Suchergebnisse

Međunarodni kazneni sud novo je međunarodno tijelo kojem je glavni cilj istraga i suđenje slučajeva genocida, ratnih zločina, te zločina protiv čovječnosti u zemljama članicama. Iako su Sjedinjene Američke Države u 2000. potpisale Rimski statut, međunarodnu povelju iz 1998. koja predstavlja osnovicu Međunarodnog kaznenog suda, Busheva vlada napravila je velik zaokret godinu dana kasnije, potpuno se ograđujući od svake ideje o suđenju Amerikancima izvan zemlje. Tekst analizira glavne argumente američke vanjske politike povezane s Međunarodnim kaznenim sudom, od navodne pristranosti Suda, te odnosa između Suda i Ujedinjenih naroda, pa sve do pitanja američkog suvereniteta. Također, ponuđena je i međunarodnopravna politička kritika nedavnih poteza američke vlade, koji štete i američkim nacionalnim interesima, i međunarodnoj sigurnosti. ; The International Criminal Court is a new international body constituted with the aim of prosecuting and trying cases of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Although in 2000 the United States signed the 1998 Rome Statute, which is the foundation of the International Criminal Court, the Bush Administration took a radically different position the following year, protecting itself from any idea of trying American citizens abroad. This text analyses the main U.S. foreign policy arguments pertaining to the ICC, from the alleged impartiality of the Court and the relationship between the Court and the United Nations, to the question of American sovereignty. In addition, the text offers an international legal and political critique of the recent U.S. policy actions, which harmed both American national interests, as well as international security.

The article focuses on the interconnectedness of foreign policy environments to explain Slovenia's opportunities and constraints for foreign policy action. During the period of pre-independence para-diplomacy, the building of an internal and external domestic environment successfully turned constraints (no international recognition) into opportunities (applying for membership of European and global intergovernmental organizations). In the second period — post-recognition — considering the absence of a strategic foreign policy document, the Slovenian internal foreign policy environment became a major constraint to seize foreign environment opportunities. This affected Slovenia's accomplishments, notably after NATO and EU memberships were achieved in 2004. Although the Slovenian internal environment matured during the following period to adopt, in 2015, a comprehensive foreign policy strategy the recent turn in world politics (especially the European financial and economic crisis and the migration crisis) created for the first time a foreign environment for Slovenia that offered many fewer opportunities and far more constraints. ; The article focuses on the interconnectedness of foreign policy environments to explain Slovenia's opportunities and constraints for foreign policy action. During the period of pre-independence para-diplomacy, the building of an internal and external domestic environment successfully turned constraints (no international recognition) into opportunities (applying for membership of European and global intergovernmental organizations). In the second period — post-recognition — considering the absence of a strategic foreign policy document, the Slovenian internal foreign policy environment became a major constraint to seize foreign environment opportunities. This affected Slovenia's accomplishments, notably after NATO and EU memberships were achieved in 2004. Although the Slovenian internal environment matured during the following period to adopt, in 2015, a comprehensive foreign policy strategy the recent turn in world politics (especially the European financial and economic crisis and the migration crisis) created for the first time a foreign environment for Slovenia that offered many fewer opportunities and far more constraints.

