Suchergebnisse

AbstractEUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta has been the first maritime operation of the European Union and it has certainly been successful given the significant decrease of pirate attacks off the Somali coast. However, various issues have been raised concerning its legal basis under international law and its legal framework, including questions of responsibility. These issues are particularly interesting since the EU has a more integrated legal order than other organizations involved in such operations (eg UN, NATO). The present article attempts to address these issues against the background of international and European law. Even though the legal basis of the Operation is clear from a European law perspective, there have been certain misconceptions concerning the legal basis of the Operation under international law. The delineation of the Operation's legal framework requires a careful analysis of the rules applicable to each of its phases and of its addressees, since each phase is subject to different rules which are binding on different actors. Finally, there is an extensive discussion of questions of responsibility, which were heavily influenced by the applicable Rules of Engagement and of the actual conduct of the Operation. The conclusion is that, at least on the high seas, responsibility should primarily rest with the flag States rather than with the EU. However, in most cases the EU is indirectly responsible for violations of international law, except in cases where suspected pirates are transferred to third States pursuant to EU agreements with such States, in which case it bears primarily responsibility.

The author discusses the causes, the special forms and the consequences of piracy in the coastal waters of Somalia. She debates the reasons for the decision of the European Union to launch a military operation against piracy. In spite of the fact that the German constitution prohibits the use of armed forces for the prevention of criminal acts German naval forces are taking part in the European military operation "Atalanta".

The author discusses the causes, the special forms and the consequences of piracy in the coastal waters of Somalia. She debates the reasons for the decision of the European Union to launch a military operation against piracy. In spite of the fact that the German constitution prohibits the use of armed forces for the prevention of criminal acts German naval forces are taking part in the European military operation "Atalanta". Adapted from the source document.

An internal security problem of Somalia—state failure from internal conflict resulting in increased piracy—has increasingly become an external security problem for the European Union (EU). This article contributes to analysing the role of the EU as a security actor in countering piracy off the Horn of Africa, by examining three different dimensions of the EU response to this problem: (a) the immediate EU response (the EU military mission EUNAVFOR Atalanta); (b) the medium-term EU response (the Critical Maritime Routes (CMR) programme launched by the European Commission); and (c) the long-term EU response (development and security assistance). This article concludes that the EU has been very active in addressing piracy through its naval task-force to protect maritime transport in the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, as well as its efforts to enhance regional counter-piracy capacities and thematic and geographical financial instruments. The EU thus has taken up the fight against 'Captain Hook'.

The uncontrollable outbreak of piracy attacks off the Somali coast has lately made the East African coast the area where the majority of all global maritime crimes occur. Located in East Africa, Somalia borders one of the most important maritime communication routes on Earth: the Suez Canal – the Red Sea – the Gulf of Aden. EU states could be acutely affected by the disruption of sea trade in this area, therefore they have become actively involved in fighting piracy off the Somali coast. As a result of political, organizational and legal activity, the Council of the EU established the first maritime military operation under the auspices of the European Union – EUNAVFOR Somalia – Operation Atalanta. The efficient operation of EU naval forces, hundreds of miles from European shores would not have been possible had it not been for an extensive and comprehensive maritime policy. Not only has its implementation enabled the EU to chase pirates in the Somali basin, or helped bring any criminals detained before the courts, but is has also influenced countries outside the European Union.

Durch die Globalisierung der Märkte nimmt weltweit der Verkehr auf den Meeren, dem Land und in der Luft rasant zu. Das maritime Umfeld bildet somit einen hochkomplexen Sicherheitsraum. Eine wesentliche Aufgabe der Behörden und Organisationen mit Sicherheitsaufgaben (BOS) ist die Gewährleistung der maritimen Sicherheit. Dafür benötigen sie schnelle und situationsspezifische Lageinformationen in Echtzeit, um Bedrohungen zu erkennen und möglichst präventiv zu begegnen. (Europäische Sicherheit & Technik / SWP)

An internal security problem of Somalia-state failure from internal conflict resulting in increased piracy-has increasingly become an external security problem for the European Union (EU). This article contributes to analysing the role of the EU as a security actor in countering piracy off the Horn of Africa, by examining three different dimensions of the EU response to this problem: (a) the immediate EU response (the EU military mission EUNAVFOR Atalanta); (b) the medium-term EU response (the Critical Maritime Routes (CMR) programme launched by the European Commission); and (c) the long-term EU response (development and security assistance). This article concludes that the EU has been very active in addressing piracy through its naval task-force to protect maritime transport in the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, as well as its efforts to enhance regional counter-piracy capacities and thematic and geographical financial instruments. The EU thus has taken up the fight against 'Captain Hook'. Adapted from the source document.

