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Issues vital to private investors, from competition law to tax aspects, are surveyed here by accountants and lawyers from throughout the EU. The text shows the extent to which deregulation, or "liberalization," of industrial sectors in the member states of the European Union (EU) has impacted beyond the economies and financial markets of Europe. As more sectors of the European economy open to private participants, the effect on the aviation, rail, insurance, telecommunications, and utilities sectors, as this insightful text shows, will continue to intensify dramatically. Published under the Transnational Publishers imprint

ABSTRACTPublic enterprises in the Federal Republic of Germany are about average for all nonsocialist countries and markets are more heavily regulated than in the United States. Compared to American deregulation and British privatization, there have been few developments in the Federal Republic. Why? In the last ten years new schools of thought have provided a stronger normative foundation for and a stronger positive explanation against deregulation and privatization in Germany in the near future. The German political debate on deregulation and privatization is characterized by three institutional peculiarities. Major steps to deregulate or privatize economic sectors require legislation, which is influenced by political parties. Trade unions exert a strong influence on the major parties and are opposed to privatization and deregulation. The European Community forces some deregulation upon the Federal Republic in order to liberalize service sectors.

The extent of public enterprises & regulation of the markets in the Federal Republic of Germany is reviewed, & the German situation compared to US deregulation & British privatization. It is argued that in the last ten years, new schools of thought have provided a stronger normative foundation for, & a stronger positive explanation against, deregulation & privatization. The German political debate on these issues must consider three institutional peculiarities: trade unions are stronger & further to the Left than in the US, political parties & their ideologies are more powerful, & the European Community rules & policies constrain German economic policy. It is concluded that the European Community rules will result in some deregulation, but that large-scale deregulation & privatization are unlikely to occur. 39 References. Modified HA

THE DEREGULATION OF THE U.S. COMMERICAL AVIATION INDUSTRY, AND AMERICA'S ATTEMPTS TO GLOBALIZE ITS LIBERAL AVIATION EXPERIMENT, HAVE GENERALLY BEEN VIEWED AS SUCCESSFUL APPLICATIONS OF U.S. LIBERAL ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY IN REAL WORLD PRACTICE. HOWEVER, THE CONDITION OF TODAY'S DOMESTIC AVIATION MARKET WARRENTS A REEVALUATION OF THIS EXPERIEMENT. THIS PAPER EXPLORES THE MOTIVES BEHIND THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978, TO ANALYZE THE MARKET AS IT HAS DEVELOPED IN ITS DEREGULATED ENVIRONMENT, AND TO ANSWER THE QUESTION OF WHETHER DEREGULATION HAS FULFILLED ITS INTENDED PURPOSES.

Abstract
The growth of the American financial services remains a bit of a puzzle. The standard approach, the deregulation hypothesis, posits that the industry expanded in response to national deregulation. Yet, when viewed in a comparative context, US finance was deregulated significantly less than other national financial systems and yet grew significantly more than most. We propose the global deregulation hypothesis as a solution to this puzzle. The hypothesis posits that American finance grew in response to deregulation in Europe and the emerging market economies. The article develops two theoretical mechanisms that link global deregulation to US financialization. It reports statistical tests that support two central implications of the global deregulation hypothesis. First, global deregulation is positively associated with the growth of US financial services, while US deregulation is not. Second, global deregulation is not systematically related to the growth of financial services in other industrial democracies.

It has frequently been claimed that the cost of air travel in Australia has fallen by around 20 per cent in real terms since the end of the Two Airline agreement. However, this claim rests on a misinterpretation of price data. In this article, an analysis based on the theory of price indexes is presented. It is concluded that the representative passenger has probably experienced a small reduction in the cost of air travel since deregulation. Some additional benefits have flowed from the expansion of frequent flyer schemes, and from increased frequency of service. The distributional effects of deregulation are unclear, but are probably favourable on balance. The Australian airline industry is a natural duopoly and the market is not contestable. Therre is no evidence of dynamic efficiency gains arising from deregulation. The observed effects of deregulation are consistent with the predictions of neoclassical microeconomic theory.

In Hong Kong, after its smooth establishment as a Special Administrative Region, there is a major deregulation effort. A deregulation committee is pursuing cases of unnecessary red tape and the private sector is becoming more involved in the delivery of public services. Hong Kong is the best place in Asia to do business.

Abstract. 'Deregulation' is best conceived as covering two separate sets of processes: changes to the structure of rules embodied in regulatory systems; and disturbances to the stability of those systems due to the inability of system 'governors' to function effectively. The most striking feature of deregulation is variety ‐ in incidence, form and extent. This variety is a function of three broad sets of variables: place, notably national setting; time, notably the historical epoch and the stage in a regulatory cycle when deregulation happens; and arena, notably the economic arena and policy networks where deregulation takes place.

Harry Phibbs interviews the minister with responsibility for deregulation at the DTI, Neil Hamilton MP, and finds him an enthusiastic supporter of free markets.

Stephen M. Johnson (Mercer University Law School) has posted Deregulation: Too Big for One Branch, But Maybe Not For Two (53 Seton Hall L. Rev. 839 (2023)) on SSRN. Here is the abstract: When President Trump took office, he pursued...