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Life and responsibility in European education
In: European dimension in education and teaching Vol. 5
Objectives and strategies for education policies in the Baltic Sea Region
In: Baltic Sea Academy series 2
Eastern model of the modern state education on the example of the russian cadet corps. Outline of the problem ; Wschodni model współczesnego wychowania państwowego na przykładzie rosyjskiego korpusu kadetów. Zarys problemu
The modern model of state education in Russia promotes patriotism and devotion to the authorities. Young people must be proud of their origin and, in spite of deteriorating material conditions, should stay in the country contributing to its development. Cadet Corps Alumni are an example of a patriotic education model. Several years of learning in the military school shapes their beliefs and teaches them complete surrender to authority. Patriotism, combined with the sense of external threat, has become the driving force behind the reconstruction of the Russian superpower. One of the cornerstones of the school is the acceptance of Putin's Russia by spreading the vision of becoming an international representative of the country. The increase in military spending and functioning of military schools such as the Corps of Cadets give rise to fears that in the future Russia the army will become one of the tools of the superpower on the arena of foreign policy. ; The modern model of state education in Russia promotes patriotism and devotion to the authorities. Young people must be proud of their origin and, in spite of deteriorating material conditions, should stay in the country contributing to its development. Cadet Corps Alumni are an example of a patriotic education model. Several years of learning in the military school shapes their beliefs and teaches them complete surrender to authority. Patriotism, combined with the sense of external threat, has become the driving force behind the reconstruction of the Russian superpower. One of the cornerstones of the school is the acceptance of Putin's Russia by spreading the vision of becoming an international representative of the country. The increase in military spending and functioning of military schools such as the Corps of Cadets give rise to fears that in the future Russia the army will become one of the tools of the superpower on the arena of foreign policy.
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Quality Assurance in Education for Democratic Citizenship. Can this Strategy Work in Polish Schools?
Education for democratic citizenship (EDC) encompasses all educational practices aimed at preparing young people and adults for life in a democratic society and helping them become active, informed and responsible citizens. The changes that have taken place over the past 18 years in Poland have not bypassed the school evaluation system. The country has slowly passed from a system of "hard control" to one of "soft supervision," and its control functions have been strongly limited to make way for consultancy and support.Obviously it is now impossible to foresee the future of school evaluation – many educators agree that the 2006 law meant less bureaucracy, but some add that it might also mean more control and less school autonomy. Whether and when we will see new regulations in this field remains unclear now. It can only be hoped that bodies running the school (both local governments and other "owners" of the schools), independent of the Ministry, will in some places (if not everywhere) support an initiative for real quality assurance. Incentives, such as diplomas or quality badges, might also help teachers and schools take part in a "pilot" or "large -scale" programme of introducing quality assurance in Education for Democratic Citizenship.
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Quality Assurance in Education for Democratic Citizenship. Can this Strategy Work in Polish Schools?
Education for democratic citizenship (EDC) encompasses all educational practices aimed at preparing young people and adults for life in a democratic society and helping them become active, informed and responsible citizens. The changes that have taken place over the past 18 years in Poland have not bypassed the school evaluation system. The country has slowly passed from a system of "hard control" to one of "soft supervision," and its control functions have been strongly limited to make way for consultancy and support.Obviously it is now impossible to foresee the future of school evaluation – many educators agree that the 2006 law meant less bureaucracy, but some add that it might also mean more control and less school autonomy. Whether and when we will see new regulations in this field remains unclear now. It can only be hoped that bodies running the school (both local governments and other "owners" of the schools), independent of the Ministry, will in some places (if not everywhere) support an initiative for real quality assurance. Incentives, such as diplomas or quality badges, might also help teachers and schools take part in a "pilot" or "large -scale" programme of introducing quality assurance in Education for Democratic Citizenship.
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The Intricacies of the Military Higher Education System in Poland ; Drogi i bezdroża szkolnictwa wojskowego w Polsce
The article presents the history of the military higher education system, which is connected to the shaping of the Polish statehood as well as its present state. The structure of this type of education system was dependent on the e ectiveness of socio-economic, political and military activities of public authorities. However, it is only the November Uprising which is generally associated with the revolt of the o cers from the O cer Cadets School [Szkoła Podchorazych] in Warsaw. The changes which occur within the military education system on account of its adjustment to the requirements of the Act "Law on higher education" of 27 June 2005 are very positive. They accommodate military higher education institutions to the public system of higher education, they in uence the development and the quality of education in these institutions, they obliged them to implement the regulations arising from the National Quali cations Framework and to observe all the procedures arising from the legislations which are enacted in the domain of higher education by the competent public authorities.
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Health insurance reform in the United States: old lessons on a renewed debate
In 2009, following the election of Barack Obama to the Presidency of the United States, the American public entered into a fierce debate on how to reform its health care system. The intense debate on health care reform, however, is not a new phenomenon in American political life. Debate over health care has cycled its way into the American political discourse every twenty-years or so. History suggests that forceful opposition has prevailed against most major efforts to alter the health system in the United States. Yet, once again the Democratically-controlled Congress and Presidency in the United States aspire to break this cycle of history. With both houses in Congress passing a bill with significant reforms, it seems that this time may be different. While it is very likely some reforms will pass in 2010, no law has been signed yet56. In the end, only time will dictate the outcome of this round of health reform debates. Through a thorough literature review, this article provides the Polish reader a sense of health care reform efforts in the U.S. from the historical perspective and discusses the current proposed reforms. Particular attention is paid to the evolution of the American health insurance system, failed efforts of past health reform initiatives, their contrast with today's efforts, and current health and economic indicators that could lead to reform in 2010.
