Suchergebnisse

Preliminary Material /Laura C. Engel -- New State Formations in Education Policy /Laura C. Engel -- Globalization and State Formations /Laura C. Engel -- Constructing the New Spanish State /Laura C. Engel -- Decentralization in the Post-Franco Era /Laura C. Engel -- Global Pressures and EU Educational Priorities /Laura C. Engel -- Rescaling and the Politics of Decentralization /Laura C. Engel -- References /Laura C. Engel -- Index /Laura C. Engel.

First published in 1982, Education and Power remains an important volume for those committed to critical education. In this text Michael Apple first articulated his theory on educational institutions and the reproduction of and resistance to unequal power relations, and provided a thorough examination of the ways in which race-gender-class dynamics are embedded in, and reflected through, curricular issues. While many of the theories set forward in this book are now taken for granted by the left in education, they were nothing short of revolutionary when first proposed. In this newly reissued c

One of the key ways that state governments pursue better higher education performance is through performance funding. It ties state funding directly to specific indicators of institutional performance, such as rates of graduation and job placement. This study considers the ways that performance funding systems in states with long-lasting systems have changed over time and what political and social conditions explain the changes. We analyze the experiences of two states: Tennessee, which pioneered performance funding in 1979; and Florida, which launched it in 1994. Funding for Tennessee's system has steadily increased over the years, whereas Florida's funding history has been more volatile and now provides much fewer dollars than when it was at its peak. Both Tennessee and Florida have changed their performance indicators substantially. But Florida added nine and dropped two in 12 years, while Tennessee added only six and dropped four over 31 years. Moreover, in Tennessee, performance indicators are added at the end of a regular five-year review, whereas in Florida they have been added irregularly, with no tie to a cyclical process of program reappraisal. Overall, Tennessee's performance funding system has been considerably more stable than Florida's because its initial policy design delineated much more clearly how the system was to be governed and changed over time, and provided for regular and systematic evaluation. Moreover, Tennessee's state legislature has played a smaller role in the ongoing development of performance funding than Florida's. These differences in policy process carry important implications. A system where funding levels do not oscillate greatly and indicators change more gradually and systematically is more likely to allow institutions to plan effectively. Further, such a system will have a more secure base of consent from institutions if it comes under attack.

Performance funding in higher education ties state funding directly to institutional performance on specific indicators, such as rates of retention, graduation, and job placement. One of the great puzzles about performance funding is that it has been both popular and unstable. Between 1979 and 2007, 26 states enacted it, but 14 of those states later dropped it (though two recently reestablished it). To shed light on the causes of this unstable institutionalization of performance funding, we examined three states that have experienced different forms of program cessation—Illinois, Washington, and Florida. For our analysis of the factors leading these three states to abandon performance funding systems, we drew upon interviews and documentary analyses that we conducted in these states. Our interviews were with state and local higher education officials, legislators and staff, governors and their advisors, and business leaders. The documents we analyzed included state government legislation, policy declarations and reports, newspaper accounts, and analyses by other investigators. We inevitably found that factors unique to one or another state played a role in the demise of performance funding. Nonetheless, we also found several common features: A sharp drop in higher education funding (present in Florida and Illinois); A lack of support by higher education institutions for the continuation of performance funding (all three states); The loss of key supporters of performance funding (all three states); Weak support by the business community (Florida and Illinois); and The establishment of performance funding through a budget proviso rather than a statute (Illinois and Washington). The final section of this paper discusses the implications of these findings for advocates of performance funding.

