A dynamic model of training transfer
In: Human resource management review, Volume 29, Issue 2, p. 270-283
ISSN: 1053-4822
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In: Human resource management review, Volume 29, Issue 2, p. 270-283
ISSN: 1053-4822
SSRN
Working paper
In: Korean journal of policy studies: KJPS, Volume 34, Issue 2, p. 127-150
Anticorruption policy transfer has been discussed for decades, but the influence of culture in target countries has not received comparable attention sufficient to explain the lack of progress in reducing corruption in those countries. The conceptualization of culture so far has provided only a limited tool for developing a dynamic theory of policy transfer. We propose a bottomup model of dynamic policy transfer that takes into account the cultural context in target countries. We first define culture as a set of values that are consistent with each other but that also conflict. We then develop a dynamic policy transfer model that revises the traditional model by considering the proposed concept of culture. Finally, we discuss the practical implications of the model, emphasizing the importance of knowledge of culture at the local level, where a bottom-up implementation of anticorruption policy takes place. We conclude by suggesting strategies for empirical research and specific implications regarding the Korean policy context.
In: Decision sciences, Volume 17, Issue 3, p. 428-435
ISSN: 1540-5915
ABSTRACTThis paper is concerned with the dynamic interactions between output and transferprice decisions in a three‐country model for a multinational firm when profits taxation and ad valorem tariffs are applied simultaneously. A numerical example is used to illustrate that the three‐country model modifies considerably conclusions reached in the traditional two‐country, two‐goods framework.
This book examines the relevance of global strategic perspective, as international competition continues to intensify & gain momentum, and management of human resource remains a challenge in contemporary corporate scenario. As global business strategy requires globally competent people and implementation of global human resource systems, therefore the need to harness the multi-faceted dimensions of corporate employees is elaborated upon. This book explores cross cultural movement & interactions in International human resource management, where the theme of cross-cultural reentry remains largely neglected and underestimated in the sojourners transition trajectory. This book takes into account the available empirical investigations pointing to substantial concerns, affecting the psychological wellbeing, social readjustment and cultural identity of the returning individuals. This book examines the significance of re-entry as an issue of highest priority to both sojourning individuals as well as people managing the reentry transitions of travelers. In light of the unfolding knowledge revolution, the book explores the context of corporate India offering high knowledge density and rich demographic dividend. The need for companies, to harness the knowledge capital and accelerate Indians in the knowledge revolution is examined. Various factors that can influence the repatriation of an individual when back in the home country, and the challenges faced in repatriation at the individual-, team-, organizational-, and country-levels, is explored & analyzed. This book focuses on eliminating overall wastage and losses in Repatriation process, from an organizational point of view. The purview of this book encompasses the interface of Anticipatory Adjustment, Competency Transfer, Effective Repatriation and Reverse Culture Shock with Repatriates Adjustment, back home, and empirically analyzes the precursors and effects of the said paradigms in optimization of Repatriate talent from an organizational perspective. The purpose is to analyze the antecedents of repatriate adjustment in the mentioned context and to subsequently deliberate upon the acquired results to arrive at feasible and relevant conclusions. Optimization of Repatriate talent, and Repatriation Management from International Human Resource Management (IHRM) perspective, deserves a cross-disciplinary study of precursors effecting Repatriation Adjustment, with focus on the dimension of Indian Repatriate acculturation.
In: Journal of economics, Volume 67, Issue 1, p. 75-92
ISSN: 1617-7134
Producción Científica ; This paper analyzes the dynamic interaction between two regions with interconnected river basins. Precipitation is higher in one river-basin while water productivity is higher in the other. Water transfer increases productivity in the recipient basin, but may cause environmental damage in the donor basin. The recipient faces a trade-off between paying the price of the water transfer, or investing in alternative water supplies to achieve a higher usable water capacity. We analyze the design of this transfer using a dynamic modeling approach, which relies on non-cooperative game theory, and compare solutions with different information structure (Nash open-loop, Nash feedback, Stackelberg) with the social optimum. We first assume that the equilibrium between supply and demand determines the optimal transfer price and amount. We show that, contrary to the static case, in a realistic dynamic setting in which the recipient uses a feedback information structure the social optimum will not emerge as the equilibrium solution. We then study different leadership situations in the water market and observe that the transfer amount decreases towards a long-run value lower than the transfer under perfect competition, which in turn lays below the social optimum. In consequence, the water in the donor's river-basin river converges to a better quality in the presence of market power. Finally, we numerically compare our results to the Tagus-Segura water transfer described in Ballestero (2004). Welfare gains are compared for the different scenarios. We show that in all dynamic settings, the long-run transfer amount is lower than in Ballestero's static model. Further, we show that the long-run price settles at a lower level than in Ballestero's model, but is still higher than the average cost-based price determined by the Spanish government.
