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The end of the Cold War showed the geostrategical transformation of the world. We could see how relations between great powers became more ethical. The main subject of the analysis is the ethical problems in realization of foreign policy. Nowadays ethical problems became more important when we see so many crises, wars, & attacks of terrorists in different places of all over the world. Especially after September 11,' 2001, international terrorism became the most threatening problem for all states. Thus, states of different geostrategy have to collaborate to reach international security. The article aims to discuss how to administrate international relations due to reach the consensus in more ethical-moral way between states with different geostrategy. The work consists of five parts, in which are discussed various aspects of ethical problems in realization of foreign policy. The analysis of different geostrategical models lets to envisage possibilities of the formation of more common global geostrategical model in the 21st century. Bargains between the greatest powers (G8) attest to the ethical reality of global policy. All states understand that security is a very important condition of reform & progress, which could be reached through the common efforts of all states. Adapted from the source document.

The aim of this article is to explore the bargaining process of the EU Financial Perspective 2007-2013 & to provide the conceptual explanation of the particular result of this bargaining. Although quite a number of drafts have been discussed among member states, three of them characterize the most important turns of the bargaining: Commission's Proposal, the Luxemburg's Compromise & the Decision of the European Council. Andrew Moravcsik's Liberal Intergovernmental Approach has been applied as the methodological tool for the analysis of the EU Financial Perspective 2007-2013. Moravcsik assumes that European bargaining is a two level game. A two level game is a metaphoric concept describing how the interaction between the domestic pressure groups & decision makers formulates national preferences & how political leaders on the European level represent those national preferences. On both levels pragmatic economic interests are the driving factors of different actors. It should be emphasized that states are the main players in EU arena, whereas supranational institutions play a supporting part. Five different groups or informal coalitions could be found in the recent bargaining for the Financial Perspective. The key interest of rich member states (UK, Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, & France) was to decrease EU spending -- to cut the contributions to the EU budget. Phasing out states (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece) as former major beneficiaries of EU structural policy strived to diminish financial losses in the new Financial Perspective. Poorer Central European countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic & Hungary) fought for the structural funds. Finally, the UK was alone against the rest of member states which called for the radical review of the British rebate. The comparative statistical & qualitative analysis of those proposals revealed two important trends in the bargaining. First, the EU spending was cut in every turn. Second, the funds for the rich member states were redistributed at the expense of the poorer member states. Certainly, such redistribution did not change the fact that the older member states remained the net contributors & the poor Central European countries gained more benefits compared to the previous Financial Perspective 2000-2006. Besides these two main tendencies the phasing out states succeed to increase the funds for their undeveloped regions & the final Decision of the European Council offered for the UK the most favorable mechanism counting the British rebate. The article reveals the weaknesses of the popular geopolitical interpretations which were proposed in order to explain the strong clashes between member states. The geopolitical & ideological discourse was aimed at neutralizing the domestic pressure. The economic logic to pay less & get more was the dominant thinking in the bargaining for the European financial pie. The asymmetrical interdependence which was the main source of bargaining power during the previous intergovernmental negotiations on Common Market is obsolete in explaining the modalities of redistributional policies. The effect of relative power was limited to the bargaining strategy, however it did not make a remarkable impact to the final agreement. On the contrary, the typical net recipient is a small & poor member state. The author has to come to the conclusion that the poor Central European countries states were forced to support the cuts of the budget & suffered a relative defeat in the bargaining, since they were the main beneficiaries of the common EU budget. It means that the poor Central European countries were the most interested to reach an agreement as soon as possible in order to avoid the risk of facing the EU financial turbulences. For this reason their bargaining power was very weak. Adapted from the source document.

The article unfolds diasporic discourse as an alternative to linear, progressive & territorial discourse of the nation-state. It is based on a qualitative research of Armenian community residing in Lithuania. After presenting different meanings of 'diaspora,' the article examines the context where deterritorialized Armenianness is practiced. The diasporic discourse is revealed analyzing how ethnic identifications & relations with homeland & host country change between two generations of diasporic community. Research unravels that second generation sees their relation to undiscovered homeland as more important than the relation to the host country & so expresses the need to consolidate ethnic identity & thus exceptionality. Meanwhile, the first generation makes more effort creating positive relations with host country but use ethnic principles for social reality construction. Adapted from the source document.

