Suchergebnisse

This article, based on the archives stored in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Russia and some recently published documents, investigates the coup attempted by the Soviets on December 1, 1924 in Tallinn and evaluates its consequences within the broad context of international relations. During the research, it was established that an attempt to stage a coup in Estonia had been undertaken both by the Estonian communists and the USSR leadership, which had the highest political body – the Politburo – and the Comintern, a self-crafted tool set up for spreading the communist movement around the world, at its disposal. Thus, the revolution was masterminded by the Soviet authorities, whereas the Estonian communists were mainly responsible for its implementation. The task of the coup leadership was to seize power and hold on to it for some time, long enough to request that the USSR "renders support." Preparations were underway for such support. This is evidenced by military preparations in the northern regions of the USSR and the territory near the Estonian border as well as by the deployment of Soviet ships in the vicinity of Tallinn and the activities of the Soviet embassy located in the capital. The attempted coup turned into a putsch due to the maximum conspiracy of their organizers. The conspiracy was brought about by the then-public awareness that the revolutionary events in Germany in 1923 had been instigated by the Soviets. The attempted coup in Estonia failed due to the extraordinary defensive operations put up by the Estonian authorities and power structures as well as due to the failure to involve the workers and the other strata of society in the coup. Latvia, Estonia's only ally, was the first country to stand by Estonia's side after the country withstood the attempted coup. The lessons were learnt not only by these two countries but by Lithuania as well. They began taking adequate measures to stifle communist activities. Neither France nor England or any other Western state made plans to deploy their fleets to the Baltic Sea to support the Estonians or at least show, in a demonstrative way, their support in such a trying time. They also failed to hold any diplomatic démarches against the Soviets opposing the export of revolution practiced by the Soviets. Due to diplomatic pressure imposed by the USSR, Estonia could not publicly and officially name the actual organizers of the putsch. As a result, only the local communists were indiscriminately accused. Such forced tactics, if only indirectly, had at least partially been influencing the area of historical research as well. However, the sudden and unequivocal liquidation of the putsch in Tallinn could have prompted the USSR to no longer expand its revolutionary export to the West, and the "abstinence" of such kind had lasted until the Second World War. The war itself and the previous collusion with Adolf Hitler made it possible for Stalin to cherish even greater ambitions to renew the spread of communism in other countries.

This article, based on the archives stored in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Russia and some recently published documents, investigates the coup attempted by the Soviets on December 1, 1924 in Tallinn and evaluates its consequences within the broad context of international relations. During the research, it was established that an attempt to stage a coup in Estonia had been undertaken both by the Estonian communists and the USSR leadership, which had the highest political body – the Politburo – and the Comintern, a self-crafted tool set up for spreading the communist movement around the world, at its disposal. Thus, the revolution was masterminded by the Soviet authorities, whereas the Estonian communists were mainly responsible for its implementation. The task of the coup leadership was to seize power and hold on to it for some time, long enough to request that the USSR "renders support." Preparations were underway for such support. This is evidenced by military preparations in the northern regions of the USSR and the territory near the Estonian border as well as by the deployment of Soviet ships in the vicinity of Tallinn and the activities of the Soviet embassy located in the capital. The attempted coup turned into a putsch due to the maximum conspiracy of their organizers. The conspiracy was brought about by the then-public awareness that the revolutionary events in Germany in 1923 had been instigated by the Soviets. The attempted coup in Estonia failed due to the extraordinary defensive operations put up by the Estonian authorities and power structures as well as due to the failure to involve the workers and the other strata of society in the coup. Latvia, Estonia's only ally, was the first country to stand by Estonia's side after the country withstood the attempted coup. The lessons were learnt not only by these two countries but by Lithuania as well. They began taking adequate measures to stifle communist activities. Neither France nor England or any other Western state made plans to deploy their fleets to the Baltic Sea to support the Estonians or at least show, in a demonstrative way, their support in such a trying time. They also failed to hold any diplomatic démarches against the Soviets opposing the export of revolution practiced by the Soviets. Due to diplomatic pressure imposed by the USSR, Estonia could not publicly and officially name the actual organizers of the putsch. As a result, only the local communists were indiscriminately accused. Such forced tactics, if only indirectly, had at least partially been influencing the area of historical research as well. However, the sudden and unequivocal liquidation of the putsch in Tallinn could have prompted the USSR to no longer expand its revolutionary export to the West, and the "abstinence" of such kind had lasted until the Second World War. The war itself and the previous collusion with Adolf Hitler made it possible for Stalin to cherish even greater ambitions to renew the spread of communism in other countries.

