In this article I analyzed one of the goals of the 2004-2006 EU Cohesion policy reform -- to adjust the Cohesion policy to the new reality: increased development disparities inside the Union after Enlargement. I argue that despite big changes caused by Enlargement the Commission with its reform proposal of 2004 in principle did not try to reform anything, while decision on Cohesion policy reform taken by the European Council in the end of 2005, which finalized two years of Member States discussions, just slightly improved the situation. Cohesion policy reform of 2004-2006 actually did not reform this policy, because increased development disparities in the EU were overshadowed by indirect factor of Enlargement -- its costs to the EU-15. Adapted from the source document.
This article is devoted to the models of integration without membership as a method to solve the EU "enlargement versus deepening" dilemma. Stagnation of EU enlargement implicates that policy alternatives to enlargement & various models of integration without membership become essential. Authors dealing with issues of external europeanization often conclude that models of integration without membership rely heavily on methods similar to enlargement methods. It is recognized, however, that alternatives to enlargement lack an essential mechanism, an incentive that would induce reform & approximation to European standards, ie., these models do not provide a membership opportunity. Thus principle of conditionality that lies at the heart of such models fails without proper incentives to reform. Therefore a vicious circle emerges: with no membership opportunity there is no reform incentive & lack of reform hinders the possibility to transpose cooperation with EU to a qualitatively upper political, economic & institutional level. That raises a question if the enlargement "toolkit" (conditionality principle first of all) may fruitfully function in models of integration without membership. Adapted from the source document.
The EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) established by 1957 Rome Treaty was reformed constantly, but never radically. Although every attempt to reform the CAP was followed by rhetoric of necessity to introduce radical changes, the reform results always were of incremental character. Even EU enlargement has not resulted in the radical CAP reform, while negotiations on EU financial perspective for 2007-2013 have not moved the financing allocated to direct payments & market support measures. Just after reaching agreement on EU financial perspective for 2007-2013, discussions on the new period of 2014-2020 have already started in 2007. The goal of this article is, taking into account the CAP efficiency problems & likely attitudes of Member States & European Commission in respect of this policy future, to identify the most likely CAP development scenario & evaluate how well it matches the interests of Lithuania. Adapted from the source document.
Although the correlation of welfare & democracy is not direct, it is possible to sustain that the problems related with democracy satisfaction could be solved by public policy measures. Lithuanian's who reflect themselves as the losers of the transition reforms are unsatisfied with their socio-economic status & their anticipation of the prompt life improvement is rather high. If such tendencies start to dominate in the society of Lithuania, the question of political stability arises. Therefore social security, welfare network & infrastructure development as well as the increase of the redistribution amounts look like inevitable reforms in nowadays Lithuania. All appropriate compensatory measures could be related to the development of the welfare state in Lithuania. The liberal model of the welfare state should be the most suitable option for Lithuania at first sight. The Lisbon Strategy is implicitly based on this kind of welfare state model. Lithuania was trying to apply active labor market policy nevertheless the efforts were restrained by the small resources. The structural policy of the EU, mainly the measures financed by the European Social Fund, should increase the amount of funds allocated to the active labor market policy. Considering public policy in Lithuania an exclusive attention should be paid to the reduction of regional inequalities, establishment of the workplaces & social security infrastructure. Due to the Lithuanian budget restrictions it's necessary to develop a tax base & to improve tax administration. The second important component is partial decentralization of programming & implementation of the EU funds by means of the EU Cohesion policy reform. The third component is the implementation of horizontal regional policy in Lithuania. Legal & organizational premises for the aforementioned steps are already established. Adapted from the source document.
