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Sample chapter available in Open Access ; Competition authorities use ex post evaluation of enforcement decisions to help determine if an intervention (or non-intervention) has achieved its objectives – and, if not, the reasons it failed to do so – thus allowing for improvement in the design and use of techniques used in the analysis underpinning the decision. In this essential volume, expert contributors use this procedure to provide a neutral and extensive assessment of cases that have significantly shaped European Union (EU) competition law enforcement. With in-depth analysis of foundational cases of EU competition law and the methodologies that have been developed over time to predict how enforcement decisions will affect competition, for each case the authors respond thoroughly to such questions as the following: • Did the decision have an impact on the affected market? • Did it improve consumer or social welfare? • With the benefit of hindsight, were the factual assertions true? • Were all the relevant theories of harm (and efficiency justifications) properly investigated? • Was the decision able to deter similar anticompetitive behaviour? • Did the decision provide clear guidance on which types of conduct should be deemed illegal? Industries covered include information technology (the Microsoft cases), payment cards (the Visa Europe 2010 Commitments Decision), pharmaceuticals, and conditional rebates (Michelin I, Michelin II and BA/Virgin). Also investigated are the role of buyer power in concentration cases and the relative strength of competition law enforcement versus regulation, where appropriate. In its accumulation of evidence from individual cases that have gradually improved our ability to grasp the connections between policy choices and the outcomes they lead to, this matchless volume has no peers. It constitutes an invaluable resource for competition authorities in performing ex post evaluations and will be welcomed by practitioners and academics concerned with European competition law. ; -- About the Global Competition Law Centre -- Editors -- Contributors -- Preface -- CHAPTER 1: Methods for the Ex Post Assessment of Competition Law Decisions: A Concise Guide, Paolo Buccirossi -- CHAPTER 2: Ex Post Assessment of European Competition Policy: The Microsoft Cases, Daniel Gore & Ashwin van Rooijen -- CHAPTER 3: Ex Post Assessment of European Competition Policy in the Payment Sector: The Visa Europe 2010 Commitments Decision, Alen Veljan, Scott McInnes & Nicolas Petit -- CHAPTER 4: Ex Post Assessment of European Competition Policy: Buyer Power in Concentration Cases, Maurice de Valois Turk & Ignacio Herrera Anchustegui -- CHAPTER 5: Ex Post Assessment of European Competition Policy: The Pharmaceutical Parallel Trade Cases, Jan Blockx & Benoît Durand -- CHAPTER 6: Conditional Rebates under EU Competition Law: A Retrospective on Michelin I, Michelin II and BA/Virgin, Christian Ahlborn, Xavier Boutin, Verity Egerton-Doyle & Nayantara Ravichandran

Since the end of the 20th century, ex-post evaluation of tax legislation has consistently been part of the agenda of the Dutch government. In 2005, the 2001 Income tax Act was evaluated. In addition, several tax expenditures are evaluated each year. Tax expenditures can be a controversial aspect of tax legislation. In general, tax expenditures have the drawback that, compared with direct subsidies, there is less information and less democratic control on these expenditures than on direct subsidies which are accounted for in the annual budget. In the past 20 years, the Netherlands has taken several measures to improve the accountability of tax expenditures. One of the measures in the 2001 Budget was the introduction of a framework consisting of several questions which have to be answered before a tax expenditure can be introduced. This framework has been amended several times. The current framework consists of the following questions: (1) Is the problem clear?; (2) Is the object stated clearly and unambiguously?; (3) Can it be proven why financial intervention is necessary?; (4) Can it be proven why a subsidy is preferred over a levy?; (5) Can it be proven why a tax incentive is preferred over a direct subsidy?; and (6) Is the evaluation of the provision sufficiently safeguarded? An evaluation of a proposed tax expenditure, therefore, has to be guaranteed before the tax expenditure is introduced.In this paper the Dutch techniques for ex-post evaluation are discussed briefly. These include accounting for tax expenditures and similar provisions in a tax expenditure report and a tax expenditure overview, evaluation reports and, possibly, sunset legislation.