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Identifiant HAL : hal-01006695 ; This paper analyzes the dynamic interaction between two regions with interconnected river basins. Precipitation is higher in one river-basin while water productivity is higher in the other. Water transfer increases productivity in the recipient basin, but may cause environmental damage in the donor basin. The recipient faces a trade-off between paying the price of the water transfer, or investing in alternative water supplies to achieve a higher usable water capacity. We analyze the design of this transfer using a dynamic modeling approach, which relies on non-cooperative game theory, and compare solutions with different information structure (Nash open-loop, Nash feedback, Stackelberg) with the social optimum. We first assume that the equilibrium between supply and demand determines the optimal transfer price and amount. We show that, contrary to the static case, in a realistic dynamic setting in which the recipient uses a feedback information structure the social optimum will not emerge as the equilibrium solution. We then study different leadership situations in the water market and observe that the transfer amount decreases towards a long-run value lower than the transfer under perfect competition, which in turn lays below the social optimum. In consequence, the water in the donor's river-basin river converges to a better quality in the presence of market power. Finally, we numerically compare our results to the Tagus-Segura water transfer described in Ballestero (2004). Welfare gains are compared for the different scenarios. We show that in all dynamic settings, the long-run transfer amount is lower than in Ballestero's static model. Further, we show that the long-run price settles at a lower level than in Ballestero's model, but is still higher than the average cost-based price determined by the Spanish government.
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Identifiant HAL : hal-01006695 ; This paper analyzes the dynamic interaction between two regions with interconnected river basins. Precipitation is higher in one river-basin while water productivity is higher in the other. Water transfer increases productivity in the recipient basin, but may cause environmental damage in the donor basin. The recipient faces a trade-off between paying the price of the water transfer, or investing in alternative water supplies to achieve a higher usable water capacity. We analyze the design of this transfer using a dynamic modeling approach, which relies on non-cooperative game theory, and compare solutions with different information structure (Nash open-loop, Nash feedback, Stackelberg) with the social optimum. We first assume that the equilibrium between supply and demand determines the optimal transfer price and amount. We show that, contrary to the static case, in a realistic dynamic setting in which the recipient uses a feedback information structure the social optimum will not emerge as the equilibrium solution. We then study different leadership situations in the water market and observe that the transfer amount decreases towards a long-run value lower than the transfer under perfect competition, which in turn lays below the social optimum. In consequence, the water in the donor's river-basin river converges to a better quality in the presence of market power. Finally, we numerically compare our results to the Tagus-Segura water transfer described in Ballestero (2004). Welfare gains are compared for the different scenarios. We show that in all dynamic settings, the long-run transfer amount is lower than in Ballestero's static model. Further, we show that the long-run price settles at a lower level than in Ballestero's model, but is still higher than the average cost-based price determined by the Spanish government.
BASE
Identifiant HAL : hal-01006695 ; This paper analyzes the dynamic interaction between two regions with interconnected river basins. Precipitation is higher in one river-basin while water productivity is higher in the other. Water transfer increases productivity in the recipient basin, but may cause environmental damage in the donor basin. The recipient faces a trade-off between paying the price of the water transfer, or investing in alternative water supplies to achieve a higher usable water capacity. We analyze the design of this transfer using a dynamic modeling approach, which relies on non-cooperative game theory, and compare solutions with different information structure (Nash open-loop, Nash feedback, Stackelberg) with the social optimum. We first assume that the equilibrium between supply and demand determines the optimal transfer price and amount. We show that, contrary to the static case, in a realistic dynamic setting in which the recipient uses a feedback information structure the social optimum will not emerge as the equilibrium solution. We then study different leadership situations in the water market and observe that the transfer amount decreases towards a long-run value lower than the transfer under perfect competition, which in turn lays below the social optimum. In consequence, the water in the donor's river-basin river converges to a better quality in the presence of market power. Finally, we numerically compare our results to the Tagus-Segura water transfer described in Ballestero (2004). Welfare gains are compared for the different scenarios. We show that in all dynamic settings, the long-run transfer amount is lower than in Ballestero's static model. Further, we show that the long-run price settles at a lower level than in Ballestero's model, but is still higher than the average cost-based price determined by the Spanish government.
