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The dynamical behavior of domestic political hostility is modeled in terms of the interaction between hostile (challenger) and ruling (regime) groups. The conditions under which the conflict situation will either settle down in a steady state or evolve in time are derived for various forms of collective action costs. The model presented is a general framework for explaining the various outcomes of the repression/dissent nexus as special cases of the same fundamental process. We also obtain critical parameter values of discontent that bring about discontinuous jumps in the level of hostility.

This study undertakes an empirical investigation of the near universal assumption that domestic political conflict is invariably harmful to the societies in which it occurs. In particular, we examine the implications of domestic conflict for the provision of basic human needs once the known effects of aggregate national wealth are removed. Using a variation of the panel regression model, we regress an index of basic needs satisfaction on measures of domestic conflict scope and intensity, along with suitable controls, for a sample of 85 contemporary nations. The findings indicate that the intensity measure is associated with long-term improvements in basic needs while the scope of conflict carries a negative impact for basic needs outcomes.

Traditional accounts in both the international law and international relations literature largely assume that great powers like the United States enter into international legal commitments in order to resolve global cooperative problems or to advance objective state interests. Contrary to these accounts, this Article suggests that an incumbent regime (or partisan elites within the regime) may often seek to use international legal commitments to overcome domestic obstacles to their narrow policy and electoral objectives. In this picture, an incumbent regime may deploy international law to expand the geographical scope of political conflict across borders in order to isolate the domestic political opposition and increase the influence of foreign groups or governments sympathetic to the regime's objectives. The political opposition may in turn seek to exploit the existence of a fragmented system of domestic institutions to thwart both the adoption and enforcement of any international law that strengthens the ruling regime and weakens its own position. Finally, this Article sketches a framework for predicting when distributive international legal commitments are likely to be sustainable across electoral cycles and when they are not. More specifically, the framework suggests that an international legal commitment is likely to be electorally sustainable when the veil of ignorance underlying the commitment is sufficiently thick; in other words, an international commitment entered into by a partisan regime has more staying power if it produces policy outcomes that are favored by some salient groups in the political opposition. The Article uses examples from the United States experience with human rights and international trade to illustrate how partisan dynamics between Republicans and Democrats has helped spawn and restrict the scope of international legal commitments.

In the course of the analysis we revealed that the foreign policy of Ukraine was affected by domestic political conflicts, which involve the central political institutions of the state – the Parliament, the President and the Prime minister. This confrontation leads to the fact that the acts of central political actors of foreign policy in the international relations become inconsistent and the state loses the status of the projected partner. The most serious conflicts between Ukrainian governmental bodies occurred in the period of the parliamentarypresidential republic. These conflicts were often caused by different views of Ukrainian political elites on foreign policy. This fact complicates the implementation of the foreign policy and leads to the deterioration of the state's image in the world. On the other hand, the foreign policy differences often led to the aggravation of the political situation in Ukraine (for example, the political crisis in 2006 over the question of NATO).A special role in the formation and implementation of the foreign policy in accordance with the Constitution assigned the President of Ukraine. Ukrainian researchers associate the foreign policy of the state with the name of the Presidents – the foreign policy of President Kuchma, Yushchenko's foreign policy etc. However, the transformation of the Ukrainian political system from presidential to parliamentary republic extends opportunities of the parliament and the government. The President loses the ability of management and to control the foreign policy of the Government. Parliament does not receive additional leverage political influence, but it has the ability to appoint the Prime minister from among the parliamentary majority. This gives Parliament the opportunity to realize the foreign policy of the party, which has a majority in the Parliament or Parliament's coalition.The foreign policy dichotomy caused by the specifics of the geopolitical position of the state, can be seen in multi-vector orientation Ukrainian society and political elites. The Law «On the basis of domestic and foreign policy of Ukraine» (2010) fixed the strategic directions of the foreign policy of the state, excluding the most problematic issue about NATO. In general, this Law is a compromise between political elites and the Ukrainian society. Although for the development and implementation of a balanced and effective foreign policy requires a real consensus of experts, elites and society ; Проанализирована взаимосвязь между внутренней и внешней политикой Украины на примере политического противостояния между центральными политическими институциями – президентом, парламентом и правительством, в результате которого происходит разбалансирование внешней политики государства, а сама страна приобретает статус непредсказуемого партнера. ; Проаналізовано взаємозв'язок між внутрішньо та зовнішньої політикою України на прикладі політичного протистояння між центральними політичними інституціями – президентом, парламентом та урядом, унаслідок чого зовнішня політика держави стає розбалансованою, а країна отримає статус непередбачуваного партнера.

This article focuses on the interconnection between international factors and domestic political conflicts in the Third World context, with specific reference to Caribbean countries. Theories suggesting either no correlation or a direct linear linkage between international and domestic conflicts are criticized. It is posited that (a) the linkage between international pressures and domestic political conflicts is usually mediated by domestic class forces, particularly the contentious role of the middle classes, which invariably control Caribbean states, (b) these middle-class controlled states usually display a preference for the more authoritarian approaches to conflict resolution; (c) states subjected to the most destabilizing international pressures, such as the ideologically deviant (or pro-socialist) states, tend to display the more intensive levels of both political conflicts and repressive force; and (d) these conflict patterns harbour largely negative implications for democratic developments in the region. It is suggested, further, that approaches to conflict resolution should involve institutionalized changes which foster the more direct, democratic inclusion of the subordinate classes in the political decision-working process. Supportive data and evidence are drawn from periodical news reports and other documentary archival sources pertaining to the English-speaking Caribbean during the post-colonial period.

"Domestic-International Conflict Linkages" published on by Oxford University Press.

Given the conventional claim that external threats increase internal cohesion and government capacity, cross-country studies have examined how interstate conflict events influence domestic politics. This article reevaluates the in-group and out-group mechanisms by examining how international strategic rivalry, which indicates the presence of persistent external threats even in the absence of military conflict, affects domestic political competition. An alternative explanation suggests that the effect of external threats on political incentives of domestic actors differs between regime supporters and oppositions. We posit that the presence of international threats from rival states inflames domestic unrest and oppositions' antiregime challenges, while making governments rely more on repressive tactics given resource constraints and a high level of domestic political intolerance. In addition, we propose that the domestic consequences of international rivalry are heterogeneous depending on the characteristics of political systems and the level of threat perception. Empirical tests reveal robust evidence for the hypotheses.

Given the conventional claim that external threats increase internal cohesion and government capacity, cross-country studies have examined how interstate conflict events influence domestic politics. This article reevaluates the in-group and out-group mechanisms by examining how international strategic rivalry, which indicates the presence of persistent external threats even in the absence of military conflict, affects domestic political competition. An alternative explanation suggests that the effect of external threats on political incentives of domestic actors differs between regime supporters and oppositions. We posit that the presence of international threats from rival states inflames domestic unrest and oppositions' antiregime challenges, while making governments rely more on repressive tactics given resource constraints and a high level of domestic political intolerance. In addition, we propose that the domestic consequences of international rivalry are heterogeneous depending on the characteristics of political systems and the level of threat perception. Empirical tests reveal robust evidence for the hypotheses.