This article, based on the archives stored in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Russia and some recently published documents, investigates the coup attempted by the Soviets on December 1, 1924 in Tallinn and evaluates its consequences within the broad context of international relations. During the research, it was established that an attempt to stage a coup in Estonia had been undertaken both by the Estonian communists and the USSR leadership, which had the highest political body – the Politburo – and the Comintern, a self-crafted tool set up for spreading the communist movement around the world, at its disposal. Thus, the revolution was masterminded by the Soviet authorities, whereas the Estonian communists were mainly responsible for its implementation. The task of the coup leadership was to seize power and hold on to it for some time, long enough to request that the USSR "renders support." Preparations were underway for such support. This is evidenced by military preparations in the northern regions of the USSR and the territory near the Estonian border as well as by the deployment of Soviet ships in the vicinity of Tallinn and the activities of the Soviet embassy located in the capital. The attempted coup turned into a putsch due to the maximum conspiracy of their organizers. The conspiracy was brought about by the then-public awareness that the revolutionary events in Germany in 1923 had been instigated by the Soviets. The attempted coup in Estonia failed due to the extraordinary defensive operations put up by the Estonian authorities and power structures as well as due to the failure to involve the workers and the other strata of society in the coup. Latvia, Estonia's only ally, was the first country to stand by Estonia's side after the country withstood the attempted coup. The lessons were learnt not only by these two countries but by Lithuania as well. They began taking adequate measures to stifle communist activities. Neither France nor England or any other Western state made plans to deploy their fleets to the Baltic Sea to support the Estonians or at least show, in a demonstrative way, their support in such a trying time. They also failed to hold any diplomatic démarches against the Soviets opposing the export of revolution practiced by the Soviets. Due to diplomatic pressure imposed by the USSR, Estonia could not publicly and officially name the actual organizers of the putsch. As a result, only the local communists were indiscriminately accused. Such forced tactics, if only indirectly, had at least partially been influencing the area of historical research as well. However, the sudden and unequivocal liquidation of the putsch in Tallinn could have prompted the USSR to no longer expand its revolutionary export to the West, and the "abstinence" of such kind had lasted until the Second World War. The war itself and the previous collusion with Adolf Hitler made it possible for Stalin to cherish even greater ambitions to renew the spread of communism in other countries.

The main objective of this work - to assess the possibility of synthesized conflict transformation model to address the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. My problem is the work reads as follows: if the conflict management strategy still did not produce tangible results (and it is unlikely that it could give) for solving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should be thinking about other complex peacebuilding analysis and practice. To achieve the main objective of this work I had to address these tasks: 1.Make access to conflict transformation approach; 2.On the base of conflict transformation theory create synthesized research model of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; 3.To reveal what the internal causes leads to disagreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict issues; 4.To evaluate the role of external actors (Russia, Turkey, the EU, the U.S. and Iran), which indirectly involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; 5.Identify internal and external factors for the ratio of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict transformation perspective; There are the some conclusions of my research: Analysis of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict through the prism of the five types of transformations shows that in the sense of the four types (structures, actors, problems, the elite level) the transformation took place at negative direction. Only the context transformation can be seen a positive transformation process, which may in the future affect positive transformation of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan is an important route for supplying oil and gas in the West, bypassing Russia. This increases the importance of Azerbaijan to the West, which may eventually be forced to increasingly focus on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Nagorno-Karabakh conflict analysis showed that the activity of interior actors of second and third level have no impact on conflict transformation. Over the past 15 years in Armenia and Azerbaijan no ground for the first, the second and the third level actors' interaction was created. It should be noted that Russia, Turkey and Iran do not use second and third track diplomacy in South Caucasus. EU, U.S. and Turkey, under certain conditions, can adress the second and third levels of transformation initiatives in niche Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In order to obtain greater effectiveness of such initiatives should be established a structure to coordinate the second-and third-level diplomatic efforts in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia remains a major obstacle to the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. South Caucasus, Moscow considers its "near abroad" in its sphere of influence, so it reacts cautiously to U.S. and EU promotes of democracy and human rights initiatives. In this case, Russia sees post-modern Western peace-building strategies as nothing more than a Western desire to assert its influence in the region. Unlikely that Russia would be interested in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement. The Western strategy for implementing the transformation of the conflict must pay attention to the importance of the Russian factor and focus on long-term work – the transformation of the structure and problems in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Internal and external context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict analysis presupposes the view that the compromise between the Armenian and Azerbaijani authorities in the near future is impossible. One of the most realistic option is the establishment of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey. If Ankara will agree to establish diplomatic relations with Yerevan and open the border, the situation in the region may be in a positive change. Most importantly, it would reduce Russia's role both in Armenia and the South Caucasus. This should be most interested in Turkey. In my view, the first track diplomacy of the Western diplomats' efforts should be aimed at precisely that direction.