Im Rahmen des Generalthemas 'Methodische Grundlagen der empirischen Institutionenökonomik: Konzeptionelle Fragen und Beispiele' beschäftigt sich der vorliegende Beitrag mit Methoden und wirtschaftspolitischen Konsequenzen der empirischen Ex-Post-Evaluation wettbewerbspolitischer Entscheidungen. Damit werden indirekt die zugrundeliegenden Institutionen empirisch evaluiert, da wettbewerbspolitische Entscheidungen durch eine Wettbewerbsbehörde und durch ein Gericht auf einer Reihe von Institutionen (materielle Wettbewerbsregeln, Verfahrensregeln, usw.) beruhen. Erfahren die Entscheidungen einer Wettbewerbsbehörde beispielsweise systematisch eine negative Ex-Post Evaluierung, so liegt der Schluss nahe, dass die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen dieser Entscheidungen mindestens Teil der Problemursache sind. Neben der Frage unangemessener Eingriffs- oder Verbotsstandards, problematischer Verteidigungen und Ausnahmen, ineffizienter Verfahrensregeln u.v.a.m. könnte ein solches Problem der institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen beispielsweise auch darin bestehen, dass die entscheidende Behörde einen zu großen diskretionären Handlungsspielraum hat und zu wenig regelgebunden agiert (Budzinski 2010). Es muss hierbei allerdings auch klar gesehen werden, dass der Schritt von der Feststellung 'falscher' Entscheidungen einer Wettbewerbsbehörde zu der Identifizierung möglicher institutioneller Ursachen alles andere als trivial ist.

Introduction Since the end of the 20th century, ex-post evaluation of tax legislation has consistently been part of the agenda of the Dutch government. In 2005, the 2001 Income tax Act was evaluated. In addition, several tax expenditures are evaluated each year. Tax expenditures can be a controversial aspect of tax legislation. In general, tax expenditures have the drawback that, compared with direct subsidies, there is less information and less democratic control on these expenditures than on direct subsidies which are accounted for in the annual budget. In the past 20 years, the Netherlands has taken several measures to improve the accountability of tax expenditures. One of the measures in the 2001 Budget was the introduction of a framework consisting of several questions which have to be answered before a tax expenditure can be introduced. This framework has been amended several times. The current framework consists of the following questions: (1) Is the problem clear?; (2) Is the object stated clearly and unambiguously?; (3) Can it be proven why financial intervention is necessary?; (4) Can it be proven why a subsidy is preferred over a levy?; (5) Can it be proven why a tax incentive is preferred over a direct subsidy?; and (6) Is the evaluation of the provision sufficiently safeguarded? An evaluation of a proposed tax expenditure, therefore, has to be guaranteed before the tax expenditure is introduced. Below, the Dutch techniques for ex-post evaluation are discussed briefly. These include accounting for tax expenditures and similar provisions in a tax expenditure report and a tax expenditure overview, evaluation reports and, possibly, sunset legislation.

AbstractEvaluators who take a complexity‐aware approach must consider tradeoffs related to theoretical parsimony, falsifiability, and measurement validity. These tradeoffs may be particularly pronounced with ex‐post evaluation designs in which program theory development and monitoring frameworks are often completed before the evaluator is engaged. In this chapter, we argue that theory‐based evaluation (TBE) approaches can address unique ex‐post evaluation challenges that complexity‐aware evaluation (CAE) alone cannot, and that these two sets of approaches are complimentary. We will outline strategies that evaluators may use to conduct rigorous ex‐post evaluations of democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) interventions that merge CAE's inductive approaches with a theory‐testing structure. It will illustrate these strategies with two case studies of ex‐post evaluation using process tracing (PT).

We study the influence of the program-targeted planning mechanisms on the civil service efficiency in the subjects of the Russian Federation. Our hypothesis is that the criteria for assessing effectiveness of civil service development programs are to increase the efficiency of its functioning and focus on solving problems of socio-economic development. The research methodology is based on the generalization of statistical data on the regions of the Central Federal District (CFD) of Russia in 2003-2016, and on the construction of some indices for civil service and socio-economic development. We have analyzed 67 programs of civil service development. Due to lack of financing Russian regions are forced to abandon many measures of the civil service reform. The average values of efficiency coefficients do not reach 30%, which indicates the existence of significant reserves for increasing the civil service development programs effectiveness. We have revealed that a crisis condition of socio-economic development resists the effective civil service development in the regions. At the same time, the region's advanced positions in the economy do not automatically lead to a comparable high level of civil service development. This conclusion is important for extrapolating to regions of other federal districts and to the federal level in Russia.