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Includes bibliography. ; v.1. The political and administrative setup.-- ; Mode of access: Internet.

A number of studies suggest that mortality rates among East German men increased in the wake of reunification, in particular between 1989 and 1991, in some age groups by up to thirty percent. This study first examines the developments of mortality and cause of death statistics based on detailed regional data. The results indicate that there was indeed an increase in mortality rates which cannot be dismissed as a statistical artefact. Next, the paper discusses various theories explaining mortality crises and their relevance for the case of East Germany. Based on individual-level panel data the relationship between exposure to stress and overall health is shown. Apparently, the increase in mortality can be explained by the increase in individual stress levels after the economic, cultural and political consequences of reunification.

There has been a long tradition of thinking on Civic Education in Western Germany, mainly after World War II. Aims and means have been discussed thoroughly, experiences in teaching politics (the most common name for the school subject) have been reported on. After the (re-)union of the two Germanies in 1990, Western concepts were brought to and adopted by Eastern Germany. Transformation of civic education (politische Bildung) faces the problem that the democratic system is open to conflicts and competition and does not lead and direct the citizen in an authoritative manner. Democracy asks for different abilities on the side of its citizens than an authoritarian system does. Research data show the difficulties of learning for democracy.

One of the greater problems arising from the reunification of Germany has been the privatization of land in eastern Germany. Initially, the principle that shaped the privatization policies was restitution, the idea that land unlawfully taken by the former East German government should be returned to its rightful owner. A second goal of the privatization program was to stimulate investment in the economy of eastern Germany. These two goals, however, have conflicted. The result has been a policy that has created confusion with regard to the ownership of property and clear title. This Article examines two series of amendments, in 1991 and 1992, that attempted to facilitate investment in eastern Germany. Despite amendments to the major privatization laws in 1991, the investment in eastern Germany has remained anemic. The 1992 amendments expressly placed the goal of investment before restitution. However, the author concludes that the 1992 amendments have been helpful in only a limited number of cases. The absence of a clear mechanism for compensation of rightful owners continues to impede investment. Legislation proposing such a mechanism has yet to be adopted; more importantly, the legislation may not pass constitutional muster. Accordingly, the author concludes that Germany should employ other short-term remedies until it drafts a constitutionally sound law.

We present the results of an interdisciplinary project exploring street name changes in Leipzig (Germany), over the past 102 years. Our analysis focuses on the ways in which semantic choices in the streetscape express the national past and support the hegemonic socio-political order by visualising waves of street (re)naming during a century of political turmoil. Drawing on historical archival data allows us to interpret spatial and temporal patterns as the public embodiment of subsequent political state ideologies, demonstrating that the indexing of officially sanctioned identity and ideology as well as the appropriation of urban space are performed by and in turn index state- hegemonic politics of memory.

Vital statistics clearly indicate that the fertility rate in East Germany dropped sharply after German unification; moreover, it has not yet rebounded but remains stable at a low level. This paper uses data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) to examine births in the former German Democratic Republic in 1992 and 1993. The primary explantory variables include women's employment status in 1991 and 1992, expectations about future unemployment, and the employment status of cohabiting or marital partners. Our hypothesis is that young women who become unemployed are likely to use this occasion to become pregnant. We assume that the preference for children has not changed dramtically among East German women following unification. Support for this assumption is found in data from the GSOEP, which indicates that the value women attach to family life has remained relatively stable. Instead of viewing the decline in fertility as a shift in preferences, it is viewed as a change in opportunity costs. In general, there are long-term opportunity costs associated with an interruption in employment due to the subsequent devaluation of human capital. Specifically, in East Germany the re-entry rates of unemployed people into the labor market are very low. As a result: 1) the opportunity costs of having a child are quite high for employed women since they are likely to experience difficulties reentering the labor force; 2) for women outside the employment system, who are likely to remain there, the opportunity costs are quite low. In examining this question we make use of the household orientation of the GSOEP and also consider the employment status of each woman's partner, married or cohabiting, if the woman shares a household with such a person. Along with these theoretical issues this paper also addresses an interesting theme in the public debate regarding fertility changes in East Germany. Our results run counter to a widely held belief that young women become unemployed because they get pregnant. Instead, our longitudinal analyses suggest that the timing goes in the other direction: women become pregnant after they are unemployed.

This essay attempts to undertake a comparative study of the Shakespearean appropriations in late 19th century India under colonial rule on one hand, and in mid-20th century (East) Germany on the other. While 19th century Indian responses to Shakespeare carried a covert nationalist agenda against the British rulers who had made him complicit in the colonial project, the mid-20th century German adaptations found in him, a potent site for voicing their opposition against the governments, which had imposed censorship regulations upon newspapers, books and television. Within this framework and making use of the textual, performative and audience sensibility components, the paper would endeavor to: a) explore the nuances in the performance strategies of selected playwrights from both the countries, and understand the extent of divergences and departures from the English text; and b) scrutinise the location of these performances respectively within the overlapping currents of colonial modernity, nationality and regional identity in the 19th and 20th century India, and the post-war communist regimes operating in (East) Germany.