U članku se analiziraju institucionalni aranžmani euromediteranskih politika, koji se mogu opisati kao proces euromediteranizacije, pri čemu se ključni elementi analize zadržavaju na pitanju interguvernmentalne, regionalne i vanjske politike Europske unije. Uočavajući razlike u klasificiranju utjecaja europeizacije te mogućeg tematiziranja jednog aspekta euromediteranskih politika i procesa euromediteranizacije kao procesa europeizacije, rad se bavi pitanjem diplomacije kolosijeka, uspješnosti euromediteranskih politika i, posebno, istražuje primjer komplementarne uloge nevladinih organizacija u kreiranju uspješnih euromediteranskih politika. Analiza pokazuje da su pristup Procesa iz Barcelone i institucionalna izgradnja Unije za Mediteran u velikoj mjeri ostali bez željenih učinaka te da su navedene institucionalne metamorfoze ostale samo na superficijalnoj interguvernmentalnoj razini. ; The paper analyses the institutional arrangements of Euro-Mediterranean policies, which can be described by the process of Euro-Mediterraneanization, and in doing so the key elements of the analysis dwell on the issue of the intergovernmental, regional and foreign policies of the European Union. By recognizing the differences in different classification of the impact of Europeanization, and a possible study of one aspect of Euro-Mediterranean policies and the process of Euro-Mediterraneanization as a process of Europeanization, the paper deals with the issue of track diplomacy, the success of Euro-Mediterranean policies and, in particular, examines an example of the complementary role of non-governmental organizations in the making of successful Euro-Mediterranean policies. The analysis shows that the approach of the Barcelona Process and the institutional construction of the Union for the Mediterranean have been largely left without the desired effects, as well as that the specified institutional metamorphoses have remained only at the superficial intergovernmental level.

The author looks into the problem of the sovereignty of the nation-state in the era of globalization. States have lost a number of their attributes & are no longer particularly efficient. Although states are still the primary actors in international relations, they have lost some of their sovereignty, functions & powers. International institutions now usurp the right to appraise & restrict what states do on their own territory. Despite this, in the near future the state is to remain the dominant political form in international relations. It still maintains an army, conducts diplomacy, negotiates agreements, wages wars, supervises international organizations & influences production & trade. The author points out that states are capable of adjusting to the imperatives of international political economy & claims that the state in the 2lst century will probably perform indispensable political social-economic functions since no other organization has emerged as its genuine rival able to replace it. 1 Table, 18 References. Adapted from the source document.

The three-year war seriously undermined religious solidarity on which Vatican's political influence in the world was based. That is why Pope Benedict XV opted for a peace initiative hoping to find the base for a lasting peace. His sympathies lied with the Central Powers, so the Vatican's peace note was composed in that vein. The note was supposed to be passed on by GB to its allies. During these British-Vatican contacts, one had an impression that GB was particularly interested in Belgian independence. The Vatican diplomacy strongly pressured Berlin to renounce Belgium as a stepping stone to peace. The German military leadership was not in the mood for compromises regarding this, but on the basis of the Vatican's counsel, the new German foreign minister Kuhlmann tried to get into contact with GB as the first step to universal peace talks. However, this attempt also led to an impasse because of the unreadiness of both warring parties to forego their war goals in favor of a compromising peace. 12 References. Adapted from the source document.

Ovaj se rad bavi stvarnim mogućnostima koje stoje na raspolaganju Bosni i Hercegovini u ostvarenju strateškoga cilja koje je sebi zadalo bosanskohercegovačko društvo, a to je članstvo u Europskoj uniji. Kako svaka država u vanjskim odnosima može računati na tri vrste moći (vojna, ekonomska i meka moć), ovdje se pošlo od pretpostavke da ta država nema značajne vojne i ekonomske potencijale, ali i to kako se među tri izvora meke moći (vanjska politika, unutarnje političke vrijednosti i kultura) Bosna i Hercegovina za sada može uspješno koristiti samo kulturom. Stoga se, u usporedbi s dosegnutom razinom uspješnosti primjene kulture u vanjskim odnosima EU-a, došlo do zaključka da je kreiranje i primjena jedinstvene kulturno-diplomatske strategije Bosne i Hercegovine poželjan način pozitivnoga pozicioniranja te države na političkoj i društvenoj karti Europe. ; This paper deals with realistic opportunities available to Bosnia and Herzegovina in achieving the strategic goal set by Bosnian-Herzegovinian society, which is membership in the European Union. Since every country in its external relations can count on three types of power (military, economic, and soft power), we have assumed that the country in question has no significant military and economic potentials, but, also—among the three soft power sources (foreign policy, internal political values and culture)—Bosnia and Herzegovina can successfully use only culture for the time being. Therefore, the intention of this paper is to show that the creation and implementation of a unified cultural-diplomatic strategy is a desirable way of positive positioning of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the political and social map of Europe.

