The economics of real estate management: research need in Sweden
In: Document 1980,27
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In: Document 1980,27
In: Skrifter 28
In: Lund social science studies 20
In: Economic Affairs Series, 118A
World Affairs Online
The European Union (EU) recently implemented the Environmental Liability Directive (ELD), requiring that environmental damage be restored so that the affected environment returns to (or toward) its baseline condition and the public is compensated for the initial damage and the losses during the time it takes for the environment to recover (interim losses). Equivalency Analysis (EA) represents a method for scaling environmental compensation to offset interim losses. Ensuring appropriate compensation for resource loss requires a merging of ecological measurement with the theories of welfare economics. This thesis explores some of the issues in scaling resource-based compensation in three papers. Paper I is a quantitative application of the EA method to compensate for sea eagle mortality from wind turbine collisions. It is co-authored with a biologist and proposes a new and innovative compensatory measure based on electrocution prevention on power lines. Paper II is written for an ecological readership and communicates fundamental economic assumptions in a way that might be helpful for cross-discipline collaboration. The main contribution is to clarify that the underlying goal of environmental compensation should be "no net loss of welfare." Paper III scrutinizes the conventional EA method from a social efficiency perspective, suggesting that the focus on equity for the victim may preclude a socially optimal compensatory outcome. The overarching conclusion is that EA fails to inform policy makers of the inescapable environmental trade-offs that arise in compensating environmental losses.
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Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) are widespread in conservation policy. In PES, environmental effectiveness and social equity are often perceived as conflicting goals. Empirical studies on the relationship between popular design features, such as payment differentiation and payment conditionality, and effectiveness and equity are scarce. Further, they struggle with measuring and separating ecological and equity outcomes. In this study, we combine two incentivized lab-in-the-field experiments with 259 land users from eight villages in North-Western Vietnam to assess both individual conservation effort and community-level equity perceptions under four different PES designs. Effort is measured in a real-effort task with real-world environmental benefits; equity perceptions about payment designs in the real-effort task are measured in a coordination game. We demonstrate that payment design affects both effort and equity perceptions. Payments which are differentiated and are solely conditional on individuals' contributions of effort are perceived as most equitable. They are also more effective in motivating conservation effort than other designs, although the differences are small and not significant for all comparisons. By working out the positive correlation of effectiveness and equity across the four payment schemes, we show that these objectives are not necessarily conflicting goals in incentive-based conservation policy. Further, we can show that women exert greater conservation efforts. We discuss how greater equity and effectiveness could be achieved with reforms towards more input-based distribution criteria in Vietnam's PES legislation and the limitations and opportunities of the experimental paradigm for research on PES.
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Agricultural price distortion which is the discrepancy between world market price of agricultural produce and price received by farmers as a result of market interventions by governments, either through subsidies or taxes or even trade protection systems, has received rare attention in the cocoa and coffee sub-sectors. This study examines the contribution of mobile phone technology in reducing price distortions in cocoa and coffee production. In addition, we tested stylized facts such as the development paradox, resource abundance, and group-size effect in agricultural price distortions literature. The findings suggest that access to mobile phones reduces the extent of price distortions. The effect of mobile phone usage on the extent of price distortion, the nominal rate of assistance, and relative price margin is conditional on internet connectivity. Whereas our results support the development paradox and group-size effect hypotheses, the resource abundance hypothesis is not supported. Based on our results, policies that seek to reduce the cost of telecommunication, increase competition in the telecommunication industry, and increase economic growth would go a long way to reduce price distortion in the cocoa and coffee industries.
