Suchergebnisse

The author claims that all major efforts concerning European security have always been linked with the end of a war. Thus the end of the cold war has been marked with the expansion of NATO and an attempt to create a new security. By analysing the political scope of the expansion, the military and strategic framework, the Russian reactions, and the economic significance, the author comes to the conclusion that the expansion is not conducive to the establishment of an integral system of European security. The purpose of this development by Clinton's team was primarily to outline the new European borders (the key aspect of Clinton's foreign policy) and, in the future, to create the conditions for further expansion and admittance of new members. Only in the remote future, through constant expansion and links with other European organisations, NATO could turn into the central system of European security. (SOI : PM: S. 97)

Wars and suffering in the 20th century, mostly the consequences of ethnic and religious antagonisms, have been typical for Europe's southeast. That is why the ethnic aspects of security are central to the understanding of the totality of this region's security, particularly in the 21st century. The security of southeast Europe can be analyzed using realistic, idealistic and neo-realistic approaches to contemporary security as its starting point. The security of this region is affected by the internal circumstances of the region's states and by the economic situation and inter-ethnic relations in particular. Similarly, significant influence is exerted by the relations among the states and nations living there as well as by the ethnic-based conflicts which are the outcomes of these relations. A series of problems caused by the east-European transformations includes the unresolved ethnic and minority issues. That is why no southeastern European state today has worked out the issue of the relations with its neighbors. This part of Europe is to remain a volatile region, fraught with economic difficulties and crises, nationalisms and xenophobia. In such circumstances, with the open sores of simmering ethnic feuds and the specter of various nationalisms, is it realistic to expect rational politics which is supposed to lead the countries of southeastern Europe towards the united Europe? This is the question the answer to which is sought not only by this region's states but also by the leading European states and the USA. (SOI : PM: S. 78)

The process of European integrations, with a growing political, economic, and security interdependence of member states is designed in such a way that, among other things, it can eventually result in developing a collective approach to defense, whose features would be a far cry from any other form of traditional alliances. The signatories of the Maastricht Agreement vowed to shape a common defense policy which would in time lead to the common defense. The common defense policy, whose structure would be built on the basis of the models and trends of the defense policies of the leading West-European countries, should evolve as an integral part of EU's common foreign and security policy. It should address all the aspects of the use of military power, and it will require an analysis of a broad spectrum of possible scenarios which may pose a threat to EU's security. EU countries have demonstrated certain shortcomings in their military capacities e.g. transport equipment and other capacities for deployment. Although in the economic field they have achieved consensus on numerous issues, it is obvious that defense issues such as nuclear weapons, professionalization of the military and the policies of defense industry are still a major bone of contention for EU members. Though EU, WEU, and NATO represent only a segment of the European security architecture, they will most probably serve as the key institutional framework for the development of a common defense policy and common defense. Further expansion of this triangular institutional framework is going to be interdependent, mutually supportive and parallel. (SOI : PM: S. 89)

The nationalization of Jewish property in the Independent State of Croatia was carried out through a number of legal decrees: the legal decree concerning the mandatory reporting of Jewish property and commerce of June 5, 1941, the legal decree concerning property of individuals deported from the territory of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) of August 7, 1941, and the legal decree concerning the nationalization of Jewish property of October 30, 1943. The promulgation of these decrees was entrusted to the state directorate and the state treasury, more specifically, the treasury's office of nationalized property. With these measures the Ustasa government wanted to emancipate the national economy from Jewish capital, so this aspect of economic policy was called the "arianization of production". On the basis of available documents from the Croatian national parliament (Sabor) and official reports from the office of nationalized property it is possible to substantiate the value of Jewish property nationalized by September 15, 1943 (including movable goods, buildings, retail and industrial trades, and valuables) at 6,711.369,971 kunas. Further, according to the documentation of the committee in Zagreb administering the donations of Jews to help finance the state, it can be shown that on October 31, 1941 Jews voluntarily procured to the state a total of 106,533.929,67 kunas, which amounts to 1065,339 kilograms of gold. (SOI : CSP: S. 453)