U prilogu je donesen prijepis 12 tjednih političkih izvještaja koje je Konzulat Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (NDH) tijekom 1942. godine slao Ministarstvu vanjskih poslova NDH u Zagrebu, odnosno ministru vanjskih poslova dr. Mladenu Lorkoviću. Usto je donesen prijepis dijela jednog tjednog izvještaja Odsjeka za Italiju Političko-pravnog odjela Ministarstva vanjskih poslova NDH iz rujna 1941. koji se odnosi na otvaranje Konzulata NDH u Ljubljani. Spomenuti izvori, iako fragmentarni, daju niz podataka o ratnim događajima u Ljubljanskoj pokrajini, koju je Kraljevina Italija uspostavila kada je, nakon sloma Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1941., anektirala dio slovenskog teritorija ; The paper contains the transcription of 12 weekly political reports of the Consulate of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH) in Ljubljana from 1942 sent to the NDH's Ministry of foreign affairs in Zagreb, more precisely to the minister of foreign affairs Mladen Lorković. The paper also contains the transcript of a weekly report of the Detachment for Italy of the Political-legal department of the NDH's Ministry of foreign affairs from September 1941 dealing with the establishment of NDH's Consulate in Ljubljana. Transcripts of these documents, although fragmentary, give a whole variety of information dealing with the events in the Ljubljana province. Kingdom of Italy established the Ljubljana province on the Slovenian territory annexed by Italy after the Axis attack on Kingdom of Italy in April 1941.

Protokol kao disciplina predstavlja skup propisanih i unaprijed utvrđenih pravila lijepog ponašanja, komunikacije i međusobnog ophođenja prilikom političkih, gospodarskih i društvenih aktivnosti države i njezinih predstavnika te drugih pravnih subjekata poput međunarodnih organizacija. Prije svega protokol predstavlja smjernice civiliziranog ponašanja u međusobnom ophođenju i komunikaciji. Protokol i poštivanje protokolarnih pravila ima dugačku i tradicijski bogatu povijest, pravilima lijepog i uljudnog ponašanja pridodavala se posebna pažnja i pozornost još od vremena organiziranja bogatih ceremonijalnih prigoda na dvorovima velikih vladara i visokih državnika. Važnost poštivanja protokolarnih pravila proizlazi iz činjenice da se poštivanjem pravila ponašanja i postupanja unaprijed utvrđenih propisima kojima se definira protokol, prije svega iskazuju poštovanje i čast prema drugim državama i njihovim predstavnicima, te ostalim međunarodnim subjektima. Protokolarna procedura i njeno strogo poštivanje jedan su od bitnijih preduvjeta za provođenje uspješne državne diplomacije. Diplomacija je disciplina putem koje se promiču interesi i moć države, o uspješnosti i vještini diplomatskog znanja ovisi rješavanje bitnih vanjskopolitičkih i međunarodnih pitanja između država. Uspješnosti diplomacije u međunarodnom okruženju između ostalog pridonosi i dobro organiziran diplomatski protokol. Diplomacija i protokol moraju biti dobro iskoordinirani i povezani kako bi u očima susjednih zemalja, Europe i svijeta stvorili pozitivnu sliku Republike Hrvatske, te na što bolji način promovirali njezine vrijednosti i prednosti. Uspješna diplomacija najbolji je promotor svoje zemlje, najbolje gradi pozitivan imidž zemlje i na taj način stvara uspješan i prepoznatljiv brand Republike Hrvatske u međunarodnom okruženju. ; Protocol as a discipline is a set of prescribed and pre-established rules of good manners, communication and mutual dealings during political, economic and social activities of the state and its representatives, and ...

