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In this paper I would like to reflect on discipline as a category (as opposed to other possibilities, such as notion, structure, norm, protocol, etc.), and explain the quotation marks in the title, as they can always follow and amend the word discipline. my intention is to reconstruct a decades-long resistance to discipline (as punishment, control, violent pedagogy, militarism, fanaticism, masculinity, unfreedom), and to uncover the origin of praise for self-discipline, un-discipline or interdisciplinarity. Further, I would like to offer a few arguments in favor of discipline as one of the most important protocols of social ontology, and the unconditioned condition of cooperation, life and group work. Discipline is joint learning, as well as production and a nurturing of knowledge that constitutes and sustains an institution. the question is whether individuals' discipline indeed makes an institution necessarily better or more just. © 2019 CSIC.

Intro -- Title Page -- Chapter 1 -- Chapter 2 -- Chapter 3 -- Chapter 4 -- Chapter 5 -- Chapter 6 -- Chapter 7 -- Chapter 8 -- Chapter 9 -- Chapter 10 -- Chapter 11 -- Chapter 12 -- Chapter 13 -- Chapter 14 -- Chapter 15 -- Chapter 16 -- Chapter 17 -- Chapter 18 -- Chapter 19 -- Chapter 20 -- Chapter 21 -- Chapter 22 -- Acknowledgments -- About the Author.

As banking has evolved over the last three decades, banks have become increasingly interconnected. This Article draws attention to an effect of this development that has important policy ramifications yet remains largely unexamined – a dramatic rise in interbank discipline. The Article demonstrates that today's large, complex banks have financial incentives to monitor risk taking at other banks, They also have the infrastructure, competence, and information required to be fairly effective monitors and mechanisms through which they can respond when a bank changes its risk profile. Interbank discipline thus affects bank risk taking, discouraging banks from taking some types of risk while potentially encouraging the assumption of others. Given its influence, ignoring the phenomenon can lead to inefficiencies and gaps in bank regulation. The rise of interbank discipline has positive and negative ramifications from a social welfare perspective. 'The good news is that self-interested banks may be expected to penalize a bank when it takes excessive risks, thereby deterring such risk taking. he bad news is that the interests of banks and society are not always so well aligned. Other banks, for example, may be expected to reward a bank when it changes its risk profile in a way that increases the probability that the government would bail the bank out rather than allowing it to fail. This is because a bailout protects a bank's counterparties and other creditors, even though socially costly. Interbank discipline ma thus encourage barks to alter their activities in ways that increase systemic fragility. In drawing attention to the powerful yet mixed effects of interbank discipline on bank activity, this Article contributes to a new generation of scholarship on market discipline. Its aim is not to question whether we need regulation, but to address the pressing issue of how we should allocate inherently finite regulatory resources. By reducing the regulatory resources devoted to activities that other banks are performing relatively well, increasing the resources devoted to activities that regulators are uniquely situated or incented to address and seeking to counteract the adverse effects of interbank discipline, bank oversight could be redesigned to more effectively promote the stability of the financial system.

As banking has evolved over the last three decades, banks have become increasingly interconnected. This Article draws attention to an effect of this development that has important policy ramifications yet remains largely unexamined – a dramatic rise in interbank discipline. The Article demonstrates that today's large, complex banks have financial incentives to monitor risk taking at other banks, the infrastructure, competence, and information to be fairly effective monitors, and mechanisms through which they can respond when a bank changes its risk profile. This suggests that interbank discipline affects bank risk taking and merits more consideration than it has received thus far. The rise of interbank discipline has both positive and negative ramifications from a social welfare perspective. The good news is that self-interested banks may be expected to penalize a bank when it takes excessive risks, thereby deterring such risk taking. The bad news is that the interests of banks and society are not always so well aligned. Other banks, for example, may be expected to reward a bank when it changes its risk profile in a way that increases the probability that the government would bail the bank out rather than allowing it to fail. This is because a bailout protects a bank's creditors, even though it is socially costly. Interbank discipline may thus encourage banks to alter their activities in ways that increase systemic fragility. In drawing attention to the powerful yet mixed effects of interbank discipline on bank activity, this Article contributes to a new generation of scholarship on market discipline. Its aim is not to question whether we need regulation, but to address the pressing issue of how we should allocate inherently finite regulatory resources. By reducing the regulatory resources devoted to activities that other banks are performing relatively well, increasing the resources devoted to activities that regulators are uniquely situated or incentivized to address, and seeking to counteract the adverse effects of interbank discipline, bank oversight could be redesigned to more effectively promote the stability of the financial system.

Before the Industrial Revolution in Britain most workers controlled their pace, timing, and conduct at work. Factory discipline radically changed this. Employers now dictated how, when, and in what manner work was done. Why did discipline triumph? Was it required by the need to tightly coordinate workers with new technologies? Or was it successful because it coerced more effort from workers than they would freely give? The empirical evidence shows that discipline succeeded mainly by increasing work effort. Workers effectively hired capitalists to make them work harder. They lacked the self-control to achieve higher earnings on their own.

Intro -- Suburban Discipline -- Contents -- The Occulted Suburb -- Visual Browsing: Auto-flaneurs and Roadside Ads in the 1950s -- Siting Protocols -- Icons of the Sprawl -- The Suburban Canon Over Time -- The Hanging Suburbs -- The Lucky Country: Myth, Image, and the Australian Suburb -- The Aesthetics of Unsightliness -- Ambiguous Sovereignties: Notes on the Suburbs in Italian Cinema -- Eyes That Do Not See -- The Territory Versus the City: Origins of an Anti-Urban Condition -- New Towns -- Stalker.