Suchergebnisse

Diese Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit moralischen Verpflichtungen von Individuen im Kampf gegen den Klimawandel. Es wird untersucht, ob Individuen dazu verpflichtet sind, individuelle Emissionen einzuschränken. Dies ist in zwei Abschnitte unterteilt. Im ersten Abschnitt wird untersucht, ob individuelle Emissionen Schädigungen verursachen. Dabei werden zwei Positionen verglichen. Die erste Position besagt, dass individuelle Emissionen Schädigungen verursachen. Diese Position steht der zweiten Position diametral entgegen. Vertreter*innen dieser Position argumentieren dafür, dass individuelle Emissionen keine Schädigungen verursachen. In dieser Arbeit wird gegen die zweite Position argumentiert. Es wird erklärt, dass Vertreter*innen dieser die Natur des Klimawandels missverstehen und dass empirische Schätzungen diese Aussage schwächen. Weiters wird gezeigt, dass dem Nicht-Identitätsproblem durch eine Substituierung des zugrundeliegenden Konzepts von Schädigung begegnet werden kann. Der erste Abschnitt schließt mit dem Resultat, dass individuelle Emissionen Schädigungen verursachen. Im zweiten Abschnitt werden moralische Folgen aus dem Resultat des ersten Teils untersucht. Dabei wird der Punkt berücksichtigt, dass der Klimawandel ein existenzielles Risiko darstellt. Es wird argumentiert, dass dies auch in der Diskussion von individuellen Emissionen zu berücksichtigen ist. Anschließend wird die Beziehung zwischen der Rolle von Individuen und der Rolle von Staaten und Unternehmen untersucht. Daraus, dass Individuen eine vergleichsweise geringe Menge an Emissionen verursachen und Staaten und Unternehmen die größten Emittenten sind, wird geschlussfolgert, dass der Fokus im Kampf gegen den Klimawandel auf letztere zu richten ist. Dabei wird argumentiert, dass Individuen unter stärkeren moralischen Verpflichtungen stehen, dem Klimawandel auf Ebene der Politik und der Wissenschaft zu begegnen, als individuelle Emissionen einzuschränken. ; This work deals with moral obligations of individuals to fight climate change. More specifically, it deals with the question if individuals are morally obliged to refrain from individual emissions. This work is divided into two sections. The first section deals with the question if individual emissions cause harm. To do that, two positions are compared. The first position states that individual emissions cause harm. This position is diametrically opposed to the second position according to which individual emissions do not cause harm. I argue against these attempts to deny harms caused by individual emissions. I state that proponents of that position misunderstand the nature of climate change and that empirical estimations weaken that position. Moreover, the challenge posed by the non-identity problem can be met by substituting the underlying conception of harm. The first section of this work concludes with the statement that individual emissions cause harm. The second section of this work is based on the first section. There, moral consequences following from the proposition that individual emissions cause harm are discussed. It is also considered that climate change poses an existential risk. It is argued that this has to be considered in the discussion surrounding individual emissions. In following passages, the relation between the role of individuals and the role of states and companies is discussed. Following from the fact that states and companies are the largest emitters and individuals are merely responsible for small amounts of emissions it is stated that in the fight against climate change we should primarily concentrate on getting the latter to do their jobs. This work concludes with the statement that individuals are under stronger moral obligations to fight climate change on large-scale levels than to reduce individual emissions. ; vorgelegt von Benedikt Namdar ; Zusammenfassungen auf Deutsch und Englisch ; Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz, Masterarbeit, 2020 ; (VLID)5681265

