The article argues that economic measures of happiness are invalid and unreliable. The invalidity is implied by the subjective theory of value: happiness cannot be measured in the cardinal scales of measurement and it cannot be intersubjectively aggregated. The unreliability also follows from the subjective nature of happiness. The article concludes that the application of happiness economics to inform policy decisions should be seen as immoral. Adapted from the source document.
The article addresses the question of why the Baltic countries chose internal devaluation over external devaluation in response to the economic crisis of 2008-2010. After describing the situation in the Baltics and the two main choices, the paper argues that economic explanations are insufficient in accounting for the choice. Several political explanations for the choice are laid out based on external pressure arguments, society-oriented perspective and institutional perspective. The paper finds that the external pressure hypothesis is unable to account for the Baltic decision, which rather reflected a very strong domestic consensus on the importance of safeguarding fixed exchange rates. This consensus in turn was based on both widespread support by the general society and concentrated producer groups. Nevertheless, society-oriented perspective cannot fully explain the Baltic choice either -- economic policies pursued during the crisis can only be fully understood when analyzing specific historical conditions under which the fixed exchange rate institutional system and its supporting elements were created. Over time, self-enforcing effects of the system became apparent both in the ideational sphere (principled beliefs about nationhood as well as particular causal beliefs) and in the material one, largely through the credit channel (indebtedness in euros). The current crisis also witnessed tendencies largely reinforcing the institutional equilibrium that supports the fixed exchange rate system. Adapted from the source document.
The hypothesis raised in the article is that the strategy of Lithuania in the EU budget review in 2008-2009 & negotiations on the forthcoming financial framework should be based on the support to policies & programs with high European-wide benefits rather than the aim to maximize financial support & the country's net balance. The following analysis consists of two major stages. First, normative EU budget objectives & instruments are specified on the basis of the Treaties (assuming that the Treaty of Lisbon would be successfully ratified), EU citizens' opinions, fiscal federalism principles & evaluations of EU budget policies. Second, the impact of such budget on Lithuania & specific Lithuanian interests in the context of such a reform are estimated. Adapted from the source document.
The aim of this article is to explore the bargaining process of the EU Financial Perspective 2007-2013 & to provide the conceptual explanation of the particular result of this bargaining. Although quite a number of drafts have been discussed among member states, three of them characterize the most important turns of the bargaining: Commission's Proposal, the Luxemburg's Compromise & the Decision of the European Council. Andrew Moravcsik's Liberal Intergovernmental Approach has been applied as the methodological tool for the analysis of the EU Financial Perspective 2007-2013. Moravcsik assumes that European bargaining is a two level game. A two level game is a metaphoric concept describing how the interaction between the domestic pressure groups & decision makers formulates national preferences & how political leaders on the European level represent those national preferences. On both levels pragmatic economic interests are the driving factors of different actors. It should be emphasized that states are the main players in EU arena, whereas supranational institutions play a supporting part. Five different groups or informal coalitions could be found in the recent bargaining for the Financial Perspective. The key interest of rich member states (UK, Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, & France) was to decrease EU spending -- to cut the contributions to the EU budget. Phasing out states (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece) as former major beneficiaries of EU structural policy strived to diminish financial losses in the new Financial Perspective. Poorer Central European countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic & Hungary) fought for the structural funds. Finally, the UK was alone against the rest of member states which called for the radical review of the British rebate. The comparative statistical & qualitative analysis of those proposals revealed two important trends in the bargaining. First, the EU spending was cut in every turn. Second, the funds for the rich member states were redistributed at the expense of the poorer member states. Certainly, such redistribution did not change the fact that the older member states remained the net contributors & the poor Central European countries gained more benefits compared to the previous Financial Perspective 2000-2006. Besides these two main tendencies the phasing out states succeed to increase the funds for their undeveloped regions & the final Decision of the European Council offered for the UK the most favorable mechanism counting the British rebate. The article reveals the weaknesses of the popular geopolitical interpretations which were proposed in order to explain the strong clashes between member states. The geopolitical & ideological discourse was aimed at neutralizing the domestic pressure. The economic logic to pay less & get more was the dominant thinking in the bargaining for the European financial pie. The asymmetrical interdependence which was the main source of bargaining power during the previous intergovernmental negotiations on Common Market is obsolete in explaining the modalities of redistributional policies. The effect of relative power was limited to the bargaining strategy, however it did not make a remarkable impact to the final agreement. On the contrary, the typical net recipient is a small & poor member state. The author has to come to the conclusion that the poor Central European countries states were forced to support the cuts of the budget & suffered a relative defeat in the bargaining, since they were the main beneficiaries of the common EU budget. It means that the poor Central European countries were the most interested to reach an agreement as soon as possible in order to avoid the risk of facing the EU financial turbulences. For this reason their bargaining power was very weak. Adapted from the source document.