In this paper we are presenting the results of a scientific research on the changes in the characteristics of terrorism in the information age, relating to the influences of network technologies, results of the information revolution, the paradigm of terrorism. Perceiving the terrorism in a wider context as a conflict, Arquilla, Ronfeldt & Zanini have found two particularly interesting aspects of the influence of the information revolution on its characteristics: one, information revolution is favoring & strengthening network forms of organization, & is at the same time enabling the realization of their comparative advantages over hierarchical forms & two, the conduct & outcome of conflicts will increasingly depend on information & communication technologies. Exploring the influence on organizational forms, they have formulated a hypothesis on evolution of the hierarchical forms into network forms of organization; chain network, star network & all-channel network, substantiating the evolution of terrorism towards netwar. Netwar refers to an emerging mode of conflict at societal level, in which the protagonists use network forms of organization & related doctrines, strategies & technologies of the information age. The choice of the opus operandi of the netwar by the terrorist organization depends on the doctrinal paradigms that formulate their goals & strategies, which can be defined as the coercive diplomacy paradigm, the war paradigm & the new-world paradigm. The particular problem is that all three paradigms offer room for cybotage with the goal of disruption & destruction of information infrastructure. Based on the above stated premises we have researched "new" terrorism characteristics at organizational, doctrinal, strategic & technological levels. The study has confirmed the evolution of terrorism towards netwar & the emerging of "new terrorism," hence the counter terrorism activities will needed to be adapted at the organizational, strategic & technological levels respectively. Given methodology also represents a research model for the terrorism phenomenon which could be applied at a multidisciplinary approach to the antiterrorist activities. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

Na temelju građe nekoliko fondova Arhiva Jugoslavije i dostupne dokumentacije međunarodnih institucija zaduženih za kontrolu opijumske proizvodnje i prometa, ovaj rad rekonstruira malo poznate aspekte američko-jugoslavenskih odnosa tijekom 1930-ih koji prelaze domenu privredne suradnje. U tekstu je rekonstruirano nekoliko faza izvoza kvalitetnoga jugoslavenskoga (makedonskoga) sirovog opijuma američkim farmaceutskim kompanijama: od 1929. do 1934., kada su gotovo čitavu godišnju proizvodnju otkupljivale američke tvornice, preko perioda poslovanja tursko-jugoslavenskoga Centralnog biroa obilježenog međusobnim opstrukcijama i rivalstvom na američkom tržištu, pa do faze kada je stupanj ilegalne prerade i krijumčarenja droge u Jugoslaviji ugrozio odnose sa Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama uoči izbijanja Drugoga svjetskog rata. ; Due to its large morphine content, Yugoslav medical opium was an exception-ally sought-after pharmaceutical raw material, and therefore exported to leading processing plants in Germany, Switzerland, and France till 1928, when American plants began buying up almost the entire production. After 1932, yearly production of raw opium in Yugoslavia stabilised at 35-48 tons, with 99% of the production being absorbed by the American pharmaceutical companies Merck & Co. and Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, at prices significantly greater than those in Europe. However, the enthusiasm about exporting the entire yearly opium production to the USA was put into question in early 1934, when the Turkish-Yugoslav Central Bureau for raw opium export began operating in Istanbul. It comprised representatives of the Turkish Opium Export Institute and the Yugoslav Opium Export Institute (Jugoslovenski zavod za izvoz opijuma – JUZOP). The Yugoslav participation quota of 23-26% hindered the previous level of export to America, which generated resistance towards further cooperation with Turkey in Belgrade. Thus, disputes about placing opium on the American market led to a short-lived blockade of Yugoslav opium import, while the appearance of cheap Iranian opium in Europe further emboldened the Turkish side in the Central Bureau to compensate its loss of the European market by obstructing its Yugoslav partners in dealing with American plants. Apart from this, the debts of the American Eli Lilly plant towards the JUZOP on the day of the Central Bureau's liquidation in late June 1941 further contributed towards the impression that Yugoslavia was actually suffering a loss by exporting opium in collaboration with Turkey. According to official Ministry of Agriculture data, a total of 688 tons of raw opium worth 386 million dinars were exported from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the 1927–1939 period. On a yearly level, this amounted to an average of 42 tons of opium worth 29 million dinars, which equalled, for example, the average yearly budget revenue of the entire Vardar Banate (province). Since yearly opium smuggling in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia stood at around 8-10 tons of opium, one can conclude that almost a quarter of the legal production actually ended up in illegal trafficking. If the smuggling of processed opium derivates (morphine, heroin, codeine) to the USA is added to these figures, and if one keeps in mind the links of the Belgrade and Skopje smuggling organisations with leading European networks for drug trafficking across the Atlantic (Eliopoulos, Bacula, Raskin), then the increased interest of the League of Nations and American diplomacy for the situation in Yugoslavia from late 1937 becomes more understandable. The direct pressure of the American embassy in Paris, which operated a "service" for tracking narcotics smuggling, influenced the Yugoslav authorities to enact harsher laws and at least temporarily reign in the increasingly aggressive criminalisation of a formerly perspective branch of agriculture.