The Cold War over Germany was central to the history of the Cold War—its beginnings, its prolongation, and its end. One of the central elements in America's success in fighting the Cold War was its approach towards Germany: the creation of an economically prosperous, politically stable democracy in Western Germany that was closely integrated with the West. To the Americans involved, the success of this project was far less certain as it may seem in hindsight: West Germany's economic prosperity and political stability had humble beginnings. The Soviet threat exerted pressure that aggravated and distorted the problems of developing a viable democracy. Most importantly, the division of the country and of the former capital Berlin meant that the forces of German nationalism, while temporarily tamed, created an undercurrent of unease and unrest, a latent threat to the very foundations of the Federal Republic and the European settlement that the USSR could exploit. As a result, the United States developed a major psychological and economic warfare program to contain Soviet influence in Germany and combat Communist forces in the German Democratic Republic.

How is the protest behavior of citizens in new democracies influenced by their experience of the past? Certain theories of political socialization hold that cohorts reaching political maturity under dictatorship are subject to apathy. Yet, it remains unclear whether mobilization during the transition can counterbalance this effect. This article examines the protest behavior of citizens socialized in Eastern Germany, a region marked by two legacies: a legacy of autocracy and, following the 1989-90 revolution, a legacy of transitional mobilization. Using age-period-cohort models with data from the European Social Survey, the analysis assesses the evolution of gaps in protest across generations and time between East and West Germans. The results demonstrate that participation in demonstrations, petitions, and boycotts is lower for East Germans socialized under communism in comparison with West Germans from the same cohorts. This participation deficit remains stable over time and even increases for certain protest activities.

How is the protest behavior of citizens in new democracies influenced by their experience of the past? Certain theories of political socialization hold that cohorts reaching political maturity under dictatorship are subject to apathy. Yet, it remains unclear whether mobilization during the transition can counterbalance this effect. This article examines the protest behavior of citizens socialized in Eastern Germany, a region marked by two legacies: a legacy of autocracy and, following the 1989-90 revolution, a legacy of transitional mobilization. Using age-period-cohort models with data from the European Social Survey, the analysis assesses the evolution of gaps in protest across generations and time between East and West Germans. The results demonstrate that participation in demonstrations, petitions, and boycotts is lower for East Germans socialized under communism in comparison with West Germans from the same cohorts. This participation deficit remains stable over time and even increases for certain protest activities. ; Peer Reviewed

Can television have a mitigating e.ect on xenophobia? To examine this question, we exploit the fact that individuals in some areas of East Germany . due to their geographic location . could not receive West German television until 1989. We conjecture that individuals who received West German television were exposed more frequently to foreigners and thus have developed less xenophobia than people who were not exposed to those programs. Our results show that regions that could receive West German television were less likely to vote for right-wing parties during the national elections from 1998 to 2013. Only recently, the same regions were also more likely to vote for left-wing parties. Moreover, while counties that hosted more foreigners in 1989 were also more likely to vote for right-wing parties in most elections, we find counties that recently hosted more foreign visitors showed less xenophobia, which is in line with intergroup contact theory.

Can television have a mitigating e.ect on xenophobia? To examine this question, we exploit the fact that individuals in some areas of East Germany - due to their geographic location - could not receive West German television until 1989. We conjecture that individuals who received West German television were exposed more frequently to foreigners and thus have developed less xenophobia than people who were not exposed to those programs. Our results show that regions that could receive West German television were less likely to vote for right-wing parties during the national elections from 1998 to 2013. Only recently, the same regions were also more likely to vote for left-wing parties. Moreover, while counties that hosted more foreigners in 1989 were also more likely to vote for right-wing parties in most elections, we find counties that recently hosted more foreign visitors showed less xenophobia, which is in line with intergroup contact theory.

Can television have a mitigating effect on xenophobia? To examine this question, we exploit the fact that individuals in some areas of East Germany – due to their geographic location – could not receive West German television until 1989. We conjecture that individuals who received West German television were exposed more frequently to foreigners and thus have developed less xenophobia than people who were not exposed to those programs. Our results show that regions that could receive West German television were less likely to vote for right-wing parties during the national elections from 1998 to 2013. Only recently, the same regions were also more likely to vote for left-wing parties. Moreover, while counties that hosted more foreigners in 1989 were also more likely to vote for right-wing parties in most elections, we find counties that recently hosted more foreign visitors showed less xenophobia, which is in line with intergroup contact theory.

This paper addresses the question of why high unemployment rates tend to persist even after their proximate causes have been reversed (e.g., after wages relative to productivity have fallen). We suggest that the longer people are unemployed, the greater is their cumulative likelihood of falling into a low-productivity trap, through the attrition of skills and work habits. We develop a model along these lines, which allows us to bridge the gap between high macroeconomic employment persistence versus relatively high microeconomic labor market flow numbers. We calibrate the model for East Germany and examine the effectiveness of three employment policies in this context: (i) a weakening of workers' position in wage negotiations due to a drop in the replacement rate or firing costs, leading to a fall in wages, (ii) hiring subsidies, and (iii) training subsidies. We show that the employment effects of these policies depend crucially on whether low-productivity traps are present.

This paper addresses the question of why prolonged regional unemployment differentials tend to persist even after their proximate causes have been reversed (e.g., after wages in the highunemployment regions have fallen relative to those in the low-unemployment regions). We suggest that the longer people are unemployed, the greater is the likelihood of falling into a low-productivity "trap", through the attrition of skills and work habits. We develop and calibrate a model along these lines for East Germany and examine the effectiveness of three employment policies in this context: (i) a weakening of workers' position in wage negotiations due to a drop in the replacement rate or firing costs, leading to a fall in wages, (ii) hiring subsidies, and (iii) training subsidies. We show that the employment effects of these policies depend crucially on whether low-productivity traps are present.