Suchergebnisse

Forma part de la col·lecció: Papers; 6 ; Digitalitzat per l'empresa Artyplan per encàrrec del SEDAC ; 1. Los objetivos de la descentralización. ; 2. Elaboración de una nueva división de la ciudad. ; Resumen del programa de descentralización: I. Objetivos y medios principales de la descentralización; II. Organización política del distrito y participación ciu

In light of the existing theories about institutional change, this paper seeks to advance a common framework to understand the unfolding of decentralization and federalization in three countries: Brazil, Spain, and South Africa. Although in different continents, these three countries witnessed processes after their respective transitions to democracy that transferred administrative and fiscal authority to their regions (decentralization) and vertically distributed political and institutional capacity (federalization). This paper attempts to explain how institutional changes prompted a shift of power and authority towards regional governments by looking at internal sources of change within the intergovernmental arena in the three countries. This analysis is organized around two propositions: that once countries transit to democracy under all-encompassing constitutions there are high incentives for institutional change, and that under a bargained intergovernmental interaction among political actors subnational political elites are able to advance their interests incrementally. In short, through a common framework this paper will explain the evolving dynamics of intergovernmental dynamics in three countries.

Forma part de la col·lecció: Papers; 3 ; Digitalitzat per l'empresa Artyplan per encàrrec del SEDAC ; Introducción: La descentralización territorial de funciones; Sobre las competencias y funciones descentralizables; Sobre las competencias no descentralizables; Sobre el modelo organizativo del Distrito. ; 1. Competencia Funcional de los Distritos: Urbanismo; Obras Públicas; Jardines Públicos; Edificios Públicos; Servicios Públicos. ; 2. Competencia Funcional de los Distritos: Enseñanza; Cultura; Juventud y Deportes; Sanidad; Servicios Sociales; Centros Cínicos. ; 3. Competencia Funcional de los Distritos: Protección Ciudadana; Servicios Generales. ; 4. Anexo: Normas Reguladoras de los procesos de transferencias de funciones a los Distritos.

Forma part de la col·lecció: Papers; 5 ; Digitalitzat per l'empresa Artyplan per encàrrec del SEDAC ; 1. Organización política del distrito y participación ciudadana. ; 2. Bases para la institucionalización de los distritos y la participación ciudadana. ; 3. Nota comparativa de diferentes modelos europeos de descentralización municipal.

Forma part de la col·lecció: Papers; 8 ; Digitalitzat per l'empresa Artyplan per encàrrec del SEDAC ; 8.1. Presentación; Índice general; Metodología; Conclusiones; Propuestas. ; 8.2. Análisis y evaluación de algunas experiencias asociativas. ; 8.3 El movimiento asociativo en Francia e Inglaterra. ; 8.4 Anexos

Over the last few years, ther has been a devolutionary tendency in many developed and developing countries. In this article we propose a methodology to decompose whether the benefits in terms of effciency derived from transfers of powers from higher to municipal levels of government "the "economic dividend" of devolution) might increase over time. This methodology is based on linear programming approaches for effciency measurement. We provide anapplication to Spanish municipalities, which have had to adapt to both the European Stability and Growth Pact as well as to domestic regulation seeking local governments balanced budget. Results indicate that efficiency gains from enhaced decentralization have increased over time. However, the way through which these gains accrue differs across municipalities -in some cases technical change is the main component, whereas in others catching up dominates.

This article explains why decentralization can undermine accountability and answers three questions: what determines if power should be centralized or decentralized when regions are heterogeneous? How many levels of government should there be? How should state borders be drawn? We develop a model of political agency in which voters differ in their ability to monitor rent-seeking politicians. We find that rent extraction is a decreasing and convex function of the share of informed voters, because voter information improves monitoring but also reduces the appeal of holding office. As a result, information heterogeneity pushes toward centralization to reduce rent extraction. Taste heterogeneity pulls instead toward decentralization to match local preferences. Our model thus implies that optimal borders should cluster by tastes but ensure diversity of information. We also find economies of scope in accountability that explain why multiplying government tiers harms efficiency. A single government in charge of many policies has better incentives than many special-purpose governments splitting its budget and responsibilities. Hence, a federal system is desirable only if information varies enough across regions. ; Boffa acknowledges financial support from the Free University of Bolzano (WW82); Piolatto from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO-2012-37131) and the Government of Catalonia (2014-SGR-420); Ponzetto from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (JCI-2010-08414 and ECO-2011-25624), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (RYC-2013-13838), the Government of Catalonia (2009-SGR-1157 and 2014-SGR-830), the Barcelona GSE and the BBVA Foundation through its first grant for Researchers, Innovators and Cultural Creators.

Forma part de la col·lecció: Papers; 2 ; Digitalitzat per l'empresa Artyplan per encàrrec del SEDAC ; 1. Programa básico de Descentralización: Documento de trabajo, Octubre de 1983. ; 2. La organización político-administrativa de la Descentralización: Ponencia presentada por Pau Cernuda a los primeros encuentros sobre Descentralización y Participación. ; 3. Objetivos políticos y principales instrumentos de la Descentralización.

