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One of the consequences of the financial crisis of 2008 was a renewed focus on the issue of deregulation. The broadly recognized connection between the greatest economic downturn since the Great Depression and the systematic deregulation of our financial markets dating back over three decades reinvigorated the economic and political debate around the appropriate balance between market freedom and government regulation. This paper explores this theme historically, analyzing several economic markets that were highly regulated prior to the late 20th century. Through this analysis it establishes a foundational framework for the study of the widespread deregulation of the late 20th century. This paper first addresses the study of regulatory policy and its evolution throughout the 20th century. This section primarily focuses on the policy model proposed by George Stigler that acts as the foundational model for its conclusion. It then establishes the observed industries, the Airline and Trucking Industries, and provides evidence of their transition from industries that previously operated with strict governmental control of economic functions to markets that operated freely with little regulatory interference. This observed deregulation establishes the primary thesis question for this paper: what were the primary political and economic forces that caused the deregulation of these industries? The majority of this paper is dedicated to establishing alterations in the political and economic environment during this period that created these policy changes. This paper concludes that separate changes in the political and economic environment caused the deregulation of these industries. First, the evolution of subsystems from closed iron triangle systems to more complex issue networks granted smaller interest groups more influence on policy decisions. Thus, these groups' desired policies, which involved less regulation, received more consideration from the regulating agency. Second, the significant rise in the CPI increased the political pressure on elected officials to reduce prices. This pressure elevated the financial cost of regulating agencies to implement and maintain regulations that contributed to higher prices. These combined shifts caused a sudden, extreme removal of regulations in these markets. By establishing a causal analysis of the presented industries this paper creates a foundational case study for the broader, more complex deregulation that occurred throughout other industries during this time period.

This paper examines the opportunities available and the conditions needed for the deregulation of the Electricity Supply Industry (ESI), with particular reference to the Sultanate of Oman. The paper highlights the general issues of regulation required to encourage competition in the ESI. After that, the discussion focuses on regulation methods in the privatized ESI by describing the regulators control through price caps setting for regulatees, the conduct regulation process, the rate of return regulation setting, and the spot market (the pool) contract. Finally, the prospects of restructuring and privatizing the ESI in the Sultanate of Oman are examined by reviewing the current structure of the industry and government objectives in deregulation of the electricity sector as well as the regulation framework.

The Nigerian oil and gas industry has been experiencing a showdown since the announcement of the downstream oil deregulation policy. This paper, therefore, seeks to analyse the relationship between deregulation of the downstream sector and Nigerian economic performance using annual data from 1980 to 2009. The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression method was employed to analyze the data. Chow Test was used to determine parameter stability of the regression model, while Granger Causality Test was used to predict the direction of influence. The findings reveal that increase in price of petroleum products and inflation rate were not as a result of deregulation, and deregulating price of petroleum products significantly influence economic growth with marginal inflation. The paper recommends that government should encourage private sector participation in the oil and gas industry.

This paper investigates the short- and medium-term effects of the deregulation of shopopening hours legislation on retail employment in Germany. In 2006, the legislative competence was shifted from the federal to the state level, leading to a gradual deregulation of shop opening restrictions in most of Germany's sixteen federal states. The paper exploits regional variation in the legislation in order to identify the effect product market deregulation has on retail employment. We find robust evidence that the deregulation of shop closing legislation had negative effects on retail employment, with considerable heterogeneity in terms of the type of employment as well as establishment size. That is, the employment losses are most pronounced for small retail stores and are almost exclusively borne by full-time employees.

In 1988, Sweden made a vertical cut in its nationalised railway monopoly; since then, infrastructure is handled by a public-sector agency while trains were initially run by a government-owned monopolist. This paper seeks to describe this reorganisation, the subsequent process towards free entry and competition in parts of the sector and the consequences of these changes. It is argued that the policies have not focussed on (ticket) prices and competition issues and have rather been directed towards the sector's inability to recover costs, which seems to be a Europe-wide phenomenon. Some recommendations for further changes of the industry are suggested.

