Suchergebnisse

Autor u radu kritički ocjenjuje napore poduzete u SAD radi pronalaženja rješenja za problem odlaganja visokoradioaktivnih otpadaka (HLW). Neuspjeh u vezi rješavanja ovog problema najviše je utjecao na nuklearnu industriju. Nezgoda koja se dogodila na Three Mile Island nuklearnoj elektrani usredotočila je pažnju javnosti na odnos između cijene koštanja i sigurnosti nuklearnih elektrana. Inflacija je, poticana umnogome i porastom cijene energiji, pogoršala financijsko stanje mnogih službi pri postrojenjima. Nakon naglog širenja, nuklearna industrija je pretrpjela osjetnu štednju i sve je više planiranih postrojenja otkazivano. Konačno, sumnjičavost javnosti u pogledu prirode i veličine jedne energetske krize je ublažena tvrdnjom o neophodnosti nuklearne energije za energetsku sigurnost Sjedinjenih Američkih Država. Potreba da se uvaže takvi problemi je otežala nedavne napore za rješavanje problema s nuklearnim otpacima, dok neuspjeh da se ostvari solucija odlaganja i nadalje podriva javnu podršku nuklearnoj energiji. ; Nuclear technology has been used in the United States for the generation of electric power, the production of weapons, and in a variety of medical, research and industrial applications. The failure to solve the problem of nuclear waste disposal has, thus far, impacted most strongly on the nuclear power industry. The absence of a solution has interacted with and compounded the basic problems of the nuclear power industry. The nuclear power industry has suffered a number of set backs in recent years in the United States. The accident at Three Mile Island focused public concerns on the cost and safety of nuclear power. A decade of inflation, driven largely by sharp increases in energy costs, has severely strained the financial condition of many utilities. After a period of rapid expansion, the nuclear power industry has experienced a substantial retrenchment as more and more planned capacity is canceled. Finally, public skepticism about the nature and extent of an »energy crisis« has undercut the claim that nuclear power is essential to the future energy security of the United States. The need to address these problems has complicated recent efforts to resolve the nuclear waste problem, while the failure to achieve a disposal solution further undermines public support for nuclear power.

Nasuprot shvaćanjima o energetskoj politici kao funkcionalno-tehničkom problemu, ili na drugoj strani, kao borbe između materijalističkih i postmaterijalističkih vrijednosnih obrazaca u industrijskom, odnosno postindustrijskom društvu, ovaj rad dokazuje sljedeće hipoteze: a) u korijenu današnjih energetskih problema leže konflikti oko raspodjele, b) vrijednosti o kojima se radi, čak i na području zaštite okoline, materijalističke su naravi, c) razlike u energetskoj politici Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i Zapadne Njemačke mogu se objasniti različitim obrascima raspodjele, a težište im je u različitim vrednotama proizašlim iz razlika između industrijskih i demografskih struktura, te geološkog bogatstva, d) energetska politika, a posebno izbor pravca fleksibilne »soft energy«, može se uspješno provoditi nastajanjem »pobjedničke koalicije« poklanjanjem dovoljno pažnje pitanjima raspodjele koja su u to uključena. Zaokrete k fleksibilnoj energetskoj politici autor veže uz pokrete za zaštitu okoline i programe novih energetskih projekata na lokalnoj razini i razini globalnog društva. Na taj način, zaključuje se, »energetski sindrom« i redistributivni konflikti ne moraju biti uzroci dublje političke i društvene dezorganizacije. ; As opposed to the notion of energy policy as a functional-technical issue, and — on the other hand — as a struggle between materialistic and post-materialistic value patterns in the industrial and post-industrial society, the article is arguing the following hypotheses: (1) distributional conflicts represent the roots of the contemporary energy problems, (2) the values involved, even in the field of environmental protection, are of a materialistic nature, (3) the differences in energy policies of the United States and Western Germany can be explained by different distributional patterns, having as their core divergent values stemming from differences between industrial and demographic structures and geological resources, (4) the energy policy, especially the choice of the path of flexible »soft-energy «, can be successfully implemented by the emergence of a »winning coalition« which takes sufficient account of the distributional issues involved. Switches toward flexible energy policies are, according to the author, tied to activities of movements for environmental protection and to programs of new energy projects on the local level and on the global societal level. In such a manner, it is concluded, the »energy syndrome« and redistributional conflicts are not necessarily causes of a profound political and societal disorganization.