Digitalitzat per Artyplan per encàrrec del Servei de Documentació i Accés al Coneixement (SEDAC)

This article explains why decentralization can undermine accountability and answers three questions: what determines if power should be centralized or decentralized when regions are heterogeneous? How many levels of government should there be? How should state borders be drawn? We develop a model of political agency in which voters differ in their ability to monitor rent-seeking politicians. We find that rent extraction is a decreasing and convex function of the share of informed voters, because voter information improves monitoring but also reduces the appeal of holding office. As a result, information heterogeneity pushes toward centralization to reduce rent extraction. Taste heterogeneity pulls instead toward decentralization to match local preferences. Our model thus implies that optimal borders should cluster by tastes but ensure diversity of information. We also find economies of scope in accountability that explain why multiplying government tiers harms efficiency. A single government in charge of many policies has better incentives than many special-purpose governments splitting its budget and responsibilities. Hence, a federal system is desirable only if information varies enough across regions.

This paper offers an evaluation about the current design of the unconditional transfer system to the municipalities in Spain taking as a reference the precepts of fiscal federalism theory. The analysis carried out is based on the released results of the model during the period from 2004-2009, in which two different stages can be identified within the econòmic cycle; an expansive one up until 2007 and a recession period after that year. These data highlight that the design of the model along with the application of certain funding guarantees, have caused a disconnection between the evolution of the resources and the variables representative of need and capacity. Faced with this scenario, different reform alternatives are proposed with the aim of reconnecting the resources with these indicators. The potential impact of those proposals is evaluated using a simulation exercise in which the basic rule of status quo is assumed, i.e., that no municipality loses funding as a consequence of the new system.

This paper analyzes the relationship between fiscal decentralization, the duration of fiscal consolidation episodes, and their success for 17 OECD countries between 1978 and 2009. The consolidation of the general government budget appears to be of longer duration when expenditure decisions are more decentralized. We also find that transfers from higher levels of government are cut during consolidation episodes, suggesting that central governments shift the burden of consolidation towards lower tiers of government. This is especially true when the latter have little legal autonomy to raise tax revenues and have little influence over executive decisions taken at the central level. We document that this increases local governments' public debt/GDP ratios. In terms of the success of consolidation episodes, countries with greater degrees of decentralization appear to make smaller improvements in their primary balance when consolidating.

La diplomacia cultural suele ser definida como una política de intercambios y relaciones artísticos e intelectuales desarrollada entre Estados-nación. La proliferación, sobre todo durante los últimos treinta años, de diversas estructuras de política cultural exterior de tipo subnacional en todo el mundo, se explica debido a la reestructuración del Estado postfordista, a la aparición de nuevos actores y al desarrollo de múltiples esquemas de gobernanza multinivel. Sin embargo, la ruptura del monopolio de dicha acción exterior por los gobiernos centrales supone un desafío para el desarrollo de nuevos sistemas de representación externa de los Estados. En el caso de España, la profunda descentralización de la administración pública producida desde la transición democrática permitió la paulatina aparición de las paradiplomacias culturales autonómicas. Este trabajo analiza el desarrollo de la Administración General del Estado y de la Comunidad Autónoma de Cataluña y persigue responder como se configura la actuación cultural exterior del Estado de las Autonomías. En este sentido, plantea la inexistencia de un sistema federal de diplomacia cultural y si, en cambio, una competencia intergubernamental en la que se oponen procesos de nation building y en el que se disputa el monopolio o la legitimidad de proyectar la cultura en el exterior.

We investigate how particular configurations of national parliaments affect the dynamics of political decentralization in parliamentary democracies. Recent research has emphasized the impact of structural determinants on levels of decentralization across countries. However, we argue that decentralization processes are endogenous to legislative bargaining by political parties. Our main hypothesis is that, ceteris paribus, the greater the legislative bargaining power of parties with decentralization demands, the more likely decentralization reforms are to occur. For that purpose, we calculate an index of the parliamentary salience of decentralization that reflects the distribution of parties' preferences for decentralization weighted by their bargaining power. We test our hypotheses with dynamic models for 19 parliamentary democracies using Comparative Manifesto Project data and the Regional Authority Index. We demonstrate that the dynamics of decentralization are crucially shaped by the configuration of national legislatures, although this only seems to affect the self-rule dimension of decentralization rather than shared rule.

Los servicios sociales están sufriendo el impacto de la crisis tanto en forma de un incremento de la demanda como de una reducción de los recursos disponibles. Sin embargo, la relativa tranquilidad de los años de expansión económica ocultaban algunos problemas estructurales del modelo de servicios sociales modernos configurado en España desde la Transición, y que aparecen en toda su crudeza ahora. El artículo analiza tres aspectos problemáticos de este modelo, a saber, la insuficiente definición del objeto de los servicios sociales, el carácter discrecional de muchas de sus acciones y su complicada estructuración territorial. Finalmente se proponen algunas líneas de reforma para una posible redefinición.