In 1988, Sweden made a vertical cut in its nationalised railway monopoly; since then, infrastructure is handled by a public-sector agency while trains initially were run by a government-owned monopolist. This paper seeks to describe this reorganisation, the subsequent process towards free entry and competition in parts of the sector and the consequences of these changes. It is argued that the policies have not focussed (ticket) prices and competition issues and rather been directed towards the sector's inability to recover costs, which seems to be a Europe-wide phenomenon. Some recommendations for further changes of the industry are suggested. ; Reprint from Swedish economic policy review, vol. 9, no 2, Fall 2002

Luftverkehr und Banken gehören in den USA zu jenen Bereichen, die vor der Weltwirtschaftskrise durch intensiven Wettbewerb gekennzeichnet waren. Sie wurden in den 30er Jahren in ein engmaschiges Regulierungsnetz eingebunden, das als Substitut für den wettbewerblichen Koordinierungsmechanismus dienen sollte. Seit den 60er Jahren wurden die Schwächen staatlicher Eingriffe in die Wirtschaft immer deutlicher, was in den USA Mitte der 70er Jahre zu einer von Ökonomen, Politikern, Juristen und Verbraucherschützern getragenen Gegenbewegung (Deregulation Policy) führte, die im Luftverkehrs- und Bankensektor durch Intensivierung des Wettbewerbs sehr erfolgreich war und daher ein Beispiel für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Europa sein sollte.

This paper strives to understand the role of the deregulation movement in the 2008 financial crisis, which almost destroyed the US economy. Financial regulations created a legal barrier that safeguarded the US economy for four decades after the Great Depression. With the intent of improving the competitiveness of the US financial industry in the global economy, the US government adopted many deregulatory measures from the 1980s to the 2000s. For a short while, financial deregulation stimulated impressive economic growth. However, this temporary prosperity was subsequently overshadowed by the greatest financial disaster in modern history. This paper shows how the financial regulatory edifice was initially established after the Great Depression and how it was gradually eroded by the deregulation movement, which ultimately contributed to the 2008 financial crisis. Also, the remedies and new regulations that were introduced during and after the crisis are discussed.

This paper is aimed at conducting a detailed analysis on the government regulation and deregulation of the airline industry in the United States of America. Given the rapid growth in size and influence of the airline business in the USA, the federal government established a set of rules and regulations to steer the industry in what was believed to be the right direction. Lack of deeper understanding of the intricacies surrounding the industry led to increasing dissatisfaction amongst the airlines. The deregulation has come as a solution for a lot of problems, but it has also been deemed as a curse for airlines and passengers alike. Through a literature review, this paper discusses the real consequences of the airline deregulation in the USA and how it has influenced how people fly in America.

Abstract: As Fintech has proliferated over the last few years and most of countries have put more effort to adopt it at state level. It is apparent that Fintech brings more of cost-cut, security, and reliability to a greater number of people. At this moment, as China nurtured a myriad of Fintech giants and became one of Fintech powers so that it brings a surprise to the world. In general, each of China Fintech subsectors has flourished. It is because Chinese government is open to easing regulatory control which welcomes new entrants into a market and makes a natural competitive atmosphere with the old. Also, the state's remedial action where it complements downside of law and system afterwards is so practical that it has paved way for the prosperity of Fintech. On the other hand, despite the fact that Korea has been well known as cutting-edge technologies, it is most unlikely that Korea is playing a leading role in Fintech due to trap of legislation which impedes the progress of Fintech industry. Also, the existing financial institutions fear bearing the burden of investment in Fintech. The paper suggests the proposition of how Korea develops it along with the speed of world Fintech through the study on China's case. First of all, China took 'Inclusive Finance' that embraces non-financial sectors in it. Particularly, it reduced the regulation of Fintech and provided new markets and business opportunities. Furthermore, it set a definite political way which accumulated experiences of permitting testing businesses and induced a competition. The progressive approach through tests backed up the drawback of system afterward. Keywords: Fintech, China, Korea, China Fintech, deregulation

Drawing broadly on the literature on the political economy of the financial crisis, the paper looks at deregulation as a market driven process that culminated in a collective action failure. In the run up to the 2008 Financial Crisis strong competition and moral hazard went hand in hand and that raises a flag that needs explanation. The paper argues that opportunistic profit (rent) seeking was more the cause rather than the effect of moral hazard and regulation failure. Deregulation promised higher profitability partly because of better risk management made possible by advances in information technology and partly because financial institutions could take "tail-risks" the full cost of which they did not have to bear. The profits deregulation promised in turn incentivized financial firms to invest in tilting the political process to shape government policy. Because systemic risk cannot be fully privatized social insurance against it is inevitably a common pool (or open) resource, which means that there is an incentive for financial units to over-extract in the form of excessive risk taking in the absence of effective regulation. That explains why with deregulation market competition could culminate in excessive risk taking with mounting social costs. Using simple game theory the paper gives a stylized account of what sustained the deregulatory trend. In the course of deregulation, the regulator's implicit threat of imposing discipline on financial institutions lost much of its credibility. That, combined with growing plutocracy go a long way in explaining why deregulation became a run-away market driven process that worsened the problem of moral hazard over time.

