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Previous studies have discounted important factors and indirect channels that might contribute to business cycle synchronization (BSC) in the EU. We estimate the effects of market integration and economic policy coordination on bilateral business cycle correlations over the period 1995-2012 using a simultaneous equations model that takes into accounts both the endogenous relationships and unveils direct and indirect effects. The results suggest that (i) trade and FDI have a pronounced positive effect on BCS, particularly between incumbent and new EU members. (ii) Rising specialization does not decouple business cycles. (iii) The decline of income disparities in EU27 contributes to BCS, as converging countries develop stronger trade and FDI linkages. (iv) There is strong evidence that poor fiscal discipline of EU members is a major impediment of business cycle synchronization. (v) The same argument holds true for exchange rate fluctuations that hinder BCS, particularly in EU15. Since BCS is a fundamental prerequisite and objective in an effective monetary union, the EU has to promote market integration and strengthen the common setting of economic policies. (authors' abstract)

The subject of analysis in this paper is to review the institutional aspects of coordination mechanisms for economic policy in the European Union. In this context, the first part of the article defines the concept of coordination, the benefits versus the competition, the goals and the principles on which mechanisms are placed. In the second part of paper points to the impact of the mechanism for coordination of economic policy in Serbia, costs and benefits of the coordination process, i.e. primarily in the light of the new wave of coordination which started with the new model of economic governance during the global crisis embodied in the provisions of the European semester, the European Stabilisation Mechanism and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union. The central hypothesis is based on the fact that Serbia its economic policy must shape according to European coordination mechanisms in the broadest sense, and not only in the field of monetary and fiscal policy, but also other segments of structural macroeconomic policies (labour market, as well as in the new areas such as environmental policy and cohesion policy) to achieve sustainable economic development. Although the domestic economic policymakers have done a lot on that plan, there is still a practical and logical need for the harmonisation of specific segments of economic policy and reducing the time lag in the implementation of the actions of economic policy.

The present paper first takes a step backwards with an attempt to situate the adoption of this Treaty in discussion of the SGP and the "Maastricht criteria" (the criteria for EMU membership fixed in the Maastricht Treaty) in a longer perspective of the sharing of competences for macroeconomic policy making within the EU from the initial Treaty to the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). It then presents the main features of the Fiscal Treaty and its relation to the SGP and draws some conclusions as regards the importance and relevance of this new step in the process of economic policy coordination. It concludes that the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union does not seem to offer a definitive solution to the problem of finding the appropriate budgetary-monetary policy mix in the EMU already well identified in the Delors report in 1989 and regularly emphasised ever since and now seriously aggravated due to the Crisis. Furthermore, the implementation of this Treaty may under certain circumstances contribute to an increase in the uncertainties as regards the distribution of the competences between the European Parliament and national parliaments and between the former and the Commission and the Council.

This paper addresses the issue of fiscal policy coordination in the context of the current crisis. It first aims at clarifying the economic rationale for fiscal policy coordination in a monetary union with decentralized fiscal authorities, and at exploring the foundations of the kind of coordination devices chosen, as well as the incentives and constraints on member states' governments arising from the fiscal rules in the Euro Zone, both in tranquil and in stormy economic times. We then proceed with an analysis of the difficulties arising from the heterogeneous nature of the Euro Zone. In Section 3, we explore some of the possible causes of heterogeneity, with an emphasis on the issue of collective action and country size, with the coexistence of large and small countries, facing different incentives and constraints, hence tending to adopt divergent strategies in the occurrence of common macroeconomic shocks. Section 4 addresses the possible evolution in automatic fiscal stabilizers and Section 5 documents the size and structure of national fiscal stimulus packages. The concluding section advocates a better mix of rules and discretionary coordination for fiscal policies in the Euro Zone.

This paper addresses the issue of fiscal policy coordination in the context of the current crisis. It first aims at clarifying the economic rationale for fiscal policy coordination in a monetary union with decentralized fiscal authorities, and at exploring the foundations of the kind of coordination devices chosen, as well as the incentives and constraints on member states' governments arising from the fiscal rules in the Euro Zone, both in tranquil and in stormy economic times. We then proceed with an analysis of the difficulties arising from the heterogeneous nature of the Euro Zone. In Section 3, we explore some of the possible causes of heterogeneity, with an emphasis on the issue of collective action and country size, with the coexistence of large and small countries, facing different incentives and constraints, hence tending to adopt divergent strategies in the occurrence of common macroeconomic shocks. Section 4 addresses the possible evolution in automatic fiscal stabilizers and Section 5 documents the size and structure of national fiscal stimulus packages. The concluding section advocates a better mix of rules and discretionary coordination for fiscal policies in the Euro Zone.

This paper addresses the issue of fiscal policy coordination in the context of the current crisis. It first aims at clarifying the economic rationale for fiscal policy coordination in a monetary union with decentralized fiscal authorities, and at exploring the foundations of the kind of coordination devices chosen, as well as the incentives and constraints on member states' governments arising from the fiscal rules in the Euro Zone, both in tranquil and in stormy economic times. We then proceed with an analysis of the difficulties arising from the heterogeneous nature of the Euro Zone. In Section 3, we explore some of the possible causes of heterogeneity, with an emphasis on the issue of collective action and country size, with the coexistence of large and small countries, facing different incentives and constraints, hence tending to adopt divergent strategies in the occurrence of common macroeconomic shocks. Section 4 addresses the possible evolution in automatic fiscal stabilizers and Section 5 documents the size and structure of national fiscal stimulus packages. The concluding section advocates a better mix of rules and discretionary coordination for fiscal policies in the Euro Zone.

This paper addresses the issue of fiscal policy coordination in the context of the current crisis. It first aims at clarifying the economic rationale for fiscal policy coordination in a monetary union with decentralized fiscal authorities, and at exploring the foundations of the kind of coordination devices chosen, as well as the incentives and constraints on member states' governments arising from the fiscal rules in the Euro Zone, both in tranquil and in stormy economic times. We then proceed with an analysis of the difficulties arising from the heterogeneous nature of the Euro Zone. In Section 3, we explore some of the possible causes of heterogeneity, with an emphasis on the issue of collective action and country size, with the coexistence of large and small countries, facing different incentives and constraints, hence tending to adopt divergent strategies in the occurrence of common macroeconomic shocks. Section 4 addresses the possible evolution in automatic fiscal stabilizers and Section 5 documents the size and structure of national fiscal stimulus packages. The concluding section advocates a better mix of rules and discretionary coordination for fiscal policies in the Euro Zone.