This article presents macro-level study of voting in Lithuania's local elections, with emphasis on changing electoral support for the incumbent parties. Presented statistical analysis of vote change in two periods between municipal elections (year 1997-2000 and 2002-2007) aims to explain the success (and failure) of dominant parties in national government and municipal councils (two separate cases). Article is mainly oriented into the search of economic voting, but hypotheses related to other, political-institutional factors are also tested. It is discovered that dynamics of unemployment change helps to explain vote change for the party that is dominant in the municipal council, but it is not important when state of economy is worsening. The dominant party in the national government is unanimously punished when unemployment is rising, but when the state of economy is improving, average vote change for such party is not outstanding. The dispersion of vote change in both cases (when dependent variable is vote change for the dominant party in the national government) is better explained by the political-institutional variables (firstly, turnout change). Adapted from the source document.

Straipsnyje aptariamas Lietuvos prisijungimas prie euro zonos, ivertinant pirmojo nesekmingo bandymo tai padaryti 2007 m. ir antrojo rezultatyvaus bandymo isivesti eura nuo 2015 m. priezastis ir politines ekonomijos aiskinimus. Siekiama atskleisti su dalyvavimu euro zonoje susijusius teisinius ir institucinius pokycius, pavyzdziui, nemazoritariniu instituciju stiprejima, analizuojamos pinigu politikos sasajos su biudzeto ir darbo rinkos reguliavimo politikos sritimis. Teigiama, jog, nors sparciam Lietuvos prisijungimui prie euro zonos tinkamas salygas sudare valiutu valdybos modelio ir fiksuoto valiutos kurso egzistavimas, del politinio sutarimo trukumo ir nesuderintu skirtingu, bet fiksuoto kurso salygomis funkciskai susijusiu viesosios politikos priemoniu, ypac artejant Seimo rinkimams, euro ivedimas buvo atidetas desimciai metu nuo istojimo i ES ir Lietuva si tiksla realizavo paskutine is triju Baltijos saliu. Pasakytina, kad del skirtingu pinigu politikos ir valiutos keitimo kursu rezimu Baltijos salyse ir Lenkijoje pirmosiose euro isivedimas tapo svarbiausiu isejimo is krizes zingsniu, o pastarojoje po 2009 m. stojimas i euro zona buvo atidetas neribotam laikui. Svarbiausias elito motyvas prisijungti prie euro zonos yra susijes su ekonomine nauda, kurios tikimasi isivedus eura, is maziau svarbiu motyvu paminetini 'vieta prie stalo', t. y. dalyvavimas priimant sprendimus euro zonoje, ir gilesne integracija kaip priemone apsisaugoti nuo isores gresmiu The article discusses Lithuania's accession into the euro zone, first, by presenting the political economy analysis of the first unsuccessful attempt to introduce euro in 2007 and then comparing it with the second, successful attempt to do that in 2015. It is argued that although the existence of a currency board reduced uncertainty linked to the fluctuating exchange rate regime and facilitated the participation in the Exchange rate mechanism II, due to the lack of political consensus in the country and misaligned monetary and budgetary and regulatory policies, in particular as Parliamentary elections approached, the actual accession into the euro zone was achieved only ten years after joining the EU and Lithuania was the last of the three Baltic States to accomplish that. According to the survey of political elites in Lithuania conducted for this project, the main motive for joining the euro zone is mostly linked to the perceived economic benefits, while the 'seat at the table', i.e., the possibility to participate in the decision-making of the euro zone and security benefits from being part of the core member states of the EU are less important. Adapted from the source document.

The article seeks to explore the conception of realism in the discipline of International Relations. First, the works of the founding figures of realism are examined to extract the core set of principles intrinsic to the classical tradition. In the light of these timeless principles a research is done about the changing (mis)conceptions of realism in IR after the Cold War. The findings reveal that the latest 'realist' theories tend to break away from the genuine realistic approach to international politics. The comparison of typical 'realistic' explanations of the US foreign policy after the Cold War uncovers significant theoretical and practical implications of the recent biased thinking in the name of 'realism'. Adapted from the source document.

