Denne artikel foretager en diskursanalyse af en række centrale tekster fra partierne Nye Borgerlige og Dansk Folkeparti med fokus på disses brug af den populistiske figur hjertelandet: Et narrativ om det altid allerede tabte eller truede harmoniske fællesskab, der skal forsvares imod folkets fjender. Det konkluder-es, at idéen om hjertelandet er stærkt til stede i partiernes respektive diskurser, og at det i Nye Borgerliges diskurs i lige høj grad trues af de fremmede og eliten, mens det i Dansk Folkepartis diskurs mest trues af de fremmede, og antagonismen til eliten er nedtonet. ; This paper analyzes a series of central texts from the Danish parties The New Right and the Danish People's Party with emphasis on their use of the populist figure of the heartland: A narrative about the always already lost or threatened harmonic community that needs to be protected against enemies of the people. The paper concludes that the idea of the heartland is strongly present in the discourses of both parties, and that in The New Right's discourse the heartland is equally threated by foreigners and the elite, while in the discourse of the Danish People's Party it is mostly threatened by immigrants whereas the antagonism to the elite is downplayed.
Denne artikkelen undersøker diskursens rolle i konsolidering av autoritære regimer. Gjennom å etablere en dialog mellom Jacques Rancières arbeider om politikk og avpolitisering og poststrukturalistisk diskursanalyse argumenterer artikkelen for at diskursiv avpolitisering bidrar til at autokratier befester seg, og viser at autoritær konsolidering ofte finner sted i skjæringsfeltet mellom nasjonal og internasjonal politikk. Artikkelen retter et særskilt søkelys på Rancières begrep om kløfter som politikkens scene, og teoretiserer hvordan slike kløfter nøytraliseres i avpolitisering. Artikkelen fremsetter så en metode for å analysere diskursiv avpolitisering empirisk ved å konseptualisere Rancières logikker som idealtypiske avpolitiseringsdiskurser, og illustrerer denne analytiske strategien ved å anvende den på russisk offisiell diskurs i senere år (2015–2020). Slik forklarer artikkelen hvordan diskursive konstruksjoner har befestet Russland som autokrati: Den viser at autoritær konsolidering i Russland under Putin muliggjøres av rotfestede avpolitiserende diskurser som (re)produseres og forsterkes i et sammenvevet innenriks- og utenrikspolitisk felt. Artikkelen fremmer begrepet diskursiv avpolitisering som et nytt perspektiv på fagdebatter om den liberale verdensordens utfordringer og såkalte hybridregimer.
Abstract in English:Depoliticizing Democracy Through Discourse: Understanding Authoritarian Consolidation in Russia through Jacques Rancière's Political TheoryThis article investigates the role of discourses in processes of authoritarian consolidation. By bringing Jacques Rancière's works on politics and depoliticization into dialogue with poststructuralist discourse analysis, the article argues that discursive depoliticization contributes towards authoritarian consolidation, and displays how authoritarianism deepens in a co-dependent nexus of domestic and international politics. Focusing in particular on Rancière's concept of gaps as the stage for politics, the article theorizes how gaps are neutralized in depoliticization. The article offers a method for unpacking discursive depoliticization empirically by conceptualizing Rancière's logics as ideal-typical depoliticizing discourses, and illustrates this analytical strategy through analysis of Russian official discourse in recent years (2015–2020). The article thereby explains how discursive constructions have strengthened Russian autocracy: Entrenched depoliticizing discourses, produced and reinforced in a co-constitutive internal/external sphere, makes possible authoritarian consolidation in Russia under Putin. The article puts forward the concept of discursive depoliticization as a novel perspective on challenges to the liberal international order, and on "hybrid" regimes.
Forskningen bør ikke ukritisk overtage begreber, som politikerne på et givet tidspunkt finder nyttige – som f.eks. 'aktivisme' i dansk diskurs.
Abstract in English'Activism': Drop That Term!Research should not uncritically take over concepts that politicians may find useful at a given time – like for instance 'activism' in Danish discourse.
Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "capturing", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization-focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they collaborate in peace and friendliness. So far, the IR liberalism discourse has set the trend of the Russian policy carried out in relation to the Arctic. Thus, it has primarily been the Russian Foreign Ministry and, above all, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that have drawn the overall lines of the Arctic policy, well aided by the Transport Ministry and the Energy Ministry. On the other side are the Russian national Security Council led by Nikolai Patrushev and the Russian Defence Ministry headed by Sergey Shoygu, which both have embedded their visions of Russia and the Arctic in the IR realism/geopolitical discourse. Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, does the same. Nevertheless, he has primarily chosen to let the Foreign Ministry set the line for the Arctic policy carried out, presumably out of a pragmatic acknowledgement of the means that have, so far, served the Russian interests best. Moreover, it is worth noting that both wings, even though they can disagree about the means, in fact are more or less in agreement about the goal of Russia's Arctic policy: namely, to utilize the expected wealth of oil and natural gas resources in the underground to ensure the continuation of the restoration of Russia's position as a Great Power when the capacity of the energy fields in Siberia slowly diminishes – which the Russian Energy Ministry expects to happen sometime between 2015 and 2030. In addition to that, Russia sees – as the polar ice slowly melts – great potential for opening an ice-free northern sea route between Europe and Asia across the Russian Arctic, with the hope that the international shipping industry can see the common sense of saving up to nearly 4,000 nautical miles on a voyage from Ulsan, Korea, to Rotterdam, Holland, so Russia can earn money by servicing the ships and issuing permissions for passage through what Russia regards as Russian territorial water. The question is whether Russia will be able to realize its ambitious goals. First, the Russian state energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft lack the technology, know-how and experience to extract oil and gas under the exceedingly difficult environment in the Arctic, where the most significant deposits are believed to be in very deep water in areas that are very difficult to access due to bad weather conditions. The Western sanctions mean that the Russian energy companies cannot, as planned, obtain this technology and know-how via the already entered-into partnerships with Western energy companies. The sanctions limit loan opportunities in Western banks, which hit the profitability of the most cost-heavy projects in the Arctic. However, what hits hardest are the low oil prices – at present 50 dollars per barrel (Brent). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the fields in the Arctic are not profitable as long as the oil price is under 120 dollars per barrel. Whether Russia chooses to suspend the projects until the energy prices rise again – and until it has again entered into partnerships that can deliver the desired technology and know-how – or whether the Russian state will continuously pump money into the projects is uncertain. The hard-pressed Russian economy, with the prospects of recession, increasing inflation, increasing flight of capital, rising interest rates and a continuously low oil price, provides a market economic incentive for suspending the projects until further notice. Whether the Kremlin will think in a market economic way or a long-term strategic way is uncertain – but, historically, there has been a penchant for the latter. One of the Kremlin's hopes is that Chinese-Russian cooperation can take over where the Western-Russian cooperation has shut down. Russia has long wanted to diversify its energy markets to reduce its dependence on sales to Europe. At the same time, those in the Kremlin have had a deeply-rooted fear of ending up as a "resource appendix" to the onrushing Chinese economy, which so far has been a strong contributing reason for keeping the Russian-Chinese overtures in check. The question now is whether the Western sanctions can be the catalyst that can make Russia overcome this fear and thus, in the long term, support the efforts to enter into a real, strategic partnership with China. ; Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, Russia have an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "exploring", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization- focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they cooperate peacefully.
Grønlands udenrigspolitiske repræsentanter benytter den store internationale interesse for Arktis til at positionere Grønland som en mere selvstændig udenrigspolitisk aktør. Det er muligt, da Danmark er afhængig af Grønland for at opretholde sin status som "arktisk stat", og fordi Grønlands udenrigspolitiske kompetence er åben for fortolkning. Denne artikel analyserer, hvordan repræsentanter for skiftende grønlandske regeringer har udvidet det udenrigspolitiske handlerum ved i diskurs og praksis at styrke Grønlands position i en arktisk kontekst. Det er blandt andet opnået ved 1) højlydt at italesætte utilfredshed i Arktisk Råd, 2) stiltiende symbolske handlinger ved Ilulissat-erklæringens tiårs jubilæum, og 3) ved at mime suverænitet ved Arctic Circle konferencen, der pga. sin mere uformelle struktur er særligt nyttig til at styrke bilaterale internationale relationer. ; Greenland's foreign policy representatives use the great international attention to the Arctic to appear and act as a more sovereign foreign policy actor. This is possible due to Denmark's dependence on Greenland to maintain its "Arctic state" status and because Greenland's foreign policy competence is open to interpretation. The article analyzes how representatives of shifting Greenlandic governments have expanded the foreign policy room for manoeuvre in discourse and praxis to strengthen Greenland's position at Arctic-related events. This has been achieved by, among other things, 1) outspoken discontent in the Arctic Council, 2) tacit gestures at the Ilulissat Declaration's 10-year anniversary, and 3) by mimicking full sovereignty at the Arctic Circle conference serving as a particularly useful platform for enhancing bilateral international relations due to its more informal setup.
