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Entitlements are federal government programs that require payments to any individuals or organizations eligible to receive benefits defined by law. There are many different types of entitlements, though most of the entitlement expenditures of the federal government are distributed to the most vulnerable individuals in society--the poor, disabled, and elderly. Consequently, in addition to providing a legal right to payments for eligible beneficiaries, many entitlements carry a moral obligation to those in need. Moreover, some of the most costly entitlement programs, such as social security and Medicare, are supported in public opinion polls by large majorities of Americans and are bolstered by powerful interest groups.

This report provides a brief explanation of spending for entitlements, including so-called appropriated entitlements, and discusses the procedural and statutory constraints on legislation affecting such entitlement spending.

Entitlements are programs that require payments to persons, state or local governments, or other entities if specific eligibility criteria established in the authorizing law are met. Entitlement payments are legal obligations of the federal government, and eligible beneficiaries may have legal recourse if full payment under the law is not provided. This report provides a brief explanation of spending for entitlements, including so-called appropriated entitlements, and discusses the congressional procedural constraints on legislation affecting such entitlement spending.

In this article, the literature around the entitlement approach to famine is assessed against the background of recent developments in economics which are perceived to have increasingly encroached upon the previously neglected subject matter of the other social sciences. In this light, emphasis is given to the tension that exists in the entitlement approach between its micro‐foundations and macro‐consequences and causes. This, in turn, is related to the broader problem in social theory of the relations between structures and agency. Whilst it is found that the entitlement approach does embody an implicit causal content in the filtering of socioeconomic mechanisms through the distribution of individual entitlements, it is ultimately argued that the approach is primarily suited to investigative rather than causal analysis.

This Article describes and analyzes entitlement-shifting rules: laws that initially assign a legal "entitlement" to one party and subsequently reassign the same entitlement to a different party. Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed's classic framework of property rules and liability rules involves two basic steps that yield four possible combinations of entitlement assignments and protective rules. These combinations are conventionally numbered in a particular order as rules one through four. Over the years, numerous scholars have built upon Calabresi and Melamed's four-rule structure with add-on rules that tweak the model's second step of assigning property or liability rule protection. By contrast, academicians have devoted far less attention to what this Article calls "entitlement-shifting rules"—rules that involve variations on the model's first step of assigning the entitlement. Although government actors routinely shift entitlements in legitimate and useful ways, some types of entitlement shifting—especially certain laws and actions that shift core property entitlements—are difficult to defend on efficiency or equity grounds. This Article sets forth principles for identifying and analyzing entitlement-shifting rules, applies those principles to examine a diverse set of real-world examples ranging from civil asset forfeiture laws to proposed drone regulations, and describes some basic strategies for deterring the most costly and unjust forms of entitlement shifting. By drawing attention to entitlement-shifting rules and their impacts, this Article paints Calabresi and Melamed's model in a revealing new light and provides additional perspective on some of the core deficiencies of modern takings laws.

AbstractCorporate failure exposes employees to the possible loss of sums due as deferred benefits such as arise from annual leave entitlements. Through such deferred benefits, employees are significant, often involuntary, providers of working capital to their employer. They are not necessarily adequately compensated for the risk involved, nor able to influence corporate governance in the ways available to other creditors. These issues have been largely neglected in the debate to date, and they provide the focus for an evaluation of alternative policies which have been proposed (or implemented) for protecting employee entitlements.

Elsewhere, writing in January, 1992, I indicated my belief that we are witnessing "the emergence of a community expectation: that those who seek the validation of their empowerment" must "patently govern with the consent of the governed. Democracy, thus, is on the way to becoming a global entitlement, one that increasingly will be promoted and protected by collective international processes."