This article deals with terrorism and guerrilla warfare as two different forms of insurgency. It is argued that terrorism and guerrilla warfare can and should be understood as two different strategies or different strategic approaches used by insurgent groups. Five criteria are used to distinguish terrorism from guerrilla warfare. These five criteria: targets, size of operational units, control of territory, area of operations, identification signs. The article states that distinction between terrorism and guerrilla warfare is not only possible, but needed. Adapted from the source document.

Negotiation for the next EU budget was one of the most important & complex issues for Lithuania & other EU member states during the first three years after the EU enlargement of 2004. During the negotiation Lithuania could rely on some experience acquired at the time of EU accession. However, the crucial difference between these two negotiations was that the acceding countries did not have voice (veto power) when discussing the terms of their future EU membership. This article describes the dynamics of the negotiation in 2004-2005 over the next EU budget & tries to address the paradox that, despite the microphone & a place at the negotiating table, negotiation for Lithuania (and most of other EU new member states) by & large ended according to the accession scenario. The article also discusses the likely directions of the EU budget review & options of its modification, as well as implications for Lithuania. Adapted from the source document.

Straipsnyje nagrinejamas politiniu partiju ideologijos veiksnio poveikis lankstisaugos strategijos igyvendinimui Lietuvos darbo rinkoje pirmaisiais seseriais salies narystes ES metais (2004-2010 m.). Pirmiausia, remiantis aprasomaja statistika ir antriniu saltiniu informacija, kiekybiskai ivertinama, kiek si europine iniciatyva buvo igyvendinta Lietuvos uzimtumo politikoje, t. y. koks buvo Europos Sajungos poveikio mastas Lietuvos uzimtumo politikai lankstisaugos pastangu ir proceso pakopose. Tuomet aptariamos salygos ir veiksniai, galeje nulemti pokyciu masta ir pati pobudi. Paskui, atsizvelgiant i tai, jog uzimtumo politikos koordinavimas ES yra grindziamas neprivalomojo pobudzio sprendimais, ir remiantis prielaida, kad tokiu atveju valdanciosios politines partijos tampa pagrindinemis veikejomis, galinciomis imtis tam tikru iniciatyvu ir priimti atitinkamus sprendimus, bus nagrinejamas ju ideologijos poveikis vadovaujantis lankstisauga priimamu sprendimu pobudziui. Tam atliekama kokybine ir kiekybine analizuojamu laikotarpiu Seime pateiktu iniciatyvu uzimtumo srityje (ir susijusiu su lankstisaugos aspektais) analize The object of this article is the implementation of the Flexicurity Strategy in the Lithuanian Labour market. The aim of this paper is to analyse the EU impact on Lithuania's national employment policy in the area of flexicurity and the role of political parties' ideology in this process. To achieve the goal, the concept of flexicurity and its evaluation model were introduced. Then, the Europeanization theoretical approach and the main factors influencing the EU impact on national policies were overviewed. Finally, a piece of the input-process-output model was used to quantify the implementation of Flexicurity Strategy in the Lithuanian labour market. Also, an analysis of legislative initiatives in the Parliament was conducted. It helped to evaluate whether the ideology of the ruling parties influenced the content of law initiatives (in the flexicurity area). Adapted from the source document.

This article is an attempt to overview the state of the theory of European integration and it's development perspectives. Distinct and divergent "broad" and "narrow" definitions of integration theory, as well as various understandings of it's meaning and purpose should be regarded as symptoms of it's disintegration and fragmentation. In the absence of the broader theoretical paradigm "mosaic" picture of integration unfolds and gains dominance, thus preventing the understanding of deep and long-term tendencies of the integration process. The reconstruction and renewal of the theoretical paradigm of European integration research through the reflective restoration of the equilibrium between theoretical "explanation" and "understanding" is the necessary prerequisite for the development and progress in this research. Adapted from the source document.