The aim of this article is to explore the bargaining process of the EU Financial Perspective 2007-2013 & to provide the conceptual explanation of the particular result of this bargaining. Although quite a number of drafts have been discussed among member states, three of them characterize the most important turns of the bargaining: Commission's Proposal, the Luxemburg's Compromise & the Decision of the European Council. Andrew Moravcsik's Liberal Intergovernmental Approach has been applied as the methodological tool for the analysis of the EU Financial Perspective 2007-2013. Moravcsik assumes that European bargaining is a two level game. A two level game is a metaphoric concept describing how the interaction between the domestic pressure groups & decision makers formulates national preferences & how political leaders on the European level represent those national preferences. On both levels pragmatic economic interests are the driving factors of different actors. It should be emphasized that states are the main players in EU arena, whereas supranational institutions play a supporting part. Five different groups or informal coalitions could be found in the recent bargaining for the Financial Perspective. The key interest of rich member states (UK, Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, & France) was to decrease EU spending -- to cut the contributions to the EU budget. Phasing out states (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece) as former major beneficiaries of EU structural policy strived to diminish financial losses in the new Financial Perspective. Poorer Central European countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic & Hungary) fought for the structural funds. Finally, the UK was alone against the rest of member states which called for the radical review of the British rebate. The comparative statistical & qualitative analysis of those proposals revealed two important trends in the bargaining. First, the EU spending was cut in every turn. Second, the funds for the rich member states were redistributed at the expense of the poorer member states. Certainly, such redistribution did not change the fact that the older member states remained the net contributors & the poor Central European countries gained more benefits compared to the previous Financial Perspective 2000-2006. Besides these two main tendencies the phasing out states succeed to increase the funds for their undeveloped regions & the final Decision of the European Council offered for the UK the most favorable mechanism counting the British rebate. The article reveals the weaknesses of the popular geopolitical interpretations which were proposed in order to explain the strong clashes between member states. The geopolitical & ideological discourse was aimed at neutralizing the domestic pressure. The economic logic to pay less & get more was the dominant thinking in the bargaining for the European financial pie. The asymmetrical interdependence which was the main source of bargaining power during the previous intergovernmental negotiations on Common Market is obsolete in explaining the modalities of redistributional policies. The effect of relative power was limited to the bargaining strategy, however it did not make a remarkable impact to the final agreement. On the contrary, the typical net recipient is a small & poor member state. The author has to come to the conclusion that the poor Central European countries states were forced to support the cuts of the budget & suffered a relative defeat in the bargaining, since they were the main beneficiaries of the common EU budget. It means that the poor Central European countries were the most interested to reach an agreement as soon as possible in order to avoid the risk of facing the EU financial turbulences. For this reason their bargaining power was very weak. Adapted from the source document.
This paper suggests that "scenario building" offers methodology for understanding the forces which are crucial for ESDP development. Author analyzes such driving forces of ESDP as EU integration tendencies, threats & demands on crises management operations, defense potency & NATO transformation success, as well as the US attitude towards ESDP. After the driving forces are examined, four scenarios are constructed: creation of European security & defense union, integration of ESDP into the broader system of euroatlantic cooperation, ESDP as a project of "core" states, & ESDP as capabilities & operations of "coalition of willing." All this is done in order to find a scenario, which is most suitable for the small states of the EU. Almost all of them are participating in the activities of ESDP, however, their interests & arguments are different. At last three groups of small EU states may be recognized regarding the European security & role in international sphere. Their preferences mostly depend on the leaders in each scenario: pro-European eurocontinentalists support France & Germany & euroatlantists support those scenarios, where UK is leading. Traditionally "neutral" countries seek the realization of scenarios, which would enhance their structural power inside the EU. So, none of the approached scenarios is supported by the majority of the small EU states. For Lithuania most appropriate, of course, is the one, which withholds the US in Europe. No doubt, this is scenario of integration of ESDP into the broader system of euroatlantic cooperation. Adapted from the source document.
Common energy policy of the European Union is one of the most intensively developing EU integration field. For Lithuania EU energy policy is the key instrument while increasing its energy security. Consequently Lithuania interest is to adapt EU energy policy according its priorities. The aims of this article are the evaluation of the benefit of the EU energy policy for Lithuania, review the main elements of this policy at the same time assessing Lithuania's influence towards EU energy policy. Concluding statement of the article -- the priorities of the EU and Lithuania energy policy are converging. This fact can be qualified as the success of Lithuanian European policy indicating that Lithuania managed to transform its national energy policy interests towards priorities of the EU energy policy. Adapted from the source document.
