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La societè democratique doit assurer la libertė de la religion pour un chaque perssone. Chaque fois existe le risque heurter cette ligne. L' état constitue la limite de pouvoir d' organisation de la religions . Dans les pays se trouve les modeles variés de la separation l'églises entre l'états : religion de l'état, l'état et la religion sont sepparé partiellement, ainsi l'état entre l'eglise sont separé entieterement. Constitution de Lituanie fortifie qu'il n'y a pas religion d'état. On peut a dire, que en Lituanie agire modelle de separation partiellement. Le systeme d'éducations forme la citoyenneté, donne aux élèves une armature intellectuelle et morale. Dans l'école de statalè les élèves doivent choisir entre les classes des religions traditionnellles ou les classes d'éthique. La Cour constitutionnelle est constaté que dans le pays existe trois systemes d'organizations de religion: les religions traditionnelles, les religionsacceptè par l'état et les autres organizations. Les autres religions ont plus moins des droits que celle on assure pour religions traditionnelle. La doctrine constitutionnelle explique que cette situation est donné par la Constitution. Les actes normatives du droit ne fixe pas le clairs fondation, qui détermine les droit pour la commmunautè religieuse Neuf communautès traditionnelles et un organisation religieuse qui a la reconaissance d'ėtat agirent en Lituanie. Les autres communautés religiosses sont enregistré et agire sous un forme de la personne juridique. En République Lituanie trois dèsision de la Cour constitutionnel sont importants, qui formint base lėgal d'église centre l'église et l'état.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the development of relations between Russia and the two Western power centres, the United States of America and the European Union, in 2003 – 2004. It goes without saying that it would be quite problematic and risky to formulate an unequivocal evaluation of this dynamic phenomenon. The author, however, sought to identify and determine the key trends of development. This was done through a search for answers to more specific questions: what was the strategy of Russia's foreign policy, how did it interact with the goals and aspirations of the USA and EU, and, finally, toward what – convergence or alienation – did evolve the dialogue between the global power centres that are of greatest importance for the Central and Eastern European countries. These tasks have dictated the trinomial structure of the paper. The first part deals with the changes in the Russian foreign policy strategy in recent years. It shows how, upon sensible assessment of its opportunities, Russia abandoned its former rush-about and concentrated on the inclusion of the CIS states (the Ukraine in particular) in its political orbit. The second and the third part of the paper analyse the peculiarities and ups and downs of Russia's relations with the USA and the EU respectively. Despite certain variations, the development of these relations increasingly shows signs of alienation and cooling, which were partly masked by the intention of the EU larger Member States, in particular of the Germany, to maintain good relations with Russia at any cost. Finally, a brief overview of the culminating event in the Russian–Western relations – the Ukrainian "orange revolution" – is presented at the end of the paper, supplemented by a broader summarisation of the period under consideration. The underlying idea of the summary is that the so-called "value gap" has been widening in the Russian-Western relations in recent years.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the development of relations between Russia and the two Western power centres, the United States of America and the European Union, in 2003 – 2004. It goes without saying that it would be quite problematic and risky to formulate an unequivocal evaluation of this dynamic phenomenon. The author, however, sought to identify and determine the key trends of development. This was done through a search for answers to more specific questions: what was the strategy of Russia's foreign policy, how did it interact with the goals and aspirations of the USA and EU, and, finally, toward what – convergence or alienation – did evolve the dialogue between the global power centres that are of greatest importance for the Central and Eastern European countries. These tasks have dictated the trinomial structure of the paper. The first part deals with the changes in the Russian foreign policy strategy in recent years. It shows how, upon sensible assessment of its opportunities, Russia abandoned its former rush-about and concentrated on the inclusion of the CIS states (the Ukraine in particular) in its political orbit. The second and the third part of the paper analyse the peculiarities and ups and downs of Russia's relations with the USA and the EU respectively. Despite certain variations, the development of these relations increasingly shows signs of alienation and cooling, which were partly masked by the intention of the EU larger Member States, in particular of the Germany, to maintain good relations with Russia at any cost. Finally, a brief overview of the culminating event in the Russian–Western relations – the Ukrainian "orange revolution" – is presented at the end of the paper, supplemented by a broader summarisation of the period under consideration. The underlying idea of the summary is that the so-called "value gap" has been widening in the Russian-Western relations in recent years.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the development of relations between Russia and the two Western power centres, the United States of America and the European Union, in 2003 – 2004. It goes without saying that it would be quite problematic and risky to formulate an unequivocal evaluation of this dynamic phenomenon. The author, however, sought to identify and determine the key trends of development. This was done through a search for answers to more specific questions: what was the strategy of Russia's foreign policy, how did it interact with the goals and aspirations of the USA and EU, and, finally, toward what – convergence or alienation – did evolve the dialogue between the global power centres that are of greatest importance for the Central and Eastern European countries. These tasks have dictated the trinomial structure of the paper. The first part deals with the changes in the Russian foreign policy strategy in recent years. It shows how, upon sensible assessment of its opportunities, Russia abandoned its former rush-about and concentrated on the inclusion of the CIS states (the Ukraine in particular) in its political orbit. The second and the third part of the paper analyse the peculiarities and ups and downs of Russia's relations with the USA and the EU respectively. Despite certain variations, the development of these relations increasingly shows signs of alienation and cooling, which were partly masked by the intention of the EU larger Member States, in particular of the Germany, to maintain good relations with Russia at any cost. Finally, a brief overview of the culminating event in the Russian–Western relations – the Ukrainian "orange revolution" – is presented at the end of the paper, supplemented by a broader summarisation of the period under consideration. The underlying idea of the summary is that the so-called "value gap" has been widening in the Russian-Western relations in recent years.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the development of relations between Russia and the two Western power centres, the United States of America and the European Union, in 2003 – 2004. It goes without saying that it would be quite problematic and risky to formulate an unequivocal evaluation of this dynamic phenomenon. The author, however, sought to identify and determine the key trends of development. This was done through a search for answers to more specific questions: what was the strategy of Russia's foreign policy, how did it interact with the goals and aspirations of the USA and EU, and, finally, toward what – convergence or alienation – did evolve the dialogue between the global power centres that are of greatest importance for the Central and Eastern European countries. These tasks have dictated the trinomial structure of the paper. The first part deals with the changes in the Russian foreign policy strategy in recent years. It shows how, upon sensible assessment of its opportunities, Russia abandoned its former rush-about and concentrated on the inclusion of the CIS states (the Ukraine in particular) in its political orbit. The second and the third part of the paper analyse the peculiarities and ups and downs of Russia's relations with the USA and the EU respectively. Despite certain variations, the development of these relations increasingly shows signs of alienation and cooling, which were partly masked by the intention of the EU larger Member States, in particular of the Germany, to maintain good relations with Russia at any cost. Finally, a brief overview of the culminating event in the Russian–Western relations – the Ukrainian "orange revolution" – is presented at the end of the paper, supplemented by a broader summarisation of the period under consideration. The underlying idea of the summary is that the so-called "value gap" has been widening in the Russian-Western relations in recent years.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the development of relations between Russia and the two Western power centres, the United States of America and the European Union, in 2003 – 2004. It goes without saying that it would be quite problematic and risky to formulate an unequivocal evaluation of this dynamic phenomenon. The author, however, sought to identify and determine the key trends of development. This was done through a search for answers to more specific questions: what was the strategy of Russia's foreign policy, how did it interact with the goals and aspirations of the USA and EU, and, finally, toward what – convergence or alienation – did evolve the dialogue between the global power centres that are of greatest importance for the Central and Eastern European countries. These tasks have dictated the trinomial structure of the paper. The first part deals with the changes in the Russian foreign policy strategy in recent years. It shows how, upon sensible assessment of its opportunities, Russia abandoned its former rush-about and concentrated on the inclusion of the CIS states (the Ukraine in particular) in its political orbit. The second and the third part of the paper analyse the peculiarities and ups and downs of Russia's relations with the USA and the EU respectively. Despite certain variations, the development of these relations increasingly shows signs of alienation and cooling, which were partly masked by the intention of the EU larger Member States, in particular of the Germany, to maintain good relations with Russia at any cost. Finally, a brief overview of the culminating event in the Russian–Western relations – the Ukrainian "orange revolution" – is presented at the end of the paper, supplemented by a broader summarisation of the period under consideration. The underlying idea of the summary is that the so-called "value gap" has been widening in the Russian-Western relations in recent years.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the development of relations between Russia and the two Western power centres, the United States of America and the European Union, in 2003 – 2004. It goes without saying that it would be quite problematic and risky to formulate an unequivocal evaluation of this dynamic phenomenon. The author, however, sought to identify and determine the key trends of development. This was done through a search for answers to more specific questions: what was the strategy of Russia's foreign policy, how did it interact with the goals and aspirations of the USA and EU, and, finally, toward what – convergence or alienation – did evolve the dialogue between the global power centres that are of greatest importance for the Central and Eastern European countries. These tasks have dictated the trinomial structure of the paper. The first part deals with the changes in the Russian foreign policy strategy in recent years. It shows how, upon sensible assessment of its opportunities, Russia abandoned its former rush-about and concentrated on the inclusion of the CIS states (the Ukraine in particular) in its political orbit. The second and the third part of the paper analyse the peculiarities and ups and downs of Russia's relations with the USA and the EU respectively. Despite certain variations, the development of these relations increasingly shows signs of alienation and cooling, which were partly masked by the intention of the EU larger Member States, in particular of the Germany, to maintain good relations with Russia at any cost. Finally, a brief overview of the culminating event in the Russian–Western relations – the Ukrainian "orange revolution" – is presented at the end of the paper, supplemented by a broader summarisation of the period under consideration. The underlying idea of the summary is that the so-called "value gap" has been widening in the Russian-Western relations in recent years.

