieder zum Stillstand der Verhandlungen, welcher meistens erst durch die Bemühungen der Vereinten Nationen unterbrochen wurde. Die Regierungen der beiden Volksgruppen trugen auch dazu bei, dass sich die Verhandlungen so schwierig gestalteten. Erkennbar wird, wie schwer es für die Vereinten Nationen war, neutral zu bleiben und beiden Seiten gerecht zu werden. Erneute Gespräche brachen 1990 ab, weil die Republik Zypern der EU beitreten wollte. Als klar war, die EU würde Zypern auch ohne Lösung des Konflikts aufnehmen, fanden 2002 erneute Verhandlung unter der Schirmherrschaft der Vereinten Nationen statt. Es gab einen Erfolg, denn es wurden erstmals umfassende Kernpunkte eines politischen Lösungsplans erarbeitet, welcher Anfang 2004 fertiggestellt wurde, der sogenannte Annan-Plan. Im April 2004 wurde in den beiden Volksgruppen über den Wiedervereinigungsplan abgestimmt. Diese Gelegenheit verpasste man, weil die griechischen Zyprioten dagegen stimmten. Die Vereinigung Zyperns scheiterte und damit auch der Annan-Plan. Die stille Hoffnung, dass durch ein Generationenwechsel sich das Problem von selbst lösen würde, trat nicht ein. Festzuhalten ist, dass die Friedenstruppen den Zivilisten soviel Normalität wie möglich gewährleisten wollen. Die UN-Soldaten mussten in der Vergangenheit viel einstecken, sie wurden z.B. bei Demonstrationen attackiert oder in der Presse schlecht dargestellt. Insgesamt zeigt sich, wie schwierig es die Friedenstruppen haben. Sie müssen sowohl Blutvergießen verhindern als auch die Konfliktparteien auseinander halten und zum anderen ihre eigene Akzeptanz aufrechterhalten. Ebenso im Zypern-Konflikt wurde die Erlaubnis zum Gebrauch von Waffen zur Selbstverteidigung kontrovers diskutiert. Dadurch waren die Erwartungen an die UNFICYP teilweise zu hoch. Umstritten bleibt, ob der Waffengebrauch die Sicherheit erhöht und dadurch die Funktion der UN-Soldaten entlastet. Hinzu kam die Tatsache, dass die UN-Friedenstruppen oftmals mindestens einer Konfliktpartei unterlegen waren. Dabei stellt sich die Frage, inwiefern militärische Überlegenheit die politischen und diplomatischen Absichten von Friedenstruppen fördert. Die Vereinten Nationen geben den Konflikt nicht auf und führen immer noch Gespräche, nun auch mit der Beteiligung von den sogenannten Garantiemächten Griechenland, Großbritannien und der Türkei. Wünschenswert wäre eine Lösung des Konfliktes, hierfür reicht nicht allein das Engagement der Vereinten Nationen, sondern der Wille und ein Einsatz auf beiden Seiten ist notwendig. Dennoch gibt es eine Freizügigkeit trotz der Trennung. Die Trennungslinie ist keine Außengrenze, sondern hier wird die Freizügigkeit der Bürger*innen gewährleistet. Dadurch können EU-Bürger*innen und somit auch griechische und türkische Zyprioten*innen diese Linie an sieben Übergängen mit dem Personalausweis passieren. Literaturverzeichnis:Textquellen:Auswärtiges Amt: ABC der Vereinten Nationen. Edition Diplomatie, hg. Von Günther Unser, 7. Auflage, Berlin 2011, S. 57.Ehrenberg, Eckhart (1991): Die UNFICYP: Praxisbeispiel für Leistungen und Probleme der Eriedenssicherung vor Ort, In: Vereinte Nationen 1/1991, vgl. S.1-6.Gareis, Sven Bernhard/ Warwick, Johannes (2014): Die Vereinten Nationen, hg. Verlag Barbara Budrich Opladen & Toronto, 5.Auflage, vgl. S.111-148.Gorge, Remy (1986): Zypern und die Mutterländer, In: Vereinte Nationen 4/86, vgl. S.130-134.Jett, Dennis C. (2000): Why Peacekeeping Fails, In: New York, vol. S.23f.Menning, Gerhard (1974): Zypern-Mitwirkung der UNO an einer Lösung des Konflikts, In: Vereinte Nationen 6/74, vgl. S.172-176.Sucharipa-Behrmann, Lilly (1999): Die friedenserhaltende Operation der Vereinten Nationen, In: Cede/Sucharipa-Behrmann 1999, vgl. S. 232-239.Internetquellen:Auswärtiges Amt (2018): Aktuelle Lage im Zypernkonflikt, unter: https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/laender/zypern-node/-/210292 (eingesehen am 26.09.2020).Auswärtiges Amt (2020): UN-Friedensmissionen und deutsches Engagement, unter: https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/internationale-organisationen/uno/04-friedensmissionen-un/205586 (eingesehen am 26.09.2020).Deutsche Gesellschaft für die Vereinte Nationen: Organe der UN-Friedenssicherung, unter: https://frieden-sichern.dgvn.de/friedenssicherung/organe/ (eingesehen am 26.09.2020).Faustmann, Hubert (2009): Die Verhandlungen zur Wiedervereinigung Zyperns: 1974 - 2008, unter: https://www.bpb.de/apuz/32118/die-verhandlungen-zur-wiedervereinigung-zyperns-1974-2008 (eingesehen am 26.09.2020).Gareis, Sven Bernhard (2015): UNO – Stärken und Schwächen einer Weltorganisation, unter: https://www.bpb.de/izpb/209686/uno-staerken-und-schwaechen-einer-weltorganisation?p=1 (eingesehen am 26.09.2020).Gürbey, Dr. Gülistan (2014): Der Zypernkonflikt, unter: https://www.bpb.de/internationales/europa/tuerkei/185876/der-zypernkonflikt (eingesehen am 26.09.2020).Lugert, Alfred (2018): Der Fall Zypern - Teil 3, unter: https://www.truppendienst.com/themen/beitraege/artikel/der-fall-zypern-teil-3/#page-1 (eingesehen am 26.09.2020).Mathis, Edeltraud: Friedenssicherung als zentraler UN Auftrag, unter: https://www.brgdomath.com/politik-wirtschaft/gerechtfertigter-krieg-tk19/uno-und-un-weltsicherheitsrat/ ( eingesehen am 26.09.2020).Mehr zu den Wiedervereinigungs-Verhandlungen (2010), unter: http://friedensbildung.de/inhalt-der-ausstellung/zypern/verhandlungen/ (eingesehen am 26.09.2020).Richter, Heinz (2009): Historische Hintergründe des Zypernkonflikts, unter: https://www.bpb.de/apuz/32116/historische-hintergruende-des-zypernkonflikts?p=all (eingesehen am 26.09.2020).

The paper features three short essays. The fi rst essay is dedicated to the 60th Anniversary of Doctor of Historical Sciences I. L. Izmailov. The second essay contains a critical review of the version proposed by Polish researcher V. Sventoslavsky concerning the actual use of "combat poison gases" by the Tatar-Mongols in the Battle of Legnica (1241). Based on the information provided by Polish historian of the 15th century Jan Dlugosz, the version has no substantial grounds. The third essay contains an overview of the not always positive experience of characterization by Ukrainian researcher, Doctor of Historical Sciences Ya.V Pilipchuk (Kiev)of a complex of weapons of the ancestors of the medieval Ingush. A simple list of the known categories of weapons of the Ingush ancestors does not ensure a clear understanding of the process and dynamics of their military development, simplifying the understanding of the complexity of its formation. Ya. V. Pilipchuk, avoiding the demonstration of the historiographical heritage of his predecessors, is also subject to unjustifi ed inaccuracies. For instance, they include claims about the use of "guns and cannons" by Emir Timur in Georgia. All this makes the publications considered by the researcher to be the works of questionable scientifi c quality. ; Предлагаемая статья состоит из трех небольших очерков. Первый очерк посвящен 60-летнему юбилею доктора исторических наук И.Л. Измайлова. Второй очерк содержит критический обзор версии польского исследователя В. Свентославского о реальности использования татаро-монголами в битве под Легницей (1241 г.) «боевых отравляющих газов». Построенная на сведениях польского историка ХV в. Яна Длугоша версия не имеет никаких серьезных оснований. Последний, третий очерк содержит обзор не всегда позитивного опыта характеристики украинским исследователем – доктором исторических наук Я.В. Пилипчуком (г. Киев) комплекса вооружения предков средневековых ингушей. Простой перечень известных категорий вооружения предков ингушей не дает ясного понимания процесса и динамики развития их военного дела, упрощая осознание всей сложности его формирования. Я.В. Пилипчук, уходя от демонстрации историографического наследия своих предшественников, допускает и неоправданные неточности. Среди них есть утверждения об использовании, например, эмиром Тимуром в Грузии «ружей и пушек». Все это превращает рассматриваемые им публикации в работы сомнительного научного качества. Библиографические ссылки Археология Евразийских степей. 2017. № 5. 355 с. Басов В.И., Нарожный Е.И., Тихонов М.П. О двух типах наконечников копий с территории Северного Кавказа // МИАСК. Вып. 2 / Отв. ред. Е.И. Нарожный. Армавир: РИЦ АГПИ, 2003. С. 105−111. Воронин Н.Н. Крепостные сооружения // История культуры Древней Руси. Домонгольский период. Т. I: Материальная культура / Под ред. Н.Н. Воронина, М.К. Каргера и М.М. Тихановой. 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