The main objective of this work - to assess the possibility of synthesized conflict transformation model to address the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. My problem is the work reads as follows: if the conflict management strategy still did not produce tangible results (and it is unlikely that it could give) for solving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should be thinking about other complex peacebuilding analysis and practice. To achieve the main objective of this work I had to address these tasks: 1.Make access to conflict transformation approach; 2.On the base of conflict transformation theory create synthesized research model of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; 3.To reveal what the internal causes leads to disagreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict issues; 4.To evaluate the role of external actors (Russia, Turkey, the EU, the U.S. and Iran), which indirectly involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; 5.Identify internal and external factors for the ratio of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict transformation perspective; There are the some conclusions of my research: Analysis of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict through the prism of the five types of transformations shows that in the sense of the four types (structures, actors, problems, the elite level) the transformation took place at negative direction. Only the context transformation can be seen a positive transformation process, which may in the future affect positive transformation of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan is an important route for supplying oil and gas in the West, bypassing Russia. This increases the importance of Azerbaijan to the West, which may eventually be forced to increasingly focus on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Nagorno-Karabakh conflict analysis showed that the activity of interior actors of second and third level have no impact on conflict transformation. Over the past 15 years in Armenia and Azerbaijan no ground for the first, the second and the third level actors' interaction was created. It should be noted that Russia, Turkey and Iran do not use second and third track diplomacy in South Caucasus. EU, U.S. and Turkey, under certain conditions, can adress the second and third levels of transformation initiatives in niche Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In order to obtain greater effectiveness of such initiatives should be established a structure to coordinate the second-and third-level diplomatic efforts in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia remains a major obstacle to the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. South Caucasus, Moscow considers its "near abroad" in its sphere of influence, so it reacts cautiously to U.S. and EU promotes of democracy and human rights initiatives. In this case, Russia sees post-modern Western peace-building strategies as nothing more than a Western desire to assert its influence in the region. Unlikely that Russia would be interested in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement. The Western strategy for implementing the transformation of the conflict must pay attention to the importance of the Russian factor and focus on long-term work – the transformation of the structure and problems in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Internal and external context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict analysis presupposes the view that the compromise between the Armenian and Azerbaijani authorities in the near future is impossible. One of the most realistic option is the establishment of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey. If Ankara will agree to establish diplomatic relations with Yerevan and open the border, the situation in the region may be in a positive change. Most importantly, it would reduce Russia's role both in Armenia and the South Caucasus. This should be most interested in Turkey. In my view, the first track diplomacy of the Western diplomats' efforts should be aimed at precisely that direction.

The main objective of this work - to assess the possibility of synthesized conflict transformation model to address the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. My problem is the work reads as follows: if the conflict management strategy still did not produce tangible results (and it is unlikely that it could give) for solving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should be thinking about other complex peacebuilding analysis and practice. To achieve the main objective of this work I had to address these tasks: 1.Make access to conflict transformation approach; 2.On the base of conflict transformation theory create synthesized research model of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; 3.To reveal what the internal causes leads to disagreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict issues; 4.To evaluate the role of external actors (Russia, Turkey, the EU, the U.S. and Iran), which indirectly involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; 5.Identify internal and external factors for the ratio of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict transformation perspective; There are the some conclusions of my research: Analysis of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict through the prism of the five types of transformations shows that in the sense of the four types (structures, actors, problems, the elite level) the transformation took place at negative direction. Only the context transformation can be seen a positive transformation process, which may in the future affect positive transformation of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan is an important route for supplying oil and gas in the West, bypassing Russia. This increases the importance of Azerbaijan to the West, which may eventually be forced to increasingly focus on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Nagorno-Karabakh conflict analysis showed that the activity of interior actors of second and third level have no impact on conflict transformation. Over the past 15 years in Armenia and Azerbaijan no ground for the first, the second and the third level actors' interaction was created. It should be noted that Russia, Turkey and Iran do not use second and third track diplomacy in South Caucasus. EU, U.S. and Turkey, under certain conditions, can adress the second and third levels of transformation initiatives in niche Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In order to obtain greater effectiveness of such initiatives should be established a structure to coordinate the second-and third-level diplomatic efforts in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia remains a major obstacle to the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. South Caucasus, Moscow considers its "near abroad" in its sphere of influence, so it reacts cautiously to U.S. and EU promotes of democracy and human rights initiatives. In this case, Russia sees post-modern Western peace-building strategies as nothing more than a Western desire to assert its influence in the region. Unlikely that Russia would be interested in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement. The Western strategy for implementing the transformation of the conflict must pay attention to the importance of the Russian factor and focus on long-term work – the transformation of the structure and problems in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Internal and external context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict analysis presupposes the view that the compromise between the Armenian and Azerbaijani authorities in the near future is impossible. One of the most realistic option is the establishment of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey. If Ankara will agree to establish diplomatic relations with Yerevan and open the border, the situation in the region may be in a positive change. Most importantly, it would reduce Russia's role both in Armenia and the South Caucasus. This should be most interested in Turkey. In my view, the first track diplomacy of the Western diplomats' efforts should be aimed at precisely that direction.

The main objective of this work - to assess the possibility of synthesized conflict transformation model to address the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. My problem is the work reads as follows: if the conflict management strategy still did not produce tangible results (and it is unlikely that it could give) for solving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should be thinking about other complex peacebuilding analysis and practice. To achieve the main objective of this work I had to address these tasks: 1.Make access to conflict transformation approach; 2.On the base of conflict transformation theory create synthesized research model of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; 3.To reveal what the internal causes leads to disagreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict issues; 4.To evaluate the role of external actors (Russia, Turkey, the EU, the U.S. and Iran), which indirectly involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; 5.Identify internal and external factors for the ratio of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict transformation perspective; There are the some conclusions of my research: Analysis of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict through the prism of the five types of transformations shows that in the sense of the four types (structures, actors, problems, the elite level) the transformation took place at negative direction. Only the context transformation can be seen a positive transformation process, which may in the future affect positive transformation of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan is an important route for supplying oil and gas in the West, bypassing Russia. This increases the importance of Azerbaijan to the West, which may eventually be forced to increasingly focus on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Nagorno-Karabakh conflict analysis showed that the activity of interior actors of second and third level have no impact on conflict transformation. Over the past 15 years in Armenia and Azerbaijan no ground for the first, the second and the third level actors' interaction was created. It should be noted that Russia, Turkey and Iran do not use second and third track diplomacy in South Caucasus. EU, U.S. and Turkey, under certain conditions, can adress the second and third levels of transformation initiatives in niche Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In order to obtain greater effectiveness of such initiatives should be established a structure to coordinate the second-and third-level diplomatic efforts in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia remains a major obstacle to the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. South Caucasus, Moscow considers its "near abroad" in its sphere of influence, so it reacts cautiously to U.S. and EU promotes of democracy and human rights initiatives. In this case, Russia sees post-modern Western peace-building strategies as nothing more than a Western desire to assert its influence in the region. Unlikely that Russia would be interested in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement. The Western strategy for implementing the transformation of the conflict must pay attention to the importance of the Russian factor and focus on long-term work – the transformation of the structure and problems in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Internal and external context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict analysis presupposes the view that the compromise between the Armenian and Azerbaijani authorities in the near future is impossible. One of the most realistic option is the establishment of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey. If Ankara will agree to establish diplomatic relations with Yerevan and open the border, the situation in the region may be in a positive change. Most importantly, it would reduce Russia's role both in Armenia and the South Caucasus. This should be most interested in Turkey. In my view, the first track diplomacy of the Western diplomats' efforts should be aimed at precisely that direction.

The cooperation among Northern European and the three Baltic states has been an object of considerable attention in the Baltic region. Diplomatic relations between the states in the region were established as early as 1990. Real progress can be traced in the long dialogue among the Baltic and the Nordic countries that took over a decade. Worth of notice is also the fact that, with the help of the Nordic states, have we reached the EU threshold, as well as acquired a strong backup in the formation of common policy goals. The Baltic Assembly (BA) and the Nordic Council (NC), serving as the centre of current analysis, can be regarded as comparable interparliamentary institutions. Such conclusion is drawn regarding that the BA was actually created after the model of NC was proposed by the Nordic states. In pursuit of explanation for the inconsistencies fraud in cooperation between the BA and the NC during a set period of time, it has been divided into two parts: a) The NC assistance in founding and early functioning of the BA from 1990 to 1995 the period of limited relationships embodied in the bilateral cooperation treaty, without any collective decision-making. The BA was established in 1991 and owed its financial and political support to NC. At that time its functions were limited, as it had little experience and with the help the NC was to become a legitimate partner.