There are three main geopolitical actors whose interests & specific actions may have impact on Ukraine's geopolitical drift towards the East or the West. From such actors Russia must be named first. Yet author of the article is more interested in two others -- the United States & the European Union. Although in the Huntington's scheme they represent supposedly united Western civilization their interests in Ukraine or towards Ukraine are rather different. For the United States Ukraine is quite an important country, especially for security reasons. Those reasons are related both to containment of Russia -- the USA seeks to contain not only enemies but partners as well -- and to the implementation of national security strategy which treats the Wider Middle East as likely the most important for the USA -- from security point of view -- region of the world. Ukraine borders with this region in which the USA has few reliable partners. Ukraine may became such a partner -- more reliable than Turkey. From the first view the EU is more close to Ukraine than the USA. Yet the EU is more close to Ukraine only from geographical point of view. The EU, especially its core states, so called "old" Europe, treats Ukraine as peripheral country & regards development of closer ties with it as unnecessary or even harmful. One of the many reasons -- Ukraine may become a new Trojan Horse of the USA inside the EU. Different EU countries look at EU neighborhood policy with different eyes. Most of the new members of the EU give priority to the eastern direction but many older -- rather to the southern one. Moreover, for most of the new members Ukraine is more natural candidate for EU membership than Turkey creating much less problems for the European identity of the EU. However, Ukraine's possible accession to EU & NATO will depend not only upon position of the major geopolitical players but on the will of Ukrainians themselves. Ukraine is extremely heterogeneous country. Religious, historical & cultural divides create political ones & at the moment it is not clear which way -- leading towards the East or the West -- the country may choose. In such situation an external encouragement & support is vitally needed -- development of relations with Ukraine must become a priority not only for the USA but for the EU also. Adapted from the source document.
The paper deals with the specific features of the construction of an international identity by the EU & Lithuania. We do this by comparing the narrative of "Normative Power Europe" to that of "Lithuania, the regional center." The term "Normative Power Europe," though in use for some two years, still has no clear-cut place in the studies of European integration. So in the paper we first try to explicate its content by drawing a contrast with the more familiar concept of "civil power." We show that the term is an attempt at a new conceptualization of a problem that has been on the agenda of constructivist international relations studies for some time already, namely, that of the power of ideas in international politics. "Normative Power Europe" is defined as a discursive practice, as a narrative shaping the EU as a unique political institution which, by realizing itself via free exchange of ideas & opinions, is capable of changing the "normalcy" perception in international relations. In the EU political discourse the identity of EU as a normative power is constructed via the contrast of EU/USA politics, with America conceived as Europe's "Other." Next, in analyzing Lithuania's foreign politics in the context of the EU New Neighborhood Policy, we draw the parallels in the narratives made use of in constructing the identities of EU & Lithuania. A brief examination of the narrative "Lithuania, the regional center" shows its similarity to the narrative of "Normative Power Europe." First, the "Normative Power Europe" & the "Lithuania, the regional center" are both discursive constructions of their international identity. Second, both narratives are promoting a normative model, based on similar values & principles. Third, in both narratives regionalization is held a major instrument in spreading the values conducive to the creation of a common identity. Finally, both narratives perceive the common regional identity as a major security guarantee. The conclusion is that the narrative of "Lithuania, the regional center" is merely a nationalist replica of the "Normative Power Europe," with some peculiarities to be explained by differences in historical context & Lithuania's specifics in domestic politics. These are mainly due to Lithuania's attempt at reconciling her nation state identity & the ambitions of an active actor of the EU Common Foreign & Security Policy. Adapted from the source document.
The major question for this article is to what extent the implementation of the Lisbon strategy contributed to public policy change in Lithuania. The analysis is based on an overall discussion of experience in preparation & implementation of the National Program for Implementation of the Lisbon Strategy 2005-2010. Also, two case studies are conducted in the fields of active labor market policy & R&D policy. The overall conclusion is that Lisbon strategy is still to a large extent a missed opportunity. The article argues that perhaps the most important among the lost opportunities is the fact that the National Lisbon program has not became a catalyst for policy reform. Furthermore, the national Lisbon program has not yet found a well-defined place among other major national strategies in Lithuania. Finally, the program has only partially contributed to the improvement of strategic planning framework in Lithuania & to a better co-ordination of horizontal policies. Adapted from the source document.
The hypothesis raised in the article is that the strategy of Lithuania in the EU budget review in 2008-2009 & negotiations on the forthcoming financial framework should be based on the support to policies & programs with high European-wide benefits rather than the aim to maximize financial support & the country's net balance. The following analysis consists of two major stages. First, normative EU budget objectives & instruments are specified on the basis of the Treaties (assuming that the Treaty of Lisbon would be successfully ratified), EU citizens' opinions, fiscal federalism principles & evaluations of EU budget policies. Second, the impact of such budget on Lithuania & specific Lithuanian interests in the context of such a reform are estimated. Adapted from the source document.
