Suchergebnisse

A politological analysis is presented in this book of the more than seventy year long period of US — Panama relations. Particular interest is devoted to the diplomatic and international law aspects, since in the author's opinion they are of paramount, fundamental significance. The main stream of these considerations is preceded (section 1) by a description of the circumstances governing the founding od Panama as an independent state. The author sees this as the resultant of a number of causes, both internal and also external, and hence not merely as a product of US policies. In section 2 is presented the initial state of bilateral relations, in particular the circumstances accompanying the signing of the Hay — Bunau-Varilla agreement, analysis of its clauses and also the legal and practical consequences of this agreement as the plane of the links between' Panama and the United States. Panama — US relations in the years from 1904—1964 are shown (section 3), analysing selected problems in a dynamic conception. Dealt with here are such problems as: guaranteeing independence and the policy of intervention, titular and eminents sovereignty military and economic questions and also matters concerning the conflict of 1964. It is the author's view that the situations analysed determine the principal lines of division and differences in the interests of the two sides, and also make it possible to discern — in a negative sense — future and desired foundations of these bilateral relations. Also comprehended in the field of interest is the question of the interpretation of the 1903 convention^ the evolution of Panama's attitude towards its principal terms and also certain legal modifications. The last two sections deal with the story of the negotiations lastingover many years and also the analysis of the currently binding agreements on the Panama Canal. Attention is drawn to the internal and international determinants governing the attitudes of the two sides. The author evaluates the new foundation of US — Panama relations in finding answers to the question: to what degree have the three groups of already historical controversies between the two sides been eliminated. These involve: 1) the legal and factual position of the Canal Zone; 2) the legal situation of the canal; 3) the rights held by USA extending over the whole Panamese relations results from the overcoming of a certain barrier, impossilbe to surmount in the earlier period, which determined the limiting (referring both to intentions and also to pacts negotiated) to modification of the Hay — Bunau-Varilla agreements without making any changes in its basic terms. In this sense the actual treaties are an incomparable qualitative state (chiefly due to annulling the clause on the permanence and titular sovereignty of Panama over the Canal Zone) that is achieveable due to the determination of the Torrijos government and also of the Carter administration. The present situation is of a clearly temporary character (up to 2000 AD). Although many anachronistic regulations have been annulled and in many cases conditions for cooperation have been created, intractable problems for the future are discernible. These result from the different interpretations by the two sides of the function of the Panama Canal. Panama aims to extract maximum direct and indirect advantages from the canal. As a small country its policy is to achieve demilitarisation and neutrality understood as the elimination of foreign bases and the obtaining of international guarantees safeguarding against external intervention. For the USA the economic question, although important (the advantages are rather indirect), does not play such a dominant role. Moreover, the canal itself has a strategic significance, the more so in view Of the lack of stability in Central America. From the aspect of Panamese rights further doubts are raised by the plans for building a canal at sea level. Among the varied problems to be confronted in the coming decade, these major items are most likely to govern US — Panama relations: the economic viability, of exploiting the canal, the method of implementing its strategic function and matters relating to the plans for building a new canal.

Immediately after the dicision of the Ambasador's Council of July 28, 1920,concerning the division of the Cieszyn Silesia, it became clear thet the said delimitation did not win the acceptance of any serious political forces in Poland. The Polish state's difficult international situation, however, made the Polish authorities abandon the idea of resolving the Zaolzie question by force. Fruitless negotiations were, at the same time, conducted to obtain the cossion of at least a part of the disputed territory in Poland's favour and various diplomatic interventions were undertaken to improve the situation of the Polish population inhabiting the Zaolzie Silesia. In spite of the low efficiency of such initiatives, in 1925 the political relation between Poland and Czechoslovakia were normalised and a liquidation agreement was signed, which led to a normalisation of mutual relations in the divided area. The actions of the Polish Republic in relation to the Zaolzie were influenced by various factors that were difficult to harmonise. One of them was the necessity to subjugate the Zaolzie question to the atate's general interests, which included an acceptance of the Versailles status quo, and attempts to find a platform of co-operation with Czechoslovakia in view of the growing German threat. Another factor was the desire to maintain the Polish national character of the Zaolzie motivated by the reluctance to give up that territory in an unequivocal way. The expectation of a cooperation with Czechoslovakia in the international context led to the policy of letting bygones be bygones. The democratic nature of the Chechoslovak state afforded a possibility of making the defence of the Polish national rights the responsibility of the Polish deputies in the parliament in Prague. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried then to persuade the leaders of the Polish community in the Zaolzie to assume a more activistic attitude. At the same time, the Polish Consul in Moravska Ostrava supported financially the institutions of the Polish national life nad tried to resist the assimilating policy of the Czech authorities. This tactics brought, up to a point, some results, but it did not prevent all attempts at an assimilation on the part of influential Czech organisations and bussiness circles, neither did it safeguard the conditions of the national life in the Zaolzie so as to obviate the need for the steady flow of the Polish financial aid without which the Polish educational and cultural institutions would not survive. In the late 1920s and early 1930s a rapprochement between Warsaw and Prague seemed to substantiate the hopes for a betterment of the situation of the Poles in the Zaolzie. In the wake of such hopes there appeared Polish-Czechoslovak societies and Czechoslovak-Polish clubs. These clubs reised high expectations in the consular centre in Moravska Ostrava, which hoped that they would help to break down the barriers between the Polish and Czech population and to obtain the support of influential Czech circles for the postulates of the Polish minority. The most committed members of the clubs (just like all, with no exceptions, Polish cosuits in Moravska Ostrava) were treated, however, with great suspicion and aversion by the Czech nationalist circles, as well as by the personalities representing the views of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The most far-reaching initiative, that is the idea of calling a reconciliation conference concerning the matters of the Cieszyn Silesia in 1932, ended in a fiasco. Such factors as the way the 1930 sensus was carried out, the obvious deterioration of the living standards at the time of the Great Depression, and the attitude of the persons responsible for the Czech foreign policy who insisted on all Polish citizens leaving Czechoslovakia before "equitable" negotiations with Poland could begin, signalled the end of the period in which a positive and active conduct of the Polish population could seem an efficient antidote to the growing pressure for assimilation. The political events of 1933 changed the perception of the chances for a cooperation between Poland and Czechoslovakia, both of them being situated between Germany and the Soviet Union, which, in early 1934, made the representatives of the Polish Republic change their policy in the Zaolzie. From then, on the support of the Polish authorities and society for the Polish minority was emphasised, also a pressure was being exerted on the Czechoslovak government by means of an organised press campaign in Poland. The Czechoslovak government, however, did not yield under pressure, and assumed an intransigent attitude, taking this opportunity to get rid of a certain number of the Poles in the Zaolzie. The assimilation of the local Poles both of a natural kind and enforced by political and economic pressure seemed to the Czech authorities to be the best way to pacify this important borderline region. The tactics to which the Polish side resorted did not then lead to an improvement of the situation of the ethnic Poles in Czechoslovakia, it had, however, a different result, namely it aroused the national feelings and kindled the hopes for the Polish state's stronger support for the minority aspirations. In Poland, on the other hand, the internal situation in Poland's southern neighbour state, beginning with the elections of 1935, started to be looked at from the perspective of the apparently imminent crisis. In view of this, while the idea of an intensive propaganda camping was abandoned, the Czech policy in relation to the ethnic minorities was carefully watched, and the internal integration of the Polish community in the Zaolzie was strongly supported.