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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to settle the controversy around Kant's notorious discussion of maternal infanticide in the 'Doctrine of Right' of 1797. How should a state punish an unmarried mother who has killed her newborn infant? The text (at DoR VI 335–37) is obscure. Three readings have been defended in the literature: 1. Lenience. Maternal infanticide does not count as murder; so, capital punishment is inappropriate. On this view, the child does not enjoy the full recognition of the law (this is the standard view). 2. Temporary privilege. Lenience should prevail as long as social attitudes are barbaric and treating maternal infanticide like regular cases of murder is perceived to be unjust. The regular punishment for murder will be appropriate once sexual mores have changed. The child will then enjoy the full protection of the law (Hruschka, Varden). 3. No lenience. Capital punishment, though it appears to be unjust, is actually just and ought to be applied. Any child, whether born to married parents or not, enjoys the full protection of the law (Brandt, Uleman). Based on a close examination of the passage and the context of contemporary laws and attitudes, Kant is not, it will be argued, advocating lenience but certain legislative reforms, which are needed to dispel the perception that capital punishment is unjust. Progressive legislation will change social attitudes, not vice versa. Moreover, it will be shown that Kant does not, appearances notwithstanding, endorse the thesis that a child born out of wedlock has been smuggled into the state like 'prohibited goods' or 'contraband merchandise', which would deprive the child of the protection of the state; that is the view with which Kant saddles Cesare Beccaria.

The aim of this paper is to settle the controversy around Kant's notorious discussion of maternal infanticide in the 'Doctrine of Right' of 1797. How should a state punish an unmarried mother who has killed her newborn infant? The text (at DoR VI 335–37) is obscure. Three readings have been defended in the literature: 1. Lenience. Maternal infanticide does not count as murder; so, capital punishment is inappropriate. On this view, the child does not enjoy the full recognition of the law (this is the standard view). 2. Temporary privilege. Lenience should prevail as long as social attitudes are barbaric and treating maternal infanticide like regular cases of murder is perceived to be unjust. The regular punishment for murder will be appropriate once sexual mores have changed. The child will then enjoy the full protection of the law (Hruschka, Varden). 3. No lenience. Capital punishment, though it appears to be unjust, is actually just and ought to be applied. Any child, whether born to married parents or not, enjoys the full protection of the law (Brandt, Uleman). Based on a close examination of the passage and the context of contemporary laws and attitudes, Kant is not, it will be argued, advocating lenience but certain legislative reforms, which are needed to dispel the perception that capital punishment is unjust. Progressive legislation will change social attitudes, not vice versa. Moreover, it will be shown that Kant does not, appearances notwithstanding, endorse the thesis that a child born out of wedlock has been smuggled into the state like 'prohibited goods' or 'contraband merchandise', which would deprive the child of the protection of the state; that is the view with which Kant saddles Cesare Beccaria. ; Publisher PDF ; Peer reviewed

Abstract: This paper explores the alleged role of a conception of human nature for Kant's justification of the duty to leave the state of nature and the related right to coerce others to enter the civil condition in the Doctrine of Right (1797). I criticise the interpretation put forward by Byrd and Hruschka, according to which Kant's postulate of public right is a preventive measure based on a "presumption of badness" of human beings. Although this reading seems to be supported by § 42 of the Doctrine of Right, I shall argue that the paragraph neither offers a justification of why we have a duty to leave the state of nature, nor explains why individuals are allowed to coerce others to do so. I offer an alternative interpretation of § 42 by focusing on the difference between formal and material violations of right and argue that the rationale behind the postulate of public right is the idea that remaining in the state of nature is a formal violation of the concept of right. It is therefore not prudential reason that authorizes us to coerce others to enter the lawful condition.

Recent works of Weinrib and Ripstein argue in favour of the state duty to support the poor found in Kant's 'Doctrine of Right'. The argument is not Kant's own, but is said to flow from the most basic precepts of that work. It is, roughly, the following: because the institution of property rights can lead to the situation whereby, there being nothing left to appropriate, persons could become dependent upon others for their very existence, the validity of property rights (and private rights in general) in the civil condition depends upon the state's supporting the poor so as to ensure that such relations of dependence do not arise. This article argues that this welfarist state duty is incompatible with the structure of the Doctrine of Right, and independently implausible.

