Suchergebnisse

Clara Portela and Kolja Raube Six Authors in Search of a Notion: (In)Coherence in EU Foreign Policy and its Causes 1 Marise Cremona Coherence through Law: What difference will the Treaty of Lisbon make? 11 Olaf Poeschke Maastrichts langer Schatten: Das auswärtige Handeln der EU – Verschiebungen im institutionellen Gefüge? 37 Bernhard Stahl Incoherent securitisation: The EU in the Iraq crisis 70 Elsa Tulmets The European Neighbourhood Policy: A Flavour of Coherence in the EU's External Relations? 105 Javier Alcalde and Caroline Bouchard Human Security and Coherence within the EU: The Case of the 2006 UN Small Arms Conference 142

This article assesses the role that emotions play in European Union foreign policy-making. EU decision-making has often been depicted as technocratic and 'de-dramatized', yet there are still situations in which emotions can affect the process and outcomes of foreign policy decision-making. Using examples of the EU's responses to crises in Ukraine and Myanmar, the article illustrates that emotions can motivate the taking of particular decisions at particular times. Further, the EU expresses emotions in its foreign policy communications, although its use of emotional diplomacy may not be accompanied by substantive action appropriate to the emotions expressed, thus revealing the existence of an emotions–action gap. The 'emotional turn' in foreign policy analysis can open up new directions for research in EU foreign policy, and the conclusion considers other promising avenues for researching emotions and EU foreign policy.

First published online: 12 December 2017 ; The point of departure for the special collection is provided by the observation that the growing complexity of the crises in the neighbourhood and the internal ones faced by the Union provides a sense of urgency to any type of strategic thinking that the EU might embrace. Against this backdrop, the recent shift towards geopolitics and strategic thinking is contextualized and the understanding of key aspects of ways in which the shift is translated into strategies by EU actors is put forward. The analysis recognizes the recent developments within the institutional dimension of EU's foreign and security policy, yet it confirms the fundamental meaning of the member states' willingness to invest resources and harmonize their foreign policy strategies at the EU level.

This paper was accepted for publication in the journal International Politics and the definitive published version is available at https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-017-0125-x ; © 2017 Macmillan Publishers Ltd., part of Springer Nature The point of departure for the special collection is provided by the observation that the growing complexity of the crises in the neighbourhood and the internal ones faced by the Union provides a sense of urgency to any type of strategic thinking that the EU might embrace. Against this backdrop, the recent shift towards geopolitics and strategic thinking is contextualized and the understanding of key aspects of ways in which the shift is translated into strategies by EU actors is put forward. The analysis recognizes the recent developments within the institutional dimension of EU's foreign and security policy, yet it confirms the fundamental meaning of the member states' willingness to invest resources and harmonize their foreign policy strategies at the EU level.

AbstractWhy has the European Union been able to craft a unified sanctions policy against Russia but failed to rein in Russia's 'Trojan horses' within the EU that pursue pro‐Putin foreign policies? We argue that the EU suffers from a specific type of disaggregation in its foreign and security policy. While the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy has increased its capacities over time, the EU still lacks the power to prevent Member States from pursuing their own independent policies. In the face of the Ukraine crisis, for instance, the EU marshaled a surprisingly strong sanctions regime, but could not prevent Member States from pursuing divergent pro‐Russia policies, such as signing new energy deals or granting port access for Russian naval forces. As EU foreign and security powers grow, foreign powers face increasing incentives to cultivate Trojan horses among the EU Member States.

The rise of populism in the European Union represents a key internal political development that is likely to have repercussions on its foreign policy. It is traditionally assumed that, when in the opposition, populist parties affect foreign policy debates though not foreign policy outcomes. But when they are elected into office, as happened in several EU member states, how do they shape policy decisions and processes in EU foreign policy? This policy paper argues that although populist actors can be vocal and conspicuous in aligning with external actors contesting the international liberal order, they rarely go as far as swaying or blocking EU foreign policy decisions and outputs. At the same time, however, populist governments' domestic illiberal policies have the potential to undermine the EU's legitimacy, structural power, and resilience-building endeavours.

The rise of populism in the European Union represents a key internal political development that is likely to have repercussions on its foreign policy. It is traditionally assumed that, when in the opposition, populist parties affect foreign policy debates though not foreign policy outcomes. But when they are elected into office, as happened in several EU member states, how do they shape policy decisions and processes in EU foreign policy? This policy paper argues that although populist actors can be vocal and conspicuous in aligning with external actors contesting the international liberal order, they rarely go as far as swaying or blocking EU foreign policy decisions and outputs. At the same time, however, populist governments' domestic illiberal policies have the potential to undermine the EU's legitimacy, structural power, and resilience-building endeavours.