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In this report we aim to analyse the economic and environmental impacts of Pillar I direct payments, and to demonstrate alternative instruments that are better suited to achieve CAP objectives. The instruments—a targeted payment to land at risk of abandonment and a tax on mineral fertilisers—were selected on the basis of the Polluter Pays and Provider Gets Principles. We do this using two state‐of‐the‐art agricultural economic simulation models. The first model, CAPRI, is used to quantify the large‐scale or aggregate impacts for individual countries, the EU and the world. The other model, AgriPoliS, is used to quantify the fine‐scale or farm and field level impacts in a selection of contrasting agricultural regions, to consider the potential influence of the large spatial variability in agricultural and environmental conditions across the EU. The results show that direct payments are keeping more farms in the sector and more land in agricultural use than would otherwise be the case, and thus avoiding land abandonment, principally in marginal regions. Particularly the area of grassland is substantially higher, because it is generally less productive than arable land and hence more dependent on direct payments for keeping it in agricultural use. The magnitudes of the impacts of direct payments on land use therefore vary strongly across regions due to spatial variability in productivity: marginal regions with large areas of less productive land are heavily influenced by direct payments, while regions with large areas of relatively productive land are hardly affected, because this land would be farmed in any case. By keeping more farmers in the sector longer, direct payments are slowing structural change, which can hamper agricultural development. However the potential benefits of faster structural change vary considerably among our study regions. In relatively productive regions direct payments are hindering development, because too many farmers are staying in the sector and preventing the consolidation of land in larger farms, which would improve their competitiveness and increase farm profits. On the contrary, the mass departure of farms that is currently avoided, will not lead to the same general benefits in marginal regions. Instead of freed land being absorbed by remaining farms, large areas of relatively unproductive land are abandoned without payments. This land is unprofitable to maintain in agricultural land use, even if integrated into larger farms, because current market prices are too low to motivate farming it. Consequently direct payments pose a serious goal conflict: the avoidance of land abandonment on the one hand, which can have negative impacts on public goods, and restricting agricultural development on the other hand. Once again this goal conflict is rooted in the spatial variability of agricultural conditions in the EU. Maintaining extensively managed farmland, particularly semi‐natural pastures, is central for conservation of biodiversity and preservation of the cultural landscape. Therefore direct payments are contributing to the provisioning of these public goods, but principally in marginal areas. Further, abandonment of land can reduce its agricultural productivity due to erosion or afforestation. Thus, direct payments are contributing to food security by preserving the productive potential of land for the future, but only marginal land since relatively productive land is farmed in any case. Production of agricultural commodities is affected to a lesser degree by direct payments than land use per se. Nevertheless, food exports from the EU are higher and imports lower as a consequence of direct payments. However, the additional supply generated by direct payments also lowers output prices, which reduces the profitability of commodity production; thereby partially offsetting the additional revenues from direct payments. The higher agricultural output brought about by direct payments causes higher levels of environmentally damaging greenhouse‐gas emissions, nutrient surpluses and pesticide use. The higher greenhouse‐gas emissions for the EU are, to some extent, moderated by lower emissions in the rest of the world. Nevertheless, the net effect of direct payments is higher global emissions of greenhouse gases. The environmental impacts of higher nutrient surpluses and pesticide inputs are less conclusive, since these depend also on spatial factors, i.e., where the emissions occur. Although EU‐scale and regional emissions are higher due to direct payments, agricultural production is less intensive generally, on account of the lower output prices. Analysing the net effects of these two opposing forces requires additional biophysical modelling at relevant spatial scales, such as watersheds or landscapes, which is beyond the scope of this study. Pillar I direct payments generate a significant transfer of income to farmers and land owners who are not necessarily farmers; 40 billion euro annually. Of this transfer a substantial proportion goes to farmers in relatively productive regions and, further, to a minority of farmers that need them least. In relatively productive regions payments are not needed for continued agricultural production and preservation of farmland, but instead rather fuel higher land and rental prices, which hampers structural change. On the contrary, the need for support is greatest in marginal regions, because some form of payment to marginal land is needed to avoid its abandonment and the loss of associated public goods. Finally, the direct payments even come at the cost of lower market returns for farmers due to slower structural change (smaller and less competitive farms) and lower output prices (due to greater EU output). On the other hand the lower output prices lead to somewhat lower food prices, but at the greater cost of financing the direct payments. Our main conclusion is that Pillar I direct payments are generating serious goal conflicts due to spatial variability in conditions across the EU. On the one hand these payments are contributing to the provisioning of public goods by preserving marginal agricultural land. On the other hand they are hampering agricultural development, primarily in relatively productive regions. Payments to relatively productive land that would be farmed any way not only inflate land values (capitalisation) but also slow structural change, which are both likely to hinder agricultural development and hence the competitiveness of the EU on the global market. The direct payments also increase environmental pressure; by subsidising land use generally and the associated