BASE
Identifiant HAL : hal-01006695 ; This paper analyzes the dynamic interaction between two regions with interconnected river basins. Precipitation is higher in one river-basin while water productivity is higher in the other. Water transfer increases productivity in the recipient basin, but may cause environmental damage in the donor basin. The recipient faces a trade-off between paying the price of the water transfer, or investing in alternative water supplies to achieve a higher usable water capacity. We analyze the design of this transfer using a dynamic modeling approach, which relies on non-cooperative game theory, and compare solutions with different information structure (Nash open-loop, Nash feedback, Stackelberg) with the social optimum. We first assume that the equilibrium between supply and demand determines the optimal transfer price and amount. We show that, contrary to the static case, in a realistic dynamic setting in which the recipient uses a feedback information structure the social optimum will not emerge as the equilibrium solution. We then study different leadership situations in the water market and observe that the transfer amount decreases towards a long-run value lower than the transfer under perfect competition, which in turn lays below the social optimum. In consequence, the water in the donor's river-basin river converges to a better quality in the presence of market power. Finally, we numerically compare our results to the Tagus-Segura water transfer described in Ballestero (2004). Welfare gains are compared for the different scenarios. We show that in all dynamic settings, the long-run transfer amount is lower than in Ballestero's static model. Further, we show that the long-run price settles at a lower level than in Ballestero's model, but is still higher than the average cost-based price determined by the Spanish government.
BASE
Identifiant HAL : hal-01006695 ; This paper analyzes the dynamic interaction between two regions with interconnected river basins. Precipitation is higher in one river-basin while water productivity is higher in the other. Water transfer increases productivity in the recipient basin, but may cause environmental damage in the donor basin. The recipient faces a trade-off between paying the price of the water transfer, or investing in alternative water supplies to achieve a higher usable water capacity. We analyze the design of this transfer using a dynamic modeling approach, which relies on non-cooperative game theory, and compare solutions with different information structure (Nash open-loop, Nash feedback, Stackelberg) with the social optimum. We first assume that the equilibrium between supply and demand determines the optimal transfer price and amount. We show that, contrary to the static case, in a realistic dynamic setting in which the recipient uses a feedback information structure the social optimum will not emerge as the equilibrium solution. We then study different leadership situations in the water market and observe that the transfer amount decreases towards a long-run value lower than the transfer under perfect competition, which in turn lays below the social optimum. In consequence, the water in the donor's river-basin river converges to a better quality in the presence of market power. Finally, we numerically compare our results to the Tagus-Segura water transfer described in Ballestero (2004). Welfare gains are compared for the different scenarios. We show that in all dynamic settings, the long-run transfer amount is lower than in Ballestero's static model. Further, we show that the long-run price settles at a lower level than in Ballestero's model, but is still higher than the average cost-based price determined by the Spanish government.
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In: Resource and Energy Economics (37), 17-38. (2014)
This paper analyzes the dynamic interaction between two regions with interconnected river basins. Precipitation is higher in one river- basin while water productivity is higher in the other. Water transfer increases productivity in the recipient basin, but may cause environmental damage in the donor basin. The recipient faces a trade-o between paying the price of the water transfer, or investing in alternative water supplies to achive a higher usable water capacity. We analyze the design of this transfer using a dynamic modeling approach, and compare solutions with di erent information structure with the cooperative solution. Contrary to standard games, where decision variables di er among players, we assume that both players take the decisions concerning the water transfer. The equilibrium between supply and demand determines the optimal transfer price and amount. If the problem were set as a static game, the non-cooperative solution would match the cooperative solution. However, in a more realistic dynamic setting, in which the recipient uses a feedback information structure, the cooperative solution will not emerge as the equilibrium solution. The transfer amount is lower than in the case of cooperation, while the investment in usable water capacity is higher. Finally we numerically compare our results to the Tagus-Segura water transfer described in Ballestero (2004). Welfare gains are compared for the different scenarios. We show that in all dynamic settings, the long-run transfer amount is lower than in Ballestero's static model. Further, we show that the long-run price settles at a lower level than in Ballestero's model, but is still higher than the average cost-based price determined by the Spanish government.
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In: Dynamic games and applications: DGA, Volume 5, Issue 2, p. 228-238
ISSN: 2153-0793
In: Journal of international economics, Volume 73, Issue 1, p. 189-212
ISSN: 0022-1996