Reseña de / Book review of: Krasnoff, Larry; Sánchez Madrid, Nuria; Satne, Paula (eds.) (2018). Kant´s Doctrine of Right in the Twenty-first Century. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 244 pp.

The fact that Kant does not articulate a theory of distributive justice has not kept political philosophers from citing Kant as inspiration and support for whatever theory of distributive justice they favor - including those who argue that the notion of distributive justice is itself mistaken. This widespread reliance on Kant invites the question, "Does the Doctrine of Right imply a theory of distributive justice?" To address this question, we discuss Paul Guyer's argument that Kant's Doctrine of Right implies, roughly, the principles of distributive justice as found in Rawls's justice as fairness. Guyer's argument is that Kant's theory of property implies a contractualist theory of distributive justice; in turn, this implies that the distribution of property rights must be fair, and that fairness is secured only by something like Rawls's second principle of justice.

At the heart of Kant's legal-political philosophy lies a liberal, republican ideal of justice understood in terms of private independence (non-domination) and subjection to public laws securing freedom for all citizens as equals. Given this basic commitment of Kant's, it is puzzling to many that he does not consider democracy a minimal condition on a legitimate state. In addition, many find Kant ideas of reform or improvement of the historical states we have inherited vague and confusing. The aim of this paper is to untangle both puzzles by exploring Kant's idea of self-governance. I argue that Kant's idea of self-governance gives us a very good starting point for thinking about how to leave room for a variety of political systems—different ideals—that have grown out of and responding to different contingent historical and cultural circumstances. It also helps us id entify those areas where we want to take extra care to build in safeguards to secure stability and to take sufficiently seriously humankind's truly nasty sides. Autogovernança e Reforma no Republicanismo Liberal de Kant - Teoria Ideal e Não-Ideal na Doutrina do Direito em Kant No centro da filosofia jurídico-política de Kant está um ideal liberal, republicano de justiça compreendido em termos de independência privada (não-dominação) e sujeição às leis públicas que garantem a liberdade para todos os cidadãos como iguais. Dado este compromisso básico de Kant, é intrigante para muitos que ele não considere a democracia uma condição mínima para um Estado legítimo. Além disso, muitos consideram as idéias de Kant quanto à reforma ou melhoria dos estados históricos que herdamos, vagas e confusas. O objetivo deste artigo é desembaraçar os dois quebra-cabeças explorando a ideia de auto-governança de Kant. Eu argumento que a ideia de auto-governança de Kant nos dá um bom ponto de partida para pensar em como deixar espaço para uma variedade de sistemas políticos — diferentes ideais — que cresceram e responderam a diferentes contingências históricas e circunstâncias culturais. Também nos ajuda a identificar as áreas em que queremos ter um cuidado extra para construir salvaguardas para garantir a estabilidade segura e para levar suficientemente a sério os lados verdadeiramente desagradáveis da humanidade.

The rediscovery of Kant's Doctrine of Right resulted in many attempts to apply Kant's position to current affairs. This research often faces the problem of defining clear borders of what in Kant's texts needs to be considered as rational core of his theory and what is merely a theoretically less significant consequence of particular political situation of 18th century. My claim is that in order to be able to adequately apply Kant's ideas and concepts to the 21st century problems, the process of application of his rational principles to the world of experience must be reconstructed. This will not only bring about the core structure of right but may also determine which elements of Kant's legal theory are contingent to changing empirical data. I recognise two levels of Kant's application of the rational principles to human condition, which consecutively determine the rational core of right and secondary structural divisions that emerge from contingent data about political history of mankind. The aim of the article is to investigate the fundamental steps of Kant's application on the first level, in order to reconstruct the rational core of his legal theory. In the first step I analyse the universal principle of right in order to clarify Kant's concept of a right. Further, I investigate the axiom of external freedom, which, in conjunction with human condition generates the necessity of using external objects of choice and therefore grounds the emergence of acquired rights. Nevertheless, these rights, as particular legal titles that limit the freedom of others, cannot be reconciled with universal freedom in the state of nature. Therefore, from the establishment of innate and acquired right, there arises the necessity of public right and entering the civil condition.