Suchergebnisse

Exchange-rate policies of Central Eastern European Countries (CEEC) have often been a subject matter. Yet, some new insights in terms of political economy considerations upon exchange-rate policy are provided. It is pointed out that it is more appropriate to analyse exchange-rate policy in course of Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) with regard to a changing incentive structure. In doing so, considerable moral hazard problems become apparent. ERM II shall provide for an adequate level of convergence between prospective and current members of European Monetary Union (EMU). However, this institutional arrangement and, particularly, its impact on the incentives for exchange-rate policy making might enable CEEC to load considerable costs of convergence onto current members. Accordingly, the phase of ERM II is considered to be a bargaining on the distribution of costs of convergence between prospective and current members of EMU. In return, accession countries would offer to maintain public support for European integration. The CEEC' leverage in this bargaining rests on brinkmanship, i.e. putting exchange-rate regimes at risk, thus possibly undermining the according public support. This paper delineates the basic assumptions and conditions for successful brinkmanship, points out the specific transmission mechanisms, and characterises this kind of exchange-rate policy as 'threaten-thy-neighbour'. Overall analysis results in a cautious outlook on probable effects of such strategic exchange-rate policies on European institutional and economic matters.

Aim: The aim of this paper is to outline the essential features of the EU Exchange Rate Mechanism - ERM II - including the past experience of its participants and to analyze the benefits arising from Poland's accession to it.Research method: To this end, the method of inductive inference based on the comparative analysis of the experience of the present members of the ERM II system was employed.Findings: Participation in the ERM II system does not obligate its participants to join the eurozone; further, it allows for sustaining a floating exchange rate and guarantees help of the European Central Bank, thus reinforcing economic stability and credibility. This, in turn, should translate into the reduction of the investor's risk premium and of the relatively high cost of capital in Poland, compared to other Central and Eastern European countries, and to facilitate access to that capital, thus having a positive impact on economic growthContribution to science: Considering the unwillingness of subsequent governments and citizens to adopt euro, this paper attempts to disseminate knowledge and reinforce the substantive arguments within this area at a time when, in spite of the crisis, the group of the EU countries outside the eurozone has been shrinking. ; Cel: Celem opracowania jest przybliżenie istoty mechanizmu kursowego ERM II i doświadczeń dotychczasowych jego uczestników oraz analiza korzyści z przystąpienia Polski do niego. Układ / metody badawcze: W tym celu zastosowano metodę wnioskowania indukcyjnego opartą na analizie porównawczej doświadczeń dotychczasowych członków systemu ERM II. Wnioski / wyniki: Uczestnictwo w systemie ERM II nie zobowiązuje do wejścia do strefy euro, pozwala na zachowanie dalekiej płynności kursu walutowego i daje gwarancję pomocy Europejskiego Banku Centralnego, wzmacniającą stabilność i wiarygodności gospodarki, co powinno przełożyć się na zmniejszenie żądanej przez inwestorów premii za ryzyko i przyczynić do obniżenia względnie wysokiego kosztu kapitału w Polsce na tle państw Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej oraz ułatwić dostęp do niego, oddziałując pozytywnie na wzrost gospodarczy. Oryginalność / wartość artykułu: W związku z niechęcią ze strony kolejnych rządów i obywateli do przejścia na euro opracowanie stanowi próbę upowszechnienia wiedzy i wzmocnienia merytorycznych argumentów w tym obszarze w sytuacji kurczącego się pomimo kryzysu grona państw UE pozostających poza strefą euro.

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This paper reviews the strategies announced by the ten countries joining the European Union in May 2004 with regard to their intentions for participation in ERM II and the adoption of the euro. The paper examines the economic rationale of the monetary integration strategies declared by most acceding countries with a view to identifying also their potential risks. It does so by making use of several different approaches, including a short review of nominal convergence and a more extensive discussion from an optimum currency area perspective. An important part of the analysis is devoted to the implications of real convergence – i.e. catching-up growth in income and adjustment of the real economic structures towards those prevailing in the euro area – on the patterns of economic dynamics in acceding countries. Other aspects covered are the risks for external competitiveness in the convergence process and the appropriate pace of fiscal consolidation.