The cooperation among Northern European and the three Baltic states has been an object of considerable attention in the Baltic region. Diplomatic relations between the states in the region were established as early as 1990. Real progress can be traced in the long dialogue among the Baltic and the Nordic countries that took over a decade. Worth of notice is also the fact that, with the help of the Nordic states, have we reached the EU threshold, as well as acquired a strong backup in the formation of common policy goals. The Baltic Assembly (BA) and the Nordic Council (NC), serving as the centre of current analysis, can be regarded as comparable interparliamentary institutions. Such conclusion is drawn regarding that the BA was actually created after the model of NC was proposed by the Nordic states. In pursuit of explanation for the inconsistencies fraud in cooperation between the BA and the NC during a set period of time, it has been divided into two parts: a) The NC assistance in founding and early functioning of the BA from 1990 to 1995 the period of limited relationships embodied in the bilateral cooperation treaty, without any collective decision-making. The BA was established in 1991 and owed its financial and political support to NC. At that time its functions were limited, as it had little experience and with the help the NC was to become a legitimate partner.

The cooperation among Northern European and the three Baltic states has been an object of considerable attention in the Baltic region. Diplomatic relations between the states in the region were established as early as 1990. Real progress can be traced in the long dialogue among the Baltic and the Nordic countries that took over a decade. Worth of notice is also the fact that, with the help of the Nordic states, have we reached the EU threshold, as well as acquired a strong backup in the formation of common policy goals. The Baltic Assembly (BA) and the Nordic Council (NC), serving as the centre of current analysis, can be regarded as comparable interparliamentary institutions. Such conclusion is drawn regarding that the BA was actually created after the model of NC was proposed by the Nordic states. In pursuit of explanation for the inconsistencies fraud in cooperation between the BA and the NC during a set period of time, it has been divided into two parts: a) The NC assistance in founding and early functioning of the BA from 1990 to 1995 the period of limited relationships embodied in the bilateral cooperation treaty, without any collective decision-making. The BA was established in 1991 and owed its financial and political support to NC. At that time its functions were limited, as it had little experience and with the help the NC was to become a legitimate partner.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of the commercial diplomacy of Ukraine on its export. Within this field of research we mutually compare various official representations abroad and their effects on export flows. We consider embassies, consulates general and honorary consulates as commercial diplomacy actors abroad. The main contribution of the paper is that it is the first empirical study of Ukrainian commercial diplomacy in terms of export promotion. We use an empirical trade model to verify the impact of economic, cultural, geographical and diplomatic factors on Ukrainian exports. The panel data incorporates 1386 export flows to 198 destinations during the period from 2007 to 2013. In the end, we conclude that embassies are more relevant instruments of export stimulation than consulates general or honorary consulates. Adapted from the source document.

Today, both Lithuania and Latvia are part of the Schengen Area, which means their citizens can freely travel between these states. The situation was different during the interwar years: the border between these Baltic Republics was strictly guarded, and traveling abroad was more complex. However, the order crossing for local residents of the border area was simplified by the local border traffic regime agreed upon by both countries. This paper aims to explore the evolution of Lithuanian-Latvian local border traffic policy in the interwar period and its impact on locals (primarily on Lithuania's side). In the first few years after the establishment of the new states, border crossings for residents of Lithuania's border area were regulated by internal state legislation. Initially, people were devastated by the requirement to cross the border only at sparsely placed border crossing points, the restrictions on trade, and the radical reduction of the border area. After the peaceful settlement of the Lithuanian-Latvian border in 1921, newly signed bilateral treaties began to solve the crucial problems of the locals. However, there were instances of bilateral friction and various incidents; authoritarian state structures also had reservations based on the issue of potentially unfavorable foreign influences. The breakthrough in the diplomatic relations between Lithuania and Latvia in the 1930s saw a new level of liberalization of the local border traffic policy. A positive impact was widely felt among the locals. However, certain economic concerns made this new policy short-lived. In the interwar years, grievances and discontent toward the new border relations were gradually replaced by acceptance and adaptation. Bilateral cooperation made it possible to react to and suit the needs of the people. The overall Lithuanian-Latvian local border traffic regime showed a tendency of liberalization over time, a process which was curtailed by certain political and economic realities and considerations

