Should Emissions Reduction Units be Tradable?
In: Environmental Economics and the International Economy; Economy & Environment, S. 221-238
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In: Environmental Economics and the International Economy; Economy & Environment, S. 221-238
In: Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade Research Paper No. 12/IER/17/2-4
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This report reviews vehicle emissions standards in Europe, Japan and the United States, providing the reader with valuable comparisons. It also examines incentives for sulphur free fuels - which can contribute to reducing both conventional air emissions and carbon dioxide. It describes emissions control technologies and the impact of emissions on health and the environment and assesses the adequacy of emissions limits for new passenger cars and heavy duty diesel engines.
In: Fowler, Rob (2007) 'Emissions Reduction Targets Legislation', in Bonyhady T, and Christoff P, Climate Law in Australia, Federation Press, pp. 103-123.
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In: Environment and development economics, Band 1, Heft 4, S. 445-464
ISSN: 1469-4395
ABSTRACTThis paper models joint implementation (JI) for emission reduction between a developed and a developing country. When the per unit price of JI abatement is negotiated, the relative pay-offs deviate from the ratio of bargaining powers. When firms bargain, country-wise gains can increase with a greater abatement target. But if the governments bargain, the developing country's gains increase at the expense of the developed country as the target increases. However, the Pareto optimal JI can be achieved only when the governments negotiate over both abatement and transfer.
In: Umweltökonomie und zukunftsfähige Wirtschaft, S. 143-144
Despite climate agreements like Kyoto and Paris, CO2 emissions keep rising. If this continues, we could run out of time to stop global warming from reaching dangerous levels by 2040. ...
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In: Tol , R S J , Heintz , R J & Lammers , P E M 2003 , ' Methane emission reduction: an application of FUND ' , Climatic Change , vol. 57 , no. 1 , pp. 71-98 . https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022196517982
Methane is, after carbon dioxide, the most important anthropogenic greenhouse gas. Governments plan to abate methane emissions. A crude set of estimates of reduction costs is included in FUND, an integrated assessment model of climate change. In a cost-benefit analysis, methane emission reduction is found to be instrumental in controlling the optimal rate of climate change. In a cost-effectiveness analysis, methane emission reduction largely replaces carbon dioxide emission reduction. Methane emission reduction reinforces the case for international cooperation in climate policy, but complicates the efficient allocation of emission reduction efforts. Methane emission reduction at the short run does not help to achieve the ultimate objective of the Framework Convention on Climate Change.
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In: Proceedings of the Mediterranean Electrotechnical Conference - MELECON
During the last few years, emission control has become a problem of global concern due to the constantly increasing pollution of earth's atmosphere. In order to reach the emission reduction targets imposed by the Kyoto Protocol, a limitation of the emissions produced by the generating units is needed. This paper proposes a new method for the incorporation of the carbon dioxide emission constraints in the solution of the short-term unit commitment problem, based on an efficient simulated annealing algorithm. The emission constraints are taken into account by integrating the cost of purchasing additional emission allowances, whenever the total system emissions exceed a predefined maximum limit, into the objective function of the unit commitment problem. Numerical simulations have proven the efficiency of the proposed method. © 2006 IEEE.
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In: The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Band 118, Heft 4, S. 785-815
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4345
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The Swiss emissions trading registry was opened in 2007 and since then companies – including foreign companies - or private persons were able to open an account and transfer units. Such an account enabled to hold and transfer different types of units issued from different jurisdictions including units based on the Kyoto Protocol or emission allowances (CHUs) generated by the Swiss government for compliance under the Swiss Emissions Trading System. The majority of transferred units in the Swiss registry were Kyoto units of the following type: 1) Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs), issued according to the rules of the Clean Development Mechanism (Article 12 des Kyoto-Protocol) and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs), issued according to the rules of Joint Implementation under Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol.The aim of this paper is to analyse the transfer flows of both national and international emissions allowances and international emission credits between different accounts in order to gain a picture of Switzerland's role in international emissions trading. We use network analysis to analyse the Swiss registry transfer data from 2007 to 2014. The analysis shows that, contrary to widespread belief, the transfer volume through the Swiss registry was substantial. Although transfers in Swiss emission allowances (CHUs) are negligible, the volumes of CERs and ERUs transferred via the Swiss registry are considerable. According to World Bank estimates the total trading volume of CERs in 2008 amounted to 1 billion, of which approximately 400 million transactions were recorded in the Swiss Registry. The type of actors in both submarkets vary considerably. The market of ERUs is dominated by commodity traders buying large volumes from Russia and the Ukraine, the CER market involves more players from different sectors and is less concentrated.
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In: Ilmenau economics discussion papers vol. 27, no. 169
Since its introduction, the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has been struggling with an oversupply of emission allowances and a highly volatile allowance price. One reason for the price decline is technological progress and ist demand-reducing effect, which is only partially taken into account in the system. We propose a simple benchmark approach to endogenously adjust the supply of allowances to technical progress. Using a non-parametric benchmark approach, we measure the required adjustment of the allowance supply to avoid a technologyinduced price decline and to maintain the incentive to invest in low-carbon technologies.