In recent years, the Swedish Armed Forces have produced and distributed highly edited video clips on YouTube that show moving images of military activity. Along- side this development, mobile phone apps have emerged as an important channel through which the user can experience and take an interactive part in the staging of contemporary armed conflict. This article examines the way in which the aes- thetic and affective experience of Swedish defence and security policy is socially and (media-)culturally (co-)constructed and how the official representation of Swedish military intervention (re)produces political and economic effects when these activi- ties are distributed through traditional and social media such as YouTube and digital apps. Based on Isabela and Norman Fairclough's thoughts on political discourse, Michel Foucault's dialectic idea of power/knowledge, and Sara Ahmed's concept of the affective, I discuss how the Swedish digital military aesthetic is part of a broader political and economic practice that has consequences beyond the digital, the semi- otic, and what might at first glance appear to be pure entertainment. ; In recent years, the Swedish Armed Forces have produced and distributed highly edited video clips on YouTube that show moving images of military activity. Alongside this development, mobile phone apps have emerged as an important channel through which the user can experience and take an interactive part in the staging of contemporary armed conflict. This article examines the way in which the aesthetic and affective experience of Swedish defence and security policy is socially and (media-)culturally (co-)constructed and how the official representation of Swedish military intervention (re)produces political and economic effects when these activities are distributed through traditional and social media such as YouTube and digital apps. Based on Isabela and Norman Fairclough's thoughts on political discourse, Michel Foucault's dialectic idea of power/knowledge, and Sara Ahmed's concept of the affective, I discuss how the Swedish digital military aesthetic is part of a broader political and economic practice which has consequences beyond the digital, the semiotic and what might at first glance appear to be pure entertainment.
Tre tiår etter det ble etablert, står Barentssamarbeidet overfor en politisk kontekst preget av økende spenning og et Russland i krig. Ved starten i 1993 signaliserte det en ny politisk linje i Arktis, Nordområdene og norsk Russland-politikk. I et område som utgjorde Vestens nordligste grense mot Sovjetunionen under den kalde krigen og der militariseringen var sterk, skisserte Norge sammen med Finland, Sverige og Russland et felles utenrikspolitisk engasjement der fred og stabilitet stod øverst på agendaen. Utviklingen bidro til nye internasjonale roller og aktiviteter for regionale og lokale aktører. I denne artikkelen har vi deres erfaringer i fokus når vi undersøker legitimeringspraksiser. Vi spør: Hvordan har legitimeringen av Barentssamarbeidet blitt påvirket av endringer i det sikkerhetspolitiske klimaet? Ved å fremheve lokale aktører i Barentssamarbeidet tar vi et steg inn i et utenrikspolitisk felt preget av politiske spenninger, ulike argumenter og et mangfold av meninger. Vi har en diskursanalytisk og praksisorientert tilnærming når vi identifiserer tre legitimeringsdiskurser: en geopolitisk oppdatert legitimering, en motvekt til dominerende representasjon av Russland, og en representasjon av aktøregenskapene til Barentssamarbeidet i lys av framtidig norsk-russiske relasjoner. Abstract in EnglishThe Barents Cooperation Amid Geopolitical Tensions: A Discourse Analysis of Norwegian ExperiencesBack in 1993 the formalization of the Barents-cooperation signaled a new political approach in the Arctic region, High North, and Norwegian Russia-policy. In the area where militarization was strong and which formed the Wests northernmost border with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Norway, together with Finland, Sweden and Russia, outlined a joint foreign policy engagement where peace and stability were at the top of the agenda. Today, almost 30 years later, the Barents-cooperation is surrounded by growing geopolitical tension – especially highlighted in the period after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. In this article we try to answer the question: What is the Barents-cooperation in the context of today's international political situation? By emphasizing the voices of the actors in the cooperation, as this article does, we take a step into a field characterized by political tensions, by arguments, and a diversity of opinions within the Norwegian foreign policy field. Based on interviews with actors from the Barents-cooperation, the article presents three different discourses: a geopolitically updated legitimization; a counterweight to the dominant representation of Russia; and a representation of the agency of the Barents-cooperation in light of future Norwegian-Russian relations.