In this article the author attempts to analyse the power relationships in the Yugoslav society, in post-war historical perspective of development. He is using the difference between power and meta-power as the conceptual framework. The whole development can be demonstrated as the creation of a system by actors who have meta-power and who want to negate their own meta-power by development of self-management. However, the spontaneous developments lead to such social structuring which challenges the established structure of meta^power. The dilemma with which those having meta-power are faced is whether to intervene into the development of the system and thus »come to surface« as the one having meta-power, or leave the development to remain spontaneous and in such a manner endanger their meta-power. Particular attention has been paid to the relationship between an enterprise and the political system as that sphere of the social system where the processes described in this article are shown with great clarity.

Considering the System theory the author conceives the Yugoslav enterprise to be an open system. Moreover critically taking into consideration all the various definitions for the purpose of operationalization he defines the environment as a communicative influential domain, integrating in this way the theory of the environment and of the organization. Accepting the phenomenological hypothesis and considering the actual influence as equaling the perceptional one — the influence has been investigated, with a help of some innovations, by means of the graph of control on the top management in 55 industrial organizations. The difference between the external and internal, passive and active influences has been distinguished. Internal influence is the one within and the external is the one outside the relevant enterprise; passive is the one to which the respondent is subjected by other members of the organization and active is the one which is exercised by the respondent on other members of the organization. According to the indexes got in this way the enterprises seem to be influenced by the examined factors of the environment to a larger extant than vice versa. The grouping of the bodies of the environment has shown the dominant status of the bank and the trade organizations in their relation to the industrial enterprises. Still that environment is not very much like the system that was typical of eighteenth century liberal capitalism although it might appear so. Considering the system of the country itself we seem to be speaking of the seemingly liberal environment with the state itself appearing indirectly through the banks. The results seem to be confirmed and even more differentiated by the factor analysis. Regarding the internal influence it should be pointed out that the influence of the top management on the organizational groups in the enterprises is almost equal to the amount of the influence exercised on the top management by the organizational groups. Generally, the internal organizational relationships of influence are more intensive and more balanced. We can assume that the social relations between the organizational groups within the enterprises are more socialized and more integrated than the relations between the enterprises and their environment. Top management in an enterprise has a marginal relation towards the political representatives, a central relation towards the professionals and self-managing bodies and a firm-hierarchical-superordination-and-superordination-relation towards managerial groups. The analysis of the correlations has shown that the active and passive external influences make up a united system of power — if viewed from the standpoint of the top management. That does not mean that the top management are exposed to the system of total control because there is also a united system of influence, which is exercised by the top management on the bodies outside the enterprise. In the same way the uncontrolled power does not appear either in the influence of the top management on the organizational groups within the enterprise. So we claim the existence of only two integrated subsystems of the active and passive influences. The increasing influence of the top management on the environment and the organizational groups leads to the reverse influence, that is, the increasing influence of the environment and organizational groups on the top management, exhibiting thus clearly the logic of the reciprocal influence. The author has found out a considerably different influence of the environment within the work organizations than he expected. He expected the influence of the administrative-political environment to lessen the internal active influence of the top management, and the influence of the business professional environment to increase the internal active and passive influences of the top management, and the influence of the trade organizations to increase the active internal influence of the top management. He has found out that the redistribution of power within the work organizations is not influenced by the administrative political environment, and that the influence of the top management within the enterprise is even diminished by the trade-organizations. Moreover, though in a system of external- -internal power-relations the self-managerial bodies and political organizations are not reduced to being merely marginal factors, the backbone of the whole system of the external-internal power-relations still makes the influence of the top management on the leading organizational groups and the influence of the business organizations on the enterprises. That means that the business circle from other enterprises exercises a considerable influence on the internal status of the top management within individual enterprises, and thus on the interactions between the other managerial groups as well. This circulus vitiosus of power is uncontrolled and spontaneous product of the division of labor at the macro-level of the whole society and also at the micro-level of the work-organizations because it makes possible an intensive reciprocal influence between the external and internal managerial groups. This proves the functional autonomization of the management which will be sustained spontaneously up the time when a functionally adequate, and not only politically adequate redistribution of managerial function will be varied out.