Performance funding in higher education ties state funding directly to institutional performance on specific indicators, such as rates of retention, graduation, and job placement. One of the great puzzles about performance funding is that it has been both popular and unstable. Between 1979 and 2007, 26 states enacted it, but 14 of those states later dropped it (though two recently reestablished it). To shed light on the causes of this unstable institutionalization of performance funding, we examined three states that have experienced different forms of program cessation — Illinois, Washington, and Florida. For our analysis of the factors leading these three states to abandon performance funding systems, we drew upon interviews and documentary analyses that we conducted in these states. Our interviews were with state and local higher education officials, legislators and staff, governors and their advisors, and business leaders. The documents we analyzed included state government legislation, policy declarations and reports, newspaper accounts, and analyses by other investigators. We inevitably found that factors unique to one or another state played a role in the demise of performance funding. Nonetheless, we also found several common features: A sharp drop in higher education funding (present in Florida and Illinois); A lack of support by higher education institutions for the continuation of performance funding (all three states); The loss of key supporters of performance funding (all three states); Weak support by the business community (Florida and Illinois); and The establishment of performance funding through a budget proviso rather than a statute (Illinois and Washington). The final section of this paper discusses the implications of these findings for advocates of performance funding.

Performance funding is a method of funding public institutions based not on inputs, such as enrollments, but on outcomes, such as retention, degree completion, and job placement. The principal rationale for performance funding has been that performance funding will prod institutions to be more effective and efficient, particularly in a time of increasing demands on higher education and increasingly straitened state finances. Critics of performance funding have warned that it could potentially provide state officials with an excuse to cut back on the regular state funding of higher education and at the same time provide college officials with an incentive to raise their retention and graduation rates by becoming more selective in their admissions. This report examines in detail the origins of state performance funding in six states: Florida, Illinois, Missouri, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Washington. These states were chosen for analysis because they have considerably different state performance funding systems and histories as well as higher education governance arrangements, political systems, political cultures, and social characteristics—all of which enables the authors to look at the formation of state performance funding systems from a wide variety of angles. Interestingly, analysis reveals that there are striking similarities among these six states, particularly in terms of who were the main supporters and opponents, what beliefs animated them, and what political openings allowed policy entrepreneurs to put performance funding on the decision making agendas of state governments. This analysis yields some important lessons for policymakers, which are discussed at the conclusion of this paper.

Offering the first systematic, comparative examination of the origins of teachers' unions in two countries-France and the United States-Teaching Marianne and Uncle Sam shows how teachers' unions came into existence not because of the willful efforts of particular actors, but over the course of decades of conflict over the proper role of professional educators in public politics. Nicholas Toloudis traces teacher unionism back to the first efforts of governments to centralize public education. He carefully documents how centralization created new understandings of the role of teach.

AbstractIn this paper I show how modern democratic states are likely to be inimical to traditional liberal education. Drawing on theoretical considerations and recent history I show how any attempt to promote traditional educational values through state interventions, such as national curricula or state regulation, is bound to be illusory. The preservation of liberal education will best be served by the wholesale removal of education from the progressive state and its bureaucracies.

One of the key ways that state governments pursue better higher education performance is through performance funding. It ties state funding directly to specific indicators of institutional performance, such as rates of graduation and job placement. This report considers the ways that performance funding systems in states with long-lasting systems have changed over time and what political and social conditions explain the changes. We analyze the experiences of two states: Tennessee, which pioneered performance funding in 1979; and Florida, which launched it in 1994. Funding for Tennessee's system has steadily increased over the years, whereas Florida's funding history has been more volatile and now provides much fewer dollars than when it was at its peak. Both Tennessee and Florida have changed their performance indicators substantially. But Florida added nine and dropped two in 12 years, while Tennessee added only six and dropped four over 31 years. Moreover, in Tennessee, performance indicators are added at the end of a regular five-year review, whereas in Florida they have been added irregularly, with no tie to a cyclical process of program reappraisal. Overall, Tennessee's performance funding system has been considerably more stable than Florida's because its initial policy design delineated much more clearly how the system was to be governed and changed over time, and provided for regular and systematic evaluation. Moreover, Tennessee's state legislature has played a smaller role in the ongoing development of performance funding than Florida's. These differences in policy process carry important implications. A system where funding levels do not oscillate greatly and indicators change more gradually and systematically is more likely to allow institutions to plan effectively. Further, such a system will have a more secure base of consent from institutions if it comes under attack.