Artikkelen gir en oversikt over den «visuelle vendingen» innen IP-faget og diskuterer noen av de mest sentrale teoretiske argumentene som har blitt lagt frem i denne sammenheng, med særlig vekt på studiet av «internasjonale ikoner». Denne diskusjonen leder videre til en empirisk studie, nærmere bestemt en kasusstudie med utgangspunkt i bildet av Omran Daqneesh, også kjent som «Syrian boy in an ambulance». Dette bildet, som ble tatt under beleiringen av Aleppo i august 2016, oppnådde raskt ikonisk status i den bredere vestlige debatten, og det er nettopp samspillet mellom bilde og fortolkning i form av tekst jeg ser nærmere på i analysen. Ved hjelp av en diskursanalyse viser jeg hvordan debatten bar preg av uklarhet og en slags ubestemmelighet når det gjaldt hvordan en burde respondere til ikonet i utenrikspolitisk forstand. Dette funnet leder meg videre til artikkelens teoretiske bidrag: å anskueliggjøre hvordan begrepet apori kan bidra til å teoretisere debatten rundt borgerkrigen i Syria. Mer konkret argumenter jeg for at debattens innramming leder til et selvkonstruert paradoks, som kommer til uttrykk i ulike krav om at noe må gjøres, uten at dette «noe» spesifiseres. Dermed blir kravet i seg selv et symbol på en utveisløshet; det ender i en apori. Formålet med artikkelen er derfor todelt: For det første å undersøke hvilken rolle bilder spiller i internasjonal politikk og, for det andre, å belyse hvordan møtet med en apori fordrer refleksjon, som derfor kan bidra til å åpne opp for alternative tilnærminger til de forståelsesrammene som preget, eller kanskje rettere sagt fremdeles preger, diskursen rundt borgerkrigen i Syria.
Abstract in English:Icons and Aporias in the Western Debate on the Civil War in Syria
This article provides an overview of the 'visual turn' in IR and reflects on some of the key theoretical arguments put forward with particular attention paid to the proposed study of 'international icons'. This discussion provides the basis for an empirical study in which I examine the photograph of Omran Daqneesh, also known as the Syrian boy in an ambulance, as a case study. This photo, which was taken during the siege of Aleppo in August 2016, quickly reached an iconic status in the broader Western debate on the Syrian Civil War. The ensuing analysis zooms in on and accentuates the interplay between the visual and (textual) interpretation. This is done by way of discourse analysis, through which I demonstrate how the debate was characterized by an ambiguity and an undecideability regarding what should be done in terms of foreign policy as a response to the icon. Building on this finding, I advance this article's theoretical contribution: to suggest that the concept of aporia can help us theorize the debate on the Syrian civil war. More specifically, I argue that the current framing of the debate leads to a self-constructed paradox, which finds its expression in the various demands that 'something must be done', without this 'something' being specified. As such, the demand becomes a symbol of a undecidability; it ends in an aporia. Thus, the purpose of this article is two-fold: First, to understand the role of images in international politics and, second, to illuminate how the aporetic encounter demands reflection, which therefore can open up thinking space for alternative approaches to the frames of interpretation that dominated, or rather, continues to dominate the discourse around the civil war in Syria.
I 2001 besluttet Stortinget en vesentlig endring i forsvarskonsept og en betydelig reduksjon i forsvarsstrukturen. Forsvarets hovedoppgave skulle ikke lenger være å utgjøre et mobiliseringsbasert invasjonsforsvar. Beslutningen var et brudd med forsvarskonseptet som hadde dominert norsk forsvarsplanlegging under den kalde krigen og i tiåret som fulgte. Hvorfor ble invasjonsforsvaret forlatt, og hva ble Forsvarets nye hovedoppgave? Artikkelen argumenterer for at det finnes tre dominerende og delvis konkurrerende forklaringer på omleggingen av Forsvaret: en sikkerhetspolitisk, en kulturell og en økonomisk. Den første tilnærmingen ser beslutningen som drevet av et ønske om å bidra mer i utenlandsoperasjoner for å bli oppfattet som en «god alliert» i NATO og USA. Den andre forklarer overgangen med en kulturell endring der en ny og mer «internasjonalisert» forsvarspolitisks diskurs vant frem blant norske beslutningstakere. Den tredje ser endringen som et uunngåelig resultat av invasjonsforsvarets manglende økonomiske bærekraft.
Abstract in English:Security Policy, Culture or Defence Economics? Competing Explanations for the Transformation of the Norwegian Armed Forces after the Cold WarIn 2001, the Storting – Norway's parliament – decided on a significant change in Norway's national defence concept and a significant reduction in the defence structure. The Armed Forces' main task should no longer be to constitute a mobilization-based territorial defence force. The decision was a break with the defence concept that had dominated Norwegian defence planning during the Cold War and in the decade that followed. Why was territorial defence abandoned, and what became the Armed Forces' new main task? The article argues that there are three dominant and partly competing explanations for the transformation of the Armed Forces: a security policy explanation, a cultural explanation and an economic explanation. The first approach sees the decision as driven by a desire to contribute more in international operations in order to be perceived as a "good ally" in NATO and the United States. The second explains the transformation with cultural changes among Norwegian decision-makers, through which a new and more "internationalized" defence policy discourse became dominant. The third sees the change as the inevitable result of the financial unsustainability of the old status quo in the Armed Forces.