The lndependent Democratic Party (Samostalna demokratska stranka) was one of the many political parties of pre-war Yugoslavia. Although it was not a large party as far as number o members was concerned, its role, and especially that of its leader Svetozar Pribićević, in the political life of the Yugoslav stace was very important. ln this paper the author deals with the party's foundation, development and activities, shows the characteristics of its programme, and its social and nacional basis. He restricts his exposition to the period of the Vidovdan Constitution, accunting for this by the fact that ater the institution of the dictatorship the organizational work of the party (and of all other political parties) and its activities in further political development had a special quality. The Independent Democratic Party was formed after a group of 14 delegates, with Svetozar Pribićević at their head had withdrawn from the Democratic Party in March 1924. The leaders of the new party stressed from the beginning that the basis of their policy was unitarism and centralism. Since the ideal of unitarism was expressed most strongly in the Vidovdan Constitution, the Independant Democrats emphasized the importance of the full application of that Constitution. This was the foundacion of their coalition with the Radicals and of the formation of the government of the National Block. When the Radicals saw that their agrement with the Independent Democratic Party and the enforcement of the Obznana against the Croatian Republican Peasant Party (Hrvatska republikanska seljačka stranka) did nat affect Radić's position, they broke off the alliance with Svetozar Pribićević and came to an understanding with Stjepan Radić. The Independent Democratic Party then became part of the opposition. Svetozar Pribićević started forming a large, general Yugoslav party, whose nucleus was to be the Independent Democratic Party. Thes did nat succeed. A struggle for unitarism and centralism remained the basic substance and prime aim of his political activities. Being in the opposition, however, he became more and more aware of manifestations of great-Serbian predominence. Realizing that centralism was not creating Yugoslav unity, but, on the contrary, was strengthening great-Serbian hegernony and bringing the country to a serious crisis, Svetozar Pribićević approached Stjepan Radić. Thus a political alliance between the Independent Democratic Party and the Croacian Peasant Party was formed, named the Peasant-Democratic Coalition (Seljačko-demokratska koalicija). The transformation of the Independent Democratic Party's programme started after the formation of the Peasant-Democratic Coalition. At the beginning a consistent enforcement of the Vidovdan Constitution and a respect for the law were demanded, but soon a demand was made for a revision of the Constitution and even its abolishion. This was expressed in particular after the assassinations in the Nacional Assembly. Before the proclamation of the Dictatorship formulations concerning the reorganization of the state had not been concrete enough, and left possibilities for various different interpretations. But after the manifest of January 6, 1929, the Independent Democratic Party explicitly proclaimed itself for federalism. Svetozar Pribićević himself, after emigrating from the country, even worked for a republican state.

Istraživanja u slovenskim poduzećima pokazuju da se u sedamdesetim godinama oligarhijska struktura moći u poduzeću nije promijenila. To potvrđuju percepcije ispitanika o strukturi moći i vlastitoj nemoći. Malo značenje sindikata za socijalnu organizaciju poduzeća vidi se iz činjenice da je većina radnika koji se ne smatraju članovima sindikata. To, također, potvrđuju podaci istraživanja koji govore o nereprezentativnosti sindikata. Na drugoj strani, radnici priželjkuju njegovu zaštitiničku ulogu. Članak upozorava na ulogu dominantne koalicije moći pri nedemokratičnom izboru samoupravnih organa i analizira ideologiju samoupravljanja kao faktor neinstitucionalizirane socijalne stratifikacije. ; The research of Slovenian enterprises reveals that the oligarchical structure of power in the enterprise has not changed in the seventies. It is verified by the perceptions of respondents on the structure of power and their own powerlessness. The meager significance of trade-unions for the social organization of the enterprise is evident from the fact that the majority of workers do not consider themselves to be members of the trade-union. Furthermore, it is verified by the research results which demonstrate non-representativeness of trade-unions. On the other hand, workers desire the protective role of trade-union. The article cautions about the role of the dominant power- -coalition in non-democratic elections of self-management bodies and analyses the ideology of self-management as a factor of non-institutionalized social stratification.

The first part of the article deals with the renewal of old and establishement of new associations in Šibenik and its district during the period betwen the two world wars. The associations are astablished by the pro-government elements of the society in order to be able to realize the goals of the state policy as defined by the »Vidovdan« Constitution. The opposition parties of the burgeois society established their own associations intended to reach the goals set by the programe of their political or cultural activities. The oppositional forces and particularly the HSS (Croatian Peasants' Party) developed a great activity in the founding of new associations after 1935. The activity of various associations was forbidden by the dictatorial government of January 6th, 1929, while others were required to engage themselves more intensively in the realization of the unitarian-centralistic conception of state The »Jugoslavenski Sokol«, »Jadranska Straža«, etc.) The second part of the article contains various data referring to associations ordered in the following way; (a) Yugoslav, (b) Croatian, (c) Serbian, (d) Religious, (e) the remaining ones (trade unions, cultural, humanitarian, and sports association. Then follows a general survey of the activity of each of the associations, a description of their activities and the occasions on which they took place. Numerous associations developed their most important annual activity in connection with the celebration of same national, religious and similar holidays. The activities of some associations is illustrated by interesting data (»Kolo«, the Yugoslav workers' Sports Club »Šibenik«, branch organizations of the »Seljačka Sloga«). Some documents and observations are presented in the third part of the article, showing that some of the associations were influenced by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. This applies to »Vodička Glazba«, to the »Seljačka Sloga« branch organization at Zaton, the JRSD »Šibenik«, the Jugoslavenski Akademski Klub, as well as to the academic clubs »Matija Gubec«, and »Stjepan Radić«. Taking into account the fact that a maximum number of activists and combatants in the People's Liberation War came from the Šibenik region, the author concludes that the above mentioned associations and similar organizations, particularly on the Adriatic islands, were real hotbeds of ideas and viewpoints of the Communist Parties of Yugoslavia and of Croatia.

The idea underlying the politics of the Independent People's Party (Samostalna narodna stranka), emphasized already in the program of 1863, was the principle that Croatia had rights as an independent entity and consonant with this the duty to determine the status of its rights in the Monarchy independently, and not in conjunction with Hungary. In accordance with this principle the Party took as a point of departure its political conceptions of 1848 from which arose the separation of Croatia from Hungary. Although of all parties, the Independent People's Party built least on historical rights, it was prepared to turn to them in order to strengthen the position of Croatia as a state. It differed from the other parties in that the viewpoints of the aristocrats received least expression in its publications, and it favored the democratization of politics, with the involvement of the widest range of social strata in political life. Regarding the central government, the Independent press emphasized that the Croatian Office and the Viennese government did not have the same goals; to verify this assertion they indicated that the programmatic document "Conditionally or Unconditionally?" originated with the sanction of the Office. The demands expressed in this document were certainly not in accord with the centralistic tendencies in the Viennese government. Conditions for entrance into the Emperor's Council were, namely, an independent and autonomous budget, unification with Dalmatia and with a part of Krajina. Besides this it was emphasized that the Croatian Constitution and autonomy could not come into question, nor could the government ministers interfere in the issue of Croatia's autonomy. It was further emphasized that Inasmuch as Hungary obtained a different status as a state, those same rights must also be granted to Croatia. In their writings the Independent politicians sharply differentiated between two freedoms: the political freedom of citizens and the freedom to develop national identity, and they consistently supported the latter. They were convinced that within the Hungarian community of nations, Croatians would not be able to attain conditions conductive to free national development, and hence supported an agreement with Vienna. Aside from this, they hinted that in the event an agreement with Vienna could not be reached, the Croatians still had the opportunity to negotiate with Budapest. On the other hand, inasmuch as the Croatians would first negotiate with Budapest, or rather send their representatives to the Hungarian Assembly, the significance of the Croatian Assembly would be greatly reduced and would become completely dependent on the Hungarian Assembly. In this event there would be no further possibility for Croatia to enter into any other combination of states' rights. They further stressed, quite correctly, that the Hungarians themselves were making agreements with Vienna and that in some transactions they treated the Monarchy as an equal unity. Insofar as negotiations were already under way, the Independents were convinced that it was more advantageous for Croatians to take part in them immediately rather than directly with Hungary. In spite of the fact that the program demanded a lot, the majority of the populists did not support it from distrust that the program was merely a decoy to draw the Croatians into the Emperor's Council. The Independents were convinced that the main reason for this distrust was the widespread conviction that the goals of the Viennese government and the Croatian Office were identical, so they attacked such assertions in their publications. However, despite this, the majority of the populists continued to reject Independent policies and in their resistence joined the Unionists; in this way they strengthened the dualistic trend, which even without this support, became stronger in the political life of the Monarchy.

