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The article confirms the hypothesis that a multiplicity of parties of the European and national levels forms the party system of the European Union (EU). The authors describe the main characteristics of Europarties and political groups comprised of them as key actors in the European Parliament's (EP) political and legislative processes. The authors adopt the institutional approach and make use of the tools of the comparative, structural, and functional analyses. Special attention is paid to the 'two-tier' structure the connection between national and supranational institutions as a key feature of the European Union's party system. The study is based on the European Parliament framework laws, election results, Europarties' political programmes, as well as on the comparison of the composition of the Europarties and the EU bodies. The analysis provides a new perspective on the major processes and contradictions in the functioning of the European Parliament and demonstrates that the transformation of the EU from an intergovernmental association to a (con)federation has not been completed yet.

Introduction Once the reformation of suffrage (see Reform #1) is accomplished – laying down the foundation of enlightened democracy –, the transformation of the united Europe's (henceforward Republic of the United Europe or RUE) political system is the next priority. As any political system is complex and their institutions are interconnected, I am going to […]
The post Reform #2: Political system (vol. 1) – European electoral system appeared first on Enlightened Europism.

'1993 wurde in Italien das Verhältniswahlsystem durch ein kombiniertes Wahlsystem ersetzt. Damit sollte das fragmentierte Parteiensystem beseitigt, die Herausbildung eines bipolaren Parteiensystems eingeleitet sowie die Stabilität der Regierungen und eine Alternanz zwischen Regierung und Opposition garantiert werden. Die Bilanz nach drei Parlamentswahlen scheint positiv zu sein: Eine Alternanz an der Regierung ist erfolgt, die Regierungen sind immer stabiler geworden und die tatsächlichen Akteure des Wettbewerbs sind nicht mehr die Parteien, sondern die Wahlkoalitionen. Dennoch ist der italienische Bipolarismus noch nicht konsolidiert, denn die Reform des Wahlsystems hat ein bipolares Parteiensystem mit jeweils zwei Akteuren hervorgebracht: Koalitionen und Parteien. Die Koalitionen haben die Parteien noch nicht ersetzt, die Parteien können auf die Koalitionen nicht verzichten. Der Bipolarisierung der Wahlkoalitionen steht nach wie vor die Fragmentierung der Parteien gegenüber.' (Autorenreferat)

Based on conference paper. Compares the service activities of French and British members of the European Parliament.

Why have European large parties lost electoral ground in recent decades? Whereas most explanations draw on theories of dealignment, this article advances a novel, institutional, argument by focusing on the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament (EP) in 1979. Archetypes of second-order elections, EP elections are characterized by lower vote shares for (a) large and (b) incumbent parties. Bridging the second-order elections theory with theories of political socialization, we posit that voting patterns in EP elections spill over onto national elections, especially among voters not yet socialized into patterns of habitual voting. In so doing, they increase the national vote shares of small parties. This proposition is examined using an instrumental variables approach. We also derive a set of testable propositions to shed light on the underlying mechanisms of this pattern. Our findings show that EP elections decrease support for big parties at the national arena by inculcating voting habits.

Why have European large parties lost electoral ground in recent decades? Whereas most explanations draw on theories of dealignment, this paper advances a novel, institutional, argument by focusing on the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament (EP) in 1979. Archetypes of second-order elections, EP elections are characterized by lower vote shares for 1) large and 2) incumbent parties. Bridging the second-order elections theory with theories of political socialization, we posit that voting patterns in EP elections spill over onto national elections, especially among voters not yet socialized into patterns of habitual voting. In so doing, they increase the national vote shares of small parties. This proposition is examined using an instrumental variables approach. We also derive a set of testable propositions to shed light on the underlying mechanisms of this pattern. Our findings show that EP elections decrease support for big parties at the national arena by inculcating voting habits.

Introduction As discussed in my previous article (see Reform #2 vol. 1), the European electoral system would go through a radical reformation, which affects the composition and working dynamics of the European Parliament (or EP) profoundly. Based on the figures of turnout and election results, the pan-Europarties and their national branches are going to reshape […]
The post Reform #2: Political system (vol. 2) – European Parliament appeared first on Enlightened Europism.

The tandem system provides a new frame for the election of the European Parliament. It pays due tribute to the European level of the election rather than construing the event as a patchwork of separate elections per Member State. It offers a forum for europarties to contest an election with power, visibility and influence. It promotes the leaders of europarties as prime personnel for political offices to be staffed in the new legislative period. The tandem system proceeds in three steps geared to primary Union law. The first step apportions all parliamentary seats among europarties by aggregating the electorate's votes at Union level. Thus, with regard to the division of the Union's citizens by political persuasion, the tandem system obeys the One Person One Vote principle. The second step, disaggregation of the unionwide apportionment, allots the seats by Member State and europarty in a way safeguarding the preordained seat contingents of the Member States. Thus, with regard to the Union's socio-cultural layout by Member State, the tandem system respects the principle of degressive representation that is peculiar to the European Union. The third step assigns the seats of a party in a Member State to domestic candidates by means of the same provisions which the Member State has been employing in the past, thus complying with the Union's principle of subsidiarity. Das Tandemsystem: Ein neues Wahlsystem für das Europäische Parlament Das Tandemsystem ist ein neues Wahlsystem für das Europäische Parlament. Es betont die europäische Ausrichtung der Wahl anstatt in eine Ansammlung separater Wahlen pro Mitgliedstaat zu zerfallen. Es lädt die Europarteien ein, an der Wahl mit Elan, Sichtbarkeit und Gestaltungskraft teilzunehmen. Es erlaubt den Spitzenkandidaten der Europarteien, sich für Führungspositionen in der neuen Legislaturperiode zu positionieren. Das Tandemsystem geht in drei Schritten vor, die sich am Primärrecht der Union ausrichten. Im ersten Schritt werden auf Unionsebene alle Sitze den Europarteien im Verhältnis ihrer Stimmenerfolge zugeteilt. Hinsichtlich der Aufteilung der Unionsbürger nach politischer Positionierung genügt das Tandemsystem somit dem Grundsatz der Erfolgswertgleichheit der Wählerstimmen. Im zweiten Schritt werden die unionsweiten Sitzzuteilungen nach Mitgliedstaat und Europartei so aufgeschlüsselt, dass jeder Mitgliedstaat sein vorher festgelegtes Sitzkontingent erhält. Hinsichtlich der Unionsgliederung nach Mitgliedstaaten genügt das Tandemsystem somit dem Grundsatz der degressiven Repräsentation. Im dritten Schritt werden die Sitze einer Partei in einem Mitgliedstaat den dort nominierten Kandidaten und Kandidatinnen zugewiesen, wobei die bisher geltenden Bestimmungen des betreffenden Mitgliedstaates weiterhin Anwendung finden. Hinsichtlich der innerstaatlichen Sitzzuweisungen genügt das Tandemsystem somit dem Grundsatz der Subsidiarität.