Suchergebnisse

Import zjawisk stanowiących zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego Unii Europejskiej w dość bolesny sposób odbija się na państwach członkowskich, powodując chaos naszczeblach decyzyjnych, co w konsekwencji osłabia całą UE. To z kolei wpływa na postrzeganie Unii Europejskiej jako słabej, nieradzącej sobie z problemami. Dlatego Autorka poddałaanalizie rolę polityki ekspedycyjnej w ramach WPBiO dla bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego i zewnętrznego UE. ; Import dangerous phenomena to the European Union causes a main threat to its internal security and in a very painful way affects for the Member States, causing chaos on the decisionmaking levels, which in turn weakens the whole of the EU. This in turn affects the perceptionof the European Union as weak, not deal with problems. Therefore, the author analyzed the role of policy expeditionary CSDP to internal and external security EU.

The paper presents the attitude of the EU to the Presidential elections in Ukraine which took place this year. It discusses the statements of leading EU politicians related to Brussels–Kiev relations at the time, the impact of the elections on the further development of cooperation between the EU and Ukraine, as well as the activities of the European Parliament intended to support the pro-European policy of Ukraine, headed by the recently elected President Viktor Yanukovich. The paper also presents articles that reported the campaign and its results published in the main European newspapers, such as "Süddeutsche Zeitung", "Spiegel", "The Economist", "The Financial Times", "Liberation", "Corriere della Sera" and others, which exerted a significant influence on shaping EU public opinion on presidential elections in Ukraine. The author pays particular attention to the analysis of the first visit of the new Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukowich, to Brussels. It resulted in the key priorities of the EU-Ukrainian coopera- tion under the new political circumstances being established.

Import zjawisk stanowiących zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego Unii Europejskiej w dość bolesny sposób odbija się na państwach członkowskich, powodując chaos na szczeblach decyzyjnych, co w konsekwencji osłabia całą UE. To z kolei wpływa na postrzeganie Unii Europejskiej jako słabej, nieradzącej sobie z problemami. Dlatego Autorka poddała analizie rolę polityki ekspedycyjnej w ramach WPBiO dla bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego i zewnętrznego UE. ; Import dangerous phenomena to the European Union causes a main threat to its internal security and in a very painful way affects for the Member States, causing chaos on the decision-making levels, which in turn weakens the whole of the EU. This in turn affects the perception of the European Union as weak, not deal with problems. Therefore, the author analyzed the role of policy expeditionary CSDP to internal and external security EU.

Od początków rządów D. Camerona w Wielkiej Brytanii (2010) pogłębił się eurosceptycyzm, który doprowadził do polaryzacji społeczeństwa, referendum i Brexitu. Niemcy opowiadały się za pozostaniem Zjednoczonego Królestwa w UE, ale po wynikach referendum zapowiedziały twarde negocjacje na warunkach UE. Jednocześnie uznały, że stwarza to dobre perspektywy do pogłębienia współpracy w gronie 27 pozostałych państw. Największe problemy w negocjacjach koncentrują się wokół rozliczeń finansowych Londynu z Brukselą (ok. 60 mld euro), statusu obywateli Unii Europejskiej, zatrudnionych i przebywających na terenie Zjednoczonego Królestwa oraz granicy pomiędzy Irlandią Północną i Republiką Irlandii. Trudne rokowania dotyczą również kształtu nowej umowy handlowej pomiędzy Unią Europejską i Wielką Brytanią. ; Since the beginning of David Cameron's rule in the United Kingdom (2010) Eurosceptic sentiments have intensified, leading to a split in society, a referendum and, finally, Brexit. Germany was for the UK remaining in the EU, but after the referendum Germany announced the EU would negotiate hard to have its conditions met. Germany decided that Brexit provided favorable prospects for enhancing cooperation among the remaining 27 states. The most difficult negotiating items concern financial settlements between London and Brussels (ca. EUR 60 billion), the status of EU citizens employed and residing in the territory of the UK, and the North Ireland-Irish Republic border. The negotiations of a new trade agreement between the EU and the UK are also difficult.