Višestruke krizne pojave u jugoslavenskom društvu zahvatile su i međunacionalne odnose i utječu na jačanje »regresivnih nacionalizma«. Polazeći od pretpostavke da jedan oblik »regresivnog nacionalizma« (partikularizam) izaziva reakciju drugog (unitarizam), autor opširno analizira rezultate istraživanja slovenskog javnog mnijenja 1982. godine povodom događaja na Kosovu, kako se ti događaji reflektiraju na etničku distancu u Sloveniji, stavove i informiranost o međunacionalnim odnosima. Oslanjajući se na te rezultate i na opservacije drugih autora o jugoslavenskoj krizi, autor zaključuje da je potrebno jačati netradicionalne mehanizme integracije; reorganizirati zatvorene i neadaptivne ekonomske sisteme bez konkurentskih sposobnosti, provesti složenu operacionalizaciju samoupravnih načela i integracijsku ulogu SK što više razvijati mimo administrativne sile. ; Multi-fold crises in the Yugoslav society have encompassed inter-ethnic relations and they have an impact on the strengthening of »regressive nationalisms«. Starting from the assumption of a form of »regressive nationalism« (particularism) provoking the reaction in the form of another (unitarism), the author attempts a detailed analysis of the results of public opinion survey in Slovenia of 1982 with respect to the events in Kosovo, emphasizing the reflection of those events on the ethnical distance in Slovenia, on attitudes and information with respect to inter-ethnic relations. On the basis of those results and observations of other authors in relation to the Yugoslav crisis, the author concludes that non-traditional mechanisms of integration have to be strengthened; closed and inadaptive economic systems :— having no competitive abilities — have to be reorganized; the complex operationalization of the self-management principles yet has to be implemented and the integrative role of the League of Communists has to be developed exempt from administrative powers.

Using primary sources, the author has described Maček's meeting with Prince Paul and the Prime Minister Stojadinović. The meeting with the Prince was held on November 8, 1936. This meeting paved the way for Maček's later meeting with Stojadinović on Januar 16, 1937 in Brežice (Slovenia). At the meetings various question of external and internal policy were discussed. The Croatian question was the Central problem. The Prince and Stojadinović were of the opinion that it was impossible to change the September 3, 1931 Constitution, and that any agreement about the Croatian question could only be arrived at within the frame of that Constitution. This, in fact, meant retaining the unsatisfactory unitary establishment. Maček's opinion was that the solution of the Croatian question was possible only if the Constitution was abrogated and there was a new constitutional situation, based on a federal state. He proposed a procedure for attaining this new constitution. Although the views of the government and the Croatian opposition for the solution of the Croatian question were different, both sides were interested in maintaining contact, making concessions and pursuing a policy of compromise. Stojadinović's government had enemies on several sides. In such a situation it did not want to make relations with the Croatian opposition worse. That is why this opposition's activity was to a certain extent tolerated. These tactics were a result of the Prince's and Stojadinović's wishes for the government to show itself as following a new political course after the assassination of King Alexander. Maček, on the other hand, wished Stojadinović's government to remain in power because there was a danger of it being pushed aside by forces which upheld the earlier absolutist policy of King Alexander. The relatively tolerant policy of the government made the process of the renewal of the Croatian Peasant Party, and organizations under its influence, easier. Among the Contributiones is the report of the Ban of the Sava banovina on reactions to Maček's meeting with Stojadinović, and also two reports from which are seen Maček's secret contacts (through the Chief of Stojadinović's Cabinet) after the meeting in Brežice. In these reports their mutual wish to continue the policy of reciprocal concessions and compromise is affirmed.

