Suchergebnisse

Analyzing the results of the 1963 Canadian federal election, which saw the Liberal party victorious after six years of Progressive Conservative rule, American Ambassador Walton Butterworth predicted that Canada would henceforth "be more stable, responsible, sophisticated and generally cooperative than at any time since 1958." That Butterworth would single out that year as being of such importance is interesting but not a surprise. Although Tory leader John Diefenbaker became Canadian prime minister as head of a minority government in 1957, it was not until a snap election in March 1958 that he won a resounding majority of seats in the house of commons, the most to that point in Canada's history. A former lawyer and long-serving member of parliament, Diefenbaker was a fiery populist who rose to power on a growing tide of nationalism -- some would call it anti-Americanism -- that was coming to prominence in Canada thanks to uneasiness among Canadians over the economic ties between their country and the behemoth to the south. That Diefenbaker was a populist and a nationalist is no secret. His clashes with John Kennedy, American president from 1961 to 1963, are well known and have been the subject of much academic and popular history. Less well known, and examined, is how Canada-US relations played out during the years 1957 to 1961 when Dwight Eisenhower was the American president. Of the Diefenbaker-Eisenhower years, as Butterworth observed, 1958 served as an important benchmark, because, to many observers, it was clear that at this point something was rotten with the state of the Canadian-American relationship. Nationalism in Canada had come to the fore, the United States was subjected to frequent criticism from north of the border, and with a parliamentary majority Diefenbaker seemed poised to enact nationalist legislation, particularly in economics. In the late 1950s, a host of troublesome economic issues divided the two countries: Canadian trade with China, of which Washington disapproved; high levels of American investment in Canada, of which Ottawa was wary; the disposal of surplus US agricultural goods, which cornered Canada out of the market; and the imbalance in Canadian-American trade, which favoured the United States. These problems fuelled nationalist anger and contributed to Conservative electability. So throughout 1958 American diplomats, government officials, and legislators sought ways of dealing with Diefenbaker. Examining this relative high point of interest in how Canada-US relations functioned, this article traces reactions in Canada and the United States to Diefenbaker's electoral victories and nationalism, including American efforts to highlight and mitigate sources of Canadian discontent. Ultimately, these steps, which were largely applauded by Canadians, did little to stem the rise of Canadian nationalism, a force that loomed over bilateral relations throughout the following decades. Adapted from the source document.

John Diefenbaker's Latin American policy was based on his vision of Canada's national interest, which placed a strong emphasis on the achievement of greater autonomy in foreign policy for Canada vis-à-vis the US and the expansion of Canadian exports to the region. Though Diefenbaker was often accused of being driven by anti-Americanism, instead his Latin American policy was based on his vision of Canada's national interest. For Diefenbaker, an enhanced relationship Other Latin America had the.

Cover; Contents; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; Introduction; Part 1: The Commonwealth; 1 A New Vision for the Commonwealth: Diefenbaker's Commonwealth Tour of 1958; 2 Different Leader, Different Paths: Diefenbaker and the British, 1957-63; Part 2: Canadian-American Relations; 3 The Spirit of '56: The Suez Crisis, Anti-Americanism, and Diefenbaker's 1957 and 1958 Election Victories; 4 When the Chips Are Down: Eisenhower, Diefenbaker, and the Lebanon Crisis, 1958; 5 The Problem Child: Diefenbaker and Canada in the Language of the Kennedy Administration; Part 3: Nuclear Weapons