Straipsnio tikslas - nustatyti, kokia itaka demokratijos veikimo verti-nimui ir pasitikejimui parlamentu daro politiniai veiksniai - partines siste-mos fragmentacija, poliarizacija ir valdanciosios koalicijos dydis. Tyrime, apimanciame desimt Vidurio ir Rytu Europos saliu nuo 1991 iki 2011 m., ivertinamas ir dvieju ekonominiu veiksniu - ekonomikos augimo ir nedarbo lygio - poveikis politines paramos rodikliams. Stipriausias statistinis rysys nustatytas tarp nedarbo lygio ir pasitenkinimo demokratija: kuo daugiau ne-turinciuju darbo, tuo maziau teigiamai vertinanciuju demokratijos veikima. Taip pat paaiskejo, kad demokratijos veikimo vertinimui neigiamai atsiliepia mazas parlamentiniu partiju skaicius ir dideles valdanciosios koalicijos. Pasi-tikejimas parlamentu buvo mazesnis tais atvejais, kai ideologiniai skirtumai tarp parlamentiniu partiju buvo dideli, ir tuomet, kai ekonomika traukesi arba augo tik labai nedaug. Ketvirtoje straipsnio dalyje siekiama nustatyti, kodel dideles valdanciosios koalicijos veda prie mazesnio patenkintuju demokrati-ja procento. Cekijos ir Bulgarijos lyginamoji analize parode, kad didele val-dancioji koalicija apriboja parlamento politini vaidmeni, sudaro palankias salygas grieztai ir nepopuliariai ekonominei politikai vykdyti ir palieka di-dele rinkeju dali be priimtinu politiniu alternatyvu. Siu politinio gyvenimo reiskiniu visuma didina nepasitenkinima demokratijos veikimu The article examines the effect of parliamentary fragmentation, polarization and ruling coalition size on satisfaction with democracy and trust in parliament. Statistical analysis, encompassing 10 CEE countries from 1991 to 2011, is used to measure the impact of political factors, while the effect of economic growth and unemployment rate is also evaluated. The strongest finding suggests that there is a negative relation between unemployment rate and satisfaction with democracy. Furthermore, satisfaction with a political regime is undermined by a small number of parliamentary parties and large ruling coalitions. Trust in parliament tends to be lower when ideological differences among parliamentary parties are sizable, as well as at the times of economic recession or marginal growth. Fourth section of the article deals with the question of why large ruling coalitions lead to lower satisfaction with democracy. A comparative analysis of political realities in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria has shown that a large ruling coalition diminishes the political role of parliament, provides a strong ground for the implementation of a strict and unpopular economic policy and leads to the lack of viable political alternatives in the ranks of parliamentary opposition. The complex of these political phenomena contributes to the low satisfaction with democracy. Adapted from the source document.