Among the many factors that determine the development of a political democracy, political culture should be stressed. Research by Almond and Verba, and later similar research in Yugoslavia, show that there exists a rather strong connection between political culture and the stability of a democratic political system. As large and ever larger groups of people have access to television, this mass medium plays more and more prominent role in shaping political culture. When the population attains (as in many societies now) a certain basic level of education, the majority of programmes can be understood by everybody. With this, there is lessening of the discrimination as to the political information, at least in principle. Television is an especially potent medium for introducing people into subject areas for which they have shown little or no interest previously. In spite of selective processes, a good measure of such material reaches the viewer and causes changes in his mind. People, in short, become conscious of political processes, which means enhancing of political culture. After the advent of TV, the political process has been transformed into real life, that can be seen, heard and almost touched. With this, the politician and politics itself loses their mystique and moves into the area of the secular things. The politician's image on the TV screen in not only physically diminished, but also psychologically deflated: now everybody can measure and criticize him by use of common yardsticks. In that way ordinary citizens gain certain strength, of the psychological nature, that becomes a part of their new political culture. Furthermore, television acts as an integrator and affirmer of small, isolated opposition groups. This is especially important for political systems in which political life has been integrated around two or three great political parties, and everything outside, remains unnoticed and ineffective. When such a small political group gets a portion of TV time (as it must, because it il »news« by definition), it immediately draws the support of all similar element in society and by that the chance to influence the broader political process. Naturally, television does not have only positive effects on political culture and political process. We not forget that television, with rare exceptions, is under direct and strong monopolistic control of varied political and other elites. The television viewer is to a large extent a victim of manipulation. Furthermore, there are some authors that consider television detrimental for political action, because it purportedly passivizes the public. But our conclusion is still on the positive side. The suppression of news and information in general, cannot go too far except in countries that are cut off the rest of the world in a seal-tight fashion. If people get information and that during long periods, (throughout years and decades), they cannot but form their attitudes, and become readier for political action, »spectoritis« or not. The whole problem of television influence on viewer should be always discussed in a broad time perspective, and not, as in some of the current research, in an artificially isolated moment. And so, to conclude, television does build the basic psycho-cultural prerequisites for better political participation, and by that, for a more democratic world.

This paper describes an attempt of a new methodological approach to the studying of the power structure in organizations. The first part comprises critical remarks directed to the most extensively used method of graphs of control based upon the examined subjects' perception of the existing power structure, (a) A small dispersion of results about some values is not necessarily an indicator of the validity, but perhaps of the generally accepted stereotype, (b) Perception also depends on a series of factors of social position and psychological state of examined subjects. Tending to avoid the disadvantages of the method of graphs of control, and to retain, however, a high degree of standardization, we have tried to create a method which would comprise these qualities. The research work has been carried out in two stages. The first stage consisted of a project based upon the observation with specially prepared forms as persons who contributed in the meetings of workers' councils. Objective data for all the respective persons were collected. In this way a complete picture of activity within the forum with prerogatives of bringing all the key decisions was obtained. However, even if this method offers a very detailed picture of the examined phenomenon, it is not fully satisfactory. As first, it is concentrated upon a fragment (segment) of a continuous process of decision making. Second, this method does not allow the identification of informal groups in organization which might have the key influence upon the decision making. Due to these reasons we have then created an instrument tending to cover the complete process of the decision making (including both formal and informal levels), allowing identification of all the key groups within organization, formal and informal, and being also maximally standardized. The first stage in the obtained scheme refers to the preparation of the decision making which comprises the overall social process before the formal act of the decision making. The second stage refers to the decision making itself. As last, there might appear the control, consisting of the initiative for the control implementation and the implementation itself. It is assumed that in all these various stages of the decision making process it is possible to identify persons actively participating in it. We are, however, primarily concerned with the following — which are the groups whose interests these persons represent. We will also try to analyse goals, strategies and effects of activity. In order to follow directly the overall process through which the decision making passes, we have relied upon the informants, well informed about respective organizations. Therefore this method represents a kind of a »key-men« technique, as we tried to reach persons who had such positions, this primarily through the industrial psychologists already extensively employed in industry and various other organizations. Obviously, there is always a problem of objectivity of such informants. This can be avoided in two ways: by requesting the informants to provide information only and by trying to maximally eliminate their evaluation, and also by the engage meant of several informants from the same organization.

There are varied institutional forms (formal and informal) in which electoral (political) subjects take part in elections. Elections for assemblies show that the actions of such subjects are differently motivated, and also that their approach during conflict or cooperation in the realization of their wishes is different. Thus conflict situations, »election scandals«, occur sporadically. Such conflicts are an expression and a result of contradictory desires and actions of the participants. The significance and effect of an electoral conflict is conditioned and determined by the (political) significance of the elections themselves, not only in the sense that they are formally one of the basic constitutive elements of the political system, but first and foremost because they are the form in which citizens are active in politics. Following the procedure in election the author has tried to reveal the basic actors in electoral conflicts, the content of their conflict and the form it takes. In the author's opinion it is wrong to pass an a priori judgement of the character and value of electoral »cases« (negative judgements have usually been passed), the foundation of the conflict and the character and orientation of the persons involved, who do not seek for affirmation of their political value in the strength of arguments and objective achievement. We can understand and solve the ambivalent character of such conflicts, and the political behavior of their participants, only after studying the case. There will be a smaller number of »cases« and electoral conflicts, and they will be less complicated, the more consistently we free ourselves from varied formal-legal and political restraints, and the more society takes on the characteristics of self-managing and democratic socialism. Conflicts of this type are not the result of democracy. They are the result of its insufficient development or presence, thus making it subject to misunderstanding, searching and abuse.