Akin to a public good, emissions reduction suffers from the 'free rider' syndrome. Although many countries claim that they are meeting their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction commitments, the average global temperature and GHG emissions continue to rise. This has led to growing speculation that some countries may be taking advantage of the system by effectively exploiting a range of loopholes in global agreements. Using a case study approach, we critically review the evidence from Australia, exploring how Australia has participated in global climate change negotiations and the way in which this emissions intensive country's national emissions reduction obligations have been met. The findings suggest that: (1) successful negotiation to include Article 3.7 ('Adjusting the 1990 Baseline' or 'the Australia Clause') in the Kyoto Protocol significantly favored Australia's ability to meet its First Kyoto Commitment (2008–2012); and (2) successful bargaining for the accounting rule that allowed carbon credits from the first commitment period to be carried over to the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol benefitted Australia by 128 MtCO2e. At the national level, a lack of bipartisan political support for an effective mechanism to drive emissions reduction has also been problematic. While the introduction of the Carbon Pricing Mechanism (CPM) in 2012 reduced emissions from electricity production from about 199.1 MtCO2e to 180.8 MtCO2e in 2014, a change of government led to the abolition of the CPM in 2014 and emissions from electricity production subsequently rose to 187 MtCO2e in 2015 and 189 MtCO2e in 2016 with adverse impacts in many sectors as well as Australia's overall emissions. The current Australian government continues to undermine its commitment to mitigation and the integrity and credibility of its own emissions reductions policy, introducing a softer 'calculated baseline' for its own Safeguard Mechanism, which allows companies to upwardly adjust their calculated baselines on the basis of their highest expected emissions, permitting emissions in excess of their historical emissions. While disappointing in the context of the global emissions reduction project, Australia's actions are sadly not unique and we also provide examples of loopholes exploited by countries participating in a range of other negotiations and emissions reduction projects. Such strategies undoubtedly serve the short-term political and economic interests of these countries; however, it is increasingly apparent that the cumulative impact of such tactics will ultimately impact the entire global community

Akin to a public good, emissions reduction suffers from the &lsquo ; free rider&rsquo ; syndrome. Although many countries claim that they are meeting their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction commitments, the average global temperature and GHG emissions continue to rise. This has led to growing speculation that some countries may be taking advantage of the system by effectively exploiting a range of loopholes in global agreements. Using a case study approach, we critically review the evidence from Australia, exploring how Australia has participated in global climate change negotiations and the way in which this emissions intensive country&rsquo ; s national emissions reduction obligations have been met. The findings suggest that: (1) successful negotiation to include Article 3.7 (&lsquo ; Adjusting the 1990 Baseline&rsquo ; or &lsquo ; the Australia Clause&rsquo ; ) in the Kyoto Protocol significantly favored Australia&rsquo ; s ability to meet its First Kyoto Commitment (2008&ndash ; 2012) ; and (2) successful bargaining for the accounting rule that allowed carbon credits from the first commitment period to be carried over to the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol benefitted Australia by 128 MtCO2e. At the national level, a lack of bipartisan political support for an effective mechanism to drive emissions reduction has also been problematic. While the introduction of the Carbon Pricing Mechanism (CPM) in 2012 reduced emissions from electricity production from about 199.1 MtCO2e to 180.8 MtCO2e in 2014, a change of government led to the abolition of the CPM in 2014 and emissions from electricity production subsequently rose to 187 MtCO2e in 2015 and 189 MtCO2e in 2016 with adverse impacts in many sectors as well as Australia&rsquo ; s overall emissions. The current Australian government continues to undermine its commitment to mitigation and the integrity and credibility of its own emissions reductions policy, introducing a softer &lsquo ; calculated baseline&rsquo ; for its own Safeguard Mechanism, which allows companies to upwardly adjust their calculated baselines on the basis of their highest expected emissions, permitting emissions in excess of their historical emissions. While disappointing in the context of the global emissions reduction project, Australia&rsquo ; s actions are sadly not unique and we also provide examples of loopholes exploited by countries participating in a range of other negotiations and emissions reduction projects. Such strategies undoubtedly serve the short-term political and economic interests of these countries ; however, it is increasingly apparent that the cumulative impact of such tactics will ultimately impact the entire global community.

The current EU proposal on greenhouse gas emission reduction has 28 targets for 2020: an EU-wide one for carbon dioxide emissions covered by the European Trading System, and one target for non-ETS emission per Member State. Implementation is necessarily more expensive than needed. I consider three alternative proposals to reduce costs. In the Irish proposal, Member States can purchase ETS permits to offset excess non-ETS emissions. In the Polish proposal, Member States can sell excess non-ETS emissions in the ETS. In the Swedish proposal, Member States can trade their non-ETS allocations. I compare these three alternatives to the default policy (no flexibility outside the ETS) and to the cost-effective solution (full flexibility). I calibrate a simple model to the results of the impact assessment of the European Commission. This reveals that European Commission did not fully disclose all details, and that odd assumptions were made. In the case of three Member States, the non-ETS allocation exceeds the projected emissions. The results show that the alternative flexibility mechanisms would be used to only a limited extent, but would help to suppress the costs of meeting the target. The Swedish and Polish proposals come closest to the cost-effective solution as full use is made of the hot air in the non-ETS system. The Irish proposal performs best if there are negative surprises in either the cost of non-ETS emission reduction or non-ETS emission projections.

