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This article aims to analyze the notion of creation in Sartre's thought. This notion is not predominant in the first texts. We try to demonstrate their place in the philosopher's thinking. First, we turn to the text Cahiers pour une morale where such a notion occupies a fundamental place. Then, we show how this analysis is resumed in the Critique of Raison Dialectique. This analysis will explain the content of creation as a process of singularization so that the being of the individual or his freedom is taken as a singular quality, this is, as meaning of being while it is finitude. Finally, this configuration alludes to relations according to his gift and generosity as existence in the world.

Due to the naturalization of the protagonism of the concept of experience in the interpretation of Theodor Adorno's dialectic, this article intends to elucidate some lines of displacement from the category of experience to the category of mediation, from the critical appropriation of this category of Hegel's thought by Adorno; because, since all experience is mediated, mediation presents itself as a condition for the realization of the experience and, for this reason, mediation is established as a privileged instance in the process of knowledge in the scope of the subject and object relationship, given that defines itself as a cause and condition for the organization of experience. Fundamentally, the proposal is to demonstrate that both Hegelian and Adornian dialectics - despite their idiosyncrasies - have in mediation their motivic aspect of determining the subjective and the objective. Therefore, the concept of mediation will be presented as a transversal and reciprocal component that, at the same time that it brings together, distinguishes the related aspects, making dialectics a procedure, within which mediation becomes a condition and fundamental for the development and the determination of the concepts circumscribed in a given context or situation. In this sense, mediation will emerge as the structuring agent of experience, a fact that justifies its priority in relation to experience, as described by Hegel.

The current study investigates the consistency between the claims of the Dialectic and those of the Canon concerning the problem of freedom, and does so through a comparative analysis of three interpretations, showing why two of them (Carnois and Allison) would be mistaken, and a third (Esteves), defensible. Carnois points out that there would be an incompatibility between Dialectic and Canon in considering that the freedom of the Canon would be a limited and empirical freedom, whereas in the Dialectic it would have an absolute spontaneity. Allison believes that the texts would be compatible, although both present relative and ambiguous practical freedom (dependent on a sensitive incentive), and therefore there would be a pre-critical morality in KrV. Esteves's interpretation seems to us to be more sustainable and allows us to understand the coherence and contemporaneity of texts (both present freedom with absolute spontaneity), showing that, although practical freedom is a relational freedom (applied to human beings and therefore in contact with the empirical), it is not an empirical but hybrid concept.

Marx's engagement in philosophy has from the outset attempted a more objective development of humanism insofar as it only enters into such discipline in pursuit of a rationality whose development is not cut off from the concrete transformation of the world. Such is his impression of philosophy under the Hegelian dialectic: only philosophical reason would perceive itself as an undisputed form of reality, being able to realize the humanism that in Law is given as a pure idealism. In the Preparatory Notes for his doctoral thesis entitled Difference between the Philosophies of Democritus and Epicurus (DFDE) Marx developed a philosophy of history alternative to that of Hegel, indicating that democracy did not suffer decline in Greece due to the development of philosophical reason, but because of the victory of a philosophical reason that had undergone a change to theology.