Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis note analyses a peculiar feature of the ESM, namely the lack of an acceptable set of standards for the fundamental democratic principle of transparency. Moving from the particular nature of this mechanism, we will highlight the most critical concerns connected to secrecy, confidentiality and inviolability of documents, looking not only at the ESM Treaty but also at relevant documents approved by its bodies (in particular the Code of Conduct and the By-Laws).

The goal of this article is to analyse whether the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and its current reform have been subjected to sufficient legal and democratic approval in non-euro area Member States. It is argued that the establishment of the ESM and the consequential obligation to accede to it after entering the euro area is at least to a certain extent legally and democratically underpinned by Article 136(3) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The establishment of the prospective euro area entrants' obligation to join the ESM after adopting the euro is a manifestation of the normative value of Article 136(3) TFEU. However, the 2021 ESM reform has not been accompanied by a similar Treaty amendment and thus lacks legal and democratic legitimacy in non-euro area countries. This may have legal and political consequences for the obligation to adopt the euro in the affected countries.
ESM, European Stability Mechanism Reform, ESM Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union, euro adoption, euro area entry criteria, Article 136 TFEU, democratic legitimacy

To date, the resolution of the Banco Popular Español, being the first and only resolution case in the euro area, has had the "benefit" of bringing to light several shortfalls of this crisis management system. Back then, thanks to the sale of business, the need of the use of the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) has been avoided, prompting criticism on whether the fund had sufficient means to overcome a major widespread crisis. During the period elapsed from the last financial crisis, the euro area banking sector has built capital and liquidity buffers, which were aimed at protecting them for future shocks. Although it is now widely accepted that crises are of a cyclical nature, new risks and the high interconnectivity of today's economic activities brought an unexpected crisis due to the current pandemic. The consequences of this unprecedented event in modern history had severe effects to the worldwide economy, mostly for the boundless block of labour activities, which caused severe losses for households, enterprises and governments that consequently affected the financial intermediation function of the banks. Concerning the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the current pandemic has had the effect to put temporary on hold the discussion on the revision of the ESM Treaty, including its role as a Backstop to the SRF, so that the Mechanism could experience a new role through the ESM Pandemic Crisis Support. In such a framework, this paper aims to bring back the attention to the unfinished path in the establishment of the Common Backstop by addressing an important element of risk, namely its decision-making process. The main aim is to explore possible governance issues, which could hamper a timely and effective use of the Common Backstop, in the case that the SRF would be depleted and no alternative funding sources would be available.

The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) has been instrumental in safeguarding the financial stability of the Euro area and of its Member States. This article looks at the tumultuous process of reforming the ESM. It analyses the main changes that would be brought about by the draft revised ESM Treaty, whose text was agreed upon in June 2019 and finalized in December 2020. These concern the ESM's purposes and operations; the procedure for granting stability support to a Euro area Member State; precautionary financial assistance instruments; single-limb collective action clauses; and the common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund. The focus then shifts to the changes agreed upon in response to the COVID-19 crisis. A new credit line has been introduced, the Pandemic Crisis Support, which builds on an existing instrument. It is argued that the reforms posited in the draft revised ESM Treaty would plug important gaps in the framework of the Economic and Monetary Union. Nevertheless, some of the ESM's underlying vulnerabilities would remain, notably as regards its governance, the status of non-Euro area Member States, and the framework for its transparency and accountability. A more comprehensive reform could have taken place, which would have improved upon the overall structure of the Euro area.
European Stability Mechanism, ESM Treaty, ESM reform, Pandemic Crisis Support, European Monetary Fund, economic governance, accountability

This paper examines and critically discusses several new forms of differentiated integration developed in reaction to the Eurozone crisis, including the so-called Two-Pack of economic governance, the ESM Treaty and the Fiscal Compact. A number of elements from these instruments will be discussed that best illustrate the challenges of the most recent forms of further integration in the light of legitimacy. A theoretical framework for the concept of legitimacy is used that builds on the assumptions that legitimacy is provided through legality and that parliaments contribute to the legitimacy of political projects as an important element of so-called 'input legitimacy'. The paper illustrates some of the opportunities, challenges and risks of the recent forms of differentiated integration. It is argued that in the absence of an increased legitimacy of democratic politics at the level of the European Union, the most important legitimacy source remains at the level of national democracy and parliaments. Therefore, the importance of national legitimacy moments should not be underestimated. Moreover, they should not be avoided.

This book provides an analysis of the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Pringle case. It focuses on the three main aspects of the ruling. First, it examines the part of the judgment concerning the validity of the European Council Decision 2011/199 - adopted under the simplified revision procedure (Article 48(6) TEU) - which provides for the possibility to establish a financial stability mechanism. Second, it evaluates the new rules developed by the Court in order to interpret agreements concluded exclusively by the member states, such as the ESM Treaty. Third, it assesses the Court's interpretation of the main provisions of the so-called economic pillar of the Economic and Monetary Union and the fundamental rules provided for by the Treaties (nature of competence, financial assistance, institutional balance, judicial review charter of fundamental rights etc.) with regard to the ESM treaty provisions

In her view on the Pringle case, Advocate General Kokott unfolded an interesting analysis with regard to the scope of Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the no bail-out clause. In order to sustain her argument that this provision did not preclude the euro states from concluding the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (the ESM-Treaty), Kokott linked three principles: national sovereignty, stability and solidarity.