The uncontrollable outbreak of piracy attacks off the Somali coast has lately made the East African coast the area where the majority of all global maritime crimes occur. Located in East Africa, Somalia borders one of the most important maritime communication routes on Earth: the Suez Canal – the Red Sea – the Gulf of Aden. EU states could be acutely affected by the disruption of sea trade in this area, therefore they have become actively involved in fighting piracy off the Somali coast. As a result of political, organizational and legal activity, the Council of the EU established the first maritime military operation under the auspices of the European Union – EUNAVFOR Somalia – Operation Atalanta. The efficient operation of EU naval forces, hundreds of miles from European shores would not have been possible had it not been for an extensive and comprehensive maritime policy. Not only has its implementation enabled the EU to chase pirates in the Somali basin, or helped bring any criminals detained before the courts, but is has also influenced countries outside the European Union.

The uncontrollable outbreak of piracy attacks off the Somali coast has lately made the East African coast the area where the majority of all global maritime crimes occur. Located in East Africa, Somalia borders one of the most important maritime communication routes on Earth: the Suez Canal – the Red Sea – the Gulf of Aden. EU states could be acutely affected by the disruption of sea trade in this area, therefore they have become actively involved in fighting piracy off the Somali coast. As a result of political, organizational and legal activity, the Council of the EU established the first maritime military operation under the auspices of the European Union – EUNAVFOR Somalia – Operation Atalanta. The efficient operation of EU naval forces, hundreds of miles from European shores would not have been possible had it not been for an extensive and comprehensive maritime policy. Not only has its implementation enabled the EU to chase pirates in the Somali basin, or helped bring any criminals detained before the courts, but is has also influenced countries outside the European Union.

This article argues that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to control Somali piracy for four reasons. First, Somali piracy is a land-based problem and naval control mechanisms are not changing the incentives for pirates. Second, improving Somalia's anarchic political situation will not necessarily stop piracy. Our analysis demonstrates that piracy is a business which improves with a more stable operating environment. Third, piracy is organized criminal activity, and like other organized crime groups will be difficult to control, especially if it becomes embedded in state structures. Finally, we argue that few of the relevant players have any real incentives to alter their behaviour. ; August 2011, Updated version

Maritime engagement in the Gulf of Aden is a puzzling case for anyone interested in the political and institutional problems underlying European Union–North Atlantic Treaty Organization (EU–NATO) cooperation. Although the EU's operation NAVFOR 'Atalanta' and NATO's 'Ocean Shield' operate in the same theatre and with similar mandates, there is no formal link between them. No joint planning has been envisaged, and no official task-sharing takes place. As this article aims to show, cooperation and coordination between EU and NATO forces at the operational and tactical levels have nevertheless worked surprisingly well. Two faces of EU–NATO cooperation become apparent: the political level is dominated by a permanent deadlock, while on the ground and at sea staff have developed a modus operandi that allows them to deliver fairly successfully in complementing yet detached operations. Based on 60 interviews with EU and NATO officials (2010–2013), this article illustrates how the operational and tactical levels have developed ways of coordinating efforts informally despite the lack of a formal framework. It aims to show to what extent and how they succeed at bypassing organizational boundaries and at overcoming political limitations. Although these practices are becoming increasingly institutionalized, it remains to be seen whether this will translate into formal changes.

This paper critically assesses the EU's anti-piracy operation Atalanta in the light of the protection of Union citizens. The main question is to which extent a Union citizen threatened by pirates off the coast of Somalia could rely on the promise of civis europaeus sum. The paper discusses the various legal aspects pertaining to the forceful protection of EU citizens in international law, EU constitutional law and the operational parameters of Atalanta. It argues that within the particular framework of the international effort to combat piracy, the protection of citizens by military force could be legal. Moreover, the protection of citizens outside the EU forms now one of the legally-binding general objectives of the Union. Yet, this objective is not reiterated in the operational mandate, which creates tension and confusion between the general objective and the CSDP instrument. The paper concludes that the mandate of Atalanta, by focussing entirely on universal objectives, is constitutionally incomplete and shows that the external dimension of Union citizenship is still underdeveloped.