This paper suggests that "scenario building" offers methodology for understanding the forces which are crucial for ESDP development. Author analyzes such driving forces of ESDP as EU integration tendencies, threats & demands on crises management operations, defense potency & NATO transformation success, as well as the US attitude towards ESDP. After the driving forces are examined, four scenarios are constructed: creation of European security & defense union, integration of ESDP into the broader system of euroatlantic cooperation, ESDP as a project of "core" states, & ESDP as capabilities & operations of "coalition of willing." All this is done in order to find a scenario, which is most suitable for the small states of the EU. Almost all of them are participating in the activities of ESDP, however, their interests & arguments are different. At last three groups of small EU states may be recognized regarding the European security & role in international sphere. Their preferences mostly depend on the leaders in each scenario: pro-European eurocontinentalists support France & Germany & euroatlantists support those scenarios, where UK is leading. Traditionally "neutral" countries seek the realization of scenarios, which would enhance their structural power inside the EU. So, none of the approached scenarios is supported by the majority of the small EU states. For Lithuania most appropriate, of course, is the one, which withholds the US in Europe. No doubt, this is scenario of integration of ESDP into the broader system of euroatlantic cooperation. Adapted from the source document.

The aim of the article was to explore the Agreement on the Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 1999 (hereinafter referred to as an A-CFE) & its positive/negative implications for the NATO-Russian relations. The A-CFE, considered to be a cornerstone of the European security paving the way to a greater conventional stability on the continent, has not entered into force for political & geo-strategic reasons. Moreover, A-CFE aims at establishing a stable & balanced overall level of conventional armed forces between NATO & Russia in Europe, thus solving NATO enlargement & security dilemmas, the bone of contention between NATO & Russia. The main question the article dealt with was whether the A-CFE could stabilize NATO-Russian relations in the anarchical international system facing the dynamics of balance of power. The article focused on analyzing conventional arms control influence on NATO-Russian interaction; a heavy emphasis was placed on A-CFE functionality to solve security dilemma problems in light of NATO enlargement, hypothetical NATO-Russian conflict, & NATO-Russian level of conventional armed forces in Europe. What's more, a concrete case -- the Baltic States possible membership in A-CFE & its influence on NATO-Russian relations has been analyzed in the context of military power disparities & geo-strategic position of the Eastern Baltic sub-region. Having analyzed it accordingly, the following conclusion has been made: A-CFE Treaty of actual text would not properly stabilize NATO-Russian relations due to the reaction of national units to the on-going redistribution of military power & the dynamic of military balance. If not revised, A-CFE will amount to a "sunset Treaty" while remaining an instrument of political process. This assumption emerges from the following factors: 1. A-CFE has asymmetrically imposed the ceilings of conventional arms in favor of Russia, reducing U.S. Army quota in Europe & setting strict limits on keeping foreign military forces on a permanent basis; new NATO members are obliged not to increase the ceilings whereas Russia's limits rise to the Flanks. 2. Asymmetrical distribution of power imposed by A-CFE has decreased NATO operational capabilities to respond to Russian offensive/defensive attacks. NATO forces have been reduced in NATO-Russian border sub-regions, which might become a conflict zone. 3. The first wave of NATO enlargement was set in a frame of arms control thus solving the security dilemma of Russia, whereas the second wave diverted the distribution of power & required a new response from arms control. With the second wave including the Baltic States, NATO has significantly improved its geo-strategic positions as a result of the possibility of establishing an offensive front against Russia from the Baltic States in which conventional arms control does not apply. 4. The Baltic States' membership in the A-CFE has had implications for its own national security could be evaluated from perspectives of defensive & offensive realism. In the world of the offensive realism, the Baltic States should avoid entering the A-CFE with low ceilings, as Russia proposed, which would diminish Baltic States' national security. On the other hand, the Baltic States are supposed to evaluate a negative effect of the security dilemma, according to defensive realists. Large & flexible ceilings the Baltics may negatively affect Russian security & it could start increasing the weapons. The Baltic States would lose the arms race with Russia due to the lack of economic recourses. 5. The research suggests two ways to revise the A-CFE to solve the security dilemma of both Russia & the Baltic States: (1) to set ceilings for the whole Eastern Baltic sub-region (at the present time, Russia's commitments in Kaliningrad & Pskov are the political ones); (2) to add the whole Eastern Baltic sub-region to Central European stability zone using the formula national ceilings = territorial ceiling. 5 Lenteles. Adapted from the source document.