Although the correlation of welfare and democracy is not direct, it is possible to sustain that the problems related with democracy satisfaction could be solved by public policy measures. Lithuanian's who reflect themselves as the losers of the transition reforms are unsatisfied with their socio-economic status and their anticipation of the prompt life improvement is rather high. If such tendencies start to dominate in the society of Lithuania, the question of political stability arises. Therefore social security, welfare network and infrastructure development as well as the increase of the redistribution amounts look like inevitable reforms in nowadays Lithuania. All appropriate compensatory measures could be related to the development of the welfare state in Lithuania. The liberal model of the welfare state should be the most suitable option for Lithuania at first sight. The Lisbon Strategy is implicitly based on this kind of welfare state model. Lithuania was trying to apply active labour market policy nevertheless the efforts were restrained by the small resources. The structural policy of the EU, mainly the measures financed by the European Social Fund, should increase the amount of funds allocated to the active labour market policy. Considering public policy in Lithuania an exclusive attention should be paid to the reduction of regional inequalities, establishment of the workplaces and social security infrastructure. Due to the Lithuanian budget restrictions it's necessary to develop a tax base and to improve tax administration. The second important component is partial decentralisation of programming and implementation of the EU funds by means of the EU Cohesion policy reform. The third component is the implementation of horizontal regional policy in Lithuania. Legal and organisational premises for the aforementioned steps are already established.

