In: Canada watch: practical and authoritative analysis of key national issues ; a publication of the York University Centre for Public Law and Public Policy and the Robarts Centre for Canadian Studies of York University, Band 6, Heft 2
This paper is divided into three parts. Part I contains a brief discussion of traditional theories for, and the actual methods of, economic regulation. It also examines factors that have influenced global trends toward deregulation -- e.g., regulatory failure, poor performance, labor market problems and budgetary concerns. Part II examines some of the U.S. academic literature that has analyzed the political economy of economic deregulation in the United States and the factors that drove deregulation. Chief among these factors includes: the convergence of elite opinion in support of reform and the important contribution of economic analysis in the reform process; the proactive exercise of leadership by policymakers; the role of independent regulatory agencies and courts which allowed for considerable deregulation to occur without Congressional action; and the role of Congress. Drawing on the structural features identified in part II, Part III of the paper examines the political economy of economic deregulation in Japan, both historically and at the current time. This paper argues that over the postwar period Japan has experienced a considerable degree of regulatory reform and economic deregulation. This has been driven by the interplay of four factors: the pluralization of interests within Japanese society; the emergence of domestic and international market-based pressures for change; external political pressures for change; and the perceived fiscal necessity to reduce public expenditures. Each of these factors is discussed in some detail. The paper also examines the current deregulation debate in Japan and identifies groups supportive and opposed to deregulation and regulatory reform. The paper argues that domestic and international market and technological factors have converged to necessitate on-going reforms. The costs to the Japanese economy of failing to continue the process seem to be sufficiently great that further reforms are expected. However, the paper discusses the role played by Japanese regulatory agencies, courts, policy makers and interest groups and argues that the institutional mechanisms that exist elsewhere to drive reform, or tolerate it, are less than robust in the Japanese setting.
Introduction -- The Latin American economy, and the political and criminal-political context -- Visible and invisible violence according to Johan Galtung -- Seeing invisible violence : case studies from Mexico, Ecuador, Chile and Argentina -- Linking economy and visible violence : case studies from Guatemala, Brazil, Peru and Honduras -- The vicious circle of deregulated international businesses and violence -- The crime of maldevelopment as a needed conceptual category of criminology -- Approaching the crime of maldevelopment - conclusion and starting point
One of the consequences of the financial crisis of 2008 was a renewed focus on the issue of deregulation. The broadly recognized connection between the greatest economic downturn since the Great Depression and the systematic deregulation of our financial markets dating back over three decades reinvigorated the economic and political debate around the appropriate balance between market freedom and government regulation. This paper explores this theme historically, analyzing several economic markets that were highly regulated prior to the late 20th century. Through this analysis it establishes a foundational framework for the study of the widespread deregulation of the late 20th century. This paper first addresses the study of regulatory policy and its evolution throughout the 20th century. This section primarily focuses on the policy model proposed by George Stigler that acts as the foundational model for its conclusion. It then establishes the observed industries, the Airline and Trucking Industries, and provides evidence of their transition from industries that previously operated with strict governmental control of economic functions to markets that operated freely with little regulatory interference. This observed deregulation establishes the primary thesis question for this paper: what were the primary political and economic forces that caused the deregulation of these industries? The majority of this paper is dedicated to establishing alterations in the political and economic environment during this period that created these policy changes. This paper concludes that separate changes in the political and economic environment caused the deregulation of these industries. First, the evolution of subsystems from closed iron triangle systems to more complex issue networks granted smaller interest groups more influence on policy decisions. Thus, these groups' desired policies, which involved less regulation, received more consideration from the regulating agency. Second, the significant rise in the CPI increased the political pressure on elected officials to reduce prices. This pressure elevated the financial cost of regulating agencies to implement and maintain regulations that contributed to higher prices. These combined shifts caused a sudden, extreme removal of regulations in these markets. By establishing a causal analysis of the presented industries this paper creates a foundational case study for the broader, more complex deregulation that occurred throughout other industries during this time period.
Examines the environmental implication of economic deregulation through case studies of the energy, transport and water sectors. The book deals with options for deregulation, looking at self-regulation, negotiated agreements and environmental management systems. Presenting evidence from a number of EU member states and Hungary, a likely contender for EU membership, this work points at particular challenges facing these countries
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