Straipsnio tikslas - nustatyti, kokia itaka demokratijos veikimo verti-nimui ir pasitikejimui parlamentu daro politiniai veiksniai - partines siste-mos fragmentacija, poliarizacija ir valdanciosios koalicijos dydis. Tyrime, apimanciame desimt Vidurio ir Rytu Europos saliu nuo 1991 iki 2011 m., ivertinamas ir dvieju ekonominiu veiksniu - ekonomikos augimo ir nedarbo lygio - poveikis politines paramos rodikliams. Stipriausias statistinis rysys nustatytas tarp nedarbo lygio ir pasitenkinimo demokratija: kuo daugiau ne-turinciuju darbo, tuo maziau teigiamai vertinanciuju demokratijos veikima. Taip pat paaiskejo, kad demokratijos veikimo vertinimui neigiamai atsiliepia mazas parlamentiniu partiju skaicius ir dideles valdanciosios koalicijos. Pasi-tikejimas parlamentu buvo mazesnis tais atvejais, kai ideologiniai skirtumai tarp parlamentiniu partiju buvo dideli, ir tuomet, kai ekonomika traukesi arba augo tik labai nedaug. Ketvirtoje straipsnio dalyje siekiama nustatyti, kodel dideles valdanciosios koalicijos veda prie mazesnio patenkintuju demokrati-ja procento. Cekijos ir Bulgarijos lyginamoji analize parode, kad didele val-dancioji koalicija apriboja parlamento politini vaidmeni, sudaro palankias salygas grieztai ir nepopuliariai ekonominei politikai vykdyti ir palieka di-dele rinkeju dali be priimtinu politiniu alternatyvu. Siu politinio gyvenimo reiskiniu visuma didina nepasitenkinima demokratijos veikimu The article examines the effect of parliamentary fragmentation, polarization and ruling coalition size on satisfaction with democracy and trust in parliament. Statistical analysis, encompassing 10 CEE countries from 1991 to 2011, is used to measure the impact of political factors, while the effect of economic growth and unemployment rate is also evaluated. The strongest finding suggests that there is a negative relation between unemployment rate and satisfaction with democracy. Furthermore, satisfaction with a political regime is undermined by a small number of parliamentary parties and large ruling coalitions. Trust in parliament tends to be lower when ideological differences among parliamentary parties are sizable, as well as at the times of economic recession or marginal growth. Fourth section of the article deals with the question of why large ruling coalitions lead to lower satisfaction with democracy. A comparative analysis of political realities in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria has shown that a large ruling coalition diminishes the political role of parliament, provides a strong ground for the implementation of a strict and unpopular economic policy and leads to the lack of viable political alternatives in the ranks of parliamentary opposition. The complex of these political phenomena contributes to the low satisfaction with democracy. Adapted from the source document.

The article deals with contemporary executive's rewards system in the Lithuanian public sector and its changes over time. This analysis includes high officials in civil service as well as heads of public service's providers and managers of state-owned enterprises. The analysis bases on the reward dimension of the Public Service Bargains (PSBs) model which reflects different approaches to tangible and intangible reward elements. This theoretical approach is used to test the hypotheses that there is a clear public sector bargain on the executive's rewards system, and this bargain was shaped by pre-planned reforms in the public sector. This article concludes that the Lithuanian public sector executive reward system can be regarded as egalitarian and was largely shaped by incremental policy decisions, changes in economic conditions, and court decisions but not by pre-planned reforms. Adapted from the source document.

In this article we analyze the background & extent of the Europeanness of political & economic elites in the EU member states. Europeanness is defined & operationalized along the lines of emotive, cognitive-evaluative, & projective dimensions. We propose five hypotheses about the inter-relationships of dimensions of elites' Europeanness & their ideologies, macro-contexts of life experiences, cultural & social capital as well as inter-elite cueing processes. In order to test the hypotheses we use the data of interviews of political & economic elites in 17 EU member states collected in the Intune (FP6) project. The largest support is found for the hypothesis concerning the relationship between elites' Europeanness & inter-elite cueing. Considerable support is also found for the hypothesized links between elites' Europeanness & their ideologies & cultural as well as social capital. Adapted from the source document.