The last decades saw Turkey evolving from its Cold War era model of foreign relations, when it was the bastion of the West in the region, which involved alliance with the US and Israel. Following the doctrine of Ahmed Davutoĝlu, a theoretician of the Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP), which rose to power in 2002, Turkey opened to the neighbouring states, striving to become a regional power by diplomatic rather than military means and through cultural and economic incentives. Both the internal and international actions of AKP governments were initially successful, and Turkey with its version of Islamic democracy was considered a model during the Arab Spring and a sound counterbalance to such countries as Iran. However, Turkey's bid to join the EU was stalled, and its approach to the civil war in Syria as well as other issues has been heavily criticized both in the West and in the region. The internal tensions are growing too, as the government has failed to recognize the rights of large minority groups, particularly the Kurds and the Alevi, which may threaten the integrity of the country.

The last decades saw Turkey evolving from its Cold War era model of foreign relations, when it was the bastion of the West in the region, which involved alliance with the US and Israel. Following the doctrine of Ahmed Davutoĝlu, a theoretician of the Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP), which rose to power in 2002, Turkey opened to the neighbouring states, striving to become a regional power by diplomatic rather than military means and through cultural and economic incentives. Both the internal and international actions of AKP governments were initially successful, and Turkey with its version of Islamic democracy was considered a model during the Arab Spring and a sound counterbalance to such countries as Iran. However, Turkey's bid to join the EU was stalled, and its approach to the civil war in Syria as well as other issues has been heavily criticized both in the West and in the region. The internal tensions are growing too, as the government has failed to recognize the rights of large minority groups, particularly the Kurds and the Alevi, which may threaten the integrity of the country.

The problem of enclaves/enclaves in the theory of IR opens an interesting field of study, not only because of the actual phenomena and processes accompanying the formation of said entities, but also due to inaccuracies and variances in the very terms in use, especially in the field of public policy. The Kaliningrad Oblast is either an enclave (from the point of view of the EU, NATO, as well as Poland and Lithuania), or an exclave (from the point of view of the Russian Federation). The status of the region as perceived by the Western countries and organisations differs from the Russian standpoint. The Kaliningrad Oblast always would be a region of external influences of the West, an element of their foreign, security and economic policies, while for Russia Kaliningrad is a sphere of its domestic governance, although shaped by many international determinants resulting from its geographical location. This paper is aimed at examining public policy of the EU and neighbouring countries towards the Kaliningrad Oblast in the context of its specific geographical location and legal status. Possibilities of the region's incorporation in the EU's neighbourhood is also emphasized in the paper as an important factor affecting the position of the Kaliningrad Oblast.

The problem of enclaves/enclaves in the theory of IR opens an interesting field of study, not only because of the actual phenomena and processes accompanying the formation of said entities, but also due to inaccuracies and variances in the very terms in use, especially in the field of public policy. The Kaliningrad Oblast is either an enclave (from the point of view of the EU, NATO, as well as Poland and Lithuania), or an exclave (from the point of view of the Russian Federation). The status of the region as perceived by the Western countries and organisations differs from the Russian standpoint. The Kaliningrad Oblast always would be a region of external influences of the West, an element of their foreign, security and economic policies, while for Russia Kaliningrad is a sphere of its domestic governance, although shaped by many international determinants resulting from its geographical location. This paper is aimed at examining public policy of the EU and neighbouring countries towards the Kaliningrad Oblast in the context of its specific geographical location and legal status. Possibilities of the region's incorporation in the EU's neighbourhood is also emphasized in the paper as an important factor affecting the position of the Kaliningrad Oblast.

The EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy was adopted by the European Council on June 28, 2016. It defines the common interests of the EU and its member states. It was based on the following objectives: security of citizens and territory, prosperity, democracy, global order, which are to lead to the creation of a credible, reactive and cohesive European Union. The principles which the European Union began to follow are unity, cooperation with others, responsibility, and deepening external partnerships.It is worth noting that cybersecurity in the European Union is a prerogative of the Member States unlike cyberterrorism which is a shared competence. Nevertheless, the EU has a key role to play in creating the conditions for the ability of Member States to improve, cooperate and build trust.This article will attempt to demonstrate that the effectiveness of actions taken by European Union bodies in the field of cyber terrorism depends on the type of instruments at the disposal of the EU and the Member States and the legal basis of the relevant regulations. The problem is that there are legal inaccuracies and interpretation discrepancies in the provisions of legal regulations at the EU level regarding the division of competences regarding cyberspace protection, which in fact lead to a delay in the establishment of mutual cooperation between the EU and the Member States. ; Globalna strategia UE na rzecz polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa została przyjęta przez Radę Europejską 28 czerwca 2016 r. Określa wspólne interesy UE i państw członkowskich. Opiera się na następujących celach: bezpieczeństwie obywateli i terytorium, dobrobycie, demokracji, ładzie światowym, które mają doprowadzić do stworzenia wiarygodnej, reaktywnej i spójnej Unii Europejskiej. Zasady, którymi zaczęła kierować się Unia Europejska, to jedność, współdziałanie z innymi, odpowiedzialność, pogłębianie partnerstw zewnętrznych.Warto zauważyć, że cyberbezpieczeństwo w Unii Europejskiej jest prerogatywą państw członkowskich w przeciwieństwie do cyberterroryzmu, który należy do kompetencji dzielonych. Mimo to UE ma do odegrania kluczową rolę w tworzeniu warunków dla zdolności państw członkowskich, aby ulepszać, współpracować i budować zaufanie. W niniejszym artykule zostanie podjęta próba wykazania, że na skuteczność działań podejmowanych przez organy Unii Europejskiej w zakresie polityki cyberterrorystycznej zależy od rodzaju instrumentów będących w dyspozycji UE i państw członkowskich oraz podstawy prawnej odpowiednich regulacji. Problemem pozostają nieścisłości prawne i rozbieżności interpretacyjne w zapisie regulacji prawnych na poziomie unijnym w zakresie podziału kompetencji dotyczących ochrony cyberprzestrzeni, które w rzeczywistości prowadzą do opóźnienia powstania wzajemnej współpracy między Unią a państwami członkowskimi[1] https://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_pl_.pdf. (dostęp: 3.02.2021 r.).

Since the Soviet Union collapsed and Ukraine regained her independence, Ukraine has become an object of interest of the EU's foreign policy. Ukraine has immense economic and social potential, and a significant geopolitical location, particularly from the point of view of EU – Russian relations. Good mutual relations were corroborated by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Ukraine and the EU. Signed on June 14, 1994, the Agreement provided for the reinforcement of mutual bonds as well as political and economic cooperation. Over its near twenty years of independence, Ukraine has taken part in several EU initiatives. A current issue at the Ukraine– EU summit, held in Kiev in December 2009, concerned the agreement of association to be drawn up that should replace the present Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Ukraine and the EU. On account of a number of issues that the EU continues to have reservations about (the insufficient battle against corruption in Ukraine, the slow pace of economic reforms, and the lack of a uniform standpoint of the Ukrainian President, government and parliament) the signing of this Agreement has been postponed until next year.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: The scientific goal of the article is to analyze traffic safety policy, in a problem-chronological perspective, as part of the Swedish "welfare state" model, with particular emphasis on internal political and social factors.THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODS: In exploring the issues of road safety in Sweden, the author used a functionalist approach to examine the relationship of political forces affecting their shape. The genetic method has allowed to mention qualitative factors that are the foundations of Swedish policy. Institutional and normative approach with regard to the characteristics of decision-making processes, law-making processes resulted in a system analysis in line with the theoretical model proposed by David Easton. Each stage of the legislative process has been followed – from the change initiative to the entry intoforce of the "Vision Zero". The method of content analysis and the institutional and legal method served to illustrate the role that it has for Sweden for 20 years.THE PROCESS OF ARGUMENTATION: Ensuring broadly understood, multi-tasked road traffic safety is today a prerequisite for harmonious economic and social development of the country (for example, due to the cost of treatment of accident victims, but also the legitimacy of authority, whose task is to ensure safety).RESEARCH RESULTS: The necessity of introducing a nationwide road safety strategy was convinced by all the groups that sat in the Swedish parliament in 1997 (as evidenced by its voting through acclamation). The consolidation attitude of many social groups, institutions and individual road users, promoted by the Vision Zero, resulted in considerable successes. First of all, the number of fatalities in road accidents in 1997-2012 dropped by 48%. At the same time, the number of people who suffered minor injuries in the same period as a result of road accidents has increased. This testifies to the correct decisions of Swedish strategists who were already well aware in 1997 that it is impossible to eliminate accidents as such (which is why they focused on reducing the most tragic effects).CONCLUSIONS, INNOVATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The Vision of Zero, which is now a general philosophy of approach to road safety issues in Sweden, thanks to its efficiency and effectiveness has become not only a source of pride on the part of the Swedes themselves. Few (Sweden's population for the first time reached a ceiling of 10 million inhabitants in January 2017), although the very innovative Swedish society developed an innovative model of cooperation between private and public sector entities as well as every single user of transport infrastructure that contributed to the radical decline the number of accidents resulting in death or serious injury. Thus, once again, the descendants of the Vikings became a role model for other nations – both among European Union countries and on a global scale.