Although the correlation of welfare & democracy is not direct, it is possible to sustain that the problems related with democracy satisfaction could be solved by public policy measures. Lithuanian's who reflect themselves as the losers of the transition reforms are unsatisfied with their socio-economic status & their anticipation of the prompt life improvement is rather high. If such tendencies start to dominate in the society of Lithuania, the question of political stability arises. Therefore social security, welfare network & infrastructure development as well as the increase of the redistribution amounts look like inevitable reforms in nowadays Lithuania. All appropriate compensatory measures could be related to the development of the welfare state in Lithuania. The liberal model of the welfare state should be the most suitable option for Lithuania at first sight. The Lisbon Strategy is implicitly based on this kind of welfare state model. Lithuania was trying to apply active labor market policy nevertheless the efforts were restrained by the small resources. The structural policy of the EU, mainly the measures financed by the European Social Fund, should increase the amount of funds allocated to the active labor market policy. Considering public policy in Lithuania an exclusive attention should be paid to the reduction of regional inequalities, establishment of the workplaces & social security infrastructure. Due to the Lithuanian budget restrictions it's necessary to develop a tax base & to improve tax administration. The second important component is partial decentralization of programming & implementation of the EU funds by means of the EU Cohesion policy reform. The third component is the implementation of horizontal regional policy in Lithuania. Legal & organizational premises for the aforementioned steps are already established. Adapted from the source document.
This article is devoted to the models of integration without membership as a method to solve the EU "enlargement versus deepening" dilemma. Stagnation of EU enlargement implicates that policy alternatives to enlargement & various models of integration without membership become essential. Authors dealing with issues of external europeanization often conclude that models of integration without membership rely heavily on methods similar to enlargement methods. It is recognized, however, that alternatives to enlargement lack an essential mechanism, an incentive that would induce reform & approximation to European standards, ie., these models do not provide a membership opportunity. Thus principle of conditionality that lies at the heart of such models fails without proper incentives to reform. Therefore a vicious circle emerges: with no membership opportunity there is no reform incentive & lack of reform hinders the possibility to transpose cooperation with EU to a qualitatively upper political, economic & institutional level. That raises a question if the enlargement "toolkit" (conditionality principle first of all) may fruitfully function in models of integration without membership. Adapted from the source document.
The article deals with contemporary executive's rewards system in the Lithuanian public sector and its changes over time. This analysis includes high officials in civil service as well as heads of public service's providers and managers of state-owned enterprises. The analysis bases on the reward dimension of the Public Service Bargains (PSBs) model which reflects different approaches to tangible and intangible reward elements. This theoretical approach is used to test the hypotheses that there is a clear public sector bargain on the executive's rewards system, and this bargain was shaped by pre-planned reforms in the public sector. This article concludes that the Lithuanian public sector executive reward system can be regarded as egalitarian and was largely shaped by incremental policy decisions, changes in economic conditions, and court decisions but not by pre-planned reforms. Adapted from the source document.
The concept of deterrence is widely used in social sciences. In general literature this means prevention of someone's actions by threatening to impose sanctions. In the area of strategy, deterrence means preventing states to act in a way that is not acceptable to others. According to deterrence theory, wars or aggressions to be prevented by threatening a potential aggressor with retaliation destructive & credible enough to outweigh any benefit the potential aggressor could expect to gain. The concept of deterrence came to prominence with the appearance of nuclear weapons, precisely because they made it possible for a state under attack to do great harm to the attacker even without really defending itself. This requirement becomes difficult to fulfill when we consider non-nuclear powers. They do not enjoy military capabilities to strike their enemies in retaliation without carrying defense. Nuclear have-not may only threaten her adversaries with a high level of resistance. This articles addresses deterrence strategy of small non-nuclear powers that do not possess retaliatory capabilities but only are capable to threaten their adversaries with a level of destruction higher than the value of objectives sought. The logic of deterrence strategy formulates two main requirements for it to be effective. First is a sufficient capability to carry out the defense actions. The second is ability to impress enemy leaders of their intentions without provoking a preventive or pre-emptive strike out of fear. Effective