The Factor Case and Double Criminality in Extradition
In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Volume 28, Issue 2, p. 274-306
ISSN: 2161-7953
The recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Factor
v. Laubenheimer and Haggard has broken new
ground with reference to the interpretation of the extradition treaties
between the United States and Great Britain, and it seems to deserve special
consideration as a contribution to the law of extradition. Factor's
extradition was requested by Great Britain on a charge of receiving certain
sums of money, aggregating £458,500, known to have been fraudulently
obtained. On the complaint of a British consul, Factor was taken into
custody in Illinois, and a United States Commissioner in Illinois issued a
warrant for his commitment pending surrender. On a return to a writ of
habeas corpus, the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois ordered his discharge from custody, but this
order was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Both the District Court
and the Circuit Court of Appeals seem to have regarded extradition as
possible only if the offense charged was a crime both by the law of Great
Britain and by the law of Illinois; the District Court held that receiving
money known to have been fraudulently obtained was not a crime by the law of
Illinois, but a majority of the Circuit Court of Appeals, relying chiefly on
Kelly v. Griffin, took the contrary view. On
certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the
offense charged was an extraditable crime even if it is not punishable by
the law of Illinois, the opinion being written by Justice Stone. Justice
Butler was joined in a vigorous dissenting opinion by Justices Brandeis and
Roberts.