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Widespread moral disagreement raises ethical, epistemological, political, and metaethical questions. Is the best explanation of our widespread moral disagreements that there are no objective moral facts and that moral relativism is correct? Or should we think that just as there is widespread disagreement about whether we have free will but there is still an objective fact about whether we have it, similarly, moral disagreement has no bearing on whether morality is objective? More practically, is it arrogant to stick to our guns in the face of moral disagreement? Must we suspend belief about the morality of controversial actions such as eating meat and having an abortion? And does moral disagreement affect the laws that we should have? For instance, does disagreement about the justice of heavily redistributive taxation affect whether such taxation is legitimate? In this thorough and clearly written introduction to moral disagreement and its philosophical and practical implications, Richard Rowland examines and assesses the following topics and questions: How does moral disagreement affect what we should do and believe in our day-to-day lives? Epistemic peerhood and moral disagreements with our epistemic peers. Metaethics and moral disagreement. Relativism, moral objectivity, moral realism, and non-cognitivism. Moral disagreement and normative ethics. Liberalism, democracy, and disagreement. Moral compromise. Moral uncertainty. Combining clear philosophical analysis with summaries of the latest research and suggestions for further reading, Moral Disagreement is ideal for students of ethics, metaethics, political philosophy, and philosophical topics that are closely related, such as relativism and scepticism. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such aspublic policy and philosophy of law.

"Widespread disagreement about moral issues is a prominent aspect of contemporary pluralistic societies. Surveys indicate that in the United States opinion is split close to 50/50 on the morality of abortion, the death penalty, same-sex relationships, and physician-assisted suicide. It is also a subject with a long philosophical history, going back to Plato and Aristotle and drives contemporary debates about moral relativism, scepticism and objectivity. Should we be concerned about the extent of moral disagreement? What causes it? What are the onsequence of moral disagreement? In this thorough and clearly written introduction to the philosophy of moral disagreement and its philosophical and political implications Richard Rowland examines and assesses the following topics and questions: Relativism and moral disagreement Moral realism Peer disagreement, moral knowledge and the problem of conciliationism Non-cognitivism and moral disagreement Moral uncertainty Moral disagreement and coercion New directions. Combining clear philosophical analysis with summaries of the latest research and including chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary, Moral Disagreement is ideal for students of ethics, metaethics and political philosophy as well as philosophical topics that are closely related such as relativism, scepticism and objectivity. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as political philosophy, ethics and public policy and philosophy of law"

Folke Tersman explores what we can learn about the nature of moral thinking by examining moral disagreement. He explains how diversity of opinion on moral issues undermines the idea that moral convictions can be objectively valued. Arguments on moral thinking are often criticized for not being able to explain why there is a contrast between ethics and other areas in which there is disagreement, but where one does not give up the idea of an objective truth, as in the natural sciences. Tersman shows that the contrast has to do with facts about when, and on what basis, moral convictions can be correctly attributed to an agent or speaker

Philosophers have been puzzled for quite some time by the fact that intelligent and generally reasonable individuals who are equally well-informed and familiar with the same bodies of evidence still disagree with one another. Legal theorists wonder why this is puzzling for philosophers in the first place as disagreement is the very foundation of their work. This book, placed at the intersection of philosophical epistemology and jurisprudence, deals with the theoretical challenges that disagreements between judges create. The philosophical debate is applied to German and American legal disputes. How can such disagreements be integrated into the general philosophical debate on »peer disagreement« and into the legal theory of judicial decisionmaking? How should one deal with such disagreements under the existing legal framework but also in terms of legal policy?