production, they are incapable of controlling environmentally damaging emissions, which is also in conflict with broad CAP objectives. The goal conflict arises because direct payments are universal, a payment principal that does not consider spatial variability in the EU and the associated trade‐offs in regard to development and environmental effectiveness. Our analysis considered two alternative policy instruments that have the potential to curb the identified goal conflicts associated with direct payments, by applying the Polluter Pays and Provider (of public goods) Gets Principles at appropriate spatial scales. Replacing direct payments with a payment targeted on marginal land (and associated public goods) prevents land abandonment at a lower cost, by avoiding payments to relatively productive land that is farmed in any case. This also allows surviving farms in regions with relatively productive land to compensate for lost direct payments through expansion and associated scale economies, as well as higher output prices. This instrument therefore finances the provisioning of public goods without adverse effects on development and the efficiency of agricultural production. The EU‐wide tax on mineral fertiliser demonstrates that this instrument has the potential to reduce nutrient surpluses. Since direct payments cause higher levels of polluting emissions, policy instruments targeting emissions at relevant spatial scales are needed to achieve cost‐effective abatement. Overall we find that Pillar I direct payments are not addressing the diversity of challenges facing European agriculture. In fact our quantitative analysis indicates that the potential for the current system to meet these challenges is seriously impaired by goal conflicts and spatial variability across the EU. A better policy requires that instruments are targeted on desired outcomes and designed according to sound principles, specifically the Polluter Pays and Provider Gets Principles. These principles would ensure that farmers are provided with appropriate incentives to i) generate public goods that otherwise would be underprovided; ii) mitigate environmentally damaging emissions at the lowest possible cost to society; and iii) continually strive to improve environmental performance. Such instruments are also fairer and promote a more competitive or viable agricultural sector by not obstructing structural change and hence agricultural development.
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We calculate values of forest carbon sequestration and nutrient recycling applying the replacement cost method. The value is then determined as the savings in costs by the replacement of more expensive abatement measures with these ecosystem services in cost-effective climate and nutrient programs. To this end, a dynamic optimization model is constructed, which accounts for uncertainty in sequestration. It is applied to the Stockholm-Malar region in southeast Sweden where the EU 2050 climate policy for carbon emissions and the Baltic Sea action plan for nutrient discharges are applied. The results show that the value of carbon and nutrient sequestration can correspond to approximately 0.5% of the region's gross domestic product, or 40% of the value of productive forest. The largest part of this value is attributed to carbon sequestration because of the relative stringency in targets and expensive alternative abatement measures. However, sequestration is uncertain because of stochastic weather conditions, and when society has a large risk aversion for not attaining climate and nutrient targets, the values of the forest carbon and nutrient sequestration can approach zero.
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This paper developed a simple dynamic model in order to analyse the impact of social capital on violation of environmental regulations. Two main channels of influence were identified; through informal enforcement of regulations and through effects on costs from disinvestment in social capital caused by violation. The model was tested using survey data on enforcement and violation of command and control regulations at municipalities and counties in Sweden. Four different measures on the social capital variable were used; general trust, trust in local and national governments, and organizational activity. Count data models were used for estimating the explanatory power of these variables in relation to inspection frequency and control variables of community characteristics. Statistically best results were obtained for organizational activity for all firm categories. The results showed that both the level of this social capital measure and its growth over time curb violation.
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate policy instruments for interdependent carbon pools and how they can be applied in the EU climate policy to 2050. Cost-effective policy instruments for forest products which are adjusted for the impact on carbon pools are identified. A numerical, dynamic, chance-constrained model including the EU-27 countries shows that inclusion of only one forest carbon pool can reduce costs and increase emission reductions. Results also suggest that decentralized policy instruments for both carbon pools are less costly than uniform instruments at the EU level.
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Large emissions of greenhouse gases are expected to cause major environmental problems in the future. European policy makers have therefore declared that they aim to implement cost-efficient and fair policies to reduce carbon emissions. The purpose of this paper is to assess whether the cost of the EU policies for 2020 can be reduced through the inclusion of carbon sequestration as and abatement option while also equity is improved. The assessment is done by numerical calculations using a chance-constrained partial equilibrium model of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and national effort-sharing targets, where forest sequestration is introduced as an uncertain abatement option. Fairness is evaluated by calculation of Gini-coefficients for six equity criteria to policy outcomes. The estimated Gini-coefficients range between 0.11 and 0.32 for the current policy, between 0.16 and 0.66 if sequestration is included and treated as certain, and between 0.19 and 0.38 when uncertainty about sequestration is taken into account and policy-makers wish to meet targets with at least 90 percent probability. The results show that fairness is reduced when sequestration is included and that the impact is larger when sequestration is treated as certain.
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