Suchergebnisse

Examines differences between biological, chemical, and atomic weapons in terms of lethality and destructive power; argues that combining them under a single term obscures the overriding priority of reducing the nuclear danger. Some focus on US relations with Russia and Iraq.

Russia's annexation of Crimea will make it harder for Germany to achieve its disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. Joint action by Russia and the United States to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals appears unlikely in the medium term. And that reduces the chances of tactical nuclear weapons being included - as Germany would prefer - in a future arms control accord. While existing nuclear arms control agreements have not thus far been openly called into question, they may yet become consumed by the ongoing Ukraine crisis. Berlin should argue against NATO re-directing missile defences at a Russian threat. In order to prevent a further weakening of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, Germany can emphasise the value of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon states. (author's abstract)

Nonproliferation Issues for Weapons of Mass Destruction provides an understanding of WMD proliferation risks by bridging complex technical and political issues. The text begins by defining the world conditions that foster proliferation, followed by an analysis of characteristics of various classes of WMDs, including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. It then explores the effectiveness of arms control, discussing current nonproliferation problems, nonproliferation prior to the fall of the USSR, and weapons safeguards. The book analyzes the future of these weapons, discussing delivery systems and potential use by states, terrorist groups, and individuals. The text concludes with a discussion of what can be done to limit the impact of WMDs. This volume enables a realistic understanding of the relative risks that WMDs present to our way of life.

Russia's annexation of Crimea will make it harder for Germany to achieve its disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. Joint action by Russia and the United States to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals appears unlikely in the medium term. And that reduces the chances of tactical nuclear weapons being included - as Germany would prefer - in a future arms control accord. While existing nuclear arms control agreements have not thus far been openly called into question, they may yet become consumed by the ongoing Ukraine crisis. Berlin should argue against NATO re-directing missile defences at a Russian threat. In order to prevent a further weakening of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, Germany can emphasise the value of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon states. (SWP Comments)