Although the correlation of welfare and democracy is not direct, it is possible to sustain that the problems related with democracy satisfaction could be solved by public policy measures. Lithuanian's who reflect themselves as the losers of the transition reforms are unsatisfied with their socio-economic status and their anticipation of the prompt life improvement is rather high. If such tendencies start to dominate in the society of Lithuania, the question of political stability arises. Therefore social security, welfare network and infrastructure development as well as the increase of the redistribution amounts look like inevitable reforms in nowadays Lithuania. All appropriate compensatory measures could be related to the development of the welfare state in Lithuania. The liberal model of the welfare state should be the most suitable option for Lithuania at first sight. The Lisbon Strategy is implicitly based on this kind of welfare state model. Lithuania was trying to apply active labour market policy nevertheless the efforts were restrained by the small resources. The structural policy of the EU, mainly the measures financed by the European Social Fund, should increase the amount of funds allocated to the active labour market policy. Considering public policy in Lithuania an exclusive attention should be paid to the reduction of regional inequalities, establishment of the workplaces and social security infrastructure. Due to the Lithuanian budget restrictions it's necessary to develop a tax base and to improve tax administration. The second important component is partial decentralisation of programming and implementation of the EU funds by means of the EU Cohesion policy reform. The third component is the implementation of horizontal regional policy in Lithuania. Legal and organisational premises for the aforementioned steps are already established.

Although the correlation of welfare and democracy is not direct, it is possible to sustain that the problems related with democracy satisfaction could be solved by public policy measures. Lithuanian's who reflect themselves as the losers of the transition reforms are unsatisfied with their socio-economic status and their anticipation of the prompt life improvement is rather high. If such tendencies start to dominate in the society of Lithuania, the question of political stability arises. Therefore social security, welfare network and infrastructure development as well as the increase of the redistribution amounts look like inevitable reforms in nowadays Lithuania. All appropriate compensatory measures could be related to the development of the welfare state in Lithuania. The liberal model of the welfare state should be the most suitable option for Lithuania at first sight. The Lisbon Strategy is implicitly based on this kind of welfare state model. Lithuania was trying to apply active labour market policy nevertheless the efforts were restrained by the small resources. The structural policy of the EU, mainly the measures financed by the European Social Fund, should increase the amount of funds allocated to the active labour market policy. Considering public policy in Lithuania an exclusive attention should be paid to the reduction of regional inequalities, establishment of the workplaces and social security infrastructure. Due to the Lithuanian budget restrictions it's necessary to develop a tax base and to improve tax administration. The second important component is partial decentralisation of programming and implementation of the EU funds by means of the EU Cohesion policy reform. The third component is the implementation of horizontal regional policy in Lithuania. Legal and organisational premises for the aforementioned steps are already established.