This article focuses on the implications of the Lisbon Treaty on the decisionmaking process in the EU in general and Lithuania in particular. It argues that a new definition of the qualified majority voting (QMV) is an essential novelty of the Lisbon Treaty, which might change the current consensual character of the decision-making in the EU. It might, in turn, penalize those member states, which have specific preferences in certain policy areas. Extension of the QMV implies increasing pressure for the national policymaking. Benefits of this extension are conditioned by the character of the EU agenda at the national level. Article offers, therefore, evaluation of the Lithuanian EU agenda in this respect. Adapted from the source document.
Straipsnyje nagrinejama Lietuvos geroves valstybes raida saliai istojus i Europos Sajunga (ES). Teksta sudaro trys dalys. Teorineje dalyje ivertinamas dvieju ilgalaikiu valstybe strukturuojanciu procesu - pokomunistines transformacijos ir europeizacijos - santykis. Antrojoje dalyje analizuojami viesojo diskurso pokyciai siekiant issiaiskinti, ar ir kiek skirta demesio geroves valstybes pertvarkai Lietuvoje pasiekus pagrindinius euroatlantines integracijos tikslus. Galiausiai, remiantis 'socialiniu investiciju' koncepcija, bus siekiama parodyti, kiek Lietuvos geroves valstybes raida atliepia europines tendencijas. Pagrindine tyrimo isvada yra ta, kad geroves valstybes raida islieka inertiska, nors finansavimo salygos istojus i ES is tiesu gerejo. Be to, palyginti su gretimomis ES salimis naremis, skiriama maziau demesio toms geroves politikoms, kurios galetu duoti didziausia 'investicine graza'. Taip pat labiau orientuojamasi i tretini paslaugu lygmeni. Tokia situacija pirmiausia aiskintina trimis veiksniais: ekonominio saugumo prioriteto islaikymu, partine poliarizacija ir istorine logika, kuria diktuoja jau susikloste galios santykiai The article analyses the development of the Lithuanian welfare state after the country joined the EU. The text consists of three parts. In a theoretical part one evaluates interrelation of two long-term state-structuring processes, i.e. post-communist transformation and Europeanisation. In the second part, the changes of the public discourse are analysed in order to evaluate, if and how much attention is paid for the reforms of the welfare state in Lithuania after the main goals of Euro-Atlantic integration have been reached. Finally, under the concept of 'social investment state', one seeks to evaluate, how much the evolution of Lithuanian welfare state reflects the European trends. The main conclusion of analysis is that the development of welfare state remains inert despite the fact that financial conditions after the access to the EU have indeed improved. Besides, in comparison with the neighbouring EU member states, Lithuania pays less attention to those welfare policies that may bring the biggest 'return on investment'. The system is also more oriented towards the tertiary level. Such situation is firstly to be explained by three factors - the overall strength of economic security as the main political priority, party polarisation and historical logic dictated by the established power relations. Adapted from the source document.
The EU energy policy has always been governed by a sort of go-it-alone principles. There has been a lack of common approach to energy problems and no real determination to create a common energy market. As a result, the 2006 and 2009 gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine left certain Central and South European countries without gas and showed how vulnerable the EU is when it does not have real instruments to react unanimously. In that context the effects of Lisbon Treaty in energy security sector are very important to assess by looking what contribution the Treaty makes in that field. Moreover, it could be argued that The Lisbon Treaty established the main priorities of the European energy policy and has envisaged the possibility for the EU to play a more active role in that sector. Adapted from the source document.
The article discusses the impact of European Union membership on the economy, politics and policies of the new member's states, in particular, Lithuania. It first presents the forecasts and arguments regarding the impact of EU enlargement that were discussed before the enlargement in 2004/2007. Afterwards it evaluates the experience so far, by discussing the studies which have been made on the impact of EU and concludes that, the enlargement has been a positive sum game for the economies of new member states (as well the whole EU), increasing trade and investments flows and contributing to the catching up with the rest of the EU. However, it argues that the impact of the EU membership is mediated by domestic policies of each member state, and that Lithuania has not attempted to strengthen the positive impulses coming from the EU accession, in particular by postponing the structural reforms in the country. So far most evidence shows that new members have not changed radically the functioning of the EU, and the implementation of the EU norms has been better than expected, with Lithuania consistently being one of the leading countries in this respect. Finally, it assesses the main European policy priorities in Lithuania, in particular the reasons for some failures (such as the failure to join the eurozone in 2007) and achievements. It argues that most European policy failures have been due to the inconsistency and low credibility of some domestic policies. It concludes by providing venues for future research of European policy after the enlargement. Adapted from the source document.