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Lithuanian-Belarusian sabotage against the Polish state between 1920 and 1923 ; Litewsko-białoruska działalność dywersyjna przeciwko państwu polskiemu w latach 1920–1923
After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities. ; After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities.
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Lithuanian-Belarusian sabotage against the Polish state between 1920 and 1923 ; Litewsko-białoruska działalność dywersyjna przeciwko państwu polskiemu w latach 1920–1923
After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities. ; After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities.
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Lithuanian-Belarusian sabotage against the Polish state between 1920 and 1923 ; Litewsko-białoruska działalność dywersyjna przeciwko państwu polskiemu w latach 1920–1923
After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities. ; After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities.
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THE SYSTEM OF CONTROL AND ENFORCEMENT OF STATE AID LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION – THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S POWERS AND ITS COOPERATION WITH THE MEMBER STATES' COURTS IN THE YEARS 2000-2010 ; SYSTEM KONTROLI I EGZEKWOWANIA PRAWA POMOCY PUBLICZNEJ W UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ – KOMPETENCJE KOMISJI EUROPEJSKIEJ I ...
In this article the author refers to issues relating to the system of control and enforcement of state aid law in the European Union in the years 2000-2010. It presented the architecture of the state aid control system in the light of new rules and procedures for its admissibility. The analysis concerned the European Commission's powers and the role of the Member States' courts in state aid policy-making. The article contains empirical data showing the direction of changes in the value and structure of state aid in the European Union. The study involved the practice issued by the European Commission decisions declaring state aid as incompatible with European competition law and these are the subject of the investigation procedure. In this context information is presented on the number of cases and the value of state aid to be recovered in the Member States, referring to the interventions undertaken in various sectors of the European Community. ; W artykule autor odnosi się do problematyki kontroli i egzekwowania prawa pomocy publicznej w Unii Europejskiej w latach 2000-2010. Przedstawiono system kontroli pomocy publicznej w świetle nowych reguł i procedur jej dopuszczalności. Zaprezentowano kompetencje Komisji Europejskiej i rolę sądów państw członkowskich w kształtowaniu polityki udzielania pomocy publicznej. Artykuł zawiera dane empiryczne przedstawiające kierunki zmian w wartości i strukturze udzielania pomocy publicznej w Unii Europejskiej. Analizie poddano praktykę wydawanych przez Komisję Europejską decyzji, uznających pomoc publiczną za niezgodną z europejskim prawem konkurencji oraz będących przedmiotem prowadzonego postępowania wyjaśniającego. W tym kontekście zaprezentowano informacje dotyczące liczby spraw i wartość pomocy publicznej podlegającej zwrotowi w poszczególnych państwach członkowskich oraz odnoszące się do interwencji podjętych w różnych sektorach gospodarki Wspólnoty.
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THE SYSTEM OF CONTROL AND ENFORCEMENT OF STATE AID LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION – THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S POWERS AND ITS COOPERATION WITH THE MEMBER STATES' COURTS IN THE YEARS 2000-2010 ; SYSTEM KONTROLI I EGZEKWOWANIA PRAWA POMOCY PUBLICZNEJ W UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ – KOMPETENCJE KOMISJI EUROPEJSKIEJ I ...
In this article the author refers to issues relating to the system of control and enforcement of state aid law in the European Union in the years 2000-2010. It presented the architecture of the state aid control system in the light of new rules and procedures for its admissibility. The analysis concerned the European Commission's powers and the role of the Member States' courts in state aid policy-making. The article contains empirical data showing the direction of changes in the value and structure of state aid in the European Union. The study involved the practice issued by the European Commission decisions declaring state aid as incompatible with European competition law and these are the subject of the investigation procedure. In this context information is presented on the number of cases and the value of state aid to be recovered in the Member States, referring to the interventions undertaken in various sectors of the European Community. ; W artykule autor odnosi się do problematyki kontroli i egzekwowania prawa pomocy publicznej w Unii Europejskiej w latach 2000-2010. Przedstawiono system kontroli pomocy publicznej w świetle nowych reguł i procedur jej dopuszczalności. Zaprezentowano kompetencje Komisji Europejskiej i rolę sądów państw członkowskich w kształtowaniu polityki udzielania pomocy publicznej. Artykuł zawiera dane empiryczne przedstawiające kierunki zmian w wartości i strukturze udzielania pomocy publicznej w Unii Europejskiej. Analizie poddano praktykę wydawanych przez Komisję Europejską decyzji, uznających pomoc publiczną za niezgodną z europejskim prawem konkurencji oraz będących przedmiotem prowadzonego postępowania wyjaśniającego. W tym kontekście zaprezentowano informacje dotyczące liczby spraw i wartość pomocy publicznej podlegającej zwrotowi w poszczególnych państwach członkowskich oraz odnoszące się do interwencji podjętych w różnych sektorach gospodarki Wspólnoty.
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