Although the correlation of welfare and democracy is not direct, it is possible to sustain that the problems related with democracy satisfaction could be solved by public policy measures. Lithuanian's who reflect themselves as the losers of the transition reforms are unsatisfied with their socio-economic status and their anticipation of the prompt life improvement is rather high. If such tendencies start to dominate in the society of Lithuania, the question of political stability arises. Therefore social security, welfare network and infrastructure development as well as the increase of the redistribution amounts look like inevitable reforms in nowadays Lithuania. All appropriate compensatory measures could be related to the development of the welfare state in Lithuania. The liberal model of the welfare state should be the most suitable option for Lithuania at first sight. The Lisbon Strategy is implicitly based on this kind of welfare state model. Lithuania was trying to apply active labour market policy nevertheless the efforts were restrained by the small resources. The structural policy of the EU, mainly the measures financed by the European Social Fund, should increase the amount of funds allocated to the active labour market policy. Considering public policy in Lithuania an exclusive attention should be paid to the reduction of regional inequalities, establishment of the workplaces and social security infrastructure. Due to the Lithuanian budget restrictions it's necessary to develop a tax base and to improve tax administration. The second important component is partial decentralisation of programming and implementation of the EU funds by means of the EU Cohesion policy reform. The third component is the implementation of horizontal regional policy in Lithuania. Legal and organisational premises for the aforementioned steps are already established.

One of today major problems of public administration – defense system of the state and planning of her strategy. Sucha situation is, because too small attention was paid for it in literature of public administration, like a specific problem that belong to sector of public administration. This problem often is solved only in military aspect, and is hold as a part of military defense system. There are not enough competitive specialist and experts who would understand sucha problem and would take part solving it as well. It is very important to understand, that defense system is systematic objekt and all problematic should be taken as a whole system that integrate and accumulate different, even opposite elements. Spectrum of methods is very wide, and amount is very large, and for realization well-organized and effective management should be involved. Effectiveness of defense system depends on ability to use all possible resources that are in the state. That is why defense system and control of he implementation should belong to public administration.

One of today major problems of public administration – defense system of the state and planning of her strategy. Sucha situation is, because too small attention was paid for it in literature of public administration, like a specific problem that belong to sector of public administration. This problem often is solved only in military aspect, and is hold as a part of military defense system. There are not enough competitive specialist and experts who would understand sucha problem and would take part solving it as well. It is very important to understand, that defense system is systematic objekt and all problematic should be taken as a whole system that integrate and accumulate different, even opposite elements. Spectrum of methods is very wide, and amount is very large, and for realization well-organized and effective management should be involved. Effectiveness of defense system depends on ability to use all possible resources that are in the state. That is why defense system and control of he implementation should belong to public administration.

The goal of this paper is to analyse the political discourse of one among the most influential thinkers of Islamic resurgence movement, Hasan al-Banna, who is frequently considered the father of contemporary radical movements advocating the must for the Islamic state what is due to extra-legal activities of his created Islamic organization "The Muslim Brotherhood" which was often taken as an organizational model by subsequent Islamic groups. The theoretical analysis, however, of the major principles that Hasan al-Banna employs in constructing foundations of the legitimate Islamic state reveals that his political theory is compromising and open to the basic values of Western democracy. This article seeks to shown how Hasan al-Banna reconstructs Islamic political theory by reworking the meanings of its basic foundations.

The goal of this paper is to analyse the political discourse of one among the most influential thinkers of Islamic resurgence movement, Hasan al-Banna, who is frequently considered the father of contemporary radical movements advocating the must for the Islamic state what is due to extra-legal activities of his created Islamic organization "The Muslim Brotherhood" which was often taken as an organizational model by subsequent Islamic groups. The theoretical analysis, however, of the major principles that Hasan al-Banna employs in constructing foundations of the legitimate Islamic state reveals that his political theory is compromising and open to the basic values of Western democracy. This article seeks to shown how Hasan al-Banna reconstructs Islamic political theory by reworking the meanings of its basic foundations.