This study analyzes the trends in the financial sector over the past 30 years, and argues that unsupervised financial innovations and lenient government regulation are at the root of the current financial crisis and recession. Combined with a long period of economic expansion during which default rates were stable and low, deregulation and unsupervised financial innovations generated incentives to make risky financial decisions. Those decisions were taken because it was the only way for financial institutions to maintain market share and profitability. Thus, rather than putting the blame on individuals, this paper places it on an economic setup that requires the growing use of Ponzi processes during enduring economic expansion, and on a regulatory system that is unwilling to recognize (on the contrary, it contributes to) the intrinsic instability of market mechanisms. Subprime lending, greed, and speculation are merely aspects of the larger mechanisms at work. It is argued that we need to change the way we approach the regulation of financial institutions and look at what has been done in other sectors of the economy, where regulation and supervision are proactive and carefully implemented in order to guarantee the safety of society. The criterion for regulation and supervision should be neither Wall Street's nor Main Street's interests but rather the interests of the socioeconomic system. The latter requires financial stability if it's to raise, durably, the standard of living of both Wall Street and Main Street. Systemic stability, not profits or homeownership, should be the paramount criterion for financial regulation, since systemic stability is required to maintain the profitability - and ultimately, the existence - of any capitalist economic entity. The role of the government is to continually counter the Ponzi tendencies of market mechanisms, even if they are (temporarily) improving standards of living, and to encourage economic agents to develop safe and reliable financial practices. - See also, Working Paper No. 573.1, 'Securitization, Deregulation, Economic Stability, and Financial Crisis, Part I: The Evolution of Securitization.'

In the quarterly CLR-News (2-2015), titled 'The future of the EU health and safety legislation' (www.clr-news.org under Publications), editor Jan Cremers (Law School UvT and AIAS) questions whether the OHS-policy developed is internal market proof and resistant enough to the reigning dogma of deregulation. Cremers notices that the EC is leaning too much to so-called evidence coming from business consultants and their very one-dimensional patchwork of attitudes and other 'irritations' expressed by entrepreneurs. He argues that the high fatality rate among newcomers and migrants, registered in several studies, is in itself already good reason for a strong occupational safety and health policy all over Europe, and, with the mobility of workers being prominent on the EU agenda, to work out a more coherent and unified, upwards oriented policy in this field as a matter of urgency.

EU Member States have implemented EU rail legislation in various ways. Germany's rail reform aimed at increasing rail transport and decreasing the sector's public financial support. These objectives have generally been reached although opinions vary. Germany and Sweden have several common features; Regional authorities are responsible for regional services, often tendered out in competition. Entry on the commercial long-distance market has been very limited. Sweden has fully separated infrastructure and operations while Germany retains infrastructure within the Deutsche Bahn group. This project analyses various aspects of the German railway regulatory framework and draw conclusions for Sweden and in general. In Germany principles for capacity allocation and priorities in daily operations are uncertain and controversial. Framework agreements can only be signed for fixed five year periods or parts thereof and operators consider this too inflexible. Incentive or Bonus/Malus agreements between infrastructure managers and operators have been tried in both countries. Little money changes hands but all parties agree that this area needs to be developed. Access to maintenance facilities is regulated but some controversies exist. Rolling stock is an unregulated area but connected to capacity allocation – if a new entrant gets his capacity allocation too late he may not be able to acquire rolling stock in time for the start of operations.

This paper deals with the issue of regulatory reform in the airline industry, in connection with environmental externalities. Deregulation has led to shorter routes, higher frequencies, probably larger aircraft sizes and more intense peak traffic at airports. In addition, deregulation has led to lower average real fares, although various barriers to entry still allow carriers to keep prices above competitive levels. Environmental effects have thus far not received much attention in the discussion on deregulation. The paper contains a discussion of various types of environmental effects of aviation. An analytical model is developed to compare these effects in hub and spoke systems with a fully connected system. The conclusion is that for CO2 emissions private cost considerations and environmental considerations may run parallel in the choice of transport network, but that for other types of pollutants there may be a clear conflict. In addition the paper pays attention to equity aspects of externalities.