Na temelju građe nekoliko fondova Arhiva Jugoslavije i dostupne dokumentacije međunarodnih institucija zaduženih za kontrolu opijumske proizvodnje i prometa, ovaj rad rekonstruira malo poznate aspekte američko-jugoslavenskih odnosa tijekom 1930-ih koji prelaze domenu privredne suradnje. U tekstu je rekonstruirano nekoliko faza izvoza kvalitetnoga jugoslavenskoga (makedonskoga) sirovog opijuma američkim farmaceutskim kompanijama: od 1929. do 1934., kada su gotovo čitavu godišnju proizvodnju otkupljivale američke tvornice, preko perioda poslovanja tursko-jugoslavenskoga Centralnog biroa obilježenog međusobnim opstrukcijama i rivalstvom na američkom tržištu, pa do faze kada je stupanj ilegalne prerade i krijumčarenja droge u Jugoslaviji ugrozio odnose sa Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama uoči izbijanja Drugoga svjetskog rata. ; Due to its large morphine content, Yugoslav medical opium was an exception-ally sought-after pharmaceutical raw material, and therefore exported to leading processing plants in Germany, Switzerland, and France till 1928, when American plants began buying up almost the entire production. After 1932, yearly production of raw opium in Yugoslavia stabilised at 35-48 tons, with 99% of the production being absorbed by the American pharmaceutical companies Merck & Co. and Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, at prices significantly greater than those in Europe. However, the enthusiasm about exporting the entire yearly opium production to the USA was put into question in early 1934, when the Turkish-Yugoslav Central Bureau for raw opium export began operating in Istanbul. It comprised representatives of the Turkish Opium Export Institute and the Yugoslav Opium Export Institute (Jugoslovenski zavod za izvoz opijuma – JUZOP). The Yugoslav participation quota of 23-26% hindered the previous level of export to America, which generated resistance towards further cooperation with Turkey in Belgrade. Thus, disputes about placing opium on the American market led to a short-lived blockade of Yugoslav opium import, while the appearance of cheap Iranian opium in Europe further emboldened the Turkish side in the Central Bureau to compensate its loss of the European market by obstructing its Yugoslav partners in dealing with American plants. Apart from this, the debts of the American Eli Lilly plant towards the JUZOP on the day of the Central Bureau's liquidation in late June 1941 further contributed towards the impression that Yugoslavia was actually suffering a loss by exporting opium in collaboration with Turkey. According to official Ministry of Agriculture data, a total of 688 tons of raw opium worth 386 million dinars were exported from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the 1927–1939 period. On a yearly level, this amounted to an average of 42 tons of opium worth 29 million dinars, which equalled, for example, the average yearly budget revenue of the entire Vardar Banate (province). Since yearly opium smuggling in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia stood at around 8-10 tons of opium, one can conclude that almost a quarter of the legal production actually ended up in illegal trafficking. If the smuggling of processed opium derivates (morphine, heroin, codeine) to the USA is added to these figures, and if one keeps in mind the links of the Belgrade and Skopje smuggling organisations with leading European networks for drug trafficking across the Atlantic (Eliopoulos, Bacula, Raskin), then the increased interest of the League of Nations and American diplomacy for the situation in Yugoslavia from late 1937 becomes more understandable. The direct pressure of the American embassy in Paris, which operated a "service" for tracking narcotics smuggling, influenced the Yugoslav authorities to enact harsher laws and at least temporarily reign in the increasingly aggressive criminalisation of a formerly perspective branch of agriculture.