deterrence strategies of small non-nuclear powers suffer from serious weaknesses that are embedded into the logic of this strategy. First of all, successful deterrence strategy of small non-nuclear powers requires more than ability to impose costs using conventional means. An adversary must be sufficiently convinced that the state will use its defensive capabilities. The greater a state's defensive capability, the less its adversary can hurt it, & the more likely it may use its punitive capabilities on its adversary. Secondly, intelligence communities long have known, policy makers have a way of resisting unwelcome information & advice. Often, national intelligence communities are entirely as culturally blind, not to mention ignorant in other ways, as are their political & military masters. Risk of a mistake when attacking a nonnuclear country is smaller then attacking a nuclear one. When employed by alliances, such as NATO, conventional deterrence also must face a number of additional problems. It requires a large & credible power projection capability because of the simple facts of geography. To operate large expeditionary forces requires an overseas base network & a forcible entry capability. Effective defense demands a large standing force structure, & technological superiority, to assure the success of conventional campaigns. Such complex, capable, & large forces prove to be very costly. Small non-nuclear powers may enhance deterrence using different strategies. Most importantly by making it plain through prior security agreements that aggressors will be severely for punished by the international community, whether or not their invasions are successful. The punishments could be military (including counter-value attacks or asymmetrical threats), political (pariah-state status), & economic (isolation), but they should be certain & tough, even if not perfectly enforced. For example, the European Union may seriously punish aggression from the East using economical measures such as sanctions, boycotts, exclusion from "clubs," etc. Conventional capabilities of small non-nuclear powers is also benefiting from significant improvements in the technology of conventional weapons, notably in accuracy, stealth, intelligence, & information support. Nor does the current theory of conventional deterrence require that conventional weapons be as powerful, destructive, or fearful as nuclear weapons. Growing military strength & asymmetrical capabilities significantly contributes to the psychological credibility of deterrence. Adapted from the source document.
Straipsnio objektas yra pokyciai Lietuvoje ir ju vertinimas is visuomenes ir elito perspektyvos. Todel pirmojoje dalyje, naudojantis pokycius ekonomikos, visuomenes ir valdymo srityse fiksuojanciais ivairiais rodikliais ir indeksais, yra apibudinami pagrindiniai bendrieji pokyciai Lietuvoje 2004-2014 m. Jie rodo sparcia Lietuvos ekonomine konvergencija su Europos Sajunga, didesne aukstaji ir vidurini issimokslinima igijusiu Lietuvos gyventoju dali ir pailgejusius sveiko gyvenimo metus, taciau taip pat stagnacija daugumos strukturiniu ilgalaike pazanga lemianciu rodikliu atzvilgiu. Straipsnyje taip pat nagrinejama paskutinio desimtmecio viesosios politikos kaita ir jos pokyciu saltiniai. Daroma isvada, jog, nepaisant galimybiu po 2004 m. nacionalizuoti viesosios politikos darbotvarke, joje ir toliau svar biavieta uzima ES klausimai, o pokycius viesojoje politikoje lyginant su laikotarpiu pries stojant i ES, jie buvo mazesni. Antroji straipsnio dalis analizuoja, kaip pokycius Lietuvoje vertina gyventojai ir elitas ir koks siu vertinimu santykis. Lietuvos politinio elito apklausos duomenys parode, jog elitas didziausius ir labai teigiamus pokycius 2004-2014 m. mato esant valstybes tarnybos gebejimu srityje ir igyvendinant vienodo teises aktu taikymo principa. Visuomene pokycius vertina pesimistiskiau, egzistuoja visuomenes ir elito vertinimu atotrukis. Straipsnyje teigiama, kad pesimistines gyventoju nuotaikas lemia del ES paramos reiksmingai nepasikeitusi visuomenes nelygybes struktura ir neispildyti dideli gyventoju ekonominiai lukesciai. Be to, gavus ES strukturine parama padidejes Lietuvos biudzetas dar paskatino valstybes uzgrobima ir korupcija, del kuriu tikrojo ir isivaizduojamo masto visuomene yra pesimistiskesne ir bendruju pokyciu atzvilgiu The object of the article is changes in Lithuania during the EU membership period and the perception of them in the eyes of the elite and Lithuanian society. It reviews the main general changes in economics, society, and governance in 2004-2014 using various indicators and indexes. Furthermore, public policy development analysis states that despite the fact that after accession in 2004 there were opportunities to nationalize public policy agenda, it was still dominated by the EU related questions. In the second section authors compare attitudes towards changes between Lithuanian elite members and Lithuanian society. Article argues that Lithuanian society tends to evaluate the same changes rather differently and its attitudes are more pessimistic. Therefore, based on process tracing methodology, the authors explain how unfulfilled high economic expectations contributed to distrust of political institutions, high perception of corruption, low turnout, and migration. In addition, it is also argued that financial support of the EU stimulated state capture initiatives and corruption in Lithuania which also contributed to the pessimistic evaluations of changes by society. Adapted from the source document.