Celem analizy jest ocena wielkości i struktury inwestycji finansowanych ze środków unijnych pozyskanych przez władze samorządowe Poznania w kontekście potrzeb oraz prawidłowości zidentyfikowanych dla obszarów polaryzacji rozwoju w Polsce. Analiza odnosi się do dwóch pierwszych perspektyw finansowych Unii Europejskiej – 2004–2006 oraz 2007–2013 – w których Polska uczestniczyła jako państwo członkowskie, obejmując tym samym pierwszą dekadę naszych doświadczeń w realizacji polityk unijnych. Wyniki zidentyfikowane dla samorządu Poznania odnosi się w analizie porównawczej do pięciu największych miast Polski: Warszawy, Krakowa, Łodzi, Wrocławia i Gdańska. ; Abstract: The aim of the analysis is to assess the size and structure of investments financed from EU funds raised by the local authorities of Poznan in the context of the needs and the accuracy of the identified areas of polarization development in Poland. The analysis refers to the first two financial perspectives of the European Union – 2004–2006 and 2007–2013 – in which Poland participated as a member state, including the first decade of our experience in the implementation of EU policies. The results identified for Poznan refers to the comparative analysis of the five largest Polish cities: Warsaw, Krakow, Lodz, Wroclaw and Gdansk.

This text attempts to answer the main research question: what opportunities and challenges are facing the development cooperation implemented by Poland in the second decade of the 21st century? The following issues were considered in the analysis: the legal and institutional framework of Polish development cooperation, its geographical and thematic concentration, and financial resources allocated to these activities. A new quality in this area of Polish policy was introduced by the Act on development cooperation adopted in 2011, as well as by the articulation, through multi‑annual programs, of the preferred specialization of Polish activities in this field. However, there are still reservations regarding the cohesion of programming of Polish development cooperation with the EU and the global development agenda, the state's fulfilment of international commitments and the level of ODA financing, due to which Poland's participation in the global ODA system remains marginal.

The aim of this article is to analyse the fulfilment of the Stability and Growth Pact rules by the EU 15 member states in the period 1999–2015. The article also presents the evolution of the EU fiscal rules since their formulation, including, in particular, the influence of the crisis on both meeting the rules by the member states and their substance. The conclusion of the article is that the construction of the rules is the main cause of the ineffectiveness of the pact in eliminating the deficit bias in the EU. In the analysed period, there were years when the member states did not follow the limits defined by the rules (the whole period, but in particular the years before the crisis), years without anticyclical influence of the rules (in fact, the whole period 1999–2015), and years when the rules turned out not to be elastic enough (the years after the crisis). It leads to the overall conclusion that the EU fiscal rules are not the best tool to counteract the deficit bias in the EU. ; Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przeanalizowanie stopnia przestrzegania przez 15 krajów UE reguł fiskalnych zawartych w pakcie stabilności i wzrostu w latach 1999–2015 i ewolucji tych reguł od początku ich sformułowania. Analiza stopnia wypełniania poszczególnych reguł prowadzi do wniosku, że na nieskuteczność reguł w eliminowaniu zjawiska deficit bias rzutują w dużej mierze ich błędy konstrukcyjne. W trakcie całego analizowanego okresu, a zwłaszcza okresu przedkryzysowego, można było stwierdzić, że limity określone przez reguły nie były przestrzegane, właściwie przez cały analizowany okres nie prowadziły do antycyklicznej polityki fiskalnej, a po kryzysie nie były wystarczająco elastyczne. Prowadzi to do konkluzji, że reguły fiskalne nie są najlepszym środkiem do walki ze zjawiskiem deficit bias w Unii Europejskiej.

The purpose of this text is to present the results of a research in which the author analysed succeeding crisis situations that could constitute the basis for some of the changes in the political system of the EC/EU and subsequently made an attempt to delineate a certain scheme behind such behaviours. It is justified to seek the answer to the following question: What is the underlying reason for introducing changes in such situations and is it possible to pinpoint certain shared elements in different cases?To achieve that goal the author takes a closer look on the "empty chair" crisis, Schengen Area crisis and the recent financial crisis in Europe. In order to confirm the actual value of the conducted research, the author will make an attempt to relate his observations to the current geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe with reference to the EU competences in the existing political system.