Today, both Lithuania and Latvia are part of the Schengen Area, which means their citizens can freely travel between these states. The situation was different during the interwar years: the border between these Baltic Republics was strictly guarded, and traveling abroad was more complex. However, the order crossing for local residents of the border area was simplified by the local border traffic regime agreed upon by both countries. This paper aims to explore the evolution of Lithuanian-Latvian local border traffic policy in the interwar period and its impact on locals (primarily on Lithuania's side). In the first few years after the establishment of the new states, border crossings for residents of Lithuania's border area were regulated by internal state legislation. Initially, people were devastated by the requirement to cross the border only at sparsely placed border crossing points, the restrictions on trade, and the radical reduction of the border area. After the peaceful settlement of the Lithuanian-Latvian border in 1921, newly signed bilateral treaties began to solve the crucial problems of the locals. However, there were instances of bilateral friction and various incidents; authoritarian state structures also had reservations based on the issue of potentially unfavorable foreign influences. The breakthrough in the diplomatic relations between Lithuania and Latvia in the 1930s saw a new level of liberalization of the local border traffic policy. A positive impact was widely felt among the locals. However, certain economic concerns made this new policy short-lived. In the interwar years, grievances and discontent toward the new border relations were gradually replaced by acceptance and adaptation. Bilateral cooperation made it possible to react to and suit the needs of the people. The overall Lithuanian-Latvian local border traffic regime showed a tendency of liberalization over time, a process which was curtailed by certain political and economic realities and considerations

Today, both Lithuania and Latvia are part of the Schengen Area, which means their citizens can freely travel between these states. The situation was different during the interwar years: the border between these Baltic Republics was strictly guarded, and traveling abroad was more complex. However, the order crossing for local residents of the border area was simplified by the local border traffic regime agreed upon by both countries. This paper aims to explore the evolution of Lithuanian-Latvian local border traffic policy in the interwar period and its impact on locals (primarily on Lithuania's side). In the first few years after the establishment of the new states, border crossings for residents of Lithuania's border area were regulated by internal state legislation. Initially, people were devastated by the requirement to cross the border only at sparsely placed border crossing points, the restrictions on trade, and the radical reduction of the border area. After the peaceful settlement of the Lithuanian-Latvian border in 1921, newly signed bilateral treaties began to solve the crucial problems of the locals. However, there were instances of bilateral friction and various incidents; authoritarian state structures also had reservations based on the issue of potentially unfavorable foreign influences. The breakthrough in the diplomatic relations between Lithuania and Latvia in the 1930s saw a new level of liberalization of the local border traffic policy. A positive impact was widely felt among the locals. However, certain economic concerns made this new policy short-lived. In the interwar years, grievances and discontent toward the new border relations were gradually replaced by acceptance and adaptation. Bilateral cooperation made it possible to react to and suit the needs of the people. The overall Lithuanian-Latvian local border traffic regime showed a tendency of liberalization over time, a process which was curtailed by certain political and economic realities and considerations

Today, both Lithuania and Latvia are part of the Schengen Area, which means their citizens can freely travel between these states. The situation was different during the interwar years: the border between these Baltic Republics was strictly guarded, and traveling abroad was more complex. However, the order crossing for local residents of the border area was simplified by the local border traffic regime agreed upon by both countries. This paper aims to explore the evolution of Lithuanian-Latvian local border traffic policy in the interwar period and its impact on locals (primarily on Lithuania's side). In the first few years after the establishment of the new states, border crossings for residents of Lithuania's border area were regulated by internal state legislation. Initially, people were devastated by the requirement to cross the border only at sparsely placed border crossing points, the restrictions on trade, and the radical reduction of the border area. After the peaceful settlement of the Lithuanian-Latvian border in 1921, newly signed bilateral treaties began to solve the crucial problems of the locals. However, there were instances of bilateral friction and various incidents; authoritarian state structures also had reservations based on the issue of potentially unfavorable foreign influences. The breakthrough in the diplomatic relations between Lithuania and Latvia in the 1930s saw a new level of liberalization of the local border traffic policy. A positive impact was widely felt among the locals. However, certain economic concerns made this new policy short-lived. In the interwar years, grievances and discontent toward the new border relations were gradually replaced by acceptance and adaptation. Bilateral cooperation made it possible to react to and suit the needs of the people. The overall Lithuanian-Latvian local border traffic regime showed a tendency of liberalization over time, a process which was curtailed by certain political and economic realities and considerations