This article is devoted to the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) as a method of the European Union (EU) governance. First, the article presents the method, its characteristics & the rationale behind its application in the EU. This is followed by an analytical framework, which includes the factors of EU & national level (independent variables), influence mechanisms of the OMC as well as public policy & institutional change (dependent variables). This analytical framework was used for structuring & summarizing the results of the OMC research in Lithuania. The main conclusion of this article is that the OMC is not effective in Lithuania due to its weak mechanisms of influence. Although according to its definition the OMC is attributable to "soft" forms of governance, its inadequate application reduces its effectiveness in Lithuania. These factors constrain the implementation of necessary reforms in Lithuania & reduce its contribution to economic growth & employment of the EU. Adapted from the source document.
Straipsnyje nagrinejama Lietuvos geroves valstybes raida saliai istojus i Europos Sajunga (ES). Teksta sudaro trys dalys. Teorineje dalyje ivertinamas dvieju ilgalaikiu valstybe strukturuojanciu procesu - pokomunistines transformacijos ir europeizacijos - santykis. Antrojoje dalyje analizuojami viesojo diskurso pokyciai siekiant issiaiskinti, ar ir kiek skirta demesio geroves valstybes pertvarkai Lietuvoje pasiekus pagrindinius euroatlantines integracijos tikslus. Galiausiai, remiantis 'socialiniu investiciju' koncepcija, bus siekiama parodyti, kiek Lietuvos geroves valstybes raida atliepia europines tendencijas. Pagrindine tyrimo isvada yra ta, kad geroves valstybes raida islieka inertiska, nors finansavimo salygos istojus i ES is tiesu gerejo. Be to, palyginti su gretimomis ES salimis naremis, skiriama maziau demesio toms geroves politikoms, kurios galetu duoti didziausia 'investicine graza'. Taip pat labiau orientuojamasi i tretini paslaugu lygmeni. Tokia situacija pirmiausia aiskintina trimis veiksniais: ekonominio saugumo prioriteto islaikymu, partine poliarizacija ir istorine logika, kuria diktuoja jau susikloste galios santykiai The article analyses the development of the Lithuanian welfare state after the country joined the EU. The text consists of three parts. In a theoretical part one evaluates interrelation of two long-term state-structuring processes, i.e. post-communist transformation and Europeanisation. In the second part, the changes of the public discourse are analysed in order to evaluate, if and how much attention is paid for the reforms of the welfare state in Lithuania after the main goals of Euro-Atlantic integration have been reached. Finally, under the concept of 'social investment state', one seeks to evaluate, how much the evolution of Lithuanian welfare state reflects the European trends. The main conclusion of analysis is that the development of welfare state remains inert despite the fact that financial conditions after the access to the EU have indeed improved. Besides, in comparison with the neighbouring EU member states, Lithuania pays less attention to those welfare policies that may bring the biggest 'return on investment'. The system is also more oriented towards the tertiary level. Such situation is firstly to be explained by three factors - the overall strength of economic security as the main political priority, party polarisation and historical logic dictated by the established power relations. Adapted from the source document.
