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Drawing on examples from Justice Antonin Scalia's jurisprudence, this Essay uses the perspective of judicial departmentalism to examine the nature and limits of two partially successful originalist law reforms in recent years. It then shifts to an examination of how a faulty conception of judicial supremacy drove a few nonoriginalist changes in the law that Scalia properly dissented from. Despite the mistaken judicial supremacy motivating these decisions, a closer look reveals them to be backhanded tributes to judicial departmentalism because of the way that the Court had to change jurisdictional and remedial doctrines to accomplish its substantive-law alterations. The Essay closes with a discussion of the somewhat surprising potential that §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment offers for originalist law reform when situated within a framework of judicial departmentalism. Originalism provides both a foundation for understanding the breadth of Congress's enforcement power under §5 and also a means of grounding enforcement legislation other than existing judicial doctrine. The combination of judicial departmentalism and originalism can be particularly potent for generating originalist law reform in areas in which existing judicial doctrine underenforces substantive Fourteenth Amendment protections when measured against the original law of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Drawing on examples from Justice Antonin Scalia's jurisprudence, this Essay uses the perspective of judicial departmentalism to examine the nature and limits of two partially successful originalist law reforms in recent years. It then shifts to an examination of how a faulty conception of judicial supremacy drove a few nonoriginalist changes in the law that Scalia properly dissented from. Despite the mistaken judicial supremacy motivating these decisions, a closer look reveals them to be backhanded tributes to judicial departmentalism because of the way that the Court had to change jurisdictional and remedial doctrines to accomplish its substantive-law alterations. The Essay closes with a discussion of the somewhat surprising potential that §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment offers for originalist law reform when situated within a framework of judicial departmentalism. Originalism provides both a foundation for understanding the breadth of Congress's enforcement power under §5 and also a means of grounding enforcement legislation other than existing judicial doctrine. The combination of judicial departmentalism and originalism can be particularly potent for generating originalist law reform in areas in which existing judicial doctrine underenforces substantive Fourteenth Amendment protections when measured against the original law of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The issue of departmentalism has been a recurring theme in discussions about UK local government. In this article the implications of the Labour Government's modernization agenda for departmentalism in local authorities are considered and assessed. In particular, the potential impact of the political management reforms, Best Value, the rise of the regulation agenda and community governance and partnership working is discussed. An analysis of executive committees, scrutiny committees and Best Value investigations in the shire counties and the London boroughs and a case study of Devon County Council are used to support this discussion. The article concludes that the modernization agenda is exerting pressure towards more cross-departmental models of working.

As part of its modernising approach to policy-making, the Blair government has emphasised the need for joined-up government. It is concerned to tackle 'wicked' issues which are not the responsibility of any other department. Departments and units have been urged to concentrate on delivering outcomes regardless of departmental boundaries. The authors show that this approach poses serious challenges to long-established Whitehall and ministerial patterns of behaviour and incentives. A review of previous attempts to combat departmentalism shows how and why they failed. The authors conclude that the present programme will have to be extended and the Whitehall system radically reformed if joined-up government is to succeed. (Parliamentary Affairs / FUB)