The basic feature and specificity of Yugoslav pluralism are the institutional interest groups. These groups are the elements of the structure of the political system itself, and therefore directly included — institutionally and legislatively in the consideration is here primarily given to the enterprise. As the enterprise is given a special status in the constitutional political system of Yugoslavia in which it is legally recognized as a political category par excellence, the consideration is here primarily given to the enterprise. Analyzing the results of the interviews with the presidents of Communal Assemblies in Socialist Republic of Croatia and directors of some bigger enterprises in the same republic, the author investigates whether and to what extent the enterprise uses its power and influence in the political process — in what degree it is a policy making factor. The research results show considerable differences between the formal authority and factual power of the enterprises. Although all the enterprises have the same status constitutionally, the real differences are so great, that some enterprises make the policy of communes and even larger regions, and the influence of others is meager. The factor is the economic power. Besides the differences between the enterprises in power and influence, the research results give the evidence to the author's thesis that the enterprises significantly influence the process of political decision making. The actual possibility of the enterprise to act as an interest group is determined by many conditions — some of political and legislative, some of factual nature, primarily: a) by political and legal status in the total system, b) unstable normative structure which is subject to many influences and constant change, c) lack of the more stable criteria that would provide an evaluation of organizations and individuals according to their results, and last but not least; d) democratization of the system itself which is becoming more open to the expression of different interests and actions of interest groups. Finally, author examines some relevant theoretical and political aspects of the strike as a mean of the political pressure in the self-management system in Yugoslavia.

From the class meeting in Bruck in 1578 to Berlin Congress in 1878, i. e. from the very beginning till the end of its fundamental function, Military Border goes through various and very complex processes. Its problems in the 1850-ies are the topic of this paper. In spite of clear demands of political circles in Zagreb concerning the Military Border, the Monarchy in Vienna tries to protect it as a distinctly military institution that will not act against Hungary only but against national integration on the Balkan and Apenine Peninsula too. After the revolution in 1848/49 military and court circles in the Austrian monarchy invest special labours to turn the Military Border into a corpus separatum where military tradition will be further cherished, with corporal strictness, waiting for the development of events on the East, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. With the presence of Vienna and Budapest, especially after 1849, solving of the Military Border question is affected strongly by the impulse coming just from Zagreb. Trying to gather around itself the separated Croatian territories as soon as possible, Zagreb supported in the Military Border question up to Austro-Hungarian agreement in 1867 the opinion about the need of administrative integration of military and civil territories of Croatia. But, because the administrative integration does not put in the first plan demilitarization of Military Border, there appear due to such political conception in Zagreb some fundamental prerequisites for the collaboration between military and royal circles in Vienna and Croatian politicians. However, this collaboration left no deeper traces in the Croatian politics. The last ''Basic Law of Military Border", accepted in 1850, rejects all the projects of political representation of Croatia about the future of Military Border. The project has been saved as Jelačić's "Military Border Foundation" from 1849. In spite of expectations of Croatian politicians the last "Military Border Foundation" from 1850 tries to contribute to stabilization of Military Border mechanism and to its preserving. This new Military Border's constitution, contrary to demands of Croatian representatives formulated in the "Military Border Foundation" in 1849, declares the whole Military Border to be a part of the imperial army. Although the basic intention of that Law was to subordinate social relationships in Military Border to its main task, i. e. to supply the Monarchy permanently with cheap army, still it did not succeed to stop the process of social differentiation and destruction of outlived forms of traditional Military Border society, In this paper are analyzed first of all those social phenomena in Military Border which point to the movement of the social structure and the crisis of traditional military-rural society. Besides problems of disharmony between legal superstructure and social reality there are analyzed the efforts of Croatian business circles to hold back - by means of concentrating merchants and craftsmen in Croatia under the ban and in Military Border - the Austrian capital existing for centuries in Military Border, that important part of Croatian territories.