Climate change is the most important challenge humankind has ever faced. It is commonly accepted that greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions must be reduced at great pace and to a significant extent to keep global warming below 2 (or, preferably, 1.5) degrees Celsius. This can only be reached if the obligations of major players (States, enterprises and investors) are sufficiently clear. The Oslo Principles on Global Climate Change Obligations aim to discern the legal obligations of States. The current Principles focus on the obligations of enterprises and investors. They identify the reduction obligations of enterprises, and articulate a series of related obligations. Investors can-and many already do-play an important role. These Principles aim to provide a legal basis for active investment management and engagement geared at stimulating enterprises to comply with their legal obligations. An extensive commentary further explains the Principles and their legal underpinning

A greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction obligation system has been implemented in the Swedish road transport sector to promote the use of biofuels. For transportation fuel suppliers to fulfil this obligation, the volume of biofuel required decreases with decreasing life cycle GHG emission for the biofuel, linking lower GHG emission to higher economic value. The aim of this study was to investigate how the economic competitiveness of a Swedish emerging lignocellulosic-based ethanol production system would be influenced by the reduction obligation. The life cycle GHG emission for sawdust-based ethanol was calculated by applying the method advocated in the EU Renewable Energy Directive (RED II). The saving in GHG emissions, compared with fossil liquid transportation fuels, was 93% for a potential commercial production system in southern Sweden. This, in turn, will increase the competitiveness of sawdust-based ethanol compared to the mainly crop-based ethanol currently used in the Swedish biofuel system, which has an average GHG emission saving of 68%, and will allow for an almost 40% higher price of sawdust-based ethanol, compared to the current price of ethanol at point of import. In a future developed, large-scale market of advanced ethanol, today&rsquo ; s GHG emission reduction obligation system in Sweden seems to afford sufficient economic advantage to make lignocellulosic ethanol economically viable. However, in a short-term perspective, emerging lignocellulosic-based ethanol production systems are burdened with economic risks and therefore need additional economic incentives to make a market introduction possible.

A greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction obligation system has been implemented in the Swedish road transport sector to promote the use of biofuels. For transportation fuel suppliers to fulfil this obligation, the volume of biofuel required decreases with decreasing life cycle GHG emission for the biofuel, linking lower GHG emission to higher economic value. The aim of this study was to investigate how the economic competitiveness of a Swedish emerging lignocellulosic-based ethanol production system would be influenced by the reduction obligation. The life cycle GHG emission for sawdust-based ethanol was calculated by applying the method advocated in the EU Renewable Energy Directive (RED II). The saving in GHG emissions, compared with fossil liquid transportation fuels, was 93% for a potential commercial production system in southern Sweden. This, in turn, will increase the competitiveness of sawdust-based ethanol compared to the mainly crop-based ethanol currently used in the Swedish biofuel system, which has an average GHG emission saving of 68%, and will allow for an almost 40% higher price of sawdust-based ethanol, compared to the current price of ethanol at point of import. In a future developed, large-scale market of advanced ethanol, today's GHG emission reduction obligation system in Sweden seems to afford sufficient economic advantage to make lignocellulosic ethanol economically viable. However, in a short-term perspective, emerging lignocellulosic-based ethanol production systems are burdened with economic risks and therefore need additional economic incentives to make a market introduction possible.

Many governments are failing to act sufficiently strongly on climate change. Given this, what should motivated affluent individuals in high-consumption societies do? This paper argues that social norms are a particularly valuable target for individual climate action. Within norm-promotion, the paper makes the case for a focus on anti-fossil fuel norms specifically. Section 1 outlines gaps in the existing literature on individuals' climate change obligations. Section 2 characterises social norms. Section 3 provides seven reasons why social norms are a particularly worthy target for individual climate actors. Section 4 asks which social norms individuals should emphasise, arguing that anti-fossil fuel norms have advantages over emissions reduction and offsetting norms. Section 5 outlines the pathways and mechanisms individuals might exploit to promote anti-fossil fuel norms.

The appropriateness and importance of market-based environmental governance systems vary according to different cases. Although so-called 'market trading' regimes can be useful in some circumstances, a false belief in the inevitability of their cost-effectiveness compared with so-called 'command and control' systems has allowed policy distortions to occur. So-called 'command and control' policies are being underemphasised, despite the fact that they may achieve reductions in carbon emissions that are cheaper than those likely to be achieved through emissions (or 'certificate') trading regimes. I address theoretical arguments which